India- Malaysia Defence Cooperation
India- Malaysia defence relations are crucial for both the nations’ security and strategic dynamics in East Asia and Southeast Asia. India’s interest in East Asia has been previously elaborated by its Look East Policy which was ratified in 1992. This interest not only allows India to increase its diplomatic horizons. This expansion is important because since its independence and being an active member in the activities of the United Nations which also saw New Delhi to focus more on its Western diplomacy. This invited criticism on the Indian government that there is no focus on Asian or Southeast Asian diplomacy. That not only proved to be a global criticism about the narrowness of India’s diplomacy, but China gained substantial momentum in terms of affirming its position in the Asian continent. Malaysia also seems to be a conundrum. Malaysia has proved that it wants to retain its independence in the region and want to pursue policies that allow the Malay peninsula to have its own identity in global politics. This provides Malaysia with the opportunity to capitalize on establishing diplomatic relations with India which also seems to be expanding its diplomatic horizons. This article tends to analyze the implications of the India- Malaysia Defence Cooperation, the historicism behind the relations which will formulate the framework of its strategic evolution in the East Asia and Southeast Asian region.
The geostrategic location of Malaysia and the emerging security dynamics in Asia particularly in East Asia and Southeast Asia makes it essential for both New Delhi and Kuala Lumpur to strengthen their mutually beneficial defence ties. Malaysia is a littoral state of the Malacca Strait that links the Indian and the Pacific Ocean and more narrowly the Bay of Bengal to South China[1]. This geostrategic positioning allows Malaysia to occupy a very critical strategic positioning which can allow expanding its defence and maritime exercises for advantage over the seas. Having the civil and military significance in the Malacca Strait for the multitude of ships allows Malaysia to be at the forefront of defence relations with multiple nation-states. Malaysia’s security dilemma is further complicated by the separation of the Malaya peninsula and its territories of Sabah and Sarawak by the South China Sea which requires it to pay particular attention to the security of air and sea lines of communication[2]. Further, Malaysia has a growing economy with large volumes of trade both with India and China besides any other nations which add to its strategic significance.
Cooperative defence and security relationships considering the crucial alignment of maritime routes and strategic positioning are in such a critical area that its development is inescapable need for Malaysia. And India’s defence relationship with Malaysia is motivated by the growth and development of a peaceful and stable environment in regional and impart that regional development on a global scale about the maritime and territorial environment. As a part of its ‘Look East Policy’ since 1992, the policy has been enhanced to substantiate its diplomatic relations with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members[3]. Malaysia in that perspective stands as a key member of the ASEAN. With its geostrategic advantage, Malaysia is a significant enabler and contributor to regional security. On a larger regional effort and implication with considerable future of the Look East Policy, this regional defence partnership will tend to formulate a narrative of security development which will serve a much larger significance not only for the security issues for both the nations but having a considerable role to play in the East and Southeast Asian region.
The defence forces for both nations have a heritage that has evolved from the British military. The Indo-Malaysian defence relationship gained concrete momentum and validation after the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Defence Cooperation between the two nations in 1993[4]. This 1993 MoU allowed the tension between both nations to be resolved due to the factors of the Cold War and divided Asian region due to the ideological imbalances. The agreement of 1993 provides the foundational consensus in terms of nurturing the framework of relationship which allowed further maritime and territorial defence establishments. Importance of 1993 MoU works on defence and security issues and supply of defence equipment the MoU provides for joint ventures, joint development projects, procurement, logistics, maintenance support, training, and education[5].
Post the MoU, the initial part of the 2000s built on policy-making levels which involved exchanges on strategic and security assessments which required further cooperation in areas of counterterrorism, maritime security, disaster management and peacekeeping operations[6]. This sets out the objective to promote regional and global security which will be propounded on a multilateral framework to achieve goals of peace and international stability in defence and strategic areas for a long-term establishment. As part of the bilateral relations with Malaysia, India has emerged to focus on economic and commercial relations.
Amongst ASEAN, Malaysia is India’s third-largest trading partner and India intends to be the largest trading partner for countries of Southeast Asia[7]. As much as the 1993 MoU is sincerely important, India-Malaysia Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (CECA) ratified on 1st July 2011 further broadens the framework of the bilateral relationship between the nation-states[8]. With the undertaking of covering goods, services, investment, and other areas cooperation which include the possible extension of developing IT sector for a multitude of purposes including climate change. Even the India-Malaysia CEO forum, which was held twice in 2012 tends to introduce the notion of soft diplomacy and soft power diplomacy between the nations[9]. But the principal question stands, where is the principality of relations focused between both nations? The principal objective for both the nations is to explore and elaborate the areas of collaboration and strengthen the relations on expanding its defence bases and collaborating on extending defence parameters on the lines of maritime security.
