Increasing strategic importance of Andaman and Nicobar Islands

“Andaman and Nicobar Islands are very strategically located. They overlook the entire sealines of communication and choke lines (in Indian Ocean Region).”- Navy Chief Admiral R. K. Dhowan

India always had a peculiar line of interest towards the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The IOR region seeks to provide a larger security dimension for the nation-state. With India’s centrality allowing for easy movement across the IOR and subsequent control of the security and strategic concerns, Prime Minister Modi’s cabinet has focused and changed its outlook towards the Indian Ocean Region. The pre-Modi narrative towards the region was much more focused on maintaining the diplomatic and resource-based dimension towards the region. Not only the region was based on the metrics of soft diplomacy, but India also seemed to be on the verge of focusing cooperative developments towards the region. This proves essential for long term diplomatic and foreign relations with the neighboring states but under the Modi administration, India is seeking a new kind of centrality in the region. Centrality tends to be focused on the advancement of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) especially along the lines of the existing geopolitical narrative of the Indian Ocean Region[1]. Factorization of the Indian Ocean Region as the establishment of its strategic and security policies is based on the decision of harnessing the maritime capabilities New Delhi can build and advance onto the region. Primary responsibility needs to be an emphasis on engaging its military diplomacy and the strategic potential that it can create. Island nations in the region seem to be the instrumentalism that can allow a nation to provide its logistical support. India factors into the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI) for projection of its maritime capabilities and views the islands as securing the net security emphasis in the region. Strategic implications also reside on connecting with other regions as well especially a closer emphasis on the Eastern region of IOR. For New Delhi to be able to secure this capability, the transformation of the islands into strategic assets, integrating the islands with the mainland and safeguarding the local ethnic concerns has become one of the objectives that are accommodated considering preserving the advantage around the ANI region[2].

The strategic importance of the ANI tends to be primarily driven by the growing Chinese footprint in the region. China’s interest in the ANI is also based on this attraction of this strategic deviance. The highlighting of the “String of Pearls” strategy has allowed initiating a larger scramble of security foothold in the region, especially regarding maritime foothold. In the quest for energy resources in the region, China has gained a foothold at the critical junctures of Chittagong, Hambantota, Gwadar and Kyaukpyu, which it believes will secure its essential energy requirements[3]. Similar ports in Pakistan and Myanmar have the potential to connect mainland China to the Indian Ocean Region through overland transport rather than through the straits of Malacca. Currently, 80 per cent of China’s energy imports cross the narrow and crowded Straits of Malacca. Overland connection to the IOR curs short the distance while also allowing China to address its “Malacca Dilemma” i.e., its dependency on this waterway that is vulnerable to being blocked off or controlled[4]. Indo- Pacific, the plight of Indian Ocean strategic control and quest for consequences of strategy implication has gained a lot of international critical attention to its chokepoints. China has displayed this larger emphasis to control the area surrounding ANI and has held multiple security dialogues since 2016 to conquer the security dynamics of the and gaining a future advantage over any strategic face-off as it has been getting with India recently. This substantially attracts our attention and poses a very peculiar question regarding why are so strategically significant for the nation-states in the Indian Ocean Region?

Andaman and Nicobar Islands constitute the southern and eastern frontiers of the Indian union, closer to South East (SE) Asia than peninsular India. Its unique position provides geographical navigational and advantage with closer access to the ocean floor resources as well. In 1857, a penal colony was established at Port Blair by the British after the Revolt of 1857 and these islands were named Kalapani where the revolutionaries and freedom fighters were put in the jail that was established on the Island[5]. In December 1941, Japan targeted a new empire which was known as the “Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, when Japan successfully bombed pearl harbor and started advancing towards Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, and Borneo[6]. Japan believed that the empire and the enclosing empire will provide the natural and human resources required to become a world power. After the Japanese surrendered in September 1945, the ANI was handed back to the British and post-independence, were devolved to the Republic of India[7]. Along with the major resettlement of all the servicemen, major demographic changes in the islands transformed the outlook of the island. Situated 750 nautical miles or about 1200 kilometes from India’s Eastern Seaboard, these islands form an important archipelago of 573 islands, only 38 of which are inhabited[8]. The 145 km wide, windswept, ten-degree channel divides the Andaman group from the Nicobar group of islands. The north to the south spread of these islands extending over seven degrees of latitude, or 450 nautical miles enables them to command the Bay of Bengal. Of particular significance is the fact that the Six-Degree Channel, at the western end of the Malacca Strait, is dominated by the great Nicobar Island[9].

