The Return of Strategic Geography: Chokepoints and Energy Corridors in Global Politics
India’s deepening engagement with West Asia reflects a significant strategic realignment shaped by energy security, trade diversification, and evolving geopolitical dynamics. This article explores how New Delhi’s policies, ranging from economic partnerships to defence cooperation, are recalibrating its role in the region. It situates India’s approach within the broader context of great-power competition, regional security challenges, and multi-alignment strategies. The analysis underscores how West Asia’s strategic geography and resource centrality position it as a pivotal arena for India’s foreign policy in the twenty-first century.
Introduction
The prominent political geographers, such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Halford Mackinder, and Nicholas J. Spykman, had underscored the significance of geography in shaping global politics and influencing the balance of global power decades ago. According to Mackinder, “every century has had its own geographical perspective.”[1] Seen through this statement, the contemporary geopolitical scenario of the international political order gives more power to Spykman’s notion of ‘Rimland,’ which he identified with the coastal areas of Eurasia, constituting regions ranging from Western Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, to East Asia. He extended his argument to claim that “who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.” Emphasising the importance of sea waters, he further says that “maritime mobility is the basis for a new type of geopolitical structure…. (and)…now the sea has become a great artery of communication.”[2] The criticality of major Sea lines of Communication (SLOCs) and maritime chokepoints in the current global order has enhanced the strategic significance of ‘Rimland’ over Mackinder’s land-based theory of ‘Heartland.’ Countries are vying to exert their influence through maritime power across the globe. Emerging connotations such as the ‘Indo-Pacific,’ establishment of permanent naval bases, formation of maritime alliances, regular patrolling, and grand maritime exercises have become common ways to demonstrate maritime superiority by the lead actors of the global system[3]. Thus, this relation between geography and strategy makes it crucial to use territory and space as a unit of analysis to understand the enduring geopolitical contestation in the Middle Eastern chokepoints – the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, and the Suez Canal.
The strategic significance of these chokepoints cannot be overestimated. They are critical nodes of maritime trade, carrying the lifeblood of the modern industrialised economy, that is, oil, natural gas, and other petroleum products. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “around one-fifth of global liquified natural gas trade and around 20 million barrels of oil per day have transited through the Strait of Hormuz in 2024.”[4] The fact that these narrow waterways are vulnerable to blockage due to a variety of factors further enhances their strategic value because volatility in the shipping lanes or energy corridors transporting vital energy resources can have cascading effects that disrupt the economic growth and development of nations dependent on such imports. In this light, this article tries to explain the significance of the three maritime chokepoints of the Middle East as a strategic artery of the global economy, along with issues and factors that make them geopolitical leverage points and central to geopolitical contestation in global politics.
The Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz, the most critical maritime lane for the global energy market, is the only sea lane that connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Located in the territorial waters of Oman and Iran, the strait is just 30 miles wide at its narrowest point, and its shipping lanes are just 3 km wide, but its depth allows Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) to navigate easily.[5] The geoeconomic value of the strait can be estimated from the fact that “about one-fifth of global oil and petroleum product consumption” flowed through the strait in 2024 and the Q1 of 2025, as per the EIA. Most of the Gulf countries, primarily Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE, heavily depend on the strait for the bulk of their oil and natural gas trade. Thus, any disruption in the Strait can have broader economic consequences for both oil and gas exporting countries of the region and for countries that substantially rely on the Gulf hydrocarbons (see figure 1.2) for their energy security, particularly major Asian economies like India, China, South Korea, and Japan.
Figure 1.1: Strait of Hormuz
Figure 1.2: Domino Effect of Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz for Oil and Gas Importing Countries
Source: Author’s own
Geopolitical Contestation
The Strait of Hormuz has always been a major flashpoint for power struggles and geopolitical rivalry among global and regional powers. The ‘Tanker War’ of the 1980s between Iran and Iraq is still relevant to highlight the criticality of safety and security of shipping vessels transiting the narrow waterway. To weaken the combat capability of Iran during the 1980-88 War, Iraq adopted the ‘pressure tactic’ by attacking Iranian ships carrying military supplies and later targeting the cargo vessels exporting Iranian goods. In retaliation, Iran too attacked “ships belonging to Iraq’s trading partners and to countries that loaned Iraq money to support its war efforts.”[6] This targeting of the enemy’s merchant shipping “resulted in over 400 civilian seamen killed, hundreds of merchant ships damaged and substantial economic losses.”[7] Ultimately, this anti-shipping campaign prompted the United States to intervene to ensure freedom of navigation through reflagging exercises and escorting vessels through the strait under the ‘Operation Earnest Will’.[8] This entire incident highlights the volatility of sea-borne passage and the weaponisation of geostrategic locations by surrounding states to pressure their rivals.
