India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Minimum Deterrence in the Age of Tactical Nukes

What most of the contemporary countries prioritize the most is reflected through their quest for upholding sovereignty through National Security which becomes the central point as to why international treaties and conventions remain legally non-binding in nature. Most of the nation’s prioritize their domestic security concerns over their external international obligations. Against this said backdrop, India’s security challenges stem both from its highly precarious geographical location and its commitment to the very core policy of “No First Use” (NFU) or broadly the second-strike policy. This declared NFU policy was developed based on this core rhetoric that India would retaliate on a massive front if it has been struck with nuclear weapons first from its neighbouring or even other opponents within the evolving geopolitical framework. This resulted in the major posture that India adopted in 1964 when it refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or broadly the NPT through which the country successfully reserved their right of nuclear retaliation in any given pretext where it has been attacked first, irrespective of the kinds of weapon deployed, whether it be conventional, unconventional, or WMDS to be specific. This stance aligns with Article 51 of the UN Charter which upholds a country’s undeniable right to self-defence in situations where the said country’s sovereignty has been compromised for a range of reasons. India has suffered from the post partition times both externally and internally through wars, insurgency, proxy wars, intervention by violent non-state actors, communal strifes, to even larger economic sanctions from the international community, specifically during the Cold War regime. This insight into the history of the country’s foreign and security background highlights the need for working on an inherently coherent strategic approach that would automatically serve as the country’s need for the hour. The defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indo War deeply shaped India's security outlook, influencing its concessions to the neighbouring country Pakistan following the first Indo-Pak war in 1947. It was followed by consecutive wars with Pakistan in 1965, 1971 and 1999, which underscored the persistent volatility of these nations. India's nuclear doctrine has been a focal point of intense deliberations ever since the first draft was issued in the year 1999, culminating in the final nuclear doctrine of 2003. Even today, the question that still strikes to be extremely relevant is, with regards to the understanding of India’s massive retaliation policies and more importantly, the catastrophic consequences that nuclear use would inevitably impose on the civilian population.

India’s current nuclear doctrine is defensive in nature, rooted in a non-threatening, norm respecting approach. The first formal nuclear doctrine of India was announced on 4th January 2003, nearly five years after India demonstrated its nuclear capability through the tests of 1998. India's nuclear deterrent is aimed primarily to deter nuclear threats and attacks, whereas it is very important to understand that India's “No First Use policy” (NFU) stems from the very precarious security environment surrounding India, shaped by its relations with its two nuclear armed neighbours, China and Pakistan. Even prior to becoming an overtly nuclear weapons state in 1998, India had developed the capacity to assess nuclear technologies and maintain an indigenous capacity to strengthen its strategic posture. This gradual evolution was influenced by a number of significant shifts that shaped the international security environment at that particular point of time. This included China's testing of Nuclear weapons in 1964 followed by NPT which prevented Non-Nuclear Weapon State from acquiring more weapons which was an indirect threat considering how the 1971 Bangladesh War saw the strategic convergence between 2 important powerful nations: The United States and China. During the 1983s, reports emerged with regards to how Pakistan has acquired tested nuclear weapons that have been delivered by China. Post 1970s, PingPong Diplomacy emerged between the United States and China with Pakistan acting as a buffer state between both countries. In this context, after the Partial Test Ban Treaty, came in 1996 the “Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty” (CTBT) which imposed a permanent ban on acquiring nuclear weapons which would have posed a huge difficulty for India who would not have been able to develop its nuclear arsenal which in return would have contributed to its further geopolitical and strategic vulnerability. 44 countries had to sign for this treaty to come into force but only 43 accepted it except for India. Instead, India contributed to Pokhran II in 1998 or Operation Shakti. India’s Nuclear Doctrine therefore, became one which was defensive and retaliatory in nature. For nearly two decades, India adopted NFU policy complimented by massive retaliation to project their responsibility and transparency to reinforce the idea of strategic deterrence and regional stability in South Asia.

However, India’s Security Doctrine is evolving in nature. India’s NFU Policy has often come under greater scrutiny particularly considering Pakistan’s deployment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons. In response to this, several policy analysts have argued that India’s stated nuclear policy limits India’s nuclear decisions which would give Pakistan more strategic upperhand. In case, India has evidence of impending nuclear strike, their nuclear doctrine restricts them from attacking first given Pakistan’s offensive nuclear doctrine which clearly does not define what an attack or breach of territory would advocate or call for their nuclear action on India or any country for that matter. Therefore, it is easier for Pakistan to initiate asymmetric warfare or low intensity warfare, proxy wars, support insurgencies, and secessionist movements within India. NFU strictly undermines India’s international reputation and could even possibly affect its domain of nuclear diplomacy. India has signed the Nuclear Civil Deal with the United States, and is a part of “Missile Technology Control Regime” (MTCR) and Wassenaar Agreement. From a cost enduring perspective, India’s given retaliatory strategy however, is more sustainable than an offensive first use policy which calls for huge military and defense investment alongside developing a strong delivery mechanism which calls for even more coherent intelligence and surveillance mechanisms. To uphold India’s nuclear credibility, it has ensured reliance on three foundational pillars:

