Increasing Radicalisation in Bangladesh:A Concern for South Asia

Political unrest, ideological conflicts between secular and right-wing ideologies, and poor administration have all contributed to the development of radical Islam over time. The public discourse on issues like corruption, the deterioration of democratic institutions, ineffective law enforcement, a shaky system for delivering justice, nascent educational and social institutions and rising unemployment gives radical ideologies more room to advance their alternative narratives. To a lesser extent, local extremist groups have benefited ideologically and tactically from transnational terrorist networks like the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent. Actors, including the government, commercial sector, civil society, and media, have not yet addressed radicalisation's supply and demand sides in Bangladesh. Islamist movements like Jamat-e-Islami and Nejam-e-Islam played an essential part in the creation of the young nation throughout these upheavals and would continue to do so. 

RADICALISATION SND VIOLENT EXTREMISM-

Between 1999 and 2006, Bangladesh experienced unprecedented violence, mostly committed by militant Islamists. This led to widespread worries that the Bangladeshi state would implode and become a haven for extremist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and other international jihadist movements. A little reprieve was provided between 2006 and 2012, but the bloodshed quickly destroyed that from 2013 to 2016.[1] Since 2013, there has been an increase in violent extremism in Bangladesh, with targeted extremist assaults occurring all around the nation, fostering a climate of dread and trepidation. In what is still considered Bangladesh's greatest terror incident, shooters stormed the Holey Artisan Bakery, a high-end bakery in Dhaka, and killed 20 hostages, of whom 18 were foreigners.[2] This attack showed a new group of targets as susceptible to radicalisation, and the paradigm of terrorism in Bangladesh was altered.

The Jamaat-e-Islami is the primary catalyst for radicalisation, and the majority of the terrorist groups operating in Bangladesh get intellectual indoctrination and operational backing from this hardline, very orthodox Sunni Islamic group. The focus of terror organisations has shifted from recruiting the poor, illiterate, and graduates of madrasas as foot soldiers to indoctrinating young people from universities, who are products of the modern education system and come from wealthy backgrounds, in order to target rural and urban cities simultaneously. Youths are another important group to focus on for their contributions of new talents. Young people are more susceptible to ideology's impact because they have a more pliable understanding of the world and less knowledge of society and religion. This is especially true when they are made to feel connected to others who share their pain or who are being denied their rights.

As in the rest of the globe, female radicalisation has recently become a well-known phenomenon in Bangladesh. The role of women in Bangladeshi jihadism has changed from more passive roles, such as being the wives of jihadists and raising their offspring, to more prominent, active roles, such as increasing participation in combat activities and facilitating the transmission of operational details, contribution to social media, as well as recruitment and mentoring of other members to terrorist groups, both male and female. Aside from that, female attackers are accustomed to receiving more media attention and notoriety on a strategic level because of their stronger psychological influence on their targets or opponents. Additionally, because they do not fit any profile that would attract the attention of law enforcement, their radicalisation is less obvious to those in their social circles. Female radicalisation is mostly motivated by retaliation for any harassment or violence, atonement or repair, relationships and respect, and the pervasive patriarchy in society.

The IS and Al Qaeda share the same ideologies with Hizbut Tahrir (HuT), Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen-Bangladesh (JMB), and Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT). Local, regional, and international Islamist groups have converged in Bangladesh, where they gain support on the ground and recruit foot troops in the overpopulated, impoverished nation. To protect Islam against allegedly anti-Islamic policies and stop secularism, Hefazat-e-Islam was established in Chittagong in January 2010. Ahmad Shafi served as its head. The 2009 Women Development Policy draught, which advocated granting women equal inheritance rights, was the impetus for the organisation's formation. Hefazat-e-Islam published a 13-point agenda in 2013 that included gender segregation, the release of detained Islamic scholars, and the creation of more space.[3] The Awami League administration has employed the organisation to balance off the political influence of Jamaat-e-Islam, another extreme organisation, and the Bangladesh National Party, its primary political rival. Millions of Rohingya refugees who have escaped tyranny in Myanmar continue to be displaced, contributing to an ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in Bangladesh. Bangladeshi Islamist organisations and outside organisations like the Arakan Salvation Army represent a potential soft target for radicalisation.

The fact that extremist organisations in Bangladesh are becoming more "tech-savvy" creates a fresh threat since their skilful use of technology multiplies their power. Additionally, an increasing number of people access the Internet primarily through mobile phones, and these people are occasionally underrepresented in data on Internet penetration. Online forums and social media platforms, located in Bangladesh or elsewhere, are increasingly focused on "defending Islam against Western invasion. Today, a sizable percentage of radicalisation occurs in what has been called the "online-offline combination." Many susceptible young people are drawn to terrorism through a mix of targeted messages in the internet world and recruiting through interaction in the actual world. The youth must be made more aware of the Internet, and better cyber hygiene must be developed. Cyberspace must be set apart for efforts to combat violent extremism (CVE) and prevent violent extremism (PVE) since terrorists use it.

