“NATO is not only the longest alliance in history, but NATO is the most successful alliance in history”- Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General

What can be characterised as NATO’s success in the 21^st century? Conclusively, NATO has been able to re-invigorate its relevancy within emerging dynamics of geopolitics. After the end of the USSR in 1991, NATO’s relevancy within a new global order was questioned. How will NATO survive in an age where the world has shifted from inter-state conflicts to intra-state conflicts? Did Francis Fukuyama’s declaration of the victory of liberalism also result in the decreasing importance of NATO?

In the light of the current Russia- Ukraine war, not only NATO has been able to show a united front against Russia, but it has been able to expand further in Eastern and Northern Europe. Despite the uncertainty around Ukraine’s admission into NATO, it was able to accept applications from Finland and Sweden with Finland becoming the 31^st member on 4^th April 2023 (NATO 2023). NATO, not only revitalized its importance but also attracted new members, signalling the continued importance of collective security in the status quo.

Sweden’s accession to NATO has presented a tricky situation for NATO as it has turned out to be an exhaustive process due to Erdogan’s objection on the same. Similar reservations were witnessed when Erdogan voiced his concern over Helsinki’s admission into NATO, stating that the country should lift the weapons embargo put on Turkey in 2019 over its military action against Kurdish groups in Syria and further demanding that Finland should publicly disavow the PKK and its affiliates (Henley 2022). It was only in July 2023 that Turkey decided to back Sweden’s 2022 application for admission into NATO and now awaits ratification from the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Andres 2023). Along with this, Viktor Orban’s government is yet to declare its stance on Sweden’s bid. Sweden’s accession to NATO has resulted in a 12-month political stalemate and diplomatic contestation between the West and Erdogan, who is backed by Viktor Orban.  

But why Sweden’s accession is proving to be difficult? What were the Turkish apprehensions towards Sweden’s accession, and are they resolved? How long is Viktor Orban expected to hold Sweden’s accession hostage? And what is the importance of Sweden’s accession to NATO? The purpose of this article is to critically evaluate the case of Swedish accession to NATO. The article will argue that Sweden’s accession case has been involved in a frivolous political gameplay in which Turkey was unable to utilize its hostage diplomacy against the West. The article will illustrate the argument by establishing the objections raised by Erdogan, understanding the outcome of the hostage diplomacy utilized and highlighting the consequences of these political manoeuvres for both the West and Turkey.

Problem with Sweden’s bill for accession:

Erdogan’s reservation against Sweden’s accession to NATO is based on two reasons. Firstly, the objection is centred around the issue of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Currently, Kurds comprise nearly 18% of Turkey’s population. Erdogan’s issues stem from the mere existence of PKK. Established in 1978, PKK has been responsible for multiple attempts of insurgency against the Turkish government, to gain further cultural and political rights (Action 2023). The overarching agenda for PKK is to seek an independent Kurdish state. PKK has showcased its discontent against Erdogan, with the instances of the June 2013 Gezi Protests, while serving as Prime Minister and the July 2016 coup attempt (Abadi 2019). Since the coup, tensions between both sides have reached the grounds of hostility between both parties. Even PKK along with the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and the People’s Protection Unit (YPG), have been regularly agitating his regime, responsible for conducting multiple attacks in southeast Turkey (Action 2023). Both Turkey and the United States of America consider PKK to be a terrorist organization, with Erdogan arguing that Kurdish control of any area close to its border is a major national security issue.

Erdogan has stated that the problem arises because Sweden allows open demonstrations and activities of PKK within its territories (Kirby 2023). This is a major national concern for Ankara. Erdogan justifies this because NATO also focuses on curbing terrorist activities (Levin 2023), Erdogan is not convinced that Sweden allowing a terrorist group to actively operate in the country would fulfil the agenda of NATO’s functioning. Turkey’s concern regarding the PKK has been consistently vocal to the point where Jens Stoltenberg stated that NATO recognises the threat of PKK (NATO 2023). Even Erdogan agreed that Finland’s bid to become a NATO member was that he believed Helsinki had done enough to address the issue of rising PKK threat within its territories.

Stockholm fully recognises Ankara’s concern. In June 2022, Turkey and Sweden signed the Trilateral Memorandum in June 2022 (Ministry of Foreign Relations 2023). The memorandum laid out three conditions under which Erdogan would accept Sweden’s accession to NATO, the main emphasis being curbing the activities of the PKK. Following this memorandum, the Swedish government has accepted that there remains considerable scope for improving the working of its anti-terror laws and was also responsible for extraditing some Kurds to Turkish courts in August of 2022 (Reuters 2022). But this issue hasn’t been resolved completely. Even though Sweden has done considerable work to satisfy Erdogan’s demands, the Turkish parliament has again started to raise the PKK question stating that Sweden is yet to showcase considerable development on the same.

