Taiwan's 2024 Elections: An In-depth Analysis

The election results, though largely in line with pre-election polls, open the door to a nuanced analysis of Taiwan's political landscape. William Lai's victory as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, securing slightly over 40 percent of the vote[i], prompts reflections on the island's trajectory and its evolving relationship with mainland China. Simultaneously, shifts in the Legislative Yuan's power dynamics, with the DPP losing seats and the Kuomintang (KMT) gaining ground[ii], contribute to a reshaped political terrain. The ramifications of these outcomes echo across domestic and international realms, influencing narratives surrounding diplomacy, security, and economic partnerships.

Amid these unfolding developments, the global community grapples with Beijing's responses, given its integral role in the Taiwan Strait tensions. Diplomatic moves, economic pressures, and the persistent spectre of potential military posturing contribute layers of complexity to the post-election landscape. As we delve into the intricacies of the election results, reactions from key stakeholders, and the multifaceted role of Taiwan's economy, a comprehensive understanding emerges of the challenges and opportunities defining this critical juncture in East Asian politics. The democratic process in Taiwan transcends local significance, serving as a litmus test for power dynamics and cooperation in a region where geopolitical fault lines have the potential to reshape the global order.

Election Results, Political Landscape Changes, and Implications

The election results, not unexpectedly, aligned closely with public opinion polls favouring William Lai. Lai secured victory with just over 40 percent of the vote, leading the Kuomintang (KMT) candidate, Hou Yu-ih, and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate, Ko Wen-je, who received 33.5 percent and 26.5 percent of the vote, respectively. Unlike Tsai Ing-wen's previous elections, Lai did not win an outright majority, presenting a different political scenario.[iii]

The Legislative Yuan elections witnessed a shift, with the DPP losing seats and its majority. The KMT gained 14 seats, obtaining a total of 52, just ahead of the DPP's 51. The TPP secured eight seats, marking the first time since 2004 that no party won an outright majority[4]. This sets the stage for the TPP to play a crucial role in forming a coalition to lead the legislature.

Beyond the immediate numerical outcomes, the implications of the election results echo across various dimensions of Taiwanese politics. William Lai's victory, while significant, points to a political landscape marked by fragmentation, with a lack of an outright majority[5]. This situation not only underscores a departure from the previous electoral patterns but also sets the stage for intricate negotiations and collaborations in the Legislative Yuan.

The DPP's loss of seats in the Legislative Yuan signifies a potential challenge for President-elect Lai in advancing the party's agenda. The weakened majority complicates the policymaking process and necessitates a more inclusive approach to garner support for key initiatives. The KMT's gain of 14 seats, positioning them marginally ahead, signals a resurgence that cannot be ignored.[6] This newfound strength empowers the KMT to assert itself more assertively in legislative matters, potentially fostering a more balanced and dynamic political discourse.

The emergence of the TPP as a significant player introduces a fresh dynamic to Taiwan's political landscape. With eight seats, the TPP holds a pivotal position as a potential kingmaker in the formation of coalitions[7]. The absence of a clear majority for any single party implies an era of collaborative governance, where cross-party alliances and negotiations become imperative for the effective functioning of the legislature[8].

The implications extend beyond domestic considerations, resonating in Taiwan's stance on cross-strait relations. With a more evenly distributed legislative power, President-elect Lai will likely face constraints in pursuing a more assertive stance towards China[9]. The need for internal cohesion and consensus-building may temper the government's approach, emphasizing stability in the region. As Taiwan navigates this altered political landscape, the implications are not confined solely to the numerical distribution of seats. They manifest in the need for strategic alliances, compromises, and a recalibration of policy objectives.

Taiwan's Economy and Its Impact on the Election

Taiwan's economic landscape played a pivotal role in shaping voter sentiments during the 2024 elections. Characterized by steady growth throughout most of the pandemic, the economy experienced a decline in late 2022 and early 2023, coinciding with the end of China's zero-Covid policy and subsequent outbreaks[10]. However, recovery ensued with growth rates of 3.4 percent in Q2 and 2.3 percent in Q3 of 2023[11].