EFFECT ON INDIA

With Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's successive victories in the 2014 and 2018 parliamentary elections, India and Bangladesh's ties further solidified. It has aided in keeping the connection consistent and expanding collaboration in a number of sectors, including connectivity, energy, space, and climate action. India's hallmark "Neighbourhood First" and "Act East" initiatives are focused on Bangladesh. A positive connection with Bangladesh will boost connectivity to the North-East Region, guarantee peace and stability, and support economic growth. India and Bangladesh significantly strengthened their bilateral ties in the years that followed. They have a tight business connection, with bilateral trade between the two countries totalling $10 billion. Bangladesh is India's largest trading partner in South Asia.[4]

The extreme religious organisations in Bangladesh do not consider the country's relationship with India. The concerns of Jamaat-e-Islami about India are widely known. In an effort to stir up support, religious organisations have sought to capitalise on the abrogation of Article 370 in Kashmir as a move by India to repress Muslims. However, the Bangladeshi government has said unequivocally that Kashmir is an internal matter for India.[5]

Bangladesh's populace has recently begun to express dissatisfaction over India's treatment of its minorities. The reason for this notion has been a variety of media stories that radical organisations have used as propaganda. In order to combat cross-border terrorism, the government has effectively collaborated with India and outlawed six groups for terrorism, including domestic terror organisations like Harkat-ul-Jihad Bangladesh, Ansar-ul-Bangla Team, and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh. Through bilateral, regional, and global collaboration, Dhaka was fully dedicated to eradicating terrorism from the South Asian area and the Sheikh Hasina government has been prompt about it.

With the Taliban back in power, the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), origins in an earlier Afghan conflict, may once more achieve influence. The Taliban recruited most extremists who have plagued Bangladesh for the past 20 years from Bangladesh in the 1990s. Both among radicals in Bangladesh and among Rohingyas, extremism may be on the rise and it will affect the entire South Asia.[6] With spillovers to border states like West Bengal and Assam and a potential influence on Myanmar, the Taliban takeover will re-energise extremist organisations operating in Bangladesh. The Sheikh Hasina administration has fought against Islamic extremism since taking office, and India and Bangladesh have been friends in this effort, but there is much more to do to prevent such influence.

In the northeast, there are said to be about 18 different militant Islamist organisations. While some of them are active, the majority remain dormant yet are still recruiting supporters and forming cadres. Assam and Bengal are strategically important for the whole northeast's security. Because Assam connects the other six northeastern states, Islamist violence and instability will have an effect on all seven of the region's states.[7] The impact on conventional warfighting capabilities would be more concerning because the Siliguri corridor and lower Assam are crucial strategic communication corridors. There are significant security worries for India due to the developing scenario in Bangladesh and its effects on northeast India and West Bengal. In addition to endangering these states' peace, stability, and security, it might influence India's defence strategies for countering the threat posed by China in the Eastern region.

CONCLUSION-

Religious extremism in Bangladesh continues to be a very complicated issue when taken into account the background of militancy in the country, the rise of Islamic fundamentalist movements, and geopolitical and international realities. Even though the government has taken many steps to reduce militancy, more comprehensive policies, strategies, and initiatives are required to deal with the complexity of violent extremism. Although several national and foreign organisations, ministries, and government agencies have individually achieved considerable headway in Bangladesh in preventing violent extremism, the nation has yet to create a thorough "whole-of-society" approach for prevention over the long term. For effective coordinated prevention, local, state, and federal governments and civil society must have a clear mandate to collaborate.

A strong relationship between the government and civil society is essential to create the right narratives that assist in counteracting extreme challenges to the nation. Additionally, we must concentrate on de-radicalisation efforts by offering more persuasive narratives and including all who have a stake in this tragedy. The task of preventing terrorism in its operational form is just half complete. The more difficult and significant challenge is combating radicalisation.

Even though Bangladesh currently has a zero-tolerance stance against extremism, nothing is being done to combat violent non-state actors' ideologies and actions. To stop ideologically driven violence from occurring in the first place, the traditional strategy for combating terrorism falls short. The government needs to do more than just enforce the law. To lessen Islamic fundamentalism in the nation, it must consider efforts involving engagement, prevention, de-radicalisation, and rehabilitation. Bilateral collaboration and cooperation to combat extremism and radicalisation between India and Bangladesh is very much needed and can go a long way in establishing their relationship.

REFERENCES-

[1] What’s Behind the Surge in Violent Islamism in Bangladesh? (n.d.), from https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/whats-behind-the-surge-in-violent-islamism-in-bangladesh/

[2] GatewayHouse. (2016, July 6). Terrorism in Bangladesh. Gateway House. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/terrorism-in-bangladesh/

[3] Hefazat-e-Islam and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh. (2022, February 16). East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/02/16/hefazat-e-islam-and-the-rise-of-islamic-fundamentalism-in-bangladesh/

[4] Bhattacharjee, J. (n.d.). Migration, river management, radicalisation: What does the future hold for India-Bangladesh relations? ORF, from https://www.orfonline.org/research/migration-river-management-radicalisation-66008/

[5] Ashok, A. (n.d.). Radicalisation: Perspectives from India and Bangladesh – Center For Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), from https://www.claws.in/radicalisation-perspectives/

[6] Chowdhury, J. R. (2021, August 15). How Taliban’s expansion in Afghanistan could signal rise of Bangladesh-based terror group. ThePrint. https://theprint.in/world/how-talibans-expansion-in-afghanistan-could-signal-rise-of-bangladesh-based-terror-group/715670/

[7] (PDF) Rise of Islamic Terror in Bangladesh and Impact on North-east India. (n.d.), from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332427267_Rise_of_Islamic_Terror_in_Bangladesh_and_Impact_on_North-east_India

Pic Courtesy-Safwan Mahmud at unsplash.com

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)