Although the islands extend over an area of only 8300 square kilometers, their geographic location confers on India, an additional Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 300,000 sq km, which is about 30 per cent of India’s total EEZ. The reserves of seafood, the possibility of offshore oil, gas, and minerals, and the presence of seabed poly-metallic nodules further add to their economic importance. New Delhi has been historically at the target of militarizing and strategizing the island for having a substantial outlook in the region. Clearing a proposal for defense infrastructure building on the Andaman & Nicobar Islands (ANI) in 2019. The Modi government is ready with a 10-year-long “roll-on” plan to create facilities for additional troops, warships, aircraft, and drones on the islands, strengthening the existing military facilities[10]. The importance of the ANI security paradigm is somewhat have been delayed by many nation-states. India first began developing a military presence in the ANI in the mid- 1990s. Malaysia and Indonesia, which were interested in terms of developing and harnessing its strategic capabilities in the area, initially did not see the projections of ANI as positive developments. The logic of minimalist security presence was the precedence that was sought by many nations in terms of preserving peace and prosperity. Even India’s actions were not seen as the annexation of sovereignty and security but exercising its territorial rights in the region. China’s growing presence in South Asia and especially around the IOR which was also around the ANI ignited the debate and sought to develop on these potentialities. ANI’s core utility remains its potential for non-traditional security cooperation. Over the years and developments, ANI has been a ‘staging post’ for humanitarian efforts, traditionally by India in the Bay of Bengal[11]. Especially by the Indian Navy, building on its 2004 tsunami relief experience, the Navy has undertaken a wide range of HADR operation in the regional seas, ranging from major evacuation efforts in Yemen to alleviating the drinking water crisis in the Maldives and providing relief supplies to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Indonesia during these natural disasters. The Navy’s biennial MILAN exercises at Port Blair are currently the largest gathering of navies in the region, including Southeast Asia and gives special attention to humanitarian relief and non-combatant evacuation drills. Showcasing that humanitarian efforts and strategic advantages can be availed from the island. 

Tri-Services Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) progressively emerged as a lynchpin of India’s regional maritime engagement in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the MILAN series of exercises, coordinated patrols, and bilateral exercise with littoral states in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea have contributed to this purpose along with regional maritime force. Regional navies of Southeast Asian countries have also been making port calls to Port Blair, other major navies viz, the US, Australian, Japanese, and French also have displayed a similar interest in visiting the ANI and subsequent exercises. Coordinated surveillance of Malacca, Sundar, Lombok and Ombai Wetar Straits with ANI and Australia’s Keeling (Cocos) Islands and collaborative anti-submarine warfare efforts in the Indian Ocean allows them to play a critical role. This enhanced advantage of keeping a strategic vision and check over the adjacent straits pushed the Modi government to plan for “Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo- Pacific” in 2019 and comprehensively enhancing the port of Sabang. 2019 visit to the port of Sabang by INS Sumitra and INS Vijit enabled the pending Indo- Japanese acquisition and cross-servicing agreement to host and seemingly allow the Japanese naval ships to cruise in ANI. INS Kahasa, in 2019, on North Andaman Island, established a “joint logistics node” at ANI to organize tri- service activities, procurement and movement. In 2017, the Indian navy upgraded the Baaz naval station at Campbell Bay with extended runaways and operating bases. “Defense of Andaman and Nicobar Exercise” in 2017 were also prominent especially for New Delhi in the focus to fire up the cross-service simulation and drills.

