Post US withdrawal scenario in Afghanistan and the role of Central Asian ethnic groups
It is noon in Kabul, and smoke is coming out of the US Embassy as documents and equipment are being destroyed while a Chinook helicopter is hovering above the embassy to evacuate the diplomats and other staff. History is being repeated. The United States embassy in Saigon was evacuated in the same manner and under more or less the same circumstances in 1975. Like the Vietcong, the Taliban, too, have not only survived the US onslaught but now can easily claim victory against two superpowers of their times. The US is the recent casualty in the ‘Graveyard of Empires’ nearly after three decades of the withdrawal of the Red Army.
Afghanistan has a new boss now, says a Presidential Palace security guard who has just dawned a new traditional Pathani suit after shedding his uniform. The Presidential Palace has been captured, while the President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, has fled his country to an undisclosed location. Kabul has finally been taken. The Afghan forces have fallen like a pack of cards, and the Taliban has finally entered the city again roughly after 20 years.
The sudden announcement of US withdrawal paved the way for a swift Taliban onslaught across all the provinces of Afghanistan. Proving all speculations wrong, the Taliban have taken Kabul without any resistance and that too within eight weeks. While the President has failed his people and left the country to a safer location, last-minute negotiations for a power-sharing mechanism are only bound to fail as the Taliban is now in a position where no compromise will be desired. It has successfully defeated the Afghan forces and the warlords and now faces no internal or external challenge to its authority.
The APP Facade
The US-led Afghan Talks with the Taliban were a tremendous miscalculation. On Feb 29th, 2020, the United States reached a peace deal with the Taliban and signed a peace agreement titled the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, officially known as the Doha Agreement. The peace deal signed between the US representative Zalmaya Khalilzad and the Taliban leader Abdul Ghani Bardar was the culmination of the Afghan Peace Process, which from the very beginning did not include the democratically elected government of Afghanistan while it was supported by China, Pakistan, and Iran and unanimously endorsed by the UN Security Council. As a result of the agreement, the United States not only committed to closed down its five military bases and reduce the number of troops, but the offensive strikes against the Taliban were significantly reduced while the Taliban-led insurgent attacks saw a significant rise. While the Taliban suffered only 610 casualties, a significant decrease as compared to the last year, it inflicted heavy casualties on the Afghan forces. After the Doha Agreement and between March 1 and April 15, the Taliban conducted more than 4500 attacks in Afghanistan, ignoring the provisions of the agreement, while killing 900 Afghan security personnel. Thus, the agreement gave not only a good breathing space to the Taliban while substantially delegitimizing the Afghan government as it was kept outside of the process. The Moscow-led peace talks also more or less favored the Taliban more than the Afghan government.
Breach of Kabul and new possibilities
The Taliban intensified their operations against the Afghan forces, and one by one, major cities fell to the Taliban fighters. While this paper is being written, the Taliban has captured Kabul, the capital city of Afghanistan, while the President and Vice President have fled the country, leaving their people at the mercy of the Taliban. Though negotiations are ongoing between the Taliban and the government representatives, it is not sure what political conditions will evolve. Other than some reports, no concrete knowledge exists on what kind of power-sharing mechanism does Taliban wants or even if it wants to share power. The United States is consistently defending its withdrawal and hence its question of going back to Afghanistan. It is easy to speculate, under these circumstances, that the Taliban will head the interim government in a power-sharing arrangement with the government. The fact that the Taliban has not captured Kabul by force but by a negotiated peace settlement will open doors for further negotiation with the world powers. The Taliban will certainly not want to be isolated again while recognized by some two three Islamic states such as Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, as happened during the first Taliban rule. The Taliban 2.0 has not only participated in the Afghan Peace Process but has also indicated major policy shifts on the question of governance. However, various reports have suggested that Taliban 2.0 is not different from the Taliban. In the districts, captured schools have been closed for women while strict Sharia law is already being implemented in the captured cities. The Taliban of today wants more global recognition, and thus it is possible that it will reach some kind of agreement of giving safe passage to the belligerent forces while ensuring that no large-scale killings of either the civilians or the members of the Afghan armed forces happen. Given the recent outreach of China to the Taliban and the visit of a Taliban delegation to China, it might be possible that the Chinese may be the first to recognize the Taliban. Pakistan, which has been backing the Taliban since its creation, will definitely follow the Chinese. Besides, Russia and Central Asia may also have to recognize the Taliban in exchange for a commitment of no export of violent and extremist ideologies to these regions. It is also possible that Iran too will recognize the new Taliban government, and thus a transfer of power brokered by the regional countries will happen. The regional forces have decided not to influence the outcomes in Afghanistan and kept their distance from the Taliban to prohibit any Taliban penetration in the region. The Central Asian concern is not only the export of extremist ideologies but also the significant population of the Central Asian tribes in Afghanistan. Central Asian tribes, particularly the Tajik and the Uzbek, have been dominant ethnic tribes in Afghanistan and have been important stakeholders in Afghan society. The new developments in Kabul have once again put these groups in a difficult situation as they have generally not been very enthusiastic about the Taliban rule.