A crucial factor influencing voter concerns was the cost of living, particularly high housing costs in major cities[12]. While Taiwan's economy has good fundamentals and relatively low inequality, the rising cost of housing and the perception of economic overdependence on China emerged as significant issues[13]. Despite a modest decrease in China's share of Taiwan's exports from 28 percent in 2010 to 25 percent in 2022, there's a notable decline in China's share of outbound foreign direct investment from 84 percent to 34 percent during the same period[14]. Additionally, Taiwan's public expressed concern about the dominance of the semiconductor industry in its economy.[15] While proud of its global leadership in semiconductor manufacturing, there are worries about overreliance on this sector, potentially crowding out opportunities for diversification and growth in other industries[16].

The New Southbound Policy and adaptations to U.S.-China tensions have contributed to a relative decrease in economic dependence on China[17]. However, the post-election period brings challenges, as the new administration grapples with addressing housing costs, fostering economic diversification, and maintaining a delicate balance between regional and global economic partnerships[18]. In summary, the economic landscape, marked by both strengths and challenges, remains a key determinant shaping voter sentiments and influencing policy priorities in post-election Taiwan.

Beijing's Reaction: Diplomacy and Economic Measures

Beijing's response to Taiwan's 2024 elections unfolded with a series of diplomatic manoeuvres, economic pressures, and subtle geopolitical strategies, reflecting its calculated approach to the changing political landscape in Taiwan. Just two days after the election, the small Pacific Island nation of Nauru announced the severance of diplomatic ties with Taiwan, opting to establish relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)[19]. This diplomatic move, a well-practiced tactic by Beijing, aims to both punish Taiwan and isolate it on the international stage. Nauru's decision adds to the list of 10 countries that have switched ties from Taiwan to the PRC during Tsai Ing-wen's leadership[20]. The timing of Nauru's announcement, coming immediately after the election, underscores Beijing's intention to wield diplomatic leverage to shape the post-election narrative. This calculated move aligns with China's broader strategy of influencing the international perception of Taiwan's political dynamics, leveraging diplomatic ties as both a reward for compliance and a punishment for perceived defiance[21].

In addition to diplomatic pressure, Beijing showcased its economic clout in attempts to sway Taiwan's policies. In April 2023, China initiated a formal investigation into Taiwan’s compliance with the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), focusing on Taiwan's restrictions on certain Chinese imports[22]. This investigation, strategically launched months before the election, was followed by announcements of minor penalties against Taiwan just days before the electoral event[23]. The potential expansion of trade restrictions looms on the horizon, creating a backdrop of economic uncertainties for Taiwan. Another display of Beijing's influence manifested in its ability to pressure an international volleyball competition to relocate from Taiwan to Indonesia[24]. While the protest against the competition was officially filed in late December, the news of the relocation strategically broke on January 17, just days after Taiwan's election[25]. This timing emphasizes Beijing's intent to flex its geopolitical muscle and influence events to align with its narrative.

On the diplomatic front, the PRC authorities issued statements criticizing the United States, Japan, and European countries for sending delegations to Taiwan post-election[26]. Furthermore, the U.S. State Department and the Philippines faced criticism for issuing congratulatory statements to President-elect William Lai.[27] However, it is noteworthy that the spokesperson of the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office released a statement that seemed to downplay the outcome of the election, emphasizing the enduring "one China" principle[28]. This nuanced response suggests Beijing's delicate balancing act, simultaneously expressing displeasure with certain international engagements while attempting not to escalate tensions excessively.

Amidst these diplomatic and economic pressures, Beijing's subtle strategic moves also include threats of potential economic penalties, with the ECFA hanging in the balance[29]. Although both China and Taiwan are members of the World Trade Organization, their economic ties are primarily governed by the ECFA[30]. The possibility of Beijing expanding trade restrictions in the coming months could have profound implications for Taiwan’s firms, affecting their ability to operate in China[31]. There remains a smaller but tangible possibility that Beijing might outright suspend the ECFA, adding another layer of uncertainty to Taiwan's economic landscape.