Furthermore, the persistent Iranian threat to block the Strait has been a pressing issue in the global energy market for decades. In the recent 12-day Iran-Israel War, Tehran even passed a resolution to block the Strait.[9] Estimates suggest that if the Iranian threat ever becomes a reality, the oil prices could surge to around $150 per barrel,[10] which “underscores the geoeconomic reverberations of a military conflict rooted in entrenched geopolitical rivalries”.[11] Besides piracy, mining of the shipping lanes, deployment of anti-ship missiles, and attacks on naval and cargo vessels are some of the other issues that exhibit the precarious situation of maritime security in the strategic artery of the global energy supply chain.
This volatile environment has created a common threat perception and security dilemma in the Persian Gulf region, giving rise to the presence of multinational naval forces such as the Combined Task Force-150, Combined Task Force-152, US Navy’s 5th Fleet (in Bahrain) and Regional Command of United States CENTCOM (in Qatar)[12] to deter any aggression emanating from Tehran and violent non-state actors (VNSAs). In addition, to thwart the supply chain disruption and ensure stability in the region, eight countries of the European Union (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal) established the European-led Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH) in February 2020.[13] Along with these international initiatives, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are enhancing their naval capabilities to deter maritime risks in the Persian Gulf region and its surrounding areas.[14]
Iran’s strategic position in the strait has even prompted countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE to invest in alternative infrastructure to circumvent the strait. Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline from the Persian Gulf to the Port of Yanbu in the Red Sea has a capacity of carrying 5 million barrels of oil per day, while the UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah Pipeline can transit around 1.5 million barrels per day.[15] However, most of the countries do not have any rerouting options. For example, Qatar fully depends on the strait for its liquified natural gas exports[16], and even Iran, for that matter, would suffer heavy economic losses if it ever stopped the ships through the waterway.[17] It could be described as what William O’ Neil says, a ‘self-destructive folly.’[18]
Thus, the geopolitical environment in the Strait of Hormuz is of significant concern for both regional as well as extra-regional powers. The traditional rivalries are giving way to a new kind of security architecture in the area where nation-states are vying to exercise their strategic autonomy and protect their national interests.
Bab-el-Mandeb
Located between the Arabian Peninsula in the East and the Horn of Africa in the West, Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. Just 29 km wide at its narrowest point,[19] the strait has only 2 two-mile-wide channels for entry and exit. It is one of the most critical maritime chokepoints of the world’s oil transportation system and has the power to upend international trade and energy security. The shortest sea route between Asia and Europe, its strategic importance lies in the fact that it is the sole maritime lane that provides direct access to the Suez Canal, another artery of sea-borne trade. As per the World Bank, almost 30% of oil and 40% of goods trade transits the Red Sea,[20] enhancing the strategic position and centrality of the Bab-el-Mandeb in global trade and the energy market.
