Troubled Waters: Indonesia & the South China Sea
It's next to impossible to have a state in the vicinity of China that has remained untouched by conflict concerning the South China Sea. Indonesia is amongst it, but it’s cause has been far more entangled and unique than others. It primarily refuses to acknowledge the fact that "conflict exists" while continuously being around the eye of the storm. Indonesia is constantly on its toes to keep its position on the disputed Natuna Island intact while not antagonizing China.
The genesis of the current disharmony between the two states goes back to the infamous "Nine Dashed Line" drawn by the Nationalist Chinese diplomats in 1947. Ever since then, it has been a hotbed for conflicts. The lines intersect the northern borders of Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) north of Natuna, located nearly 1400km away from the Chinese mainland. Indonesia became aware of this access in 1993 and demanded China's clarification on the same. However, the Chinese didn't involve in any clear statements and kept things ambiguous for the time being. In July 2010, Indonesia stepped up and took to UN Secretary-General, mentioning how the line "lacks international legal basis" and comes in the way of the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea. (UNCLOS). This breakthrough alarmed China and the world of the possible conflict that might gain weight if not resolved tactically. Albeit, Indonesia avoids considering, or at least, "labelling" it a dispute for the sole reason that under international law, maritime claims can't be legitimized unless they have some reference to the land feature. Therefore, acknowledging the said dispute would bless it with the legitimacy it doesn't deserve.
Moreover, this ignorance comes with another bliss, that is, it keeps Indonesia formally out of the list of countries that have a direct dispute with China over the South China Sea. Indonesia cash this position by projecting itself as an "honest broker" in negotiations encompassing these issues. It hosted a series of informal workshops from 1990 to 2014 for the same. Nevertheless, the fruits of these negotiations are not in sight, and with China becoming more powerful every passing day, Indonesia ends up being a little deeper in the situation.
Several incidents on and off in the area have brought the two parties to a more confrontation. The most prominent one was in 2016 when the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries vessel caught a Chinese trawler fishing in its EEZ. Some brawl followed this, but it made Indonesia level up its position. It deployed three frigates, five F-16 fighter jets, and a battalion to Ranai. Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu expressed, "Natuna is a door; if the door is not guarded, then thieves will come in".
For its part, Indonesia is well aware of the delicacy of the issue and that its tilt on any side would disrupt the equation. Hence, it tries to keep the balance of power in Southeast Asia in its favour by following the "Dynamic Equilibrium" strategy, which allows it to row its boat of diplomacy both ways from the United States to China. Former President Yudhoyono was a firm advocate of the "thousand friends, zero enemies" policy and stressed encompassing a foreign policy in all directions. However, this multifaceted approach didn't go well. As the leadership slipped to Jokowi, the goal changed to a foreign policy helpful for the people, sharp focus on trade and investment. This came to be known as "down-to-earth diplomacy". This shift inside the nation reflected on the international scale equally well. Jokowi administration was quick to combat illegal fishing in Indonesian waters through a more stringent approach. This crackdown came heavily on the Chinese vessels as well. A continued action and the growing tension have restrained Chinese encroachment to a great extent.
The Natuna is rich in fishery and natural gas reserves. This lures everyone alike and has put the ties between the two into question. On the one hand, Indonesia is willing to stick to its shuttle diplomacy and maintaining equilibrium and not upset China out rightly as it still looks out for Chinese investment and friendship while keeping a check on illegal fishing, confrontations and maneuvering. Furthermore, Indonesia faces challenges at the domestic level that arise out of the fear that locals have of the Chinese (foreign) labour and encroachment. In addition, Chinese infrastructure has a bad name in the Indonesian circuit, and they are deemed to have poor quality and delayed completion.
Putting together all the aforementioned tensions, it is unlikely that Indonesia would continue to thrive on its "equilibrium diplomacy" for long. As the status quo in international relations changes, states choose to navigate in the direction that offers them both a sense of security and sovereignty at the same time. They act quickly on these developments either by forming alliances to maintain a Balance of Power or by bargaining through their best diplomatic tools. Nonetheless, the chances of them sticking to their traditional commitments and policies remain bleak. The current scenario spells that Jokowi would continue to reinforce Indonesia's position in the Natuna, both by making direct investments and deploying military. However, unlike before, Indonesia is shying away to be an effective leader between the ASEAN and the South China Sea conflict. The possible explanation could be, the quoted non-alignment has left it in troubled water at times, as not choosing a clear side has its own cost. Albeit, ASEAN is at a loss if Indonesia doesn't take up the desired leadership, as the small states within its fold would find it challenging to come together on their own and counter the Chinese aggression. This would pave the way for direct Chinese assault and intervention. To conclude, Indonesia needs to buckle up, clear its head, and look for bringing together ASEAN along looking for alliances and states that would help it counter the Chinese capacities – both commercial and military. China's growth is inevitable, and there are no two ways that this growth would translate into aggressive policies and actions, which needs counter through equal capabilities on the other end.
References
1. Re-Assessing Indonesia’s Role in the South China Sea, Perspective ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2016.
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2016_18.pdf
2. Indonesia: A Bigger Role in the South China Sea?, THE DIPLOMAT, 2014.
https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/indonesia-a-bigger-role-in-the-south-china-sea/
3. How likely is an enhanced Indonesian role in the South China Sea dispute? Global Risks Insights, 2016.
https://globalriskinsights.com/2016/04/likely-enhanced-indonesian-role-south-china-sea-dispute/
4. South China Sea Dispute: Indonesia Refuses Negotiations, Rejects China's Nine-Dash Line Claims, International Business Times, 2020.
https://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-indonesia-refuses-negotiations-rejects-chinas-nine-dash-line-2998080
5. South China Sea dispute could lead to China-Indonesia conflict, ORF, 2014.
https://www.orfonline.org/research/south-china-sea-dispute-could-lead-to-china-indonesia-conflict/
Pic Courtesy-Anggit Rizkianto at unsplash.com
(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)
Khyati Singh has a Masters in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University. Her research interest includes AI, Great Debates, Grand Theories, International Relations, and Post Colonial Literature in IR.