Who are the Central Asian groups in Afghanistan?
Afghan society is a multilingual and multi-ethnic society that has a significant population of groups having central Asian origin. The Tajiks and the Uzbeks have been dominant groups in the Afghan power structure. Besides, Afghanistan also has Kyrgyz and Turkmen groups. However, their number is not very significant, and they still live a largely nomadic life.
Though Afghanistan has not conducted any census in the last three decades, some previous estimates suggest that the Tajik are the second-largest ethnic group in Afghanistan after the Pashtuns. It is estimated that they are 27 percent of the Afghan population. Though less in number, they remain the political and economic elite of Afghanistan, having considerable wealth. Owing to their wealth, they have gained significant political influence in the country. However, they have also been targeted for being Soviet supporters.
The Uzbeks, along with the Turkmen, make roughly 12 percent of the Afghan population and live mainly in the northern part of Afghanistan. Mostly farmers by occupation, they have the largest share of the country’s arable lands. Cotton production, along with animal husbandry, has also added significant wealth to these groups. However, it is the carpet industry of Afghanistan that is the main economic activity of the Uzbeks and the Turkmens. Traditionally they mainly remained outside of the political apparatus and have sought little or no political influence. However, the end of the Soviet occupation was followed by a desire for significant political representation of the Uzbeks, who General Abdul Rashid Dostum mainly led. The Turkmen, on the other hand, choose neutrality over political assertion and thus have remained outside of the power politics in Afghanistan.
The Kyrgyz are the smallest of all the Central Asian tribes. According to one estimate, their number was 1,300 in 2003. They have mostly inhabited the eastern Wakhan district in the Badakhshan province of northern Afghanistan.
Taliban 2.0 and the new Dynamics
The Central Asian groups have remained against the Taliban domination and have resisted the fundamentalist organization in pursuit of its political hegemony. It was the Tajiks of Afghanistan who constituted the majority of Northern Alliance fighters and after the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance was further strengthened after other ethnic groups such as the Uzbeks joined it. Ahmad Shah Massoud and Abdul Rashid Dostum, both having central Asian ethnicity, not only created the United Front against the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan but also played an instrumental role in the defeat of the Taliban after the US invaded the Afghan soil. Between 1996 and 2001, the United Front controlled roughly 30 percent of the Afghan population. The defeat of the Taliban led to the dissolution of the Northern Alliance as the leaders participated in the new political process and joined the new interim government headed by Hamid Karzai.
However, things have changed this time. The Taliban has not only participated in the Afghan Peace Talks with the United States, but they are soft on various other issues of concern. The possibility of a second Northern Alliance is now being explored as the Taliban remain seated in Kabul. It is difficult to predict its success. The crucial US military support will be missing this time. It may be possible that the United States may provide financial support and may also provide the new leaders with military equipment’s but the United States is not going to be directly involved with the Norther Alliance 2.0. It is also to be noted that the United States has directly negotiated with the Taliban, and the Biden government would be willing to let the Taliban rule the country without much interference in order to avoid large-scale conflict, which may engulf Afghanistan into another civil war. The Taliban, too, has indicated its intention of not bringing the exploitative, barbaric, and fundamentalist approach of the late 20th century and thus is looking forward to more international engagement. Taliban’s efforts at getting more international recognition and legitimacy may bring stability to the country. But these possibilities remain mere speculation as we need to wait and watch the character that Taliban 2.0 adopts once it starts ruling the country completely.
