Once one of the world’s few remaining free-flowing rivers, the Mekong makes its way through six different countries. Flowing from China to Vietnam, it is not only seen as a river but rather as the lifeline of mainland Southeast Asia. The river can be divided into two parts, the upper Mekong basin, originating in Tibet and the lower Mekong, coursing through Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam. Today, nearly 60 million people along the lower Mekong are dependent on the river as a source of fishing, agriculture and trade. However, over the past few decades, the river has slowly lost its life and in many places, the Mighty Mekong has been reduced to a trickle. The cause of these drastic changes has been the increasing number of dams along the river, the most harmful of which have been those built upstream by China. The increasing number of hydro power projects along the Mekong has meant that it is now the fastest-growing river basin in the world in terms of hydro power, but at what cost?
The effects of the hydropower dams built by China on the upper Mekong has long been debated, however, new findings have shown the actual damage caused by them. A US government-funded study by Eyes on Earth, a research company, found that while an extreme drought persisted for most of last year in the lower basin, China’s section of the river was wetter than usual. This section is where a majority of China’s massive dams lie and the study showed that due to these dams, the upper reaches of the basin received above-normal amounts of water in stark contrasts with the drought-stricken lower regions. The drought last year saw the lower Mekong at its lowest levels in more than 50 years, with the river receding to expose sandbanks and riverbeds in places. These dams have altered year-round flows, leading to excessive water levels in the dry season and decreased flows in the wet season. Thousands living alongside the river will thus be unable to use exposed riverbanks for seasonal agriculture during the dry season, and the decreased flows in the wet season would result in reduced nutrients being deposited on the floodplains. This would inevitably lead to the flood plains shrinking drastically.
Not only have the dams served as a barrier to the flows of the once Mighty Mekong, but also blocked fish migration channels. The inland fisheries of the Mekong basin are considered one of the largest in the world and as of 2017, they contributed to more than 3% of the GDP of each country in the region. It is believed that 20% of the world’s freshwater fish catch is dependent on the flows of the Mekong, but with these flows being drastically altered, so also has the quantity of fish. Along the Thai-Lao border last year, the mainstream river almost ran dry, exposing river beds and isolating fish trying to reach spawning grounds. This drying of the river is a serious cause for concern, as 50 per cent of the fish species found in the lower Mekong are migratory. During the same period, the water levels in the region were depleted to the extent that even irrigation pumps could not reach it and the government in Thailand had to mobilise its army in conducting relief efforts.
The repercussions of the building of dams are therefore now being felt by all those countries along the Lower Mekong. More than any other country Cambodia is nourished by the Mekong, where the country’s population gets about 80% of their protein intake from the river’s ecological system. The Cambodians rely on Tonle Sap Lake which typically fills in the monsoon by the Mekong’s rushing waters. However, as of the previous year, it produced merely a fraction of the normal 500 thousand tons of food. In Vietnam, officials fear that up to a million people in the country’s rice bowl, the Mekong Delta will have to move due to the lack of resources, drought and salt intrusions. Thailand and Vietnam, the world’s most productive rice growers, depend heavily on the Mekong’s rich nutrient deposits. Today, with the altered water flows, due to the dams upstream, questions of food security and sustainability loom large.
Not only are these dams now being seen as a resource barrier but also as a strategic tool for China. Since China began building these dams in the 1990s, many have been worried that it could either use these as diplomatic leverage or “turn the tap off†for the countries downriver. Many see China’s attempt to control the waters of the Mekong as a bid to establish itself as a regional hegemon. It has expanded its control of the river by building massive hydroelectric dams, and also creating and financing a new governing body that rivals the western-supported Mekong River Commission. While the Chinese Foreign Minister called on a “community of shared future†during meetings with the other states, the power that China seeks to hold is now becoming clearer. China is pushing for what they call “navigation channel improvementâ€, which is essentially dynamiting rocks and islands in the Mekong so that its bigger ships can journey from Yunnan to the South China Sea.
