Understanding Chinese Communist Party's(CCP) Psychological Warfare- Institutions and Strategy adopted against India

In the context of Sino-Indian relations, it must be understood that all-out war is detrimental to both sides and the CCP is still not at the stage where it will wage open war. It is true that China has undoubtedly adopted a stance that borders on aggression in recent years, with military deployments in the South China Sea, the Hong Kong issue, and increased threats to Taiwan. However, with regards to India, it would seem like China will adopt other tactics that would make India alter its behaviour without total aggression or conflict. The reasons? Firstly, China’s main adversary, the US, has increased ties with India and extreme aggression could invite repercussions which it is not yet willing to deal with. Secondly, China is still extending its strategic circuit through an apparent peaceful rise, still painting itself as a peaceful country through projects like the BRI and its “Health Silk Road”. This balanced approach to foreign policy would be greatly damaged by the possibility of war with India. Its latest white paper as well went so far as to say that “China does not seek hegemony or any kind of spheres of influence”. Additionally, it has always termed the other as the aggressor on numerous occasions. While many see this as discarding the connotation of a “peaceful rise”, it must be seen as arising out of a balanced approach to regional dynamics. The CCP, through actions in the People's Libration Army(PLA) as well as its own propaganda system, seeks to obtain concessions without truly escalating to the state of war.

The CCP’s psychological warfare tactics with regard to India are representative of its need to counter recent Indian activities. Continuously terming India as the aggressor through online propaganda and diplomatic statements, the Chinese government obviously seeks to change the perception that others share for India. In this context, the recent border clash at Galwan could also be viewed as a consequence of something else. The increase of activities in the Indo-Pacific, the meetings with the Quad, the signing of logistics agreements with the US have been proclaimed as Indian strategies in countering China. These accusations are perhaps closer to the truth than not and their actions at Doklam and Galwan could be seen as consequences of the same. While these are carried out by the PLA under the directions of the government in Beijing they are premised on propaganda that the CCP releases, such as the fact that India “stirs up trouble” or makes “deliberate provocations”. 

The CCP’s use of psychological warfare is carried out at multiple levels as mentioned previously, most importantly, through PLA activities which include military movements, threats, and force projection; through diplomatic statements; and through its media sources. The party relies on three major pillars, the control of personnel or the Chinese population, the control of the military and security forces under the PLA, and finally, the control of propaganda. The CCP has for long considered these activities as essential to its national security and more importantly, to the party’s security. The main reasoning behind it is to safeguard China’s political system and the ideology that the government wants its citizens to uphold. This ideology centers around terming China as united, strong, and intimidating within China and as neutral, non-aggressive, lawfully right, and benevolent, on the international stage. 

CCP institutional frameworks and dynamics

In order to understand the dynamics exerted by China, it is first important to understand the policy and decision making which lies behind and motivates all of the CCP’s decisions. The Chinese Communist Party is entrenched into Chinese society and lies at the crux of all actions undertaken by the government, whether domestic or foreign. Every five years, the CCP convenes its National Party Congress(NPC), which consists of nearly 3000-member representatives from Chinese provinces who all adhere to the party and its mandate. However, though the party consists of these 3000 members in the NPC and 90 million others throughout China, the power is concentrated right at the top and shared by only a few members who control the country and the party. 

When the NPC meets every five years it discusses major policy decisions as well as chooses the central committee which comprises ministers, senior regulatory officials, provincial leaders, and military officers. This Central Committee then chooses the Politburo, a committee of twenty-five members which then elects the Politburo standing committee who hold a majority of the power in China. In this context, it is to be noted that this system ensures that power is concentrated at the very top of the pyramid and thus all directives, policies, and decisions are made in accordance with the CCP members at the top. Under Xi Jinping, power has been further consolidated under his leadership, allowing him to possibly retain power even after the stipulated 2 terms for Presidency ends. Xi is not only the president of the country and general secretary of the party but also the head of the army, and this allows him to exert enormous influence in setting government policy. 

There might have been a time that CCP policy was the party policy under the directives of a few at the top of the CCP pyramid. However, it has now become apparent that it is no longer Party before President with Xi altering many internal dynamics. This has invited backlash from a few within but Xi has silenced many of his opponents in the massive corruption crackdown he carried out after the transfer of power in 2012. Since 2012, his anti-corruption campaign has punished nearly 2 million officials. These included former President, Hu Jintao’s closest aide, Ling Jihua; former vice chairmen of China’s top military body, Guo Boxiong; and Zhu Yongkang, a retired standing committee member. Such political maneuvers are natural after a transfer of power within the CCP, however, none of Xi’s predecessors carried out purges at such a large scale. 

