China- Bhutan sign MoU on border issues
Since 1984, talks between Bhutan and China have largely focused on two separate areas of dispute, including Doklam and other areas in Bhutan’s West.
The area under consideration is located near the India-China-Bhutan trijunction measuring 269 sq. kms, and the Jakarlung and Pasamlung valleys located near Tibet to Bhutan’s North, which measure 495 sq. kms.[i] China has resolved its border conflicts with all the states it had trouble before, using political, psychological pressure as well as techniques such as salami slicing. In which China takes over the land, create structures there, and starts claiming it as its own. That is what has happened in Bhutan too as reported in Foreign Policy magazine by Robert Barnett on how China was ready to swap the eastern corridor for a more strategic west corridor. The negotiations of the Bhutan-China border issue had begun in 1984, both have held 24 rounds of talks without heading anywhere. Talks were stalled after the 2017 Doklam standoff, in which the Indian military interfered on behalf of Bhutan, and then the corona pandemic. Both states sat for negotiations in October 2021 and came up with a roadmap to dissolve the border issue. China’s Foreign Ministry said that Bhutan and China have “mechanisms for border talks and experts meeting,” adding that more discussions are planned after they agreed in October to a landmark road map to accelerate border talks.[ii]
Background of India, China and Bhutan border dispute
What Harsh V. Pant of the Observer Research Foundation proposes is that Bhutan behaviour goes beyond the balance of power theory, it originally aligned with India due to perceived threat from China. In the 1930s only Mao declared Bhutan to be part of China So, to put it more correctly it is a balance of threat that pulled Bhutan closer to India. And this MoU should also be looked through this perception, rather than as Chinese media has portrayed it as a major success in relations to Bhutan, it is a framework to push talks forward which were stagnating since the Doklam issue. Also, after a lot of intimidating through border building and India being already troubled in Ladakh, Bhutan had very limited options.
India and Bhutan share a special relationship. India is the close neighbour of Bhutan and according to the Friendship Treaty signed in 1949 Bhutan and India would not interfere in each other’s internal affairs but India will help guide Bhutan’s foreign policy and both nations will consult each other regarding defence and foreign relations. However, in 2007 this treaty was amended by Manmohan Singh’s government and Bhutan was no longer required to consult with India on foreign policy matters. Still, the lack of diplomatic and cordial relationship between Beijing and Thimpu underlines the hold India retains in Bhutan’s foreign policy.
This was seen in action during the 72-day Doklam standoff with China when Bhutan contested China’s construction activity in its territory Indian Army defended Bhutan. According to Robert Barnett study published in Foreign Policy magazine, China has been constructing roads and airports and settling villages with Bhutan keeping mum. He cites the example of villages named Beyul and Menchuma Valley which had been uninhabited for centuries but are now under proper Chinese control. The Chinese claim to these villages is recent he argues, they started appearing in Chinese official maps in the 1980s. Bhutan has, however, decided to keep mum on these developments, sandwiched between two powerful neighbours its options are anyways limited. Hence, antagonizing either one will welcome trouble.
China has been developing close relationships with South Asian neighbours be it infrastructure development in Nepal, economic assistance to Sri Lanka or the Maldives. Bhutan, the small Buddhist kingdom close to the autonomous region of Tibet is important for China to keep an eye on. Anyway, China BRI projects in South Asia are infamous for debt traps as Sri Lanka has set an example. In addition to that, Bhutan with its Gross National Happiness approach has stayed away from massive economic projects that endanger the fragile Himalayan geography and are unsustainable. Hence, to push Bhutan into resolving border issues China relied on negotiations and simultaneous developments along to border to coerce it to agree on some settlement. Also to be reckoned is that in 2017 Beijing offered USD 10 billion in economic assistance package which involved capital investment and low-interest loans in exchange for border concessions.[iii] With Belt and Road investment China has been upping its investments in all the South Asian regions which is a cause of concern for India. Also, if India is unable to compete with Chinese remunerative economic assistance packages its south asian neighbours will move away from it and this will adversely affect India’s position against China. No country will support India and harm its prospects by annoying the dragon. If we look at the economic and political relationship that is shared between India and Bhutan, it shows how deeply connected and dependent Bhutan is on India. So, when China deals with Bhutan it needs to keep that in mind.
Bhutan as a link between India and China
Like other south Asian neighbours around India China wants Bhutan also to be under its sphere of influence. Bhutan serves as a key strategic buffer state for India in the Himalayas. That is also why China wanted Doklam, also a key strategic location. Hence, Bhutan provides a key advantage to India in the region. Chinese infrastructure build-up all along the border with new airports, helipads and military establishments indicate that China does not want any loose ends. It understands the importance of Bhutan, Ladakh, Nepal, Arunachal Pradesh, and Sikkim in giving China control over the strategic Himalayas. Mao Zedong famously referred to Tibet as the palm of China’s hand, of which the areas outlined above were the five fingers. The nightmare scenario, envisioned by analysts during a “great power conflict”, would see Beijing acquiring Doklam as a staging area through which the PLA forces in the Chengdu Military Region could seize the Siliguri Corridor, cutting off Assam and the six surrounding states and with it 55 million people.[iv] This would be a disastrous situation for India and which no Indian government will be able to overcome. Chinese repeated incursions in the Galwan Valley and along the LAC, around the Indian Ocean threaten Indian and are all indicating any war-like situation that might occur. Indian is ready for a worst-case scenario or maybe a two-front war, Indian Army chief MM Narvane suggest.
Bhutan forms an integral strategic point between Indian and China and since Bhutan is under India’s influence it will not let Bhutan sign an agreement with China that is disadvantageous to its position in the Himalayas. Hence, we might see a competition of influence with China continuing its developments and psychological warfare along the border.
Conclusion
China has land borders with 14 countries including North Korea, Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bhutan, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal, Vietnam and India. Solving most of it has coerced its way through a settlement. Bhutan and India are the only two border issues left to settle. Negotiations with Bhutan will be linked to India and Bhutan will have to play its card so as not to annoy any big power. It is confusing what China wants, it threw away the negotiated Peace and Tranquillity Agreement on India China border with its incursions on LAC, now it is building up border security and infrastructure, setting up villages and provoking India into the field. It is difficult to say if its Chinese strategy taken from The Art of War, subduing the enemy without fighting or trying to build its dominance in Southeast Asia.
Notes
[i] Haidar, Suhasini (2021), “Bhutan, China sign MoU for 3-step roadmap to expedite boundary talks”, The Hindu, 14 October 2021. URL:https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/bhutan-and-china-sign-mou-for-3-step-roadmap-to-expedite-boundary-talks/article36999596.ece
[ii] Sen, Sudhi Ranjan and Archana Chaudhary (2021), “Bhutan Struggles to Defend Territory in India-China Border Spat”, Bloomberg, 8 December 2021. URL: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-08/bhutan-struggles-to-defend-territory-in-india-china-border-spat
[iii] Pollock, John (2020), “China’s Territorial Ambitions in Bhutan – Why it Matters to India”, South Asian Voices, 21 December 2020. URL:https://southasianvoices.org/chinas-territorial-ambitions-in-bhutan-why-it-matters-to-india/
[iv] Pollock, John (2020), “China’s Territorial Ambitions in Bhutan – Why it Matters to India”, South Asian Voices, 21 December 2020. URL:https://southasianvoices.org/chinas-territorial-ambitions-in-bhutan-why-it-matters-to-india/
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(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)