The problem with these projects is that there is no substantial opposition in stopping them. While there have been environmental protests and movements in countries like Thailand, the government is largely ignorant of public opinion. The government of Thailand which is largely controlled by the military has long since distanced itself from Washington and angled closer to Beijing. It has thus been highly receptive of Chinese economic and infrastructural projects, not caring much about the population. Such dynamics have largely shaped the response that most countries along the Mekong have towards China and projects have continued. In much the same way, the government in Laos as well has shown great support towards Chinese projects, even borrowing heavily from China for its own.
This may be the case as of today, however, the countries along the Mekong will see serious repercussions of these hydropower projects in the near future. For many years it was still pure speculation that China had the power to control the water flows of the Mekong. This is because China does not release detailed records of the water levels in its new reservoirs. However, with studies like those released by Eyes on Earth, it has become increasingly clear that China has both the capacity and power to stop river flows towards the lower riparian countries. Nonetheless, the Chinese government holds that even its own Yunnan province saw serious drought last year with reservoir volumes falling to historically low levels. However, the government in China is known for shrouding its actions in secrecy and official statements are more often than not proved false.
And while this is true, all the blame for ecological and economic devastation cannot be put on China. Today, some of the lower riparian countries, including Laos, Cambodia and Thailand are building their own hydroelectric dams. Eleven new dams have been proposed along the lower mainstream Mekong, while at least 300 more have been proposed on its smaller tributaries. The plans for these developmental projects surfaced in the early 2000s, wherein the Mekong River Commission predicted that Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, its four members, would gain nearly $30 billion in benefits. However, years later the commission produced a very different and astonishing forecast. Instead of the early prediction of billions in benefits, it predicted that the economies of the Lower Mekong countries would suffer a loss of $7 billion if the proposed projects proceed.
Seemingly, one of the most motivated of the five countries downriver in building hydropower projects in Laos. The government of Laos has already signed off on more than 140 dams for the Mekong and its tributaries. It’s dream is to become the “battery of Asiaâ€. However, herein lies the main problem for the country. Though the dams are to produce massive amounts of energy, many are now sceptical whether the region will be able to consume the energy produced. While the country’s seven million people will never require so much power, it is unlikely that it will be able to sell it as well. The government has been banking on Thailand for supply, however, the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand has been urged not to buy electricity from the dams in Laos. This could cause serious economic problems for Laos, as Thailand was supposed to purchase nearly 95% of all the energy produced by the Xayaburi dam. Without such an agreement, the dam is no longer economically viable and is, therefore, a huge cause for concern.
There is another major fault line in the increasing number of hydropower projects along the Mekong. Laos’ Saddle Dam D collapsed in July 2018 and Myanmar’s Swat creek dam followed the same path in 2018, claiming hundreds of lives and leaving thousands homeless. This has led to concerns over the building of dams. Environmentalists and others, both within the countries and abroad, are now warning about the potential risks associated with such developmental approaches. Even international financial institutions like the World Bank which once propagated hydropower for the developing world has warned the countries in Southeast Asia about the consequences of building dams. Not only are these dams seen as potentially harmful to the populations living along the banks of the river but also hazardous to both economic and ecological sustainability.
And while many other hydropower projects have also had massive negative impact, they have proceeded. And the reason for this, once again, is China. Of the many dams in Laos whose infrastructural operators have been made public, about half are associated with Chinese companies. The government of Laos has already borrowed heavily from China for many other infrastructural projects, and dams along the Mekong could be a tipping point. With a failure to repay on its loans, the country could edge closer into what has been termed as China’s debt-trap diplomacy wherein it may be forced to handover certain infrastructural assets to China. Such speculations are yet to see any real substance though and it is unlikely that China will seek to have opinions turn against it in its own backyard. This would seem to be the reason for its initiation of a new multinational governing body aimed towards Mekong river cooperation. While the Chinese Media hailed it as a new age of cooperation, it is undoubtedly true that China will use it to leverage its own interests and expand its influence over the Mekong and those dependent on it.
The success of resolving issues?