ANI provides an apt opportunity for joint power projection in the Indian Ocean region. With already established airstrips in some of these islands and suitable beaching grounds, the ANI provides a perfect nodal center for Human Assistance and Disaster relief operations (HADR) operations[12]. Considering the geographical proximity to the countries in the region, nonstop UAV operations can be planned to obtain all-time maritime domain awareness. If the ante can be stepped further, these islands can be used to stage Indian and US nuclear weapons to provide an umbrella against the Chinese aggressive posture towards countries in the region. A warship is known to be the symbol of a nation’s diplomatic tool. With ANI at such a geographical advantage, it can be leveraged as an ‘unsinkable carrier’, which is projected by the Indo - US joint diplomacy through soft and hard power projection across the seas and islands. Along with the United States of America venturing into the seas and islands, Communication, Compatibility, and Security Agreement (COMCASA) with India is the first of its kind, which allows Indian military to procure US cryptologic India had also operationalized the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016, which enables US Navy to replenish supplies from Indian Navy logistics platforms[13]. The islands’ strategic significance in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) has been underplayed by India’s policy of ‘Masterly inactivity and benign neglect’. While contemplating on the actions to advance the strategic relationship, the United States - India enhanced cooperation bill clearly articulates that the United States should seek to enhance the capabilities of both the countries to address emerging common threats, increase security cooperation, and expand joint military exercises. To enhance mutual capabilities to meet the rising challenges in the Indo - Asia - Pacific regions, the Andaman, and Nicobar Islands (ANI) provide the apt avenue to boost such military understanding which enhances the diplomacy between nations[14].

Andaman and Nicobar Islands have proved to attract foreign capabilities around the region to exercise their military capabilities. India has proved one thing that ANI can be used in the account of increasing the humanitarian efforts in the region. Despite the foundations of a vibrant democracy and common observation of the rules-based international law that is majority based on strategic relations and security dynamics, ANI has accounted for multilateral dynamics. If security and humanitarian efforts are the efforts of all exercises that are being conducted, this also proved the ANI can indeed be accommodated by nations to establish a variety of reform which can accommodate the dimensions of bilateral and maritime-based relations among the islands. It will be essential to note that how the dynamics of Maritime security will evolve with years to come about. Whether the fact that rising contentions for the maritime security and control in the IOR and around Andaman and Nicobar Islands will invite any military or forceful altercations will stand in the balance. A major concern is that most of the nations fall around the IOR and nations which are associated with ANI are contesting for this control and recognition of the ANI will continue to counter the Chinese aggression. A similar situation which is seen in the water of the South China Sea and the Taiwan strait is something that is completely being avoided. India has continued to capitalize on the advantage that Andaman and Nicobar can deliver by continuing with maritime exercises and surveillance. Andaman and Nicobar Islands provide that substantial advantage over the Eastern entry of the IOR, and surveillance allows it not only to measure the resources but as well providing a substantial outlook over other state. 

Notes

[1] A. Wagle (3rd April 2019). “The rising tide in the Andaman Sea”. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, The Strategist.

[2] N. Matheswarn (2nd June 2020). “India- Australia strategic partnership: Leveraging aerospace capacity” The Interpreter.

[3] Ibid.

[4] A. Wagle (3rd April 2019) ibid.

[5] B. Chandramohan(18th June 2017). “The Growing Strategic Importance of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands”. Future Directions.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] N. Matheswarn (2nd June 2020), ibid.

[9] B. Chandramohan(18th June 2017), ibid.

[10] R. Singh (21st January 2021). “India to kink off major drills in Andaman Sea to sharpen military synergy” The Hindustan Times

[11] U. Das (11th November 2018). “Andaman and Nicobar Islands: India’s Strategic Linchpin in the East”. South Asian Voices, Defense & Security.

[12] R. Singh (21st January 2021), ibid.

[13] P.K. Balachandran (21st August 2020). “Strategic Calculations behind PM’s plan to develop India’s Islands”. The Citizen Is Hopeful,

[14] (11th May 2021). “ Andaman and Nicobar: Modi Government’s Plan for Transshipment Port, Other Infra Projects on Great Nicobar Island Clears First Hurdle”. Swarajya

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)