How is India recalibrating its role in Sri Lankan politics
Indian interests post-Cold War for Sri Lanka made a shift from a balance of power to more pragmatic security considerations. In the 1980s and 1990s, India was avoiding being engulfed in the Cold War power struggle which led to the negligence of support for Sri Lanka’s peace and stability. After the Cold War, India put more emphasis on controlling the externalities which threatened to undermine Indian interests. Sri Lanka enjoys a strategic location in the Indian Ocean with international shipping lanes being right by the southern coast of Sri Lanka.
Since instability in Sri Lanka undermines security for all nations that happen to be significant in sea trade and energy demands, its security is essential for India as sea-based trade dominates the entire international trade of India with nearly 89% of oil being imported by sea. Further, Sri Lanka occupies an important location geographically for the projection of naval power. Therefore, India has both economic and military imperatives to ensure stability in Sri Lanka [1].
India during the Civil War:
The civil war between the Tamils of Sri Lanka and the Sinhalese people in the majority started in 1983. In this issue, India under the leadership of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi played an active role. India ran training camps in Tamil Nadu for Tamil militants which later led to the emergence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as the most lethal outfit. From the national security perspective of India, New Delhi had concerns regarding foreign influence in Sri Lanka particularly from China, Pakistan, and the United States of America (USA). According to historians, on June 4, 1987, when India decided to airdrop relief supplies in the Jaffna Peninsula held by Tamil Tigers while under siege by the Sri Lankan military, its underlying desire was to assert itself as a regional power. In response to possible direct intervention by India, J.R. Jayewardene, then President of Sri Lanka held talks with India that resulted in the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of July 29, 1987, excluding the LTTE. This deal was signed between India and Sri Lanka for the deployment of the IPKF with the objective of ensuring a ceasefire. Later by month of October, Jayawardene threatened to deploy the Sri Lankan military again unless the IPKF acted against the LTTE which strained the relations between India and the Tigers. Upon agreement from India, the IPKF engaged with the Tigers in full force. When Ranasinghe Premadasa was elected as President in January 1989, he had won on the platform of getting Indians out and thereby gave Indian three months to leave in April. A Presidential Commission report published after his death stated that he even authorized a deal to arm the LTTE against the IPKF. In 1990, India withdrew from Sri Lanka when V.P. Singh, Rajiv Gandhi’s successor as Prime Minister of India called the plan a failure which alienated the Tamil constituencies in India. Later, on 21 May 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber during his re-election campaign in Tamil Nadu. While the LTTE has always denied responsibility for the attack, an Indian Supreme Court ruling upheld 26 convictions which included Vellupillai Prabhakaran, the LTTE leader. Since then, India has kept a dual policy that urges the Sri Lankan government to fix a political deal addressing the Tamil grievances while formally labeling the LTTE as a terrorist organization [2].
India during Eelam War IV:
India enjoys a greater degree of influence on Sri Lanka and its support for Sri Lanka has proved crucial. For India, this issue gives an enduring interest in the region due to the historical ties between the two nations as well as India’s desire to become a regional player. The attempt by India to broker peace between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan by deploying the IPKF to implement the India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 ended up in a disaster. The hostility was amplified with the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 by LTTE operatives. As a result, India publicly distanced itself from the civil war in Sri Lanka. However, prominent journalist Nitin Gokhale in his book Sri Lanka: from War to Peace writes that India ensured quite military support to Sri Lanka which included five Mi-17 helicopters that played an important role in aerial operations against the LTTE. Here, India sought leverage over Sri Lanka due to the growing influence of China. apart from multiple investments and development projects, China backed the government’s call for non-interference in internal affairs and is also believed to be assisting in the modernization of its armed forces. India on the other hand offered the approval of the military offensive against the LTTE by the government in 2009 occasionally addressing the deterioration of the situation for the Tamil people stating that Sri Lanka should respect their rights. Considering this, the support of the US-sponsored resolution against Sri Lanka by India at the UN Human Rights Council does not represent a shift in policy [3].
