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Weapons February 27, 2022 2,176 views

Chinese Incursions into Taiwan's Air Defence Zone

A
By Apoorva Jain
Author • Centre for Security & Strategic Studies
Chinese Incursions into Taiwan's Air Defence Zone
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS

In the past few months, the frequency of Chinese warplanes entering the island’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) has increased dramatically, fuelling speculations about a major confrontation. The month of February alone has seen 43 incursions so far while January saw China's largest intrusion with over 39 planes entering Taiwan’s ADIZ including 24 J-16 fighter planes, 10 J-10 fighter jets, two Y-9 transport aircraft, two Y-8 anti-submarine warning aircraft, and one nuclear-capable H-6 bomber was involved in the latest incursion, according to the statement released by Taiwan's Ministry of Defence. 

The Year of Invasions

2021 saw a multitude of invasions by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) into Taiwan’s ADIZ. The month of October saw nearly 150 planes dispatched over four days, shattering previous records as October 4 saw the single largest sortie conducted to date (52), as well as the largest one-day sortie record (56) when the second, night-time incursion happened.

Analysts suggest that the purpose of this exercise was an interoperability test and evaluation of electronic interference [1]. Moreover, October 1 was China’s National Day, so the large scale incursions could be a show of force to display the nationalistic tendencies and reverberate the ‘One-China’ policy. Incidentally, October 10 also marked the 110th anniversary of the Republic of China (the official name of Taiwan) as Beijing stepped up the incursions to warn President Tsai Ing-wen not to use the occasion to do something provocative.

It's been observed that the biggest incursions by the PLAAF came after international support and drills by the West. Last year, at the G7 summit held in England, the seven like-minded countries showed unprecedented support to Taiwan by directly attacking China over its assertive behaviour. Similarly, the NATO summit also stressed the threat perception of China and how the state “presents systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to alliance security”. Taiwan responded by asserting that the county will “contribute the greatest force for good for peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region,” [2].

Post the G7 and NATO support, on June 15, in one of the biggest incursions, 28 Chinese PLA Air Force planes, including nuclear-capable bombers, intruded into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ). Similarly, after October’s biggest incursion, Beijing directly blamed Washington for “being provocative and harming regional peace, with its arms sales to Taiwan and warships sailing regularly through the Taiwan Strait”. "Engaging in Taiwan independence is a dead end. China will take all steps needed and firmly smash any Taiwan independence plots," China's Foreign Ministry stated in a statement [3].

This year, on 24th Jan 2022, after two U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Groups, led by their flagships USS Carl Vinson and USS Abraham Lincoln began operations in the South China Sea as part of an exercise with Japan's navy in the Philippine Sea, an area that includes waters to the east of Taiwan, the island reported its largest mass incursion by China's air force. 39 aircraft flew past an area close to the Taiwan-controlled Pratas Islands in the northern reaches of the South China Sea [4]. Calling it “collusion”, China’s spokesman for Taiwan affairs Ma Xiaoguang defended the military drills. This strategy has been a part of ‘gray zone warfare’. The US Special Operations Command defines the ‘gray zone’ as “competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality”.

Taiwan’s Response

Post every incursion, the Taiwanese Ministry of Defence releases a response plan which involves scrambling fighter jets to chase away the Chinese jets, radio warnings to PLA pilots and deploying missile defense systems to keep an eye on their activity [5]. “With the very high frequency of Communist planes entering our ADIZ, pilots from our wing are very experienced and have dealt with almost all types of their aircraft,” Major Yen Hsiang-sheng of Republic of China Air Force (Taiwanese Air Force) recalled in an interview.

Over the past year, Taipei has modernised its military and acquired state-of-the-art equipment to bolster its defence against Chinese aggression. For instance, China has been consistently using the J-16 which is a multi-role fighter jet introduced in 2004. The aircraft is equipped with a modified AESA radar and is capable of conducting both air-to-air as well as air-to-ground combat missions. To counter the J-16s, Taiwan recently held war simulation drills with its newly inducted F-16 Vipers which successfully intercepted the Chinese fighter jets during the three-day exercise. Tawan’s F-16V ‘Viper’ variant was inducted in November 2021, after a $3.96 billion deal with Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC) to upgrade the older F-16A/B jets to the Viper variant. One of the most sophisticated versions of the Fighting Falcon multirole fighter jet, Viper has a powerful radar that can detect up to 20 targets at once, boasts advanced electronic warfare systems, precise GPS navigation, and the ability to automatically avoid collisions. With enhanced weapons, Viper can dock into a range of missiles including AGM-84 Harpoon, AGM-88 HARM, AGM-154 JSOW, and SLAM-ER missiles.

Apart from the F-16s, the island-nation has signed multiple defence deals with the west, especially the US which has been insisting that Taiwan strengthen its military system and employ a ‘porcupine strategy’ to increase deterrence so that it can defend itself. In 2021, two arms procurement contracts were signed with the United States for “a long-range precision fire system” and another “a batch of missiles,” which analysts speculate to be Harpoon missiles that can fit into the 200 new and upgraded F-16 Vs. The 2022 budget indicates that the county might procure armed Sea Guardian drones along with an upgrade of its Thunderbolt-2000 multiple rocket system (MLRS) that can strike targets within a range of 100 kilometres [6].

As the incursions continue, the relationship between Taiwan and China remains on the brink of a confrontation. With a geopolitical shift towards Indo-Pacific, it is likely that China will continue to its ‘show of muscle’ to intimidate Taiwan and indirectly warn the US and its allies to stay clear of the historic Asian rivalry.

References:

[1]https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/explaining-the-plas-record-setting-air-incursions-into-taiwans-adiz/

[2]https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-says-will-be-force-good-after-unprecedented-g7-support-2021-06-14/

[3]https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-reports-surge-chinese-aircraft-defence-zone-2021-10-04/

[4]https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/two-us-carriers-enter-schina-sea-counter-malign-influence-2022-01-24/

[5] Taiwan’s Ministry of Defence official Twitter handle: https://twitter.com/MoNDefense?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor

[6]https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4226510

Pic Courtesy-Lin Jhih Han at unsplash.com

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)

Apoorva Jain
About Apoorva Jain →

Apoorva Jain is a graduate in political science from Delhi University. Her interest in politics, governance and international relations led her to pursue a master's degree in Politics and International Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University. Her research interests include Diplomacy, Indian Foreign Policy and Indo-Pacific Affairs. She is presently research intern with CESCUBE.

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