LIVE DISPATCH
• Silent Depths, Loud Signals: Nuclear Deterrence Infrastructure and the Crisis-Stability Costs of India’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Partnerships • Loss and Damage Finance: From COP28 Pledges to Policy Architecture • Securing India's Digital Frontiers: Cybersecurity Challenges and Strategic Responses in the Age of Hybrid Warfare • Beyond Consultation: BIMSTEC's Emerging Role in Regional Intelligence and Security Cooperation • Prism of Dragon’s Maritime Assertiveness: Regional Implications and India’s Strategic Options • Between the Desert and the Savannah: Conflict and the Political Economy of Instability in the Sahel • The Architecture of Cooperation: Navigating East Asia's Geopolitical Landscape • The Politics of Ali Khamenei's Funeral • From Civil Nuclear Power to Nuclear Hedging: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Emerging Nuclear Security Dilemma in the Middle East • Operation Sindoor and the Changing Dynamics of India–Pakistan Security • The Invisible Front: China-Pakistan Grey-Zone Operations • Generative AI, Labour Sovereignty, and the Geoeconomics of India's Service Economy • India's Agentic AI Strategy Needs Authority Budgets before Autonomy Scales • India's AI Diplomacy and the Future of Strategic Technologies • From Physical Borders to Intelligent Borders: The Evolution of India's Border Security Architecture • Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Governance Deficit: Challenges to International Humanitarian Law and Accountability • AI Driven Cyberwarfare and National Security • Great Power Rivalry and the Crisis of the United Nations • The Continuing U.S. Regime-Change Toolkit: Color Revolutions, Political Influence, and Vietnam • Ten Years After Brexit: Regret, Reform, or Reversal? • Digital Pathways to Extremism: An Investigative Study of ISIS and Al-Qaeda's Use of Digital Platforms in India • Sports, Strategy and Statecraft of Mega Sporting Events as Geoeconomic Instruments: Qatar 2022 to Saudi Arabia 2034 • Strategic Autonomy in the Age of Weaponised Interdependence: India’s Geopolitical Dilemma • Hardening the Quad: From Strategic Dialogue to Operational Cooperation • China’s Grey-Zone Strategy in the Indian Ocean: Implications for India’s Maritime Security • The Maghreb of States: Identity, Sovereignty, and the Limits of Non-Interference • Europe’s Digital Dependence: Can the EU Achieve Strategic Autonomy? • Beyond the Battlefield: Understanding Unconventional Security Challenges in Contemporary Geopolitics • Cuba’s Economic Crisis and Strategic Relevance: A Peripheral State in Renewed Great Power Competition • Trapped in Deterrence: Nuclear Stability and the Persistence of Conflict in South Asia • Extended Deterrence Under Strain: Credibility, Assurance, and the Stability-Instability Paradox in the Indo-Pacific • Maritime India: Security, Trade, and Great Power Competition • Beyond Ukraine: Understanding Putin's Vision of Russian Power • Silicon Sovereignty: How Semiconductors Are Redrawing Global Power Hierarchies • The Negative Impact of US–Iran War on the Pacific Region • BRICS Expansion and the Multipolar Moment: Opportunity or Strategic Contradiction? • Foot-Dragging as Feminism: Iran, South Korea, and the Ungovernable Body • Beyond Proximity: Why the UAE Occupies a Growing Place in Iran’s Strategic Calculus • Why Fiji Matters: The New Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Islands • The Long Shadow of 1953: Understanding the Iran–US Conflict • Silent Depths, Loud Signals: Nuclear Deterrence Infrastructure and the Crisis-Stability Costs of India’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Partnerships • Loss and Damage Finance: From COP28 Pledges to Policy Architecture • Securing India's Digital Frontiers: Cybersecurity Challenges and Strategic Responses in the Age of Hybrid Warfare • Beyond Consultation: BIMSTEC's Emerging Role in Regional Intelligence and Security Cooperation • Prism of Dragon’s Maritime Assertiveness: Regional Implications and India’s Strategic Options • Between the Desert and the Savannah: Conflict and the Political Economy of Instability in the Sahel • The Architecture of Cooperation: Navigating East Asia's Geopolitical Landscape • The Politics of Ali Khamenei's Funeral • From Civil Nuclear Power to Nuclear Hedging: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Emerging Nuclear Security Dilemma in the Middle East • Operation Sindoor and the Changing Dynamics of India–Pakistan Security • The Invisible Front: China-Pakistan Grey-Zone Operations • Generative AI, Labour Sovereignty, and the Geoeconomics of India's Service Economy • India's Agentic AI Strategy Needs Authority Budgets before Autonomy Scales • India's AI Diplomacy and the Future of Strategic Technologies • From Physical Borders to Intelligent Borders: The Evolution of India's Border Security Architecture • Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Governance Deficit: Challenges to International Humanitarian Law and Accountability • AI Driven Cyberwarfare and National Security • Great Power Rivalry and the Crisis of the United Nations • The Continuing U.S. Regime-Change Toolkit: Color Revolutions, Political Influence, and Vietnam • Ten Years After Brexit: Regret, Reform, or Reversal? • Digital Pathways to Extremism: An Investigative Study of ISIS and Al-Qaeda's Use of Digital Platforms in India • Sports, Strategy and Statecraft of Mega Sporting Events as Geoeconomic Instruments: Qatar 2022 to Saudi Arabia 2034 • Strategic Autonomy in the Age of Weaponised Interdependence: India’s Geopolitical Dilemma • Hardening the Quad: From Strategic Dialogue to Operational Cooperation • China’s Grey-Zone Strategy in the Indian Ocean: Implications for India’s Maritime Security • The Maghreb of States: Identity, Sovereignty, and the Limits of Non-Interference • Europe’s Digital Dependence: Can the EU Achieve Strategic Autonomy? • Beyond the Battlefield: Understanding Unconventional Security Challenges in Contemporary Geopolitics • Cuba’s Economic Crisis and Strategic Relevance: A Peripheral State in Renewed Great Power Competition • Trapped in Deterrence: Nuclear Stability and the Persistence of Conflict in South Asia • Extended Deterrence Under Strain: Credibility, Assurance, and the Stability-Instability Paradox in the Indo-Pacific • Maritime India: Security, Trade, and Great Power Competition • Beyond Ukraine: Understanding Putin's Vision of Russian Power • Silicon Sovereignty: How Semiconductors Are Redrawing Global Power Hierarchies • The Negative Impact of US–Iran War on the Pacific Region • BRICS Expansion and the Multipolar Moment: Opportunity or Strategic Contradiction? • Foot-Dragging as Feminism: Iran, South Korea, and the Ungovernable Body • Beyond Proximity: Why the UAE Occupies a Growing Place in Iran’s Strategic Calculus • Why Fiji Matters: The New Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Islands • The Long Shadow of 1953: Understanding the Iran–US Conflict
Economics September 15, 2022 1754 Reads

