NATO's Eastward Expansion and Russia
With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and a wave of the coloured revolution taking over the region, states like Georgia and Ukraine establishing themselves as sovereign nations, it was hoped that the collective defence grouping North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will come to an end. With the US enemy in such a weak spot the idea of an organization like NATO had fulfilled its utility. But, the US was in no mood to dissolve the organization deeming it necessary for European peace.
NATO over the years kept expanding its membership, where Russia has always publically and strongly expressed opposition not just diplomatically but militarily. It has made it clear that it will not let NATO enter Georgia and Ukraine its immediate neighbouring regions. The conflict in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 depict this situation starkly. NATO’s eastward expansion as John Mearsheimer has convincingly argued will lead to more conflict in the region and it will be the United States own doing. Mearsheimer has been critical of the liberal view of the US administration which overlooked the traditional power politics. As Russia’s national security is threatened it will seek out stronger allies like China to build up its material power and gain a decisive hand over negotiations. Russian leader Vladimir Putin and US President John Biden are now in a stalemate on how to de-escalate the situation. Representatives from U.S. and Russia are set to hold talks on Jan. 9-10 in Geneva, followed by Russia-NATO Council talks and a meeting of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.[i] With US assurances to Ukraine of support if Russia invades.
History of US-Russia conflict over NATO expansion
The prospects of NATO expansion have always been a threat to the national security of Russia. Emphasized by the leaders several times. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher had travelled to Moscow to explain in advance of the January 1994 NATO summit that the United States would not support new members joining the alliance, but would rather develop a Partnership for Peace that would include all states of the former Warsaw Pact.[ii] However Bill Clinton who was the president at that time pushed for NATO expansion. Boris Yeltsin was furious with growing discontent at home he thought he had dodged the issue but the addition of members in 1992 felt like humiliation of Russia for the defeat in the cold war.
Russia wanted to develop a multilateral mechanism for peace and cooperation in the region with the involvement of the UN and at the regional level through an organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. It wanted US influence in European politics to decline. Also, when the reunification of Germany was allowed by Russia, the US promised not to expand NATO eastwards. The main factor cited for NATO’s existence after the end of the cold war was to maintain the strategic balance in Europe by keeping Germany, Britain and France in and keeping Russia out.
After the Germany reunification in the late 1990s during the First Chechen War and other regional disturbances, countries Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia formed the Visegrad group to push for NATO membership and EU integration. By the 1997 Madrid Summit, these countries had joined NATO. By 2002, Baltic states i.e. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, were the first states to join NATO that had prior been under the Soviet Union. Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia had also joined by 2004. By 2020 four more Russian bordering states had joined NATO ringing alarming bells in Russia. Albania and Croatia in 2009 and Montenegro in 2017 and the latest in the list is North Macedonia in 2020. Ukraine, Georgia and Bosnia Herzegovina are aspirant countries. With all Russia’s neighbours joining NATO, Russia feels the isolation and the fact that it was a superpower once compels it to act against the US to show its power position. Also there are domestic political considerations to be kept in mind Russian elites appear to have increasingly concluded that the United States and NATO represent long-term political and potentially military threats to the current regime in Moscow.[iii] Also, the poor economic performance by Vladimir Putin’s government may be a cause of long term political instability in the region, a military issue may become an easy distraction or excuse to unite the country under his strong leadership.
In May 1997, Russia and NATO signed the founding act. The act’s main function was to guide the relations between the two parties and build trust with the peaceful conduct of relations. Both parties agreed to act restraint in the use of conventional force and military deployment. An act broken by both parties. Russia when it attacked Crimea in 2014 and NATO which has deployed its ballistic missiles in the border region of Europe and Russia. Both of them have also been involved in the Ukrainian crisis by supporting adversary groups. It is obvious that Russia’s illegitimate March 2014 annexation of Crimea, its ongoing invasion of eastern Ukraine, and its massive exercises on the borders of NATO allies are not examples of restraint, and that today’s security environment in Europe is nothing like that of 1997.[iv]
Also, as the Baltic nations joined NATO their security concern was to be fulfilled by NATO and now NATO has a permanent military presence in the region with rotational troop deployment as well as an anti-ballistic missile system. What Kremlin demands is those offensive weapons be removed from the region and removal of economic sanctions.
The mere existence of NATO after the disintegration of the Soviet Union has been perceived as a threat to the security of Russia. But, Russia is weak now, military and economically but that doesn’t diminish its importance in global power politics. As is evident in the middle-east where Russia has been a major player in Syrian politics in collaboration with Iran. The Russian approach to dealing with Syria has upgraded its standing in middle-east politics as evident by Saudi Arabia’s Prince historic visit to Russia and the signing of various contracts when both are suffering from oil market space decline due to growing US oil production. With its growing importance in middle-east and greater bargaining power with China by its side. It might have wanted to utilize this opportunity to demand from US favourable terms regarding the border situation.
Conclusion
The cold war rivals are again at loggerheads with each other. The US which is engaged in a cold war with China does not want to appear as a weak power. It will not give in to the demands of Russia and a tussle between them in Ukraine is possible. However, the image will become clear as the discussion between the two parties concludes in the upcoming dialogue from 8th January. What Putin demands is written assurances that NATO will stop its eastward expansion. Up till the talks and if negotiations reach a conclusive end Russia has deployed its army in the borders of Ukraine bringing urgency to the deal. If the parties don’t reach a satisfactory agreement we might see unrest in Ukraine developing swiftly.
Notes
[i] Renshaw, Jarret (2022), “Biden tells Ukraine that U.S. will 'respond decisively' if Russia further invades”, Reuters, 3rd January 2022, Wilmington. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/us/biden-says-us-will-respond-decisively-if-russia-further-invades-ukraine-white-2022-01-02/
[ii] Goldgeier, James (2016), “Promises Made, Promises Broken? What Yeltsin Was Told About NATO in 1993 and Why It Matters”, War on the Rocks. URL: https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/promises-made-promises-broken-what-yeltsin-was-told-about-nato-in-1993-and-why-it-matters-2/
[iii] Frederick, Bryan et.al. (2016), “Assessing Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements”, Rand, URL:https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1800/RR1879/RAND_RR1879.pdf
[iv] De Witte, Melissa (2022), “Kremlin’s unwillingness to recognize Ukraine as a sovereign state has resulted in major strategic failure for Russia”, Stanford News, 6 January 2022.
URL: https://news.stanford.edu/2022/01/06/understanding-russia-ukraine-crisis/
Pic Courtesy-Jorge Alcala at unsplash.com
(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)