Secondly, Turkey is utilizing its leverage to get within the EU (European Union) and complete the sale of F-16 fighter jets from the USA. Turkey’s bid to get into the EU has been going on since 1987 but since 2016 the talks have stalled. US Congress is also concerned that the selling of F-16s to Turkey can fundamentally cause a security issue for Washington in the future. The reason is because of Erdogan’s strategy of trying to balance the relations between the USA and Russia while simultaneously its bid to become a regional power. Erdogan was responsible for brokering a deal with Russia to buy the S-400s, a missile defence system. Initially, Turkey’s bid was to buy the F-35s from the USA, but the USA rejected it because the information could be handed to Russia, upgrading S-400s and the process being counter-intuitive for US’s security interests (Ciddi 2023) (Mehta 2019). Though the sale of F-35s was restricted, Erdogan was hopeful that it could acquire further F-16 fighter jets. But the deal hasn’t been set in stone. Since NATO’s accession requires unanimity, it allows Turkey to leverage its position for political gains. Post the backing of Sweden’s bid for NATO accession by Erdogan, President Biden promised Turkey that it would try to influence its congressional committees to agree on the sale. But still, the final decision rests upon the congressional committees of the USA, in this case with the Foreign Relations Committee (Zengerle 2023).

But if most Erdogan’s conditions haven’t been fulfilled by either Sweden or the USA, why did he agree to back Stockholm’s accession to NATO? What was Turkey hoping to achieve from “hostage diplomacy”?

Consequences of Hostage Diplomacy:

Consensus is an important factor, both procedurally and symbolically, for NATO. The alliance’s major attraction is collective security, embedded within Article 5[i]. Collective security makes the idea of unity sensitive. What it implies is that collectivisation within member states of NATO needs to be absolute and cannot afford any political or ideological tensions. This sensitivity might be a difficulty for NATO but it’s the same principle which has allowed NATO to display a strong and united front since the Cold War.  And because the question involves elements of security, member states cannot afford to have ideological cleavages as it can compromise the security of the alliance. Even though Erdogan’s objections tend to have a strong political intent, in and of itself they directly affect the functioning of NATO.

Turkey, and to some extent Hungary, have kept the idea of consensus as hostage. Orban’s hostage diplomacy is not quite as strong as Erdogan’s. Being a NATO and EU member, Orban’s illiberal activities make sense if they get validation from other illiberal actors. Even though Viktor Orban consistently portrays an anti-EU narrative, his government hasn’t invoked Article 50[ii] of TEU yet. Fundamentally, Viktor Orban doesn’t put forth a strong independent stance against Sweden’s bid to enter NATO. He rationalizes by stating that Sweden was one of the countries that supported the EU report stating Hungary as a “hybrid regime with parliamentary autocracy”, emphasising that Stockholm has been responsible for a false projection of Hungary’s democratic status (Braw 2023). This apprehension is more of a spillover from EU politics into NATO politics. As compared to Turkey, Orban hasn’t stated any reason that explicitly refers to any Swedish activities regarding NATO. Political entanglement of two different political spectrums is Orban’s modus operandi for his “strong man card”. With Erdogan backing the bill for accession, Hungary can be expected to follow up with a similar position as Budapest has previously stated that it doesn’t want to be the last country to ratify Sweden into the alliance (Rolander 2023).

But was Turkey’s hostage diplomacy justified? It would be naïve to not recognise Erdogan’s strong opportunity to leverage its position against the West to put forth its political interests. Erdogan’s politics utilizes the strongman cards (Yilmaz 2021) for Ankara’s interests. But where is this leverage? Turkey’s leverage tends to be visible with its positioning between the USA and Russia. When Russia invaded Ukraine, Turkey continued to maintain contact with Russia and tried to function as a mediator, evidenced by Turkey not implementing sanctions against Putin and keeping the air corridor open (Cagaptay 2023). In this predicament, Erdogan presents himself as important for Russia’s future war prospects. And as Turkey was important for NATO to increase its geopolitical security, Erdogan utilized its position to halt the accession bill for 12 months.

