Vietnam’s purchase of Kilo-class submarines and military modernization

The largest submarine fleet in ASEAN belongs to the VPN with its six Kilo-class submarines. The Russian-made Kilo submarine has been proved to be notoriously difficult to detect, thereby earning the nickname "black hole" from the US Navy. It has a reputation for being able to stealthily approach aircraft carriers without being detected. The Kilo submarine is a diesel-electric powered submarine known as an "SSK" in the US Navy, which stands for "submarine" and "hunter-killer." [3]

Vietnam’s kilo-class submarine arsenal:

When surfaced, Vietnamese Kilo submarines have a displacement of 2,350 tons, which increases to 4,000 tons when submerged. They have a maximum diving depth of 300m, an operational depth of 250m, and a periscope diving depth of 17.5m. They can travel at speeds of 11 knots when surfaced and 20 knots when submerged. The range is 7,500 nautical miles when snorkeling at 7 knots and 400 nautical miles when submerged at 3 knots. The submarines can operate continuously for 45 days with a crew of 52, including 39 sailors and 13 officers. The VPN's Kilo submarines are a variant of another Project 636 submarine, otherwise known as the "Improved Kilo." [4].

According to military experts and analysts in the region, Vietnam's decision to equip its submarine fleet with land attack missiles is a clear indication of its determination to counter China's increasing military strength and assertiveness. Carl Thayer of the Australian Defence Force Academy is of the view that this move represents a significant shift beyond routine anti-ship tactics noting that Vietnam now possesses a much more potent deterrent that would complicate China's strategic calculations adding that he was surprised by the decision [5]. The selection of land attack weapons is more aggressive than the anti-shipping missiles that were previously expected to be acquired by Vietnam. While anti-shipping missiles would have targeted Chinese ships and submarines in the South China Sea, land attack weapons can precisely strike at a range of 300 kilometers, posing a potential threat to China's coastal cities in case of any conflict. This makes Vietnam the first Southeast Asian country to arm its submarine fleet with a land attack missile.

Vietnam’s military modernization:

Vietnam has shifted its military focus towards maritime security, which includes improving its air force, air defense, and submarine capabilities. This shift in focus is likely to create an increase in demand for naval combat equipment, aerial defense, intelligence systems, and surveillance and reconnaissance equipment, providing significant commercial opportunities for defense equipment suppliers and subcontractors. With improvements in the regulatory framework for exporting U.S. defense equipment and services to Vietnam, U.S. firms are now able to enter the market after being locked out for decades. These policy changes were announced during President Obama's visit to Vietnam in May 2016, where he lifted the arms embargo that had been in place for decades [6].

Vietnam's military modernization program traces its roots back to the 1979 Chinese invasion, which led to tens of thousands of casualties. The Vietnamese government realized the need to strengthen border security and modernize its military after the invasion. However, the cost of demobilization of its armed forces and the loss of Soviet military assistance resulted in a significant reduction of its defense budget, from $1.31 billion in 1987 to $431 million in 1994. It was not until 2001 that the Vietnamese government decided to invest in the defense industry and equip the military with modern technologies. From 2001 to 2005, Vietnam procured various weapons and equipment from Russia, including surface-to-air missile systems, anti-ship missiles, patrol craft, fighter/ground attack aircraft, and more. In 2006, Vietnam doubled its defense budget and continued to acquire additional equipment, such as coastal defense systems, submarines, torpedoes, and more. This expansion of Vietnam's maritime capabilities was aimed at protecting its sovereignty and maintaining control over its maritime areas, as part of a broader plan to develop its marine economy [7].

Despite continuing investment in small and medium assets such as assault rifles, radars, anti-air missile systems, main-battle tanks or training jets, the Vietnam People's Army (VPA) has experienced a slowdown in the procurement of larger and more significant systems for its air force and navy since the ousting of former Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in 2016. Although the VPA has commissioned a total of six major naval assets, including the Kilo-class submarines (two Kilo submarines were commissioned by 2017), two Gepard-class frigates in 2018, and two second-hand Pohang-class corvettes in 2019, the pace of Vietnam's military modernization has been insufficient to keep up with the increasingly complex external security environment. This is a legitimate cause for concern, as Vietnam has expressed its ambition to advance its navy and air force straight into modernity. The primary reason for this slow progress in modernization efforts is attributed to budget constraints, as former Minister of Defense Phung Quang Thanh emphasized in 2014 that the country's national budget was limited, and therefore funds had to be allocated to other critical areas of national development such as infrastructure, education, or healthcare [8].