In 2019, the Chief of Naval Staff of the Indian Navy visited Kuala Lumpur to strengthen and to work on maritime and naval relationships[10]. Both the navies have been regularly taking part in the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition (LIMA) in Malaysia with Indian naval ships and coast guard making port calls at Malaysian ports[11]. Along with this, the Malaysian Naval ship also has regularly taken part in joint naval maneuvers named as MILAN series of exercises and since 2014 the exercise series has become one of the most important accomplishment for India’s strategic uphold in the region. And maritime protection and activities have become the center of both the nations maritime policies which have allowed to establish interoperability for countering piracy at the sea and coordinating their research and rescue operation and response to natural disasters. This has allowed for both the nations to establish closer professional and culturally cementing friendship in the region. Scorpene submarine deployment has been also at the forefront of both nations. Harima Shakti based on the conventional war in an urban setting, a bilateral army exercise that is meant to prepare for the UN peacekeeping operations assists in countering and strengthening counterterrorism and counter-insurgency activities for which New Delhi and Kuala Lumpur conducted in 2021[12]. Even the Army Training Centre and Counter-Insurgency Warfare Centre, have allowed Malaysia and India to expand and exchange on non-convert existing training arrangements in form of short courses[13].
With these strategic developments, Malacca Strait is expressed as a common concern for which the navy build-ups have been a key focus. This naval exercise effort is seen to not only unite Malaysia but also Singapore and Indonesia as well, because of the general principle that exists about the responsibility of the security of Straits. Malaysian navies and Indonesian navies have allowed New Delhi to increase its patrolling activities on the avenues on entry of Malacca Straits. This multilateral effort allows air surveillance operations to counter the rising surveillance by the Chinese administration in the region. However, New Delhi must make sure that this diplomatic effort should have littoral states being an equal participant, as this effort and military exercise will only then be any different to Chinese intervention in the maritime area. ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADDM) Plus Forum has seen defence ministers and security concerns of all the members' states carry out non-traditional security exercises[14]. Cooperative Mechanism on the Strait of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS) has allowed India and Malaysia to contribute to the enhancement of navigational safety and environmental protection in the straits[15].
With the ADDM Plus Forum and SOMS, both the nations were able to strengthen the framework on creating cooperative security, especially focusing on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, maritime security, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping operations. These defence and strategic developments have given a positive perception of India and Malaysia regarding balance out complex security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific Region and this military-to-military cooperation and strategically the Look East Policy on multilateral altitudes. Along with analysis of the international dimensions of both the nation-states, nations are part of the NAM, G-15, G-77, the Commonwealth, WTO, ASEAN (ARF), the East Asia summit and Indian Ocean Rim- Association for Regional Cooperation (IORAC)[16]. At the Shangri La security dialogue, the pilotage of Malacca Straits was discussed with India, with Malaysia being the forerunner and India’s expertise allowing for the protection of the narrow channel of the Malacca Straits from constantly emerging non-traditional security threats in Southeast Asia[17].
Despite the progressive military and strategy develop the administration Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi still face certain critical issues which can lead to a diplomatic rupture between the two. Cultural understanding between the two nations has put the economic engagement, military, and defence cooperation under diasporic connection. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has expressed their concern for the domestic controversies that have afflicted Muslims. The amendment to the Citizenship Law that excluded Muslims and revocation of article 370[18]. This has led to Mahathir’s administration accusing India of ‘invading and occupying Muslim-majority Kashmir and violating their rights and territorial integrity[19].
Even though in 2019 he did not underline this concern as the overarching concern for its country’s relations with the country, the engagement with Pakistan has indeed increased on behalf of Malaysia. Mahathir's emphasis on the cultural integrity of Muslims has led to overturning the foreign policy of Najib Razak’s government, which navigated Malaysia's foreign policy at the expense of Pakistan. Mahathir’s attempt has been focused on rebalancing Malaysia’s relations by centering Malaysia between the nation-states, but seemingly pro-Pakistan on its economic and political developments[20]. PM Modi has kept his effort in terms of making strategic involvement with Malaysia, which involved visiting PM Mahathir in Malaysia for congratulating on his victory in the recent Malaysian general elections.