Additionally, Xi has strengthened his hold on foreign policymaking through major structural changes. In 2018, during the NPC meeting, the CCP announced a major reshuffling of government and party institutions. As part of this, four leading small groups including the LSG on Foreign Affairs were upgraded to Commissions. LSGs were introduced in the 1950s to advise the party on policies and to coordinate their implementation among ministries and departments. One of the most prominent of these has been the Foreign Affairs LSG which was established in the 1980s and held sway over the coordination of China’s disjointed foreign policy at the time. This particular LSG has now been staffed with Xi’s close aides. Official reports mention Premier Li Keqiang as deputy head of the commission, former Foreign Affairs Minister Yang Jiechi as its director of the general office, and Vice President Wang Qishan, a personal friend of Xi’s, as a member. 

President Xi Jinping has, therefore, propelled many of his own loyalists to the top of the CCP command in his bid to create command structures that will suit his ideological goals for China. Wang Huning was a professor at Fudan University who transformed Joseph’s Nye’s concept of the "soft power" so that China could deploy it on its own. While he acted as a foreign policy advisor to Hu Jintao as well, he was unexpectedly propelled to the Politburo standing committee in 2017, making him the fifth most powerful man in China. Wang is now in charge of propaganda and thought work throughout the establishment and is also the creator of Xi’s “Chinese dream”. This has now ensured that Xi can retain maximum power within the party, with all foreign Policy decisions now being taken by the Commission and all Propaganda decisions now being taken by Wang Huning at the directive of the Chinese President.

Along with foreign policy making, China’s propaganda department is coordinated under the directives of China’s President as well. The Central Propaganda and Ideology Work Leading Small Group is the LSG that is in charge of all propaganda activities of the CCP. The member agencies of this LSG include the Propaganda Department, the United Front Department, the State Internet Information Office, the CFAW LSG Office, and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office as well. They also coordinate the funding of propaganda, allotting certain funds to national organizations as well as a budget to each Chinese province is promoting itself to the world. Reports have cited figures ranging in billions of dollars which have only been aimed at controlling Chinese propaganda. These offices have controlled the cyberspace as well as the information the CCP chooses to share with the public and the outside world. These as well have been staffed with Xi’s close aides, allowing him to control most commissions, policy groups, and formal institutions within the CCP. Today, these dynamics have ensured that differentiating between the Party’s school of thought and Xi Jinping’s school of thought is near impossible.

Chinese psychological warfare in foreign policy – Motivations and Practice

Xi Jinping may be the first President to exert so much control over the party however, he is not the first CPC President to see the need for propaganda in foreign policy. China has applied the psychological aspect of warfare in its foreign strategies for years now. Institutions within the CCP like the CPIW LSG and the CFAW LSG, which is now a commission, have existed since the 1980s. The Chinese leadership regarded foreign propaganda as a significant tool in implementing its strategy, garnering support, or tarnishing the image of other countries. In 2002, Hu Jintao defined foreign propaganda work as one of the primary strategic tasks on the ideology and propaganda battlefront. The motivating cause according to him at the time was to publicize China’s views on international affairs accurately and safeguard its interests and national image. Two years later in 2004, the CCP Central Committee released the “Opinions on Strengthening and Improving Foreign Propaganda Work under New Situations”. This document asserted that the enforcement of international propaganda would also facilitate China’s international competitiveness. 

Since Xi Jinping consolidated power in China he has sought to make further reforms in this regard, building on the premise that China’s ideological foundations are being threatened by the west. In 2013, under Xi, the Central Committee of the CCP prepared a communique titled “Notice on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere”. This document, which was circulated throughout the establishment, highlighted several ideological trends that members of the CCP were not allowed to support. The most important of these were Western constitutional democracy, neoliberalism, historical nihilism, and universal values. Additionally, according to the notice, there could be no questioning of the socialist nature of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. This would signify the beginning of a new era of ideological rigidity and rejuvenation of the Chinese National Image, especially since it followed Xi’s speech which owed the demise of the Soviet Union to the failure of countering western ideological incursions. 

It has become apparent that, according to the CCP, ideas are central to the contest for political power. Through its foreign propaganda machinery, the party has thus sought to influence both academia as well as its vast diaspora abroad. Under Xi, there has been a systemic increase in the suppression and control of universities within China, as well, as manipulation abroad. According to reports, the pressure on international universities that depend on Chinese students for their fees has intensified. This pressure is aimed at stopping criticism of the CCP and conforming to the party’s view of the world. Through other analysis of activities, it has also become apparent that there is an effort on the part of the CCP to influence the choices, direction, and loyalties of the Overseas Chinese population as well. The work is carried out by embassies, consulates, and the CPIW and seeks to “replace the negative suspicions and misunderstandings concerning China with a positive understanding.” While this is mostly done through the spread of patriotism or the association of criticism of the CCP with ‘anti-China’ sentiment, there have also been reports which show the CCP coercing people by granting them enhanced status or other material advantages in return for their loyalty. A strong Chinese diaspora, which adheres to the party’s ideology can, after all, alter many dynamics abroad.