Geostrategic Conundrums
The geopolitical landscape and strategic context in the Bab el-Mandeb hold little to no similarity with those of the Strait of Hormuz. Surrounded by countries engulfed in civil wars, political instability, and low economic growth, the strait has become a flashpoint for maritime terrorism, hijacking of commercial vessels, piracy, smuggling, and human trafficking. Although international naval coalitions are formed to deter these threats, the resurgence of piracy along the Somali coast highlights the enduring risk faced by the global shipping industry.[21] Besides, the presence of Houthi militias in Yemen has exemplified the already fragile security architecture in the area. They deploy drones, ballistic missiles, and short-range rockets to disrupt the Red Sea, forcing shipping companies to voyage via the Cape of Good Hope (see figure 1.4), which results in increased transit time and high freight costs, severely impacting retailers, manufacturers, logistics firms and ultimately consumers.[22]
Furthermore, since Houthis are a key part of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, any conflict between Iran and Israel or Israel and Hamas provokes them to use disruption in the Red Sea as a strategic weapon (see table 1.1). For instance, since the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict in October 2023 till December 2024, Houthis conducted 201 attacks on commercial vessels within the Red Sea alone.’[23] In this scenario, many commercial ships (belonging primarily to Russia and China) traversing the strait began signalling their ownership and nationality to avoid these attacks.[24] However, the militant group did not spare vessels of the U.S., UK and other European countries, leading to military strikes by these countries on Houthi bases in the Red Sea and Yemen. Between January 2024 and January 2025, around 931 airstrikes were conducted by the combined forces of the U.S. and UK under the Operation Prosperity Guardian, but these could not deter the militias from continuing their attacks on cargo ships.[25]
Figure 1.3: Impact of Disruptions in the Red Sea 
Source: https://procurementmag.com/supply-chain-management/red-sea-disruption-trade
Table 1.1: Houthi attacks on Merchant Ships in the Red Sea Area (a few examples)
Month and Year Country and Sh
In addition, the strategic significance of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and its crucial role in ensuring energy security have led global and regional powers to establish military bases in the Horn of Africa region. This power competition among nation-states, particularly China, the United States, Russia, France, the UAE, Turkey, Iran, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, has turned the territory near the waterway into a battleground for strategic hegemony. The military bases help countries fulfil a dual purpose. Firstly, they allow them to keep a vigil on the activities of their rivals in the region and to exert military pressure in case of any adverse event. Secondly, the growing energy demands for consistent economic growth have made the security of energy corridors more imperative than ever before. Therefore, to secure the energy supply chain and ensure freedom of navigation, countries are strengthening their naval presence in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.[26]
The Suez Canal
The Suez Canal, one of the greatest technical achievements of humankind, was inaugurated on 17th November 1869 after years of toiling in a deserted area.[27] By directly connecting the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, it provided the shortest and fastest route between Asia, Europe, and the Americas and completely transformed the global trade ecosystem. Currently, around 12% of global trade and 30% of global container traffic transit the Canal,[28] making it one of the busiest maritime arteries in the world. In addition, the megastructure is also a lifeline for the global energy market as 9% of global oil and 8% of liquified natural gas traverse through it.[29] Any disruption in this sea route would cost millions of dollars to the global economy, as was evident during the MV Ever Given blockage in March 2021.[30]
Figure 1.4: Suez Canal
Source: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56559073
Geopolitical Contestation
The strategic importance of the Suez Canal can be understood from the geopolitical conflicts that reflect in its history. When the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalisation of the Canal in 1956, what followed was an invasion by Britain, France, and Israel, resulting in the Suez Crisis. The five-month (October 1956-March 1957) closure of the Canal disrupted shipping significantly and highlighted the fragility of logistics supply chains amid the power demonstration by nation-states. However, the catastrophe during the Six-Day War between Egypt and Israel in 1967 was more intense and precarious than the 1956 crisis. The Egyptian government announced the closing of the Suez Canal on 5th June 1967 as it became a frontline between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the war. The eight-year (1967-1975) long closure of the waterway reflected in some short-term and long-term consequences for global shipping and maritime trade.
Immediate headwinds were diversion of trade, transit delays, increased insurance premiums and freight costs, and approximately $250 million annual loss for Egypt and $1.7 billion loss to world trade.[31] In the long term, the prolonged closure brought about some structural changes in the shipping industry, with “shipping companies turned to larger ‘supertanker’ oil vessels capable of economising on the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope and construction of the Sumed pipeline by Egypt to transfer oil from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea.”[32]
Although the Canal has remained open since 1975, the impact of Middle Eastern conflicts in recent years has disrupted trade via the chokepoint to some extent. Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are the biggest cause of instability, which has intensified in the past two years due to the Israel-Hamas conflict. The attacks caused a drop in traffic through the Canal by 50% while increasing transit through the Cape of Good Hope by 74%,[33] and shrinking the global shipping capacity by 20%.[34]
Conclusion
The strategic vulnerability of the Middle Eastern chokepoints and the intertwined political, economic, and geographical factors highlight the significance of Colin S. Gray’s statement that “all political matters occur within a particular geographical context; in short, they have a geopolitical dimension.”[35] It is beyond doubt that the strategic locations of these chokepoints and the presence of vital energy resources have made them a flashpoint of international politics. All major powers from Asia, Europe, and the Americas are exerting their maritime prowess to safeguard their national interests. To ensure free passage and the safety of these waterways, they must work together and uphold the principle of freedom of navigation as envisaged under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Endnotes
[1] Meining, Donald W. 1956. “Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History.” The Western Political Quarterly 9 (3): 533-569. https://doi.org/10.2307/444454
[2] Spykman, Nicholas. “Heartland and Rimland.” In The Structure of Political Geography, edited by Roger E. Kasperson and Julian V. Minghi. New York: Routledge, 2017.