Today, many foresee the Mekong water disputes spiralling out of control, into one resembling the South China Sea dispute. However, it has to be understood that the issues along the Mekong are far more complex and diverse. For those along the river, sovereignty over the waterway is not of dispute, and problems in-fact revolve around common ownership. Such issues related to shared resource security have proven to be a challenge, especially in the Mekong region, as there are multiple states reliant on a single source. The biggest of these challenges stem from a very fundamental problem. China, being the most upstream nation, holds power over a resource which 60 million others are dependent on. And even though Southeast Asian states along the Mekong have tried to facilitate cooperation among themselves, their efforts have been undermined by China’s lack of cooperation.
In 1995, after a series of confrontations between the lower riparian states, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) was created by Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. The establishment of this commission led to several programmes such as the Water Utilization Programme which sought to reduce confrontations over excessive usage of the river. However, such initiatives emerged later. Most of the commission activities in the early years were criticised for failing to undertake a regional-scale project or focus. Initial efforts at cooperation were largely aimed at project development, and it took years for the commission to bring about an emphasis on better management and preservation of existing resources. The reorganization and reorientation of the Mekong River Commission in 2001 towards an emphasis on the livelihoods of the people in the region was a result of increased criticism. However, while the MRC was designed as a forum for collective agreement on the use of the river, it has in more instances than others failed. The absence of binding authority and cooperation by China, who lies at the source of the river, has left the Commission floundering.
The fact that the MRCs operations also lack transparency, has meant that the credibility of the Commission has been greatly compromised. Due to problems in its organisational structure, the Commission has, at many points in time, represented the interests of state authority and ignored other stakeholders interested in the protection of Mekong ecosystems. A major flaw in the system has been the Prior Consultation and Agreement process, which effectively requires states, and not the MRC, to review and accept proposed projects. This means that the process allows any member of the Commission to approve its own proposed hydropower dam projects without any repercussions. In addition to this, the MRC lacks a framework through which it can assess the trans boundary environmental impacts of proposed projects. The building of the Xayaburi dam in Laos is a clear indication of the fact that high-risk hydropower projects have been completed, even though there are significant ecological concerns. Such problems do not bode well with international financiers, and the foreign development funding for the 2016-2020 period saw a sharp decline from USD 115 million to USD 53 million.
While the Mekong River Commission has thus been viewed as weak and ineffective, it is also to be understood that the commission has been unable to do much with climate change and increased Chinese engagement in the Lower Mekong Basin. The MRC does not have a mechanism in countering private or Chinese funded dams, and an increasing number of projects will be highly detrimental to the Mekong ecological region. In 2010, the Commission recommended that Laos postpone or terminate all dam-building activities, however, the government in Laos rejected the proposal. It is believed that this rejection occurred only due to increased pressures from Beijing. And while the Commission has struggled through such problems over the years, China’s new Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) was launched in 2015, undermining any further efforts through the MRC. This has shown to be better funded and better coordinated with China pledging more than USD 1 billion in preferential loans for foreign aid between 2019 and 2020 alone.
While unilaterally building dams along the upper Mekong, China had for years refused to join the Mekong River Commission. Today, it has created a new avenue in increasing its influence in Southeast Asia through the LMC. Chinese Minister of Water Resources E Jingping stated that the new cooperation would not substitute but rather only coordinate with other sub-regional mechanisms. However, knowing how Chinese investments and projects along its already massive BRI have played out, the LMC is likely to supersede the MRC in all aspects. And while it is not yet clear what this new organization for transboundary river governance will seek to achieve, it is more likely than not to follow the path of other multilateral bodies created by China. Organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank have already shown how China has sought to establish rules and initiate actions which it was unable to do in other Western-dominated multilateral institutions. This would most likely also stand true for the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, which distances itself and the members of Southeast Asia from the Western-supported Mekong River Commission.
With the Mekong being one of the biggest fisheries on the planet and fertilizing one of the world’s richest agricultural areas, millions over the years have become dependent on the river for a living. It has thus become clear that fears of what China could do may in-fact be coming true. While China has already exerted massive influence through its Belt and Road Initiative, it’s so-called hydro-diplomacy or rather hydro-arm-twisting could only result in a growth in China’s influence. It is not far from the truth, to say that those who control the waters of the Mighty Mekong control much of the economy, and people of Southeast Asia.
Pic Courtsey-Tomas Malik at unsplash.com
(Zeus Hans Mendez was Research Intern with CS3. The views expressed are personal)