ASEAN centrality and the future of Indo-Pacific

The document on ASEAN outlook towards Indo-Pacific states “consistent with ASEAN’s role in developing and shaping regional architectures in Southeast Asia and beyond, and with ASEAN’s norms and principles as principles in the ASEAN Charter and other relevant ASEAN documents, ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific envisioned by ASEAN consists of the following key elements:

· A perspective of viewing the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, not as contiguous territorial spaces but as a closely integrated and interconnected region, with ASEAN playing a central and strategic role;

· An Indo-Pacific region of dialogue and cooperation instead of rivalry;

· An Indo-Pacific region of development and prosperity for all;

· The importance of the maritime domain and perspective in the evolving regional architecture”.

From multilateral position it can be stated that ASEAN nations are hesitant and unsure of the utility factor of the Indo-Pacific. Will Indo-Pacific reinforce confidence, maybe depending on the role that the major players play in the region?

In terms of recovery and impact on regional economies, Covid-19 would impact the Old ASEAN -4 (Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia) more than post 1990s members-Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. It is stated that new ASEAN (those countries which joined ASEAN in 1990s) is expected to recover faster than the old ASEAN. However, ASEAN is facing issues related to Chinese encroachment in South China Sea and tensions between the US and China very lately in those contested waters. It has been seen that increasing tensions in South China Sea would divide the attention and subscription to the Indo-Pacific (seen as a US propelled anti- China concept). It will also question the concept of Indo-Pacific whether is it promising vision or a mirage.

Indonesia had proposed to act as the bridge between the two Oceans through its strategy better known as global maritime fulcrum. In the year 2013, Indonesia under the then foreign minister Marty Natalegewa had proposed Indo-Pacific treaty. Nevertheless, with no takers for the Indo-Pacific treaty and the natural demise of the global maritime fulcrum plan, Indonesia might not have the wherewithal to provide an alternate architecture. The status of the Code of Conduct in South China is unclear and the draft is too long for negotiations and reaching a middle ground is a challenge. Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam have supported each other during their representation in the UN related to their continental shelf demarcation. Indonesia has also extended the letter of support. The US, sensing the ASEAN solidarity, also extended support on the subject.

The US has been conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) through its naval ships and aircrafts carriers but reinforcing the fact that it is still the prime power in Southeast Asia is under stress. Quad 2.0 have provided possibilities but how the common stance evolves is yet to be seen. Related to their statements after the meeting in Manila, the differences within Quad 2.0 were apparent and showed that each nation wants to highlight its concerns. Quad plus utility would depend on the stakes that three countries South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand are going to lay on the initiative. Mutual Logistics Support Agreements between Quad members are important but the modalities and related aspects need more efforts and clarity in operationalisation.

Can Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor be an effective instrument to provide an economic angle to the initiative is to be seen? RCEP seems promising still despite India’s withdrawal from the mega regional trading block( twice in last six months).The game changer would still be the fact that who provides the Covid vaccine and which country help in rejuvenation of the regional economies. Southeast Asian economies are still dependent on China in terms of regional supply chain and they are still not sure of demand from Europe and the US. However, it is known as because of angst against China, few investments are going to get diverted to Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia.

Chinese diaspora is still important in Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, the three major economies. ASEAN outlook towards Indo-Pacific would depend on three major factors –anti-China angst, resurgence of economy, US attitude towards China and the role of neutral ASEAN members. ASEAN chairman Vietnam prefers the term Indo-Asia–Pacific, and is reluctant to adopt Indo-Pacific as it would suggest that Vietnam is getting into Indo-Pacific strategic orbit managed by the US. Even media reports of Vietnam giving access to Cam Ranh Bay was denied by Vietnam foreign Ministry but any such possibility would change dynamics. However, Vietnam-US Strategic partnership, if it gets signed would mean a tectonic shift. The Philippines under Duterte proclaimed that it would retract from Visiting Forces Agreement with US but later suspended that thought of withdrawal.

The question of ASEAN centrality would need to be addressed in the context of the architecture related to Indo-Pacific. Quad members’ subscription and support to the ASEAN multilateral organization would be a major hint. Quad needs structural and operational support. Encrypted communication networks and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) related to military communications has already been signed with few members. Within Southeast Asia, BRI projects are reduced both in terms of area and the funds. Given the fact that there are instances of corruption and mismanagement, the concerns related to economic spin offs of BRI and marginal utility would be raised within the ASEAN countries. Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand and even Indonesia have reduced the scale and number of projects.

In this context the tensions between US and China as well as the political will of other Quad members to emerge as support structures would decide the future of the Indo-Pacific. The question still remains whether Indo-Pacific can be inclusive or exclusive. The answer to this lies in whether the inclusive structure would be accommodating China or compelling China to accept rules of the game.

Pic courtesy-ASEAN website

(The views expressed are personal)