Implications for the United States

The outcome of Taiwan's 2024 elections carries significant implications for the United States, despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations[32]. Taiwan remains a crucial partner for the U.S. across various sectors, including technology, public health, and security[33]. President-elect William Lai's victory in the eighth peaceful presidential election is notable in the context of growing tensions in the region.[34]

The Biden administration, maintaining a longstanding policy of neutrality regarding Taiwanese elections, emphasized no preference for specific outcomes.[35] Lai, signalling a commitment to peace and predictability, offers a potential avenue for continued collaboration[36]. As a relatively untested foreign policy leader, challenges may arise in navigating the complex geopolitical environment[37]. Given Beijing's coercion campaigns, effective communication between Taipei and Washington becomes imperative to manage potential boundary probing, disinformation, and aggression from China[38]. Lai's vice president-elect, Bi-khim Hsiao, with significant foreign policy experience, is poised to contribute to addressing the challenges ahead.[39]

While the U.S. anticipates an active partnership with Lai, potential hurdles include heightened Chinese pressure and the need for a delicate balance in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait. As the United States closely monitors the evolving situation, the election outcome prompts a revaluation of its strategic approach in the region, emphasizing the importance of preserving the status quo and managing potential flashpoints in cross-strait relations.

Potential Security Risks

China's preparedness for Taiwan's 2024 elections is evident in its comprehensive approach, incorporating political, economic, and military measures. While the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has not announced large-scale military exercises, as observed in past instances, there are notable geopolitical and security implications. Should Beijing perceive William-Lai as crossing critical redlines, there's a possibility of increased military and quasi-military pressure on Taiwan. Daily military activities near Taiwan, including heightened air and maritime presence within Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ), may intensify. The PLA's use of satellite launches, and high-altitude balloons further signals its intent to assert dominance over Taiwan's airspace[40].

China's response hinges on several factors. Lai's failure to secure an outright majority and the DPP's loss in the Legislative Yuan provide Beijing with diplomatic leverage, allowing it to argue that peaceful unification remains plausible. Recognizing economic headwinds domestically, China may exercise caution, considering the potential impact of major military actions on foreign investment and bilateral ties. Moreover, Beijing's active efforts to stabilize U.S.-China relations suggest a desire to garner international support for its stance. A significant military operation against Taiwan could undermine recent progress in bilateral ties, particularly with a U.S. presidential election on the horizon. Xi Jinping, aware of internal PLA challenges, may weigh the risks, considering potential domestic repercussions[41].

Conclusion

The 2024 elections in Taiwan have set the stage for a recalibrated political landscape with implications reverberating globally. William Lai's victory, while anticipated, signals a shift towards a more fragmented political scenario, demanding nuanced governance and cross-party collaboration within the Legislative Yuan.

Internationally, Beijing's responses, combining diplomatic manoeuvres and economic pressures, showcase a strategic recalibration. This dynamic redefines Taiwan's foreign relations and underscores the island's role as a geopolitical fulcrum. The delicate balance Taiwan must strike in its foreign engagements reflects the evolving complexities of regional dynamics. Economically, Taiwan stands at a crossroads, necessitating diversification and strategic adjustments. The post-election landscape demands a reassessment of the island's economic dependencies, particularly in light of concerns about housing costs and industry dominance. For the United States, Taiwan's continued commitment to democratic values offers avenues for sustained collaboration. As China asserts itself geopolitically, effective communication between Taipei and Washington becomes crucial in navigating potential security risks. The U.S. must delicately balance its strategic approach in the region to preserve stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Looking forward, Taiwan's trajectory will likely be characterized by collaborative governance, economic recalibration, and diplomatic finesse. The region and the world can expect a Taiwan navigating a delicate path, seeking stability amidst geopolitical complexities. The island's resilience in the face of these uncertainties will shape not only its own future but also contribute to defining the broader dynamics of East Asian politics in the years to come.