New Taliban, New Concerns, New Roles
The political weight of the Uzbeks and the Tajik’s increased manyfold after the US-sponsored overthrow of the Taliban from Kabul. Though the interim government was headed by Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun, the Tajik’s dominated the new Afghan government. Tajik’s have been recognized by the Afghan constitution as one of the Afghan national, ethnic groups. The current concerns of the community largely revolve around political participation. Tajik’s have for long-desired more political domination and have also been engaged in communal conflict with the Pashtun.
Taliban’s capture of Kabul has created new conditions in Kabul, which may adversely impact the political and social conditions of these groups. The armed Tajik groups have often resented the discrimination they have faced in the Taliban-dominated areas and have desired greater economic opportunities. Many Tajiks and Uzbeks were worried about the Taliban’s inclusion in the Afghan Peace Talks. They had expected increased discrimination due to their prominent opposition to the Taliban if the Taliban comes back to power. The Tajik’s fear has been reinforced by the assassination of former President Burhanuddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik. Now the Taliban is back in power, and it is expected that they may find themselves at odds with the new political rulers. However, a clear picture may emerge only after the Taliban have politically settled themselves and have begun ruling the country.
While Kabul has been breached, the Taliban still has to consolidate its power in the capital. Capturing political power and ruling a country are two different things. The Taliban ultimately have to take care of the fundamental needs of the Afghans. It is here that the Taliban may have to tolerate the political and economic clouts of the Tajiks and the Uzbeks. Repressing these groups will only complicate the already precarious condition. Taliban may find it necessary to engage with the non-Pashtun communities to create stable political conditions in order to consolidate its power. The Taliban certainly won’t want another armed conflict ravaging the Afghan soil if it really wants to govern the country for the long term. There is no doubt, however, that the Pashtun Taliban has a bad record against the minorities of Afghanistan. Taliban atrocities against the Shias, Hazaras, Tajiks, and the Uzbeks have been well documented. The United Nations accused the Taliban of deliberately denying emergency food to the Hazaras and the Tajiks. The two groups, the Taliban and the ethnic minorities, have been involved in the brutal ethnic massacre. Thus, if the Taliban 2.0 choose to follow its earlier policies against the minorities, it will be led to more brutal ethnic massacres, given the possibility of a Northern Alliance 2.0 is highly unlikely.
However, it is also to be noted that the post 9/11 Taliban has made attempts to diversify its support base. It has recruited ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks to increase its support base in northern Afghanistan. Ethnic Turkmen and Uzbeks have been recruited from the northwestern Faryab province and northern Jowzjan province, in particular. Taliban even recruited an ethnic Uzbek as the ‘shadow governor’ in Faryab province. Some members of these minority groups also joined the Taliban because of their growing discontent with the Afghan government. However, the lack of protection from the government also led to the creation of new Turkmen militias to fight the Taliban.
Conclusion
The new situation in Afghanistan has rather unfolded quicker than expected. The Taliban’s swift capture of Kabul has disturbed regional dynamics. It is still to be seen what kind of political system that the Taliban establishes, though it has hinted of a more inclusive and tolerant viewpoint on various issues such as women’s issues. However, what the Taliban says and what it does often does not match.
The need for greater recognition and legitimacy in the world community may compel the Taliban to approach a more reconciliatory policy towards the ethnic minorities. The Central Asian ethnic groups, particularly the Tajik and the Uzbeks, have dominated the Afghan political and economic sphere after the Taliban was defeated and ousted from Kabul with US support after 9/11. A majority of these ethnic groups have feared a Taliban-led Afghan government. Now the possibility of a Taliban government seems quite natural, and it will be interesting to see how the recent situation will shape the long-established hostile relationship between the two parties. The negotiation between the Afghan government and the Taliban is still underway as both parties have agreed for a peaceful transfer of power. It is thus easy to assume that the Tajiks and the Uzbeks who have gained good political domination in the Afghan government will be negotiating for better deals. The ball is now in the Taliban’s court.
Pic Courtesy-Marko Beljan at unsplash.com
(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)