In this context, one must also see an approach the CCP uses that of “using the local to surround the centre”. It is one that has been drawn out by many scholars who see China influencing and winning over smaller or marginal groups on the periphery of the country so as to then gain access to the center. These influences can be viewed in many business deals and partnerships the CCP has developed with local governments across the globe. The focus of these projects are largely on economic or cultural ties but can then be used as leverage against the government in the long run. A clear example of this is the state of Victoria in Australia which signed on to the One Belt One Road initiative even though the federal government declined it. In India as well, there was a sudden surge during the recent economic downturn in the bids posed by Chinese companies in buying a stake in Indian enterprises or floating contracts for infrastructural projects. While this has now been curbed by the Indian government, it still shows the reach and adeptness of the CCP at carrying out initiatives that seek to coerce the periphery to get to the centre.

China also often clouds the identity of the people who disseminate its propaganda abroad, so as to make it more acceptable and legitimate in the eyes of the international community. While Chinese corporations and businesses pose a significant threat on their own, the CCP has also made use of Academicians in altering perceptions. Zheng Bijian, the man who coined the term of China’s “peaceful rise”, has been portrayed by the CCP as a great “Chinese Thinker” and been made chair of the China Reform Forum, a non-governmental academic organization. In this role he apparently befriended many western scholars and academicians and also given lectures and speeches internationally, aimed at propagating the ‘Chinese system’ and ‘Chinese theories’. However, in all the discourse that the CCP uses to surround such people, their true identities are clouded. Zhang Bijian was deputy head of the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department and Executive Vice President of the Central Party School, institutions at the center of China’s Psychological Warfare. The CCP thus sees its Foreign propaganda or publicity as being a major factor behind altering its image and makes use of innovative methods in carrying it out. The use of such “non-governmental” mediums has been adopted in a means to showcase the Chinese system of governance and approach to international politics is one of benefit. While the success of this is debatable, the CCP continues to uphold its propaganda, becoming fiercer over the past few years. Especially during a time period when global backlash has increased against the government, its foreign affairs rhetoric has seen an uptick.

If the statements released by the Ministry are analyzed, this will become apparent. After the Hong Kong national security bill was introduced, the ministry released a statement saying “More than 50 Countries Welcomed the Adoption of the Law on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the PRC in a Joint Statement at the Human Rights Council.” In another example, on July 8, at a video dialogue on Sino-US relations, Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng said: “In a world where national interests are interconnected, any attempt to exclude China, create parallel systems or break the world into two markets will be to turn the wheel back on history.” Such statements showcase China as a country that only seeks cooperation and the betterment of all. It also shows that China has support in the international system. However, these statements must be taken with a pinch of salt because much of it doesn’t coincide with PLA actions on the ground. This is, after all, a part of China’s Propaganda mechanisms. 

Statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs already gives a clear example of how the CCP chooses to alter perceptions and bolster its own national image. It is, however, also essential to note how the image itself has been propagated. While the use or abuse of foreign journalists in communicating China’s vision to the rest of the world has always existed, it is also important to view the support China shares with foreign governments in spreading its propaganda. A video report released by the state news agency Xinhua characterised China’s management of the coronavirus through the voices of the President of Cyprus, the chief scientist of the WHO and the deputy minister of health for Venezuela. The message behind this video? China’s handling of the situation and crisis has been “timely and transparent”. 

Additionally, if one analyses the official directives as released by the CCP on websites like the China daily, other such examples will become apparent. There is a regular publication on the site that is a definite tool of changing the perception many hold for China. Each publication either propagates the message that China is a benevolent actor or a good alternative to the west. The evidence and support the CCP provides for this are western mouthpieces. The titles of a few of these articles read as follows, “Former Australian PM hails China’s Growth” or “UN Official Says Beijing can help fight poverty” or “US filmmaker says China is a good alternative to the West”. Many other media platforms like Xinhua net and Global China Times also do the same.

