Chinese PLA’s structural reforms, psychological warfare, and its implications for India

Recent deployments around the Indian border

The 2015 National Defence White Paper (NDWP) released by the Chinese government, marked its 11th major reorganisation since 1952. This restructuring of the unit was heavily influenced by Xi Jinping’s party policies. His past experience with military and security affairs, led to some drastic modifications in the institutional and structural framework of the PLA.

One of the most prominent alterations was done, with regards to the main three wings of armed forces- the army (PLAA), navy (PLAN) and the air force (PLAAF). The PLAA (PLA Army ) has been “significantly downsized” and the ground forces have decreased by about 300,000 soldiers. This is a noteworthy change, considering that China is known to have the largest standing army in the world.

But this scaling down in one sector was met with a substantial increase in the other two forces. The PLAN (PLA Navy) has seen significant investments in terms of its capacity building and power projection abilities. These include the development of defence equipment that will aid the PLAN to carry out joint forces and amphibian operations. China’s first aircraft carrier, which was declared combat ready in 2016, can be counted as one of its achievements. Apart from that, PLAN is also going to be bolstered further, as the production of Type 055 destroyers and submarines with decreased noise footprint are being rushed by the PLA. The mention of the term “overseas interests” in the NDWP only reiterates the fact that the naval forces will expand considerably in the near future.

The PLAAF (PLA Air Force), too has been no stranger to the recent developments carried out by the PLA. Similar to PLAN, PLAAF will also experience notable investments and modernisation attempts from the Chinese government. The other sector that has received attention in light of the reformations, is the rocket and missile programmes.

These transformational changes that the PRC has brought about within its military forces, greatly impacts India.Bearing in mind the recent skirmish at the Galwan border, a disputed region between both the nations, Indian forces witnessed multifaceted psychological warfare from the Chinese side. One of the tools employed to carry out this strategy was that of the media. Media and information play a key role in manipulating the opponent’s psyche. In this case, it was the narrative built by the Chinese media, with regards to the Galwan border issue. Even though many Chinese media sources have blamed India for violating the previous agreements, the Chinese authorities have refused to speak about the casualties experienced. The PLA Daily too, has not reported the incident, but the governments of both the nations are currently engaged in diplomatic talks about the matter. The accusations that were made by the media sources, greatly impacted the public opinion, if not the government policies.

However, one important development that was not covered by the Chinese media, was that of its increased naval presence in the Indian ocean. The PLA has set up an offshore naval military base in Djibouti, which to a certain degree explains the increased traffic in the IOR (Indian Ocean Region). As per media sources, satellite images have indicated that China plans on militarising the Gwadar port in Pakistan as part of CPEC (China- Pakistan Economic Corridor). Some of the Chinese submarines were also detected in the region, thereby creating a sense of alarm among the Indian forces. Keeping in mind the rapid rate of China's naval modernizations, and downsizing of its ground forces, it is very likely that the military deployments at LAC could serve as a mere distraction from the Chinese maritime encroachments in the IOR.

Shifting command structures

The military forces aren't the only ones that have undergone a significant change as per the new policies. A major alteration has also been made to the command structure and the bureaucratic framework of the PLA. The Chinese Military Commission (CMC) which supervises the PLA, plays an important role in the decision making process. The earlier offices of the CMC have been disbanded and have been replaced by 15 functional offices, committees and departments. All of which are directly answerable to the Chairman of CMC, Xi Jinping. This is a bold move on part of the PRC, as it indicates a closer association of the military with the Chinese Communist Party’s(CCPs) ideologies. This also sheds light on Xi’s increased authority over the forces. This centralised power at CMC, will impact India's border situation with China. Previously, the PLA forces deployed in the MRs (military regions) were allowed to make autonomous tactical decisions. However, with centralisation of power, instances of decision making from the local commanders might decrease, but it will allow for a more synchronised display of intentions of the CMC.

The 2019 NDWP also noted that China has altered its divisions pertaining to military regions. The previous arrangement of seven military regions has been changed to five main theatre commands. These theatre commands were established on the basis of regional crises, they are namely - the Eastern (ETC), Western (WTC), Northern (NTC), Southern (STC) and Central theatre command (CTC). The one that would directly impact India is the WTC, which covers the border regions. Prior to rezoning, the region was divided between the Xinjiang Military region (headquartered in Lanzhou) and the Chengdu Military Region (headquartered in Chengdu). Earlier, due to the divisions, the probability of a less coordinated effort made by the two headquarters gave India an upper hand while dealing with border disputes. But after this recent integration of the entire region under a single command, a combined utilisation of resources from all the wings of the PLA will be observed. The WTC is also responsible for border regions of Afghanistan and POK (Pakistan occupied Kashmir). In addition to the WTC, the presence of the STC, near the Indian Ocean creates a difficult situation for India, as it could be surrounded from multiple directions, given this new arrangement. Not to mention that the STC has the South China fleet at sea under its jurisdiction, which aligns well with its naval modernization strategies.