The Fourth Eelam War lasted between 2006-20009 marking the hostilities between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. The LTTE, through this civil war, sought to create a separate Tamil nation on the Sinhalese-majority island. Earlier, the LTTE was in control of a de facto state in the Eastern and Northern provinces. Here, the LTTE was part of a cease-fire agreement arranged by Norway which although technically in place till January 2008, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission stated that by 2007 an all-out civil war was ongoing. Further, the LTTE’s use of terror tactics had led to multiple international enemies. In this regard, in 1992 India listed it as a terrorist organization, and the leadership remained wanted in India over the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi [4].
In late 2008, the Indian position on the Eelam War IV had changed shifting from negotiations and peace talks to countering terrorism with resolve. It must be noted that this change happened before M.K. Narayanan, then National Security Advisor went to Chennai in April 2009 to meet and assure the DMK President M. Karunanidhi regarding a temporary ceasefire ahead of the 2009 elections in May. Here, it must be noted that the UPA government’s communication with its biggest coalition partners and its policy were one another. Later, on 29 April 2009, when M. K. Narayanan met President Mahinda Rajapaksa, he did not “cave in” to any Indian demands. From 2006, the Sri Lankan forces and the LTTE held vast portions of land in northern and western Sri Lanka which led to displacement and deaths of people. On 18 May 2009, the Sri Lankan side prevailed with preparations underway for the celebration of the third anniversary. However, after the visit by Basil Rajapaksa, the tone of the joint statement was different. The Indian side expressed humanitarian concerns and the need for a negotiated political solution. However, at the same time, it stated that both sides have agreed regarding countering terrorism with resolve. This change dropped the idea that there was no military solution to the conflict which was always an underlying tone in the earlier Indian statements. Earlier, Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa had stated that ‘managing India’ was the key to victory against the LTTE [5].
Due to the failure of the IPKF operation and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, India kept a distant approach towards Sri Lanka. As a result, any conflict management efforts became impossible to execute. The IPKF disaster precluded a renewed armed intervention and the ban on Tamil Tigers kept India from being either a mediator or a facilitator. Thus, several historical factors have kept India from acting as a conflict manager during the Fourth Eelam War. Further domestic factors also contributed to India being indulged in the affairs of Sri Lanka.
Between 2004 to 2009, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) which included representatives that were sympathizers of the LTTE, was the third?largest member of the UPA government led by the Congress Party. The constant threats by the DMK during the final months of the civil war, to exit the coalition to induce India to pressurize the Sri Lankan government for a ceasefire indicated their interest in Sri Lankan Tamils. However, their maneuvering was limited. Therefore, the pro-Tamil politics in Tamil Nadu influenced the central government and contributed to the indecisive policies but were unable to prevent India’s support for the offensive by the Rajapaksa government [6].
In post-Civil War Sri Lanka:
India felicitated the government of Sri Lanka on the war victory by sending a top delegation to Sri Lanka on 23 May 2009. This team was headed by the then Indian Foreign Secretary, Mr. Shia Shankar Menon. This delegation informed the government in Sri Lanka regarding its concern to apply a political solution to further persuade to seek a lasting political solution for Tamil separatism.
After the civil war ended, Mahinda Rajapaksha, the President of Sri Lanka, visited India in June 2009. Following bilateral talks between the leadership of the two nations, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced India’s support to reconstruct the areas that were affected by the war and running programs for rehabilitation. India assisted the people who were displaced internally in the North and East region and provided financial assistance for projects in the area affected by war. Initially, India with an investment of $ 110 million, provided temporary housing, and emergency medical supplies and undertook demining programs. Later, India assisted with the reconstruction process after the war which involved multiple projects. For instance, India granted USD 27.5 million meant for reconstruction projects in 2010. In the same year, India contributed 15% of foreign finance from major donors.