Bibliography

1. Cheung, Eric, Wayne Chang, Nectar Gan, and Jerome Taylor. “Taiwan Voters Dismiss China Warnings and Hand Ruling Party a Historic Third Consecutive Presidential Win.” CNN. CNN, January 13, 2024. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/13/asia/taiwan-presidential-election-results-intl-hnk/index.html.
2. Ghosh, Rudroneel. “Dissecting Taiwan Polls: The Election Was a Lot Closer, Posing a Dilemma for DPP for the Future.” Times of India Blog. Times of India, January 19, 2024. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/talkingturkey/dissecting-taiwan-polls-the-election-was-a-lot-closer-posing-a-dilemma-for-dpp-for-the-future/.
3. Hart, Brian, Scott Kennedy, Jude Blanchette, and Bonny Lin. “Taiwan’s 2024 Elections: Results and Implications.” Csis.org, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/taiwans-2024-elections-results-and-implications#:~:text=Lai%2C%20who%20is%20currently%20vice,26.5%20percent%20of%20the%20vote..
4. BNP Paribas. “Taiwan: Economic and Strategic Strength.” economic-research.bnpparibas.com, July 11, 2023. https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Taiwan-Economic-strategic-strength-7/11/2023,48780
5. Hawksley, Humphrey. “Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy Is Decreasing Its Reliance on China.” Nikkei Asia. Nikkei Asia, October 4, 2019. https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Taiwan-s-New-Southbound-Policy-is-decreasing-its-reliance-on-China.
6. Jazeera, Al. “Nauru Seals Diplomatic Ties with China after Dumping Taiwan.” Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, January 24, 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/24/china-and-nauru-resume-diplomatic-ties.
7. AP. “China Formally Restores Diplomatic Relations with Nauru after Pacific Island Nation Cut Taiwan Ties.” The Hindu, January 24, 2024. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-formally-restores-diplomatic-relations-with-nauru-after-pacific-island-nation-cut-taiwan-ties/article67771564.ece.
8. Frank Chen. “SCMP.” South China Morning Post, December 21, 2023. https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3245816/mainland-china-suspends-tariff-cuts-12-taiwanese-imports-january-response-discriminatory-measures.
9. News, Ktodo. “Taiwan Replaced as Volleyball Tourney Host amid China Pressure.” Kyodo News+. KYODO NEWS+, January 17, 2024. https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/01/53edc9554a1f-taiwan-replaced-as-volleyball-tourney-host-amid-china-pressure.html.
10. Koh Ewe. “Here’s How China Has Responded to Countries Congratulating Taiwan’s Election Winner.” TIME. Time, January 17, 2024. https://time.com/6556344/china-taiwan-election-congratulations/.

End-Notes

[i] Cheung, Eric, Wayne Chang, Nectar Gan, and Jerome Taylor. “Taiwan Voters Dismiss China Warnings and Hand Ruling Party a Historic Third Consecutive Presidential Win.” CNN. CNN, January 13, 2024. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/13/asia/taiwan-presidential-election-results-intl-hnk/index.html.

[ii] Ghosh, Rudroneel. “Dissecting Taiwan Polls: The Election Was a Lot Closer, Posing a Dilemma for DPP for the Future.” Times of India Blog. Times of India, January 19, 2024. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/talkingturkey/dissecting-taiwan-polls-the-election-was-a-lot-closer-posing-a-dilemma-for-dpp-for-the-future/.

[iii] Hart, Brian, Scott Kennedy, Jude Blanchette, and Bonny Lin. “Taiwan’s 2024 Elections: Results and Implications.” Csis.org, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/taiwans-2024-elections-results-and-implications#:~:text=Lai%2C%20who%20is%20currently%20vice,26.5%20percent%20of%20the%20vote..

[4] Hart, Brian, Scott Kennedy, Jude Blanchette, and Bonny Lin. “Taiwan’s 2024 Elections: Results and Implications.” Csis.org, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/taiwans-2024-elections-results-and-implications#:~:text=Lai%2C%20who%20is%20currently%20vice,26.5%20percent%20of%20the%20vote..

[5] Ibid

[6] Ibid

[7] Ibid

[8] Hart, Brian, Scott Kennedy, Jude Blanchette, and Bonny Lin. “Taiwan’s 2024 Elections: Results and Implications.” Csis.org, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/taiwans-2024-elections-results-and-implications#:~:text=Lai%2C%20who%20is%20currently%20vice,26.5%20percent%20of%20the%20vote..