While the above statements point to the broader picture of Chinese tactics, it is now important to note the use of these tools with regards to India. Either through its media or diplomatic statements, the CCP has often accused India of undertaking “unilateral actions” and “stirring up trouble”. This was recently seen at Galwan, at Doklam as well, and also in retaliation to closer ties with Vietnam. Many CCP statements paint the other as the aggressor even though facts are unclear or unclarified. On the Galwan issue, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said, “Indian frontline border defense troops on the night of June 15 blatantly broke the consensus reached at the commander-level talks between the militaries of the two sides. Under the circumstance that the current situation in the Galwan Valley has eased, the Indian troops once again crossed the Line of Actual Control for deliberate provocation, and even violently attacked the Chinese officers and soldiers who went to the terrain for negotiation, thus triggering fierce physical conflicts and causing casualties.” Xi as well has shown a change in the language he adopts in official speeches. Previous Chinese premiers chose to remain neutral using terms of “non-interference” and “non-alignment” in many issues. However, Xi now no longer mentions this and instead calls on “Leading” the reform on global governance and making statements like “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia and uphold the security of Asia”.

Finally, it is important to note that psychological warfare in practice isn’t only present in Chinese propaganda and statements but other aspects as well. The past few years have seen China’s cyber wing carry out operations from cyber-attacks on emails of MEA and MOD officials as well as the alleged cyberattacks which downed Indian Sukhois in Arunachal Pradesh. Such activities raise significant questions among people within the general public as well as the Indian establishment. And even though the threat may not be that significant, the questions of “Can this and will this happen again?” “Is India even strong enough to repel such an attack?” shows how the practice of non-kinetic warfare can be highly compromising for China’s adversaries. 

Conclusion

Much of what has been highlighted above is part of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream”. A dream which focuses on a strong military, a strong country, and a strong national identity. It is this dream and the underlying motivations behind it that also has significant psychological effects on China’s adversaries, as it is symbolic of the larger aspirations that Xi has for the coming future. The very aspirations of a state which lean towards aggressiveness and revisionism is a threat that needs addressing. Cyber-attacks and a show of military strength that the Indian government has failed to counter plays on the psyche of people within the establishment as well as the general public and it is these threats that the government has to fear more. An increase in the intensity of China’s propaganda machinery and foreign policy activities, clubbed with the effects they have on the psyche of China’s adversaries will always be a significant challenge to counter, but it must be done.  

In conclusion, it must be said that with regards to India, China has more often than not, succeeded in its psychological warfare. Xi Jinping’s dream and the actions of the PLA scare many within the Indian establishment who have been wary of his plans for the country and the region. The plans have now begun to coincide with actions on the ground and that is a more significant problem. Activities in Hong Kong, deployments in the South China Sea, China’s “debt-trap diplomacy, and its “string of pearls” among other actions, are clear examples. In understanding the psychological effects of the CCP on the government of India, one perhaps sees how the Indian government has adopted a pro-US posture, enjoying increased support over the past few years. Yet, while this is definitive of the Indian government’s need to counter China it could also be viewed as the reason for Chinese aggression at Galwan today, a possible warning against Indian collaboration with the US or activities in the Indian Ocean. 

Additionally, all that has been stated above, shows the exact methodology and approaches adopted by the CCP in carrying out its propaganda activities, some of which are currently exclusive to the west but may also be highly influential in India. India must also be cautious of the support a few sympathizers within India show for the CCP and indirectly or directly contribute to their agenda. These are undoubtedly influenced by ideology but can become potent forces behind the propagation of Chinese ideology and tactics. Since the 1960s, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) has had ties with the CCP, often criticizing India while maintaining support for China. Sitaram Yechury, the Secretary-General of the party has often met President Xi Jinping, highlighting later, that “the CCP thought highly of its relations with the CPI (M)”. The support the party shares is also seen in their official statements. During the Galwan incident, the statement the party released only called for dialogue on the border and showed no condemnation for China. In Doklam, the CPI (M) also asked the Indian government to let Bhutan take the lead on negotiations and not intervene. Such condemnation of Indian policies and indirect support for the CCP has increased in recent years and could pose a significant challenge for India in the future.

However, the Indian government is also poised at an important place in time. The dissent and instability within China have shown a significant increase. Xi’s centralization has effectively replaced collective leadership with strongman rule. Before Xi came to power, the party displayed a higher degree of ideological flexibility and political pragmatism, however, his presidency has signified a certain sense of rigidity within the party. Centralization may improve the decision-making process of the CCP, but strong man rule increases the risk of bad decisions. One would also see that centralization is the cause of China’s economic downturn, public dissent, and the initial cover-up of the Coronavirus pandemic. Such dynamics have seen stifled dissent arise among ex-government officials and current party leaders as well. The perception of a strong, united country, that China chooses to propagate must then be challenged, only then can it be altered. For if China’s identity and stories were to be challenged, it would show that the country is nowhere close to achieving what Xi Jinping termed a “strong national identity”. 

(The views expressed are personal)