Why then did Turkey change its stance on Russia? Erdogan has started leaning towards the West, which can be interpreted from two angles. Firstly, as the war goes on, Putin’s grasp on Russia is becoming weak, as witnessed when the Wagner mutiny posed a genuine threat to Putin’s power. A weakened Russia allows Erdogan to function in its independent foreign policy, with the balance of power tilting towards Turkey. Secondly, Erdogan is dealing with a worsening economy. From a realist paradigm, he cannot afford to be isolated from the West leading to economic collapse. Turkey’s approval of Sweden’s accession, tilt to the West can be seen as a necessity for Erdogan’s position. This tilt has been further visible as Turkey released 5 Ukrainian prisoners to Kyiv (Reuters 2023), unilaterally agreeing upon the Grain Deal (Reuters 2023) (even if Russia doesn’t agree on the same) and openly declaring that Ankara stands and supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity. What was the point of the Turkish hostage diplomacy if ultimately Erdogan sided with the West?

Possibly, Turkey has created further complications with the West. With the pressure of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Sweden and NATO cooperated with Turkey to the extent that Stockholm agreed to change its anti-terror laws. It’s important to understand that Erdogan's approval is not a breakthrough. It’s a procedural requirement, acting as a bare minimum of what is expected from each NATO member. On these grounds, it is Erdogan who is in the wrong by creating further bureaucratic restrictions. Erdogan tactics, which certainly inspired Orban as well, posed existential questions regarding the expansion of NATO further into the Nordic region. Sensitive issues like terrorism, Erdogan’s concern, could have been voiced out in a myriad of ways which didn’t necessarily involve using Sweden’s bid as a hostage. The actual repercussions could only be expected after the end of the Russia-Ukraine war. Currently, NATO is focused on projecting a unified strength against Putin. But after the war, the West decided to react against Erdogan’s tactics as he conceded his leverage by backing Sweden’s bid for NATO membership. One counter-argument can be brought forth that the decision remains uncertain with the Turkish parliament having the possibility to further stall the process. But the situation has transformed as his actions have signalled a breakaway from Moscow. Consequentially, opting for a Western alliance and leaving aside the balancing of relations.

Sweden’s accession will present a positive development for NATO as it can fill its Nordic gap. Before Finland and Sweden, Denmark and Norway have been members since 1949. Now, there’s a possibility that all four nations will have the ability to influence the geopolitical landscape of NATO and Russia’s deployment. Sweden’s accession grants an advantage to NATO’s possible strategic deployment. Sweden is one of the dominant maritime powers in the Baltic Sea due to the position of its Gotland Island (Lucas 2023). The island serves as an ideal position for the deployment of military bases and NATO’s forward deployment against Russia. The position of Gotland Island allowed it to block Russian naval bases from Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg (Wieslander and Adamson 2023). And because Sweden acts as a linchpin from Norway’s West to Finland’s East, NATO can overfly from Sweden to rapidly deploy forces in the Eastern Baltic (Lucas 2023). Therefore, Sweden’s accession to NATO allows it to strengthen the transatlantic security. Aside from its geopolitical positioning, Sweden has prior experience with NATO’s security forces with Swedish forces being deployed in NATO’s mission in Afghanistan.

Conclusion:

Turkey’s hostage diplomacy had a strong reason behind its implementation. Erdogan sought to gain more leverage over the politics of alliances, specifically with EU and NATO but in the end, it didn’t turn out to be a complete success. But Turkey was able to showcase the importance that it holds in the current geopolitical landscape of international relations and its policy of balancing relations between both countries paid off in trying to mitigate the situation as per its interests. If not for the increasing pressures from his national politics, a case could have been made that Erdogan would have extended this hostage for a longer period. And Sweden’s bid for accession was the innocent bystander in this process. The problem with these political contestations is that they can erode the fabric of trust within international politics, which already exists in rarity. Even though the efforts proved to be unsuccessful, for the West and other actors like the EU, it provided an example of not allowing a single power to retain a considerable amount of leverage, especially in situations of ongoing war and conflicts. For as much as liberal institutionalism tries to factor in cooperation via the means of alliances, institutions or supranational institutions, situations like these tend to prove the realist assumptions swiftly. It’s far easier to erode trust and cooperation in international relations than to maintain it between countries. 

Sweden’s accession to NATO brought forth a diplomatic contestation with Erdogan’s administration with multiple factors affecting the future of NATO’s expansion into Northern Europe. But with Finland being the 31^st ally and Sweden’s accession process moving forward, NATO has successfully emerged as the main guarantor of European Security. The events that have unfolded and the pact with which NATO has been able to come for Ukraine’s support, certainly solidify for now that NATO is crucial for the relevance of international security. And with the expansion moving forward, NATO hopes to limit Putin’s military advancements further into Europe. Now the international community awaits to see whether Ukraine will be admitted into the alliance or not.

Bibliography

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End Notes

[i] Article 5-  The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. (Link- https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm )

[ii] The rules for exiting the EU are set out in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. (Link- https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/withdrawal-from-the-european-union.html )

Pic Courtsey-Eugene Z at unsplash.com

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)