1.    Ensuring its Nuclear Capability;

2.    Clear Communication Channels;

3.    Strong Political Will.

In the current times, India has made progress in strengthening its deterrence posture through land based ballistic missiles, MIRV technology, and the induction of its second SSBN, which improves survivability. It has certain areas to focus more, such as developing a submarine-launched version of Agni V, maintaining its nuclear sites, and ensuring a strict command and control to guard the nation against cyber and conventional missile threats. Deterrence optimists often argue that survivability alone is sufficient as long as adversaries believe India retains a credible second-strike capability, deterrence hold. However there have been debates, since many scholars reject the NFU policy considering how this policy assumes extreme confidence in both the survivability of retaliatory forces and the efficiency of crisis management, both of which India cannot reliably claim. Therefore, it can be argued that India is caught between the dilemma of credibility and flexibility in the nuclear era. Meanwhile, Pakistan's foreign policy and border security strategy continues to be shaped by their perception on how to counter, balance, and neutralise Indian threats and thus they rely on three approaches, namely:

1.    Forging alliances with major powers to acquire defence capabilities and nuclear technology;

2.    Sponsoring Non-State Actors (NSAs) and waging proxy wars;

3.    Building its own Nuclear Deterrence.

Among these, Pakistan’s full spectrum nuclear deterrence makes the use of tactical nuclear weapons central to its security doctrine. Its nuclear diplomacy reflects the belief that nuclear weapons (either for strategic purposes or tactical purposes), may be employed if the very survival of the state was at stake. Four possible thresholds which can trigger deterrence to fail includes Territorial, Military, Economic, and Domestic Threshold. However, the latter 2 thresholds, as noted by the U.S. Scholar Peter R. Lavoy, is vague and open-ended. This ambiguity renders Pakistan, a leeway to provoke low intensity conflicts while shielding itself under the nuclear umbrella. Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine reflects its belief that as a weaker state, it can rely on the development of Tactical Nuclear Weapons as an offset machinery to India's military conventional edge. Furthermore, Pakistan can discount on the very critical aspect of India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Massive Retaliation. A faulty loophole in India’s Nuclear Doctrine makes no clear distinction between strategic and tactical nuclear use. Therefore, if Pakistan employs Tactical Nuclear Weapons, India is likely to respond with an overwhelming nuclear force, which would further escalate the entire dispute to a bigger global conflict. This dilemma highlights the political nature of nuclear weapons, as the famous Roman adage goes, “Si vis pacem, para bellum”, which translates to “if you want peace, prepare for war.” It emphasizes that nuclear weapons are used to maintain peace, thus having an underlying political character. The central purpose of states in the nuclear age is to avert wars instead of engaging with it. The principle of “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD) underpins this very simple logic: if nuclear weapons are used be it for either strategic or tactical reasons, none of the sides can emerge victorious in either ways. In this context, Pakistan’s TNWs simply aim to neutralize India's conventional military superiority by threatening nuclear escalation at the battlefield. Therefore, these deployment of tactical weapons have a political deterrence character. Many scholars and policy analysts have called for a revision of India’s nuclear doctrine owing to the fact that nobody wants direct nuclear confrontation and that the Indian administration would find it difficult to authorise such retaliations with regards to the safety protocol concerning the civilians.

Thus, India’s Nuclear Doctrine is fundamentally situated in a more credible second-strike policy which is backed by its robust assets, military infrastructure, and communication channels, that have been heavily invested upon and been developed. More importantly, in contemporary times, there is a need to revisit the nuclear doctrine of Pakistan and their TNW position and an assessment of the fact that if Pakistan ever in the long run executes the use of TNWs, how will it tackle its implication over their own civilians citing to greater humanitarian aspect of this entire security related situation. In this light, India has developed their nuclear posture from a constrained bipartisan consensus to a more diplomatically sustainable and carefully drafted strategic doctrine which will favour India’s stance on nuclear deterrence, particularly in South Asia. Therefore, this situation highlights that India does not immediately need to abandon their current strategic positioning but always needs to carefully evolve their security doctrine at least given their geopolitical situation which has shaped their vulnerability in the northern fronts with the presence of both Pakistan and China.

References:

1.  Singh, Sushant. 2015. “Nukes Are Not for War.” The Indian Express, December 25, 2015. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-shouldnt-abandon-its-nuclear-doctrine-because-of-pakistans-tactical-nukes/

2.  Velangi, Amey. 2024. “Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons Limit India’s Conventional Military Options.” Orfonline.Org. June 25, 2024. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/pakistan-s-tactical-nuclear-weapons-limit-india-s-conventional-military-options?

3.  NatStrat. 2021. “NatStrat.” Https://Www.Natstrat.Org. April 22, 2021. https://www.natstrat.org/articledetail/publications/india-s-nuclear-doctrine-in-need-of-revision-162.html.

4.  Pant, Harsh V. 2019. “Nuclear Rethink: A Change in India's Nuclear Doctrine Has Implications on Cost &Amp; War Strategy.” Orfonline.Org. August 19, 2019. https://www.orfonline.org/research/nuclear-rethink-a-change-in-indias-nuclear-doctrine-has-implications-on-cost-war-strategy-54557#:~:text=After%20the%201998%20nuclear%20test,Gen.

5.  Malik, Priyanjali. 2017. “Revisiting India’s Nuclear Doctrine.” The Hindu. March 26, 2017. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/revisiting-indias-nuclear-doctrine/article17668024.ece.

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views of CESCUBE)

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