The Tamil Nadu factor has influenced India’s foreign policy approach towards Sri Lanka throughout history. In March 2013, Jayalalitha Jeyram, the then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu put forward a resolution against Sri Lanka which was passed by the State legislative council of Tamil Nadu. This unanimously passed resolution urged New Delhi to put an economic embargo on Sri Lanka. She further stressed moving amendments to the US-backed resolution. When the number of violent cases against Sri Lankans in Tamil Nadu increased, the Sri Lankan government issued an advisory asking Sri Lankans not to visit Tamil Nadu until further notification [7].
Reconciliation in post-war Sri Lanka has been a complicated issue as it involves all communities in Sri Lanka to arrive at an acceptable political solution that goes beyond the traditional understanding of justice. The lack of progress here has led the Tamil parties under the leadership of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) to appeal to international actors like India, the US, and the UK to acknowledge the internal situation of the island nation. On 19 January 2022, the Tamil parliamentarians submitted a letter to the Indian High Commission in Colombo. In the letter, they requested India to impress upon the Sri Lankan government to find a political solution for the issue of ethnic violence. Given the current issues like human rights, decentralization and the constitutional guarantee of power devolution, the TNA and other parties are trying to inculcate attention using opportunities to spread awareness regarding the demand of the Tamil people on the international stage. The Tamil parties are also hopeful that India will pressurize the Sri Lankan government for a political solution. India’s involvement in the peacebuilding in Sri Lanka is crucial for the security of both countries reiterating the importance of issues like the need for an acceptable political solution and devolution of power when the Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka visited India between 6 to 8 February 2022. By reaching out, the Tamil parties expect any form of interim arrangement regarding the political solution while simultaneously handling the larger issues regarding justice and accountability [8].
Conclusion:
In light of the ongoing economic crisis in Sri Lanka, India once again is in a position where it is looked up to for assistance. For India, this could be an opportunity to rise to the challenge and assert itself against Chinese influence. Due to its strategic location combined with the prominence of sea-based trade routes, Sri Lanka stands crucial for India. India has interests in Sri Lanka that go beyond historical and cultural and is a major power in the region that has played a critical role in Sri Lankan politics. The role played by India has always been affected by factors both domestic and international. Considering both economic and security considerations, it is important for India to ensure a peaceful and stable Sri Lanka.
Endnotes:
1. Brian Orland, “India’s Sri Lanka Policy Towards Economic Engagement”, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, April 2008 http://www.ipcs.org/issue_briefs/issue_brief_pdf/1445888596RP16-Brian-SriLanka.pdf
2. “FACTBOX-India's role in Sri Lanka's civil war”, Reuters, 17 October 2008 https://www.reuters.com/article/idUKCOL223047
3. Pratyush, “India and Sri Lanka’s Civil War”, The Diplomat, 29 December 2012 https://thediplomat.com/2012/12/india-and-sri-lankas-civil-war/
4. Megan Price, “The End Days of the Fourth Eelam War: Sri Lanka's Denialist Challenge to the Laws of War”, Cambridge University Press, 31 January 2022 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/end-days-of-the-fourth-eelam-war-sri-lankas-denialist-challenge-to-the-laws-of-war/C66434B1E5509D50A305C2060F29A187#EN21
5. R. K. Radhakrishnan, “India’s stance towards Eelam War IV changed in Oct. 2008”, The Hindu, 15 May 2012 https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/indias-stance-towards-eelam-war-iv-changed-in-oct-2008/article3421059.ece
6. Sandra Destardi, “India and the Civil War in Sri Lanka: On the Failures of Regional Conflict Management in South Asia”, GIGA Research Programme: Violence and Security, December 2010 https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125625/http___www.giga-hamburg.de_dl_download.php_d=_content_publikationen_pdf_wp154_destradi.pdf
7. Osantha Nayanapriya Thalpawila, “India-Sri Lanka Relations: In Post Civil War in Sri Lanka”, February 2014 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283714398_India-Sri_Lanka_Relations_In_Post_Civil_War_Era_in_Sri_Lanka
8. r. Samatha Mallempati, “Sri Lanka’s Post-War Reconciliation: Rising Concerns”, Indian Council of World Affairs, 16 February 2022 https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=7063&lid=4791
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(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)