Malaysia’s inclination towards Pakistan can be attributed to Mahathir’s propensity for closer relations with countries either in the developing or Islamic world. Regarding Chinese activities as well, despite the objection that Kuala Lumpur has shown towards its maritime ventures, Malaysia has tried to maintain a balance regarding economic partnerships. It has made sure that the economic foothold is not favoring one nation but maintaining that balance so that it could maintain its independence. In 2020, Malaysia was involved in a diplomatic exercise, Kuala Lumpur Summit[21]. The Summit saw that Saudi Arabia will continue to support Mahathir's administration if the balancing act between New Delhi and Islamabad is in favor of the Kashmir issues and capitalizing Pakistan's Muslim brotherliness to fulfil its aspiration to become a full dialogue partner of ASEAN just as India has been since 1995. This also comes at a time when the Malaysian public has been criticizing Mahathir for not being Islamic enough.
The rise in Hindu nationalism in India and the attendant rise in Islamophobia provided Mahathir and his allies with political fodder for building up their support among Malay-Muslims in Malaysia by criticizing India’s treatment of Muslims. But still, that does not prove Pakistan to be an economic substitute to India’s economic assistance to Malaysia. Malaysia’s economic engagement with India also increased when it signed a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement in 2011 and moved toward actualizing the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area (AIFTA) since 2010[22]. Based on CECA bilateral agreement and AIFTA, India rose to become Malaysia’s largest trading partner in South Asia, while Malaysia became India’s third-largest trading partner in Southeast Asia, after Indonesia and Singapore[23]. In 2019, the total bilateral trade between India and Malaysia amounted to USD 17.2 billion. And in 2017, when India and Malaysia celebrated 60 years of diplomatic relations, the government of Modi and Najib extended the possibility of increasing two-way investments which PM Mahathir has also sought to extend and progress upon during his tenure. This solidifies India’s importance and position as a major economic partner to Malaysia, and Mahathir is known as an iconoclastic statesman on the international stage and his economic pragmatism will keep India’s importance for the benefit of long-term economic strengthening.
The full potential of the bilateral relations of Malaysia and India are yet to fully utilized in the regional context. What Malaysia seems to be expecting from India is rejecting any affecting link between the issue of global terrorism and Islam. More specifically, the focus is shifted to preserving and protecting the real values of Islam. Promoting multiculturalism and reaffirming their commitment to democracy, pluralism and development is the primary reason that why Malaysia and India continue to share information and heavily invest in defence and strategic developments. PM Modi is also seeking to advance the Indian nation-state on a global level and promote the idea of India being the next major global leader. When India and Malaysia signed the two MOUs on Cooperation on Cyber Security and Cooperation in Project Delivery and agreement on Cultural Exchange Programme for 2015- 2020, this seems to be focused on extending this relation to control the security narrative of the whole East Asian and Southeast Asia region[24]. If the countries can enhance these exchanges through regular dialogues and at multilateral levels, then India can find another success in its Look East policy as it has been able to find success with Singapore. Even so, India must be careful in its approach. It cannot allow itself to act in a similar interventionist way and for this to be maintained, India needs to make sure to listen to Malaysia’s concerns over long cultural and religious cooperation.
Notes
[1] Y. Singh (June 2007). “IPCS Special Report: India- Malaysia Relations”. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.
[2] (2nd April 2017). “India, Malaysia reaffirm strategic cooperation to boost economic ties” Financial Express.
[3] Ibid.
[4] P.S. Sahai (10th March 2007). “India- Malaysia Strategic Dialogue”. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.
[5] Ibid.
[6] M. Izzuddin (27th February, 2020). “Whither India- Malaysia Relations?” Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS).
[7] J. Cherian (14th February 2020). “Troubled relations between India and Malaysia”. Frontline
[8] M. Izzuddin (27th February, 2020), ibid.
[9] V. Anand (2014). “Defence Cooperation with Malaysia”. SP’s LandForces
[10] M. Izzuddin (27th February, 2020), ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] C.R. Mohan (11th May 2021). “What does US departure from Afghanistan mean for South Asia?” Indian Express
[13] Indo- Asian News Service (14th September 2019). “India, Malaysia undertake joint naval exercise”. India Today
[14] Y. Kachiar (20th April 2020). “Will a New Government in Malaysia Reset India Ties?” The Diplomat
[15] Ibid.
[16] D. Bhattacharya (13th October 2020), ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] (8th August 2020). “Mahathir admits Malaysia’s ties with India strained due to his Kashmir Remarks”. Indian Express.
[19] Ibid.
[20] R. H. Laskar (8th June 2020). “India- Malaysia ties back on upswing; Kuala Lumpur to buy more roce,s sugar”. Hindustan Times.
[21] (8th August 2020). Indian Express, ibid.
[22] S.D.Chandra (January, 2014). “Malaysia- India Defence Cooperation: Need for a Paradigm Shift before Strategic Partnership”. Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies. Vol. 38 (1).
[23] Ibid.
[24] PTI( 12th July, 2018). “India, Malaysia vow to combat terror; ramp up defence ties”. Economic Times.
(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)