India to be standby on trade pillar in IPEF

V
By Vaibhav Tomar
Author • Centre for Security & Strategic Studies
India to be standby on trade pillar in IPEF
Share Analysis:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS

The IPEF was launched on May 23, 2022 jointly by US and other countries of Indo Pacific region. It was initially composed of 14 founding member nations. Fiji was the first South Pacific Island nation to join the group. The invitation to other countries to join the framework has also been extended. It was launched to create a framework that would help participants develop their economies in the 21st century. It would make them grow faster and more fairly. The objective of the IPEF is to create a framework that would facilitate future negotiations regarding trade. It does not include a uniform reduction of tariffs. 

ADVERTISEMENT

China's Foreign Minister called the initiative an attempt to further isolate China, stating that it would not be able to achieve its goals and would lead to a failure. The US' Indo-Pacific strategy also contributed to the divisions within the group. Many analysts criticized the lack of Taiwan's inclusion in the group. They claimed that it was excluded to appease certain countries, such as Indonesia, which are worried about China. Analysts also believed that many countries recognize it as not an economic grouping, but a political one.

IPEF's focus is to enhance the economic partnership of participating countries. It aims to promote sustainable development and enhance the competitiveness of the region. The 14 founding members of the IPEF are: Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the US, and New Zealand. The framework is composed of four pillars: trade, supply chains, fair economy, and clean economy.

First-in-person Ministerial Meeting

India has joined the framework's supply chain, infrastructure, and decarbonization and transparency pillars. It also participated in the first in-person ministerial of the IPEF. Through consensual statements, the participating countries were able to reach an agreement on each of the three pillars. The statements of the members of the IPEF outline an ambitious agenda that aims to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their supply chains. These include identifying critical sectors and goods, developing a rules-based trading system, and collaboration on green technology.