[3] Antonopoulos, Constantinos. 2020. “Maritime Geographies.” International Encylopedia of Human Geography 397-406. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-102295-5.10670-5
[4] US Energy Information Administration. 2025. “Amid Regional Conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains Critical Oil Chokepoint.” June 16, 2025. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=65504
[5] Strauss Center for International Security and Law. “Strait of Hormuz: Assessing the Threat to Oil Flows through the Strait.” Accessed August 12, 2025. https://www.strausscenter.org/strait-of-hormuz-geography/
[6] Strauss Centre for International Security and Law, “Strait of Hormuz: Tanker War.” Accessed August 12, 2025. https://www.strausscenter.org/strait-of-hormuz-tanker-war/
[7] Navias, Martin S. n.d. “The First Tanker War with Iran.” History Today. Accessed August 13, 2025. https://www.historytoday.com/history-matters/first-tanker-war
[8] Brito, Dagobert, and Amy Myers Jaffe. “Reducing Vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz.” In Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran, edited by Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2005. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12040.12
[9] Yashee. 2025. “Iran moves to block Strait of Hormuz: What this will mean for India, Tehran, World, in 4 Points.” The Indian Express, June 24, 2025. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/iran-block-strait-of-hormuz-4-points-explained-10081870/
[10] The Times of India. 2025. “What would Happen to UAE and Global Energy Markets if Iran Closed the Strait of Hormuz?” June 23, 2025. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/middle-east/what-would-happen-to-uae-and-global-energy-markets-if-iran-closed-the-strait-of-hormuz/articleshow/122025996.cms
[11] Taneja, Kabir, and Prithvi Gupta. 2025. “Chokepoint Checkers: Iran’s Strait of Hormuz Gambit.” Observer Research Foundation, July 05, 2025. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/chokepoint-checkers-iran-s-strait-of-hormuz-gambit#:~:text=The%20Strait%20of%20Hormuz's%20geostrategic,to%20reach%20the%20desired%20destinations
[12] Yadlin, Amos, and Yoel Guzansky. 2012. “The Strait of Hormuz: Assessing and Neutralising the Threat.” Strategic Assessment 14(4). https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/fe-359977416.pdf
[13] Yu, Zhen. 2022. “Gulf Region and EU’s Maritime Security Strategy: The Expanding ‘Blue Border’?” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 16 (1): 102–12. https://doi.org/10.1080/25765949.2022.2056383
[14] Mosly, Amnah. 2023. “Enhancing Cooperation on Maritime Security in the Gulf.” Gulf Research Center, January 1, 2023. https://www.grc.net/single-commentary/76#:~:text=The%20creation%20of%20the%20Combined,Combined%20Maritime%20Forces%2C%202022
[15] Kumar, Himendra Mohan. 2018. “Habshan-Fujairah Pipeline Inaugurated Today.” Gulf News, September 15, 2018. https://gulfnews.com/business/energy/habshan-fujairah-pipeline-inaugurated-today-1.1049361
[16] Makarewicz, Ana Maria Jaller. 2025. “Strait of Hormuz Disruption would Jeopardise 10% of Europe’s LNG Imports.” Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, June 27, 2025. https://ieefa.org/resources/strait-hormuz-disruption-would-jeopardise-10-europes-lng-imports#:~:text=About%2094%25%20of%20the%20LNG,the%20exports%20went%20to%20Asia
[17] Lamb, Kate, and Dan Sabbagh. 2025. “The Strait of Hormuz: How could Iran Close it and why does it Matter to Global Trade.” The Guardian, June 23, 2025.https://ieefa.org/resources/strait-hormuz-disruption-would-jeopardise-10-europes-lng-imports#:~:text=About%2094%25%20of%20the%20LNG,the%20exports%20went%20to%20Asia
[18] Neil, William D. O’, and Caitlin Talmadge. 2008. “Costs and Difficulties of Blocking the Strait of Hormuz.” International Security 33(3): 190-198. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40207146
[19] Johny, Stanly. 2023. “Bab el-Mandeb: A Strategic Choke Point.” The Hindu, December 24, 2023. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/bab-el-mandeb-a-strategic-choke-point/article67669979.ece
[20] Qiao, Jun, Yitong Li, and Mingxuan Huang. 2024. “the Geopolitical Importance of Bab el-Mandeb Strait: A Strategic Gateway to Global Trade.” Middle East Political and Economic Institute, February 28, 2024. https://mepei.com/the-geopolitical-importance-of-bab-el-mandeb-strait-a-strategic-gateway-to-global-trade/
[21] SHIPUNIVERSE. 2025. “Resurgence of Somali Piracy and the 2025 Maritime Security Outlook.” February 11, 2025. https://www.shipuniverse.com/news/resurgence-of-somali-piracy-and-the-2025-maritime-security-outlook/#:~:text=The%20resurgence%20of%20Somali%20piracy,both%20commercial%20and%20fishing%20vessels.
