Initially, the FOIP strategy received support from India, Australia, and the United States of America (USA), however, by late 2018 there was reduced attention toward the framework [1]. Here, it must be noted that when it comes to countering China, ASEAN’s interpretation of the Indo-Pacific as a concept and Japan’s cooperation with China hinders the use of the FOIP as a containment strategy. However, there is another option for Japan where it can harness its strength and influence vis-à-vis, Southeast Asia. In this regard, to ensure a rules-based order, Japan has further strengthened its alliance with the USA to enhance its military standing in order to become a proactive contributor to peace. Earlier in 2015, it removed the long-standing prohibition on collective defense and created fresh guidelines for alliance cooperation. Later in February 2017, Japanese Minister of Defense Tomomi Inada stated that Japan would not deploy the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to the South China Sea for freedom of navigation operations conducted by the United States. She further highlighted that Japan would engage in a training exercise with the US Navy in the disputed maritime area, engage in bilateral and multilateral exercises with other navies in the region, and develop the provision of capacity-building assistance to coastal nations.

Japan’s Defense White Paper of 2022:

The Sasakawa Peace Foundation published its report titled “Strengthening Japan’s Defense Diplomacy” on October 2021 where it addressed issues that required due attention by the government on strategic, defense, and foreign policy issues [2]. The report presented multiple proposals in order to meet the objectives of strengthening Japan’s defense diplomacy. The report included nine proposals in total drafted by seven different authors with expertise in diverse fields allowing extensive debate and review of the proposals. The report refrained from examining exhaustive foreign policy issues and selectively focused on crucial matters that require greater consideration from a strategic perspective. Proposals 1 to 3 of the report suggest adopting a defense diplomacy strategy, creating a cross-ministerial command center for defense diplomacy, and placing strategic communications facilities at the center for the same. These proposals showcase an increased emphasis on enhancing defense diplomacy for Japan. On the other hand, strategic competition has been acknowledged in Japan’s annual Defense White Paper of 2022 with special emphasis being put on Chinese aggression, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, cooperation in outer space, deterrence, and creating a free and open Indo-Pacific [3]. The focus on creating a free and open Indo-Pacific is one of the vital components in Japan’s defense strategy due to crucial sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) passing through the region. In this regard, the Japanese Minister of Defense Nabuo Kishi stated that Japan has like-minded partners with whom cooperation is deepening over time. The defense white paper and the subsequent actions taken by Japan validates that the government is taking such policy recommendations seriously and is committed to enhancing its defense diplomacy at the policy level.

Japan’s defense engagements and reinterpretation of the Peace Constitution:

Japan’s defense policy engagements towards Southeast Asia focus both on traditional as well as non-traditional security challenges. Securing the sea lanes remains a strategic priority for Japan and therefore seeks to enhance the JCG and JMSDF capabilities. As the key objective of Southeast Asian coastal states is to develop monitoring capabilities and protect their jurisdiction and rights in the sea, Japan has been working to expand its defense partnerships with other like-minded countries. Further, it aims to use its strengthened ties with the USA to consolidate its strategic partnerships with Quad and other interested powers. However, any major new security partnerships in Southeast Asia could only be introduced after former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pushed for a legislation that reinterpreted the Constitution [4].

The Peace Constitution adopted by Japan after the Second World War was interpreted as a categorical prohibition of collective defense until 2015. Constitutionally, it was thought that Japan could only use force to defend its territory and sovereignty against direct armed attack. Abe pushed forward a landmark legislation in September 2015 which reinterpreted the Constitution allowing the SDF to use military means as the final resort or to a minimal degree of necessity to defend other states which may come under attack while defending Japan’s vital interests that are beyond its territorial limit. This legislation allowed the SDF limited collective defense and permitted it to develop overseas defense partnerships within these new parameters.

Later in 2016, Shinzo Abe extended Japan’s security considerations by inviting Indonesian President Joko Widodo where they agreed to set up the Japan-Indonesia Maritime Forum which would provide Indonesia with enhanced maritime patrol capabilities, port, and infrastructure development as well as bilateral naval cooperation. In the same year, President Abe met Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte in Tokyo to receive 10 small patrol boats alongside a Japanese ODA pledge to supply two 90-meter coast guard patrol vessels. President Duterte, in return, pledged to a resolution of disputes in the South China Sea in accordance with international law. Another meeting was soon followed by the two leaders which resulted in a pledge of USD 9.18 billion. This pledge ensured an investment, infrastructural development, and rehabilitation of the victimized city of Marawi for over five years, and President Duterte agreed to enhance maritime security cooperation. Shinzo Abe made another visit to Vietnam which resulted in an edge of financing of six new patrol vessels in addition to a previous pledge to grant six older patrol vessels while both sides agreed to enhance cooperation among its navies and coast guard units.