Strategic Support Force

As per the reforms highlighted in the NDWP of 2015, China introduced a new unit called the Strategic Support Force (SSF). The main functions of this force would be to look into the space, cyber and electronic warfare strategies. The official documents and statements made by PLA, regarding the SSF, have been ambiguous to say the least. However, analysts speculate that the role of the unit will not be limited to the three domains of warfare as specified, and might delve into aspects of psychological and information warfare. One of the many reasons for the establishment of the SSF was China's need to better integrate its EW (electronic warfare) and CW (cyber warfare) forces, especially with their ground forces. This need to incorporate the SSF with the active military forces in the name of “information support” was also highlighted in the NDWP of 2019. This unit was previously a part of the subsidiary ranks of the General Staff Department (GSD). The fact that a separate wing dedicated to the development of cyber, space and electronic warfare was created, sheds light on the increased importance of these military mechanisms.

The new unit has been viewed with suspicion, ever since its inception. For India, the creation of the SSF, forces it to look into a direction that has been neglected the most with respect to the Indian defence forces. Even though, for the past few years India has managed to accelerate its growth in the fields of nuclear and space technology, it has been relatively lacking behind in the areas of cyber and electronic warfare. Given the PLA’s improved stance on the issue, it would be a matter of time that they gain leverage over India. Hence there is an urgent need for India to address its lack of enhancement in the fields of cyber and electronic warfare. 

Using diaspora and intelligence

Unlike the intelligence departments of other nations, not much is known about the Chinese intelligence forces. Even though many speculate that they might work at different levels. Given the recent reforms in the PLA structure, there is a need to look at the information accessing capabilities of the PRC. One of the key players in this sector is the Ministry of Social Security (MSS) which has been brought into the spotlight in recent times. The MSS is responsible for monitoring both domestic as well as overseas intelligence and security operations. It can also recruit and order Chinese organizations and individuals living abroad to undertake intelligence activities. The MSS has wide networking agencies and partakes in various forms of espionage. The Ministry in itself has many different bureaus, each dedicated to a particular level of intelligence operations. What makes MSS’s functioning’s more clandestine is the fact unlike the MI6 and CIA, this particular organization does not have any website or publicly listed contacts.

One of the significant structural changes that was carried out in the PLA, was that of disbanding its four primary military headquarters and introducing 15 new offices, departments and commissions in its place. This modification removed an entire bureaucratic layer and centralized power under the CMC. The earlier organ of the PLA that dealt with intelligence forces was that of the General Staff department (GSD) . The second bureau of GSD or 2PLA was responsible for foreign intelligence operations and collaborations with private companies and universities to carry out similar endeavors. However, due to the recent reform, this role falls under the Joint Staff Department (JSD). The roles of the intelligence bureau of the JSD overlaps with its predecessor i.e. the second bureau of the GSD, but the exact functions of the JSD Intelligence Bureau have not been specified. Apart from the JSD, the SSF (Strategic Support Force) also works closely with integrating information from various sources and coordinating with the theater commands. Even though the SSF claims to be in charge of space intelligence, there is a high probability that it will also engage in human intelligence networks.

The above mentioned organizations are accountable for military intelligence, but also employ civilian facilities for accessing such information. These mainly include universities, think tanks and private business enterprises that have direct links with either the PLA or the CMC. It also actively engages in training and recruiting spies and drawing on military attaches around the world.

One significant research organization that was closely affiliated with the MSS was CICIR (China’s Institute for Contemporary International Relations). This institute could almost be considered as the research analysis wing for the MSS, as it routinely carried out information assessments based on inputs that it received from various sources. An instance that highlights the close ties between these two organizations is the election of Geng Huichang, as the Minister of State Security from 2007- 2016. Prior to his election he had served as the President of CICIR from 1992- 98. In the post- reform structure of the PLA the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS), serves a similar purpose. After revamping the organizational structure of the PLA, Xi Jinping also focused on research institutes and universities that delve into military science whilst carrying clandestine espionage activities. This includes AMS, which is currently directly accountable to the CMC. Think tanks and universities that are directly linked to the PLA, also collaborate with foreign universities and security centers. One significant detail that brings out the close association of academic institutes with intelligence forces, is the current head of the SSF. Lt. General Gao Jin, who has been a long time associate of the PLA, has also been the President of the PLA’s AMS. The fact that he heads the latest intelligence unit of China, the SSF, which has not clearly laid down its area of operations definitely raises some questions.

With regards to India, China's covert methods of accessing information may not be seen with much apprehension. Simply, because China has made it clear on multiple occasions, that it is heavily interested in the information from western nations. But, considering the increased student exchange programme that are being carried out between the India and China, it would require India to be careful in the near future.

Conclusion

During the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, every move made by China is viewed with increased suspicion. Its escalating overseas and offshore operations have already made their impacts on India's national security very clear, be it in the form of military deployments at the border or increased naval encroachments in the Indian ocean. The reformations in the PLA structure and its altered modus operandi, is something that India should take into cognizance. The PLA’s fast growing military modernisation, has definitely created a security dilemma not just for India but also for the other international actors. Irrespective of the political support and its alliances with other nations, India needs to focus on building a better military structure and tactical operations, to counter China’s strategies.

(The views expressed are personal)