[22] Mcmillan, Aaron. 2025. “How the Shipping Crisis in the Red Sea is Impacting Trade.” Procurement Magazine, march 17, 2025. https://procurementmag.com/supply-chain-management/red-sea-disruption-trade
[23] Borgne, Eric Le, Željko Bogeti?, Luan Zhao, Daria Ulybina, Joanne Matossian, Andres Chamorro, Sahiti Sarva, Yahui Zhao, and Weijian Li. 2025. “The Deepening Red Sea Shipping Crisis: Impacts and Outlook.” The World Bank, February, 2025. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099253002102539789/pdf/IDU10b8b59671dbc814cfc19c4a1299ff54854ba.pdf
[24] Raudan, Noam. 2025. “How the Iran-Israel Conflict is Affecting Gulf Energy and Maritime Security.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 23, 2025. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-iran-israel-conflict-affecting-gulf-energy-and-maritime-security
[25] Nagi, Ahmed. 2025. “The Houthis’ Red Sea Attacks Explained.” International Crisis Group, April 3, 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.org/visual-explainers/red-sea/#:~:text=BEGIN,that%20intervened%20the%20next%20year.
[26] Liyew, Estifanos Balew. 2024. “Geopolitics of the Red Sea: Implications of Foreign Military Bases Expansion to the Horn of Africa Security.” African Security Review 33 (3): 294–306. https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2024.2340015
[27] Suez Canal Authority. n.d. “Canal History.” Accessed August 20, 2025. https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/About/SuezCanal/Pages/CanalHistory.aspx
[28] New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2021. “The Importance of the Suez Canal to Global Trade.” Accessed August 20, 2025. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/mfat-market-reports/the-importance-of-the-suez-canal-to-global-trade-18-april-2021
[29] Helwa, Racha, and Perrihan Al-Riffai. 2025. “A Lifeline under Threat: Why the Suez Canal’s Security Matters for the World.” Atlantic Council, march 20, 2025. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/a-lifeline-under-threat-why-the-suez-canals-security-matters-for-the-world/
[30] Russon, Mary-Ann. 2021. “The Cost of the Suez Canal Blockage.” BBC News, March 29, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56559073
[31] The New Arab Staff and Agencies. 2021. “Before the Ever Given: A Look at the Crises that Closed Suez.” March 28, 2021. https://www.newarab.com/news/look-crises-closed-suez#:~:text=During%20the%20closure%2C%20over%20a,to%20a%20United%20Nations%20study
[32] Racha and Riffai. “A Lifeline under Threat.” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/a-lifeline-under-threat-why-the-suez-canals-security-matters-for-the-world/
[33] Kamali, Parisa, Robin Koepe, Alessandra Sozzi, and Jasper Verschuur. 2024. “Red Sea Attacks Disrupt Global Trade.” IMF Blog, March 7, 2024. https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2024/03/07/Red-Sea-Attacks-Disrupt-Global-Trade#:~:text=The%20%20Chart%20of%20the,compared%20with%20the%20prior%20year
[34] Abraham, Jude. 2024. “The Impact of the Red Sea Crisis on Global Shipping and Trade.” FREIGHTOS, October 30, 2024. https://www.freightos.com/freight-blog/market-update/red-sea-crisis-impact/
[35] Gray, Colin S. 1999. “Inescapable Geography.” Journal of Strategic Studies 22 (2–3): 161–77. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402399908437759
Photo by Hisham Zayadneh: https://www.pexels.com/photo/a-ship-in-the-sea-14924471/
(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views of CESCUBE.