Sino-Vietnamese relations:

The relationship between Vietnam and China is complex. Despite their shared ideology and government systems, disputes over maritime territories, security concerns, and geopolitical competition have caused tension. As China has become more assertive in its dealings with Vietnam, Hanoi has attempted to balance its relationship with China while asserting its own sovereignty by strengthening its diplomatic partnerships and capabilities. Vietnam's leaders will face important decisions in the coming years, which will reflect how China's neighbors are responding to its growing power.

The improvement in Sino-Vietnamese relations came with several conditions that Vietnam had to meet, including the enactment of a national security policy called the Three Nos [9]. This policy limits Vietnam's ability to form any military alliances, align with one country against another country, or host foreign military bases on its soil. This policy was framed to act as a reassurance to China that Vietnam did not pose a threat to China's periphery by limiting its ability.

China is seen as the most likely military threat to Vietnam, but a full-scale ground or amphibious attack is not considered plausible. If a military attack did occur, it would likely be aimed at a delivering significant damage and possibly gaining some strategic locations in the South China Sea [10]. This could be done through a blockade or invasion of some Vietnamese outposts in the South China Sea, a blockade of the main Vietnamese air and sea ports, or surgical strikes. In the event of a war, it would be a multi-domain operation using land, sea, air, space, and cyber forces. Therefore, Vietnam needs to make additional investments in its air defenses, artillery and missiles, unmanned vehicles, and cyber and electronic warfare rather than relying on a land-sea binary approach to defense.

Conclusion:

Vietnam shares its borders with powerful neighbors such as China to the north, Laos to the west, Cambodia to the south, and has a disputed sea to the east, which leaves it with little strategic depth or distance from the front line to its core. This means that Vietnam must rely on itself primarily for defense and may not have sufficient time to prepare for a significant invasion. However, even though Vietnam cannot rely on external assistance for continental defense, it can rely on external powers for maritime defense. While Vietnam prioritizes continental defense, it should not abandon its claims in the South China Sea. The maritime geography of Vietnam is open to all external powers, and it can use this to foster closer defense relationships with other great powers and internationalize the disputes in the South China Sea [11]. This move in the long run will prove to be less aggressive than fundamentally driving its military modernisation from a countering-China mindset.

Endnotes:

1.       Vietnam’s new-found submarine power and where it came from, V N Express International, 2017 https://e.vnexpress.net/interactive/2017/vietnams-new-found-submarine-power-and-where-it-came-from

2.      Vietnam receives sixth and final submarine from Russia, Naval Today, 20 January 2017 https://www.navaltoday.com/2017/01/20/vietnam-receives-sixth-and-final-submarine-from-russia/

3.      Vietnamese Navy Kilo submarines, Medium, 29 September 2018 https://medium.com/indo-pacific-geomill/vietnamese-navy-kilo-submarines-77ce5dc97b0b

4.     Vietnam’s new-found submarine power and where it came from, V N Express International, 2017 https://e.vnexpress.net/interactive/2017/vietnams-new-found-submarine-power-and-where-it-came-from

5.      Greg Torode, Vietnam buys submarine-launched land attack missiles to deter China, Reuters, 30 April 2015 https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-vietnam-military-idAFKBN0NL0B220150430

6.     Vietnam – Defense and Security Sector, Country Commercial Guides, International Trade Administration, 2022 https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/vietnam-defense-and-security-sector

7.      Bich T. Tran, Understanding Vietnam’s Military Modernization Efforts, The Diplomat, 2 November 2020 https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/understanding-vietnams-military-modernization-efforts/

8.     Nguyen The Phuong, Why is Vietnam’s Military Modernisation Slowing, ISEAS Perspective, 2021 https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-96-why-is-vietnams-military-modernisation-slowing-by-nguyen-the-phuong/

9.     Huong Le Thu, Rough Waters Ahead for Vietnam-China Relations, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 September 2020 https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/30/rough-waters-ahead-for-vietnam-china-relations-pub-82826

10.   Alexander L. Vuving, Is Vietnam Torn Between Land and Sea in Its Defense? The Diplomat, 06 January 2023 https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/is-vietnam-torn-between-land-and-sea-in-its-defense/

11.     Khang Vu, How Vietnam Can Balance Against China, on Land and at Sea, The Diplomat, 16 December 2022 https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/how-vietnam-can-balance-against-china-on-land-and-at-sea/

Pic Courtesy:Indian Navy

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views of CESCUBE.)