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Politics April 10, 2023 1892 Reads

Iran-Saudi Arabia Agreement: Understanding Chinese Checkers

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By Neha Singh Dayma
Author • Centre for Security & Strategic Studies
Iran-Saudi Arabia Agreement: Understanding Chinese Checkers
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS

The Middle East region has been marked by a long-standing rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, fuelled by sectarian, ideological, and strategic factors. The escalation of tensions between the two powers in recent years has contributed to regional instability, proxy conflicts, and geopolitical realignments. However, the recent agreement to restore diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, brokered by China in March 2023, marks a new era of diplomacy and potential cooperation.

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In this context, the present article aims to explore the historical roots of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, the factors that led to the reconciliation, and the implications of this development for the region and beyond.

The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran can be traced back to pre-revolutionary Iran, when the two countries vied for regional dominance. However, after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran became a Shia theocratic republic, adding sectarian and ideological dimensions to the competition. During the Iran-Iraq War, the two powers supported opposing sides, intensifying their rivalry. The post-Cold War era, especially after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, saw further escalation. The Arab Spring, the rise of ISIS, and the Yemeni civil war only exacerbated tensions. In recent years, the rivalry has turned into a cold war, with both sides supporting their proxies across West Asia. The collapse of formal ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2016, triggered by Saudi Arabia’s execution of a Shia cleric and the subsequent overrun of the Saudi embassy in Tehran by protesters, only added fuel to the fire.

However, in the past few years, there has been a growing realisation on both sides that a diplomatic path must be pursued. Keeping this in consideration, in February 2022, a senior Iranian Foreign Ministry official talked about the possibility of a breakthrough. This was followed by Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Saudi Arabia in December 2022, where he pushed for reconciliation between the two countries. In January 2023, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister talked about reaching out to Iran. In its latest developments, the foreign ministers of both countries met in Beijing on April 6, 2023, marking the first formal meeting of senior diplomats since 2016. During the meeting, the two sides discussed ways to enhance bilateral relations in various fields and follow up on the agreement signed in Beijing. This agreement includes reopening embassies and finding ways to achieve security and prosperity for both countries and their people. One significant aspect of the meeting, according to the Foreign Ministry of Saudi Arabia, was the mutual aspiration expressed by both sides to intensify consultative meetings and cooperation to achieve more positive prospects for their relations, serving their common interests. They also appreciated China's efforts in hosting the meeting.

Furthermore, as previously stated, there is growing recognition on both sides of the need for reconciliation, but how this realisation has emerged requires some clarification. The very first reason for this growing realisation is that both countries have been facing economic challenges in recent years. Iran has been under sanctions, which have severely impacted its economy, while Saudi Arabia has been seeking to diversify its economy and reduce its dependence on oil revenues. These economic challenges have created a sense of urgency for both countries to seek new opportunities for economic cooperation.

Additionally, the value of diplomacy and regional cooperation is being recognised by both parties more and more. As a result, there is now a desire to talk to one another and solve ongoing issues. This understanding has been driven by the conviction that sustaining tensions and conflicts serves no country's interests and that working together can provide positive results for both.

The presence of China as a mediator and facilitator of the negotiations has further added a new dimension to diplomacy, bypassing the traditional Western powers. This development has been viewed positively by both Saudi Arabia and Iran, as it allows for a more balanced approach to negotiations and reduces the influence of external actors. The Chinese approach is based on the principles of mutual respect and non-interference, which resonate with both sides. However, there are concerns that China's involvement may be driven by its own economic and strategic interests rather than a genuine desire to promote peace and stability in the region. Nonetheless, the fact that both Saudi Arabia and Iran have welcomed China's role suggests that there is a growing recognition of the need for new approaches to regional diplomacy.

Lastly, evolving geopolitical realities in the region, with the United States deprioritizing the Middle East, have created new opportunities and challenges for regional powers. This has led to a greater willingness among regional states to take a more proactive role in addressing regional issues, providing space for Saudi Arabia and Iran to engage in dialogue and cooperation.

Now the question is how this reconciliation will affect the Middle East and beyond. On the bright side, it might help to promote regional stability, minimise the possibility of proxy conflicts, and offer up opportunities for economic cooperation. It might also herald the beginning of a new chapter of interaction and diplomacy, with China emerging as a major actor. On the other side, it might drive a wedge between Saudi Arabia and its established allies, such as the US and Israel, and exacerbate existing regional tensions. It might also make US efforts to restrict Iran more difficult and galvanise Arab nations against it.

In conclusion, the recent reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran represents a significant shift in the geopolitical landscape of West Asia. While the rivalry between these two powers has persisted for decades, current developments suggest a growing recognition of the need for a more open diplomatic approach. The role of China as a mediator in this reconciliation process further underscores the changing dynamics of global power and the emergence of new players in the region.

However, the sustainability of this reconciliation remains to be seen, given the sectarian and ideological differences between the two nations. The United States, which has been a key player in the region, may also find it difficult to accept this development, given its interests in containing Iran and normalizing ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Nevertheless, the Saudi-Iran reconciliation offers an opportunity for greater stability and cooperation in the region. The international community must continue to support and encourage such initiatives while also remaining vigilant of any potential challenges and threats to the peace process. Ultimately, the reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran serves as a positive example of how diplomacy can be used to resolve conflicts and foster greater cooperation in the international arena.

Pic Courtesy-Pankaj Jha

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)

Neha Singh Dayma
About Neha Singh Dayma →

Neha Dayma has recently completed her Masters in Politics with Specialization in International Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University. She is a political science graduate and also a current intern at Online Foreign Policy School. Her areas of interest include South- East Asia, West Asia, geopolitics, Indo- Pacific and India's foreign policy.

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