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Space May 12, 2023 12416 Reads

Evaluating international space treaties and Weaponisation of Space

A
By Abhijeet Nehra
Author • Centre for Security & Strategic Studies
Evaluating international space treaties and Weaponisation of Space
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS

This article will delve into the history of international space treaties wherein we will go back to the 20th century and discover what the first space treaties were and how outer space is slowly being weaponised in the 21st century, dealing with actions taken by the US, Russia, China, and India. The weaponisation of space has profound implications for the future of warfare.  

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International Space Treaties:

The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space oversees five international treaties that govern space law.

1. The first-ever space treaty was signed in January and entered into force in October 1967. It is called "the outer space treaty" and is the foundation of international space law. The treaty states that space is open to all nations, and the concept of sovereignty is not applicable in outer space. It prohibits using weapons of mass destruction, and signatory states are responsible for their activities and private ventures. As of March 2023, 113 countries have ratified the treaty.

2. The rescue and return agreement entered into force in December 1968, stating that all signatories are to help astronauts in distress, if necessary, help them return to the nation where they launched. In addition, signatories are to return any space object that lands on Earth outside the country from which it launched. The treaty has been ratified by 98 states, including the European Space Agency, the European Organisation for the Exploration of Meteorological Satellites, and the Intersputnik International Organisation of Space Communications, as of January 2022.

3. The liability convention entered into force in September 1972, stating that the launching state is responsible for any damage caused by its space object on Earth and in space. It also mentions procedures for settling claims regarding damages. It also deals with cases when multiple launching states form part of one space object. The treaty has been ratified by 98 states, including the European Space Agency, the European Organisation for the Exploration of Meteorological Satellites, the European Telecommunications Satellite Organisation, and the Intersputnik International Organisation of Space Communications as of January 2021.

4. The Registration Convention, promulgated in September 1976, mandates that all space objects must be registered with the United Nations by the launching state or one of the launching states. As of February 2022, the Convention has been signed and ratified by 72 states worldwide.

5. In July 1984, the Moon Agreement came into effect, stipulating that the moon, including other celestial bodies, only be used for peaceful purposes. Secondly, the United Nations be informed about the location and purpose of any station established on any astronomical bodies in outer space. Finally, the moon and other celestial bodies are the common heritage of humanity, and an international regime should govern the exploitation of resources in outer space when it becomes feasible. As of January 2019, it has been signed and ratified by 19 states worldwide.

The outer space treaty forms the basis of international space law, and the succeeding agreements deal with issues mentioned in the outer space treaty in-depth.

The Weaponisation of Space:

Before conveying the weaponisation of space, I wish to shed-light on the distinction between the militarisation of outer space and the weaponisation of space. Militarisation of outer space is when countries use satellites to direct bombing raids or for command and control and navigation through global positioning systems. Space weaponisation is when space-based devices capable of destructive capacity are in the Earth's orbit.

Although space was militarised ever since the first communication satellites were placed in orbit, setting distructive objects in Earth's orbit is changing the status quo of outer space being peaceful.

United States weaponisation of space:

America conducted its first anti-satellite missile test in September 1985 when it decided to destroy the Solwind solar observation satellite whose instruments had failed. With this test, it was able to showcase satellite-destroying technology. In the 21st century, US Air Force and the emerging Space Force are exploring developing space-based weapons with offensive capabilities. On 7th March, 2023, the Department of Air Force secretary gave a speech at the Air and Space Forces Associations Warfare Symposium, talking about transforming the Air and Space Force to remain the dominant military force on the planet incorporating offensive weapons capabilities.

Russia’s weaponisation of space:

Moscow conducted the anti-satellite test on 15th November 2021, during which it destroyed a defunct Soviet satellite known as Cosmos 1408. Through the test, the Kremlin was able to showcase its satellite-destroying capability. The aim is to reduce Russia’s vulnerabilities to Western precision-based weapons and prepare for future warfare by targeting and navigation through satellites. Igor Morozov, the head of operations at the Russian space force, sees developing anti-satellite missiles as Moscow preparing itself for the changing nature of warfare.

China’s weaponisation of space:

President Xi Jinping's China established the strategic support force, an independent branch of the People's liberation army, was launched in 2015 tasked with launching and operating satellite architecture. Beijing destroyed its Fengyun-1c weather satellite to demonstrate to the world its satellite-destroying capability. Chinese military experts on 18 October 2022, urged talks and negotiations on arms control in space to avoid weaponisation of space. On the one hand, it seems China is favouring international agreements, but on the other, it has developed anti-satellite missiles. It is hard to ascertain what Chinese intentions concerning developing weapons capable of operating in outer space.

India’s weaponisation of space:

India neutralised a fast-moving satellite under mission Shakti undertaken by India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation. With the test, New Delhi demonstrated its capability in the fourth dimension of warfare neither did the Ministry of External Affairs nor the Prime Minister identify which satellite was targeted by mission Shakti. On 11th April 2023 the Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan said that the world is slowly but steadily moving towards the weaponisation in outer space and stressed preparing for the new front of warfare by developing defensive and offensive weapons.

Final Viewpoint:

In the 20th century, the international space treaties were created with the intention of establishing outer space as a common heritage of humanity, as outlined in the five treaties overseen by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. In contrast, in the 21st century, the United States, Russia, China, and India have established military units designated for outer space.

They are preparing for the future of warfare by developing defensive and offensive weapons. Slowly and steadily, the world is witnessing the weaponisation of outer space as the four countries have tested anti-satellite weapons.

End Notes

1. https://www.spacefoundation.org/space_brief/international-space-law/

2. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/outerspace

3. https://spacelaws.com/space-law-fundamentals/

4. https://treaties.unoda.org/t/outer_space

5. https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introrescueagreement.html

6. https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introliability-convention.html

7. https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introregistration-convention.html

8. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/1395-registration-convention-national-interest-analysis-pdf#:~:text=The%20United%20Nations%20Convention%20on,State%20Parties'%20space%20related%20activities.

9. https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/intromoon-agreement.html

10. https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/5448-outer-space

11. https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/198034/vought-asm-135a-anti-satellite-missile/

12. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/america-moving-weaponize-space-space-already-warzone-196269

13. https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3321908/kendall-outlines-clear-path-for-modernizing-air-space-forces-confronting-peer-c/

14. https://www.space.com/russian-anti-satellite-missile-test-world-condemnation

15. https://www.space.com/russia-anti-satellite-missile-test-first-of-its-kind

16. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-03/features/russias-anti-satellite-weapons-asymmetric-response-us-aerospace-superiority#:~:text=These%20weapons%20are%20detailed%20in,satellites%20beyond%20low%2Dearth%20orbit.

17. https://eurasiantimes.com/china-deploys-weapons-capable-of-wiping-us-space/

18. https://www.space.com/3415-china-anti-satellite-test-worrisome-debris-cloud-circles-earth.html

19. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2058.html

20. https://www.drdo.gov.in/mission-shakti

21. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202210/1277381.shtml

22. https://www.space.com/india-tests-anti-satellite-weapon.html

23. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/we-are-witnessing-militarisation-of-space-and-steady-progress-towards-weaponisation-cds/article66725336.ece

Pic Courtsey-Tyler Van Der Hoeven at unsplash.com

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)

Topics & Index: #Moon Agreement
Abhijeet Nehra
About Abhijeet Nehra →

Abhijeet Nehra is a M.A. International Relations from University of Sheffield and has done his graduation in Global Affairs from Jindal School of International Affairs, O P Jindal Global University . He was research associate with CESCUBE.

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