The participating countries of the IPEF agreed to improve the transparency, diversity, and resilience of their supply chains. They also committed to make them more resilient and well-integrated. Countries noted the importance of establishing and maintaining a rules-based trading system that is transparent and fair. They also noted the need for public institutions to evolve to address the issue of supply chains.

The countries also agreed to establish a framework for identifying and prioritizing goods and sectors that are critical to their national security and economic resilience. This will help them develop a process that will identify the various factors that affect their supply chains. They accepted to enhance the resilience and investment in their critical sectors by identifying choke points in their supply chains and supporting industries. This process will help them develop effective strategies and procedures.

The consent to establish a crisis response mechanism that will allow them to share information and develop effective strategies to respond to emergencies has also been into vision. This will be facilitated through a framework that will allow government to coordinate with the private sector. The participating countries will also improve their supply chain logistics. The third pillar of the IPEF is the clean economy. Through this agreement, the participating countries will accelerate their efforts in pursuit of climate mitigation and elimination, energy security, and climate resilience. They will also work together on various initiatives that promote the sharing of best practices in the field of clean energy technology. The participating countries acquiesce to reduce their emissions across various priority sectors. They have also recognized the importance of sustainable water solutions and land use. The IPEF will also pursue policies and programs that support the development of innovative technologies that can help remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. Finally, the new economic framework will provide incentives to encourage the clean energy transition.

Countries have also acknowledged the importance of ensuring that the rule of law, transparency, and accountability are at the core of their efforts to improve the investment climate. They will work together to implement and accelerate the progress on various initiatives that are aimed at combating corruption. They want to establish a framework for exchanging information related to tax matters. They will support regional and global efforts to improve the efficiency of tax administration.

India not part of IPEF's trade pillar

India has not yet agreed to the framework's trade pillar's commitments. It is still not ready to participate in the discussions on the implementation of the trade measures.

Although India has joined the framework's supply chain, infrastructure, and decarbonization and transparency pillars, it is not yet clear if it will be part of the trade pillar's binding commitments. However, India is open to participating in the discussion on the establishment of high standards for export trade. It has stood up to its own interests and is not afraid to be pushed around.

India will continue to take decisions on its own regarding the various aspects of the IPEF taking into the consideration of national interest. The other member countries will also focus on the implementation of the framework's goals. The forum is currently focused on the implementation of the policies and rules that are related to the investment climate. The discussions that are happening at the official level will be traced by India.

Conclusion

Several controversies have taken place during the foundation of IPEF, with regard to exclusion of china and Taiwan. According to many, the exclusion means that china was being isolating with the formation of this political group. However, in the group, the 14 member countries have the flexibility to select the pillar that they want to be part of. For instance, India has decided not to join the trade pillar. However, it may be that the country has concerns about certain aspects of the trade agreement that go beyond the obligations of the World Trade Organization. The 14 member countries have the flexibility to select the pillar that they want to be part of. For instance, India has decided not to join the trade pillar. However, it may be that the country has concerns about certain aspects of the trade agreement that go beyond the obligations of the World Trade Organization. All members of the IPEF have agreed on the various issues related to the trade agreement. They have a clear roadmap that will help them reach their goals. The implementation of the trade agreement is expected to be fast. The IPEF is designed to be flexible. Member countries can choose to participate in any of the trade agreement's pillars. It will help boost the economic activities of the 14 nations. The members have also agreed to ensure that their supply chains are resilient. members have also assisted to establish a robust framework in order to address the various issues related to the trade agreement. One of the main issues that the members have agreed to address is the overdependence on one country for their supply chains. The positive climate for the trade relations between India and the US is expected to continue. It will also encourage more investments by American companies in the country. India is a major contributor to the IT services industry in the US. Due to the availability of skilled workers in the country, it has been reported that the hiring plans of Indian companies are on the rise. We will also participate in the next trade policy engagement between the two countries. During the meeting with Vietnam and Japan, the countries discussed various areas of mutual interest. These will contribute to the creation of more jobs in India.

Pic Courtsey-Iam taylor at unsplash.com

(The views expressed are of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)

Vaibhav Tomar
About Vaibhav Tomar →

Vaibhav Tomar is pursuing his MA in Environment and politics , and done his MBA from Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies, Mumbai. His Key interest areas are International relations, maritime security, defence strategies, foreign policies etc. Email: vtomar866@gmail.com

ADVERTISEMENT

Related Strategic Analysis