[9] Ibid

[10] BNP Paribas. “Taiwan: Economic and Strategic Strength.” economic-research.bnpparibas.com, July 11, 2023. https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Taiwan-Economic-strategic-strength-7/11/2023,48780.

[11] Hart, Brian, Scott Kennedy, Jude Blanchette, and Bonny Lin. “Taiwan’s 2024 Elections: Results and Implications.” Csis.org, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/taiwans-2024-elections-results-and-implications#:~:text=Lai%2C%20who%20is%20currently%20vice,26.5%20percent%20of%20the%20vote..

[12] Ibid

[13] Ibid

[14] Ibid

[15] Ibid

[16] Ibid

[17] Hawksley, Humphrey. “Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy Is Decreasing Its Reliance on China.” Nikkei Asia. Nikkei Asia, October 4, 2019. https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Taiwan-s-New-Southbound-Policy-is-decreasing-its-reliance-on-China.

[18] Hart, Brian, Scott Kennedy, Jude Blanchette, and Bonny Lin. “Taiwan’s 2024 Elections: Results and Implications.” Csis.org, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/taiwans-2024-elections-results-and-implications#:~:text=Lai%2C%20who%20is%20currently%20vice,26.5%20percent%20of%20the%20vote

[19] Jazeera, Al. “Nauru Seals Diplomatic Ties with China after Dumping Taiwan.” Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, January 24, 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/24/china-and-nauru-resume-diplomatic-ties.

[20] AP. “China Formally Restores Diplomatic Relations with Nauru after Pacific Island Nation Cut Taiwan Ties.” The Hindu, January 24, 2024. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-formally-restores-diplomatic-relations-with-nauru-after-pacific-island-nation-cut-taiwan-ties/article67771564.ece.

[21] Hart, Brian, Scott Kennedy, Jude Blanchette, and Bonny Lin. “Taiwan’s 2024 Elections: Results and Implications.” Csis.org, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/taiwans-2024-elections-results-and-implications#:~:text=Lai%2C%20who%20is%20currently%20vice,26.5%20percent%20of%20the%20vote..

[22] Frank Chen. “SCMP.” South China Morning Post, December 21, 2023. https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3245816/mainland-china-suspends-tariff-cuts-12-taiwanese-imports-january-response-discriminatory-measures.

[23] Ibid

[24] NEWS, KYODO. “Taiwan Replaced as Volleyball Tourney Host amid China Pressure.” Kyodo News+. KYODO NEWS+, January 17, 2024. https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2024/01/53edc9554a1f-taiwan-replaced-as-volleyball-tourney-host-amid-china-pressure.html.

[25] Ibid

[26] Hart, Brian, Scott Kennedy, Jude Blanchette, and Bonny Lin. “Taiwan’s 2024 Elections: Results and Implications.” Csis.org, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/taiwans-2024-elections-results-and-implications#:~:text=Lai%2C%20who%20is%20currently%20vice,26.5%20percent%20of%20the%20vote..

[27] Koh Ewe. “Here’s How China Has Responded to Countries Congratulating Taiwan’s Election Winner.” TIME. Time, January 17, 2024. https://time.com/6556344/china-taiwan-election-congratulations/.

[28] Hart, Brian, Scott Kennedy, Jude Blanchette, and Bonny Lin. “Taiwan’s 2024 Elections: Results and Implications.” Csis.org, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/taiwans-2024-elections-results-and-implications#:~:text=Lai%2C%20who%20is%20currently%20vice,26.5%20percent%20of%20the%20vote..

[29] Ibid

[30] Ibid

[31] Ibid

[32] Ibid

[33] Ibid

[34] Ibid

[35] Ibid

[36] Ibid

[37] Ibid

[38] Ibid

[39] Ibid

[40] Hart, Brian, Scott Kennedy, Jude Blanchette, and Bonny Lin. “Taiwan’s 2024 Elections: Results and Implications.” Csis.org, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/taiwans-2024-elections-results-and-implications#:~:text=Lai%2C%20who%20is%20currently%20vice,26.5%20percent%20of%20the%20vote..

[41] Ibid

Pic Courtsey-Rovin Ferrer at unsplash.com

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)