Japan as a strategic player in Southeast Asia:

From a strategic perspective, Japan seeks to counter China through its resilience in Southeast Asia through a multitude of exercises, strategic dialogues, and capacity-building measures. For instance, Japan has been providing assistance in both training and equipment for the Coastguard units of Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia to mitigate the existing power asymmetry in the South China Sea. Further, the Ministry of Defense through the capacity building has been emphasizing the appropriation and implementation of maritime law through which Japan supplied five second-hand TC90 patrol aircraft to the Philippines which are meant to monitor Scarborough Shoal. In further attempts, Japan has appointed new military attaches to Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Other than that, Japan has also been upgrading its naval dispatches to enhance its security partnerships in the region and demonstrate its attachment to the freedom of navigation. Additionally, in 2017, Izumo, the aircraft carrier and the largest ship of the Japanese fleet, made port calls in Subic Bay in the Philippines and Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam and further sailed to Singapore, where ten military officers from Southeast Asian nations embarked on a four-day tour before they participated in the Malabar naval exercises alongside India and the USA. Later in 2018, Izumo’s twin vessel, JS Kaga was dispatched to the South China Sea where it conducted naval exercises with Indonesia and Malaysia. Further, Japan has also sought to reassure its attachment to ASEAN’s strategic autonomy and is therefore further developing its defense cooperation through the Vientiane Vision with ASEAN as a whole. At the same time, it is continuing its multilateral security cooperation through mechanisms like the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Additionally, Japan has recognized the concerns of ASEAN nations that the FOIP might be a containment tool and has therefore toned down their rhetoric regarding Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy [5]. All these developments point to Japan being recognized as a major strategic player in the region of Southeast Asia.

International Fleet Review 2022 hosted by Japan:

On 6 November 2022, Japan hosted its first International Fleet Review amidst North Korean missile tests, strained China-Taiwan relations, and rising tensions in the East Asian region. The naval parade was held in Sagami Bay, Tokyo, and included participants from 12 other nations [6]. The overall event included 28 vessels, 33 aircraft overhead flights, submarine-hunting patrol planes, and helicopters. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) stated that through these exercises, they contribute to the realization of a free and open ocean through friendly relations and confidence-building measures with the navies of other WPNS nations. The JMSDF further conducted a multilateral search and rescue exercise with the other participating navies to improve the tactical capabilities of the JMSDF and to further promote mutual understanding with the participating navies which included India, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Canada, New Zealand, Thailand Cambodia, Brunei, Singapore and the USA overseeing 30 warships and 5 surveillance aircraft [7].

Held to promote goodwill among other participating navies the parade was overseen by Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. Aboard the MSDF helicopter carrier Izumo, he stated that Japan and other like-minded countries must be prepared for situations in which certain nations hinder peace and security through the use or threat of force. Reiterating Japan’s plan to strengthen its defense capabilities in a period of 5 years, he further stated citing the Russian invasion of Ukraine that unilateral attempts of changing the status quo by force should not be tolerated. The event was marked by the first-ever participation of the South Korean Navy since the Japan Fleet Review of 2015. This indicates a deeper sense of defense cooperation between the two countries setting aside their political differences and focusing on mutual security interests. This bilateral relationship was strained when in 2018, in a fleet review hosted by South Korea, then-President Moon Jae-in’s government asked Japan not to hoist the Rising Sun which is the MSDF’s official flag. Meanwhile, Japan’s strengthening bilateral ties with the USA also plays a crucial part in Japan’s reproachment of security alliances as the USA upon realizing that it can no longer provide a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region has made significant strides to present opportunities for further cooperation [8].

Conclusion:

Earlier reluctant to make a concrete commitment to any major military or political initiatives in the region of Southeast Asia, Japan has come out as a visible and credible strategic player as well as a major security provider in the region. Japan has seemed to move beyond its bitter political past of aggression which has kept itself away from developing any major politico-military role in South East Asia. Japan’s military diplomacy engagements alongside its economic integration in Southeast Asia are growing allowing multifaceted partnerships on issues of military affairs and security. All these factors point toward Japan’s aim to achieve a long-term strategic engagement in Southeast Asia through its military diplomacy.

Endnotes:

1.       William Choong, “Japan’s Indo-Pacific Strategy in Southeast Asia: Floundering, not Foundering”, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 06 May 2020 https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_40.pdf

2.      “Strengthening Japan’s Defense Diplomacy: An SPF Policy Proposal”, Security Studies Program, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, March 2022 https://www.spf.org/en/global-data/user33/SPF_DefenceDiplomacyProposal.Mar2022.pdf

3.      Simran Walia, “An Analysis of Japan’s Defence White Paper 2022”, Center for Air Power Studies, 15 August 2022 https://capsindia.org/an-analysis-of-japans-defence-white-paper-2022/

4.     David Arase, “Japan’s Strategic Balancing Act in Southeast Asia”, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 12 November 2019 https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_94.pdf

5.      Celine Pajon, “Japan in South East Asia: Looking for a Balanced Indo-Pacific”, ISPI, 11 December 2019 https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/japan-south-east-asia-looking-balanced-indo-pacific-24578

6.     Manas Joshi, “Japan holds international fleet review amid rising East Asia tension”, WION, 06 November 2022 https://www.wionews.com/world/japan-holds-international-fleet-review-amid-rising-east-asia-tension-531638

7.      Dinakar Peri, “International Fleet Review ends; Malabar naval exercise gets under way in Japan”, The Hindu, 08 November 2022 https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/international-fleet-review-ends-malabar-naval-exercise-gets-under-way-in-japan/article66111967.ece

8.     Gabriel Dominguez, “Japan shows off defense diplomacy skills with international fleet review”, The Japan Times, 06 November 2022 https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/11/06/national/japan-defense-diplomacy-international-fleet-review/

Pic Courtsey-Pankaj Jha

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)