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Security August 9, 2020 4,004 views

Reimagining the Malacca Strait Security:India as a responsible participant

S
By Shreya Johar
Author • Centre for Security & Strategic Studies
Reimagining the Malacca Strait Security:India as a responsible participant
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS

International security in the 21st century has been the prime algorithm for configuring international relations and hegemonic viability that sets out to dominate a region and have an overarching influence over the world. One such pivotal role is played by the Malacca Straits, which are a narrow and shallow waterway that marks the shortest distance between the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. It is the world’s most congested and bustling trade route with over 100,000 ships, including oil tanks, that pass the region every year. The waterway is approximately 2.8 kms (or 1.5 nautical miles) wide at the tip and it is the shortest sea route to the South China and East China Sea from the Horn of Africa, the Persian Gulf of East as well as the Indian Ocean.

Some of the world’s largest energy resources go through this ‘Choke Point’ and this includes 80% of China’s crude and oil imports from the Middle East and Africa. Therefore, this area is of prodigious strategic and economic potency. According to reports, in 2007, an estimated 13.7 million barrels per day transported goods through this route and subsequently raised the stakes at 15.2 million barrels per day by 2011.

However, the region has been quite controversial since 2000s due to rise in piracy, making the waters of South East Asian nations minacious. This made regional navies of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore step in and form the Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP). The MSP comprises of the Malacca Straits Sea Patrol (MSSP), the “Eyes in the Sky” (EiS) combined air patrols and the Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG). In recent years, the reports show that the attacks have reduced to a near zero level, making the MSP another crucial collaboration. Although the partnership between these littoral states seems to reside in the area of data sharing, enhanced cooperation, and reviewing the conduct for operations while keeping each other apprised of possible incoming threats. The MSP does not infringe or conduct operations in each other’s waters and mutually respects the decision and according to UNCLOS international countries cannot enter other territorial waters until treaties are formulated. However, in 2018 India was asked to join the MSP, which was considered “not feasible” by the Indonesian counterparts for the primary reason that India is a growing power and the next major player apart from China in the Asian theatre. On the side-lines, the quadrilateral of the littoral states fear India’s capacity to build a navy that could have the potential to influence and gain sensitive information, which could turn out as a loss for the South East Asian nations. While they are trying to combat China’s unlawful claims in the region, adding another vigorous nation could make the region susceptible.

The Strait of Malacca has been a weak point for China’s maritime strategy. There is a hard power pressure due to the geopolitical leverage and states yearning for naval control over contested waters. If India becomes a part of the MSP and acquires control over the western part of Malacca Strait, it could stand against China’s barbaric and unsolicited activities in the South China Sea as well as block its imports and exports in the event of a conflict. This also gives India an upper hand within the Asian affairs as US defence forces have a tenuous role over regional politics of Asia. As maritime becomes the basic route for trade and commerce between more than 80% of the world, controlling the Straits of Malacca is a key strategy which is bordered with the largest populated countries on the planet. As rising dependence on foreign oil is weakening the dragon, the question around “Malacca Dilemma” is gaining momentum. Experts believe if China continues to import heavy amounts of oil, the new figure might raise upto 80% by the year 2040, making China more vulnerable to trade perils from its antagonists. Even if China attempts to grip most of the South East Asian nations over the years, Singapore’s close alliance and navy drills with the US and a significant US presence near Singapore would threaten China’s rise, taking it back to square one.

However, one should not be delusional as China’s strategic minds have been looking for alternatives in light of the recent backlash it has received from the international community. One way is the Kazakhstan-China Pipeline which will allow China to operate in the oil-rich Caspian Sea. Another strategic point is the Myanmar-Yunnan Pipeline that will siphon out oil and gas from the Bay of Bengal to the Kunming region of China, thereby avoiding the Strait of Malacca. Other options involve using the Sunda Strait, but it seems unsuitable due to its narrowness and shallowness for allowing large containers to cross. The Lombok and Makassar Straits offer another alternative, but longer routes mean additional shipping charges estimating from about $84-$220 billion per year. However, the most important channels for China remain its BRI and the String of Pearls that allows the People’s Liberation Army Navy to access crucial ports for its sustenance in international relations. These are the Gwadar-Xinjiang Pipeline with the port of Gwadar being a ‘Crown Jewel’ of China, with its close proximity to Africa and the Strait of Hormuz, giving it an advantage to bypass the Malacca Strait. It’s another significant hold is provided by the Iran-Pakistan Pipeline that adds an advantage to the prestige of China as imports in energy and oil made to China’s industrial machinery. In the long-term, evident industrial and economic backlash is presumed going down form 6.5million barrels per day through the Malacca Strait to 420,000 barrels per day through the pipelines.

India holds a very strategic yet unpredictable geopolitical position in the Asian subcontinent, though it is strong enough to counter Chinese forces. With India expanding its defence and particularly maritime clout, it seems China has been surrounded by foes near the South China Sea. As far as China’s relationship with Middle Eastern countries is concerned, major regions like Iran and Afghanistan won’t upset India with its strong alliance in heavy investments and joint operations & drills which are more important to these nations especially in the post-pandemic world. The Malacca Strait is the Achilles Heel of China, and with the rise of India and the Quad group in the region, China is bound to lose a vital artery for global trade unless it regulates its actions and adheres to the rules of the international community.


Pic courtesy - @Indian Navy


(The views expressed are personal. The author is the research intern with CESCUBE.)


Shreya Johar
About Shreya Johar →

Shreya Johar, is a third year, undergraduate student at O.P Jindal Global University pursuing B.A (Hons) Global Affairs. Being from the forces background one got intrigued with subjects pertaining to defence and military strategy, South Asian and South East Asian politics and security, Maritime affairs and conflict and peace studies. While in college one interned for Defstrat, a defence magazine which further kindled my interest in the constantly changing military and security scenario globally given the complexities arising through constantly shifting political climate around the world. In a shrinking world, where national interests seem to dominate international requirements it is difficult to identify singular independent international interests. Studying subjects that relate to the ever-changing structure of interconnected communities, strategizing today’s requirement is of grave importance. She is research Intern with CESCUBE

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