Chinese infrastructure development in Tibet: A Long term Strategy
China has been expanding its transportation networks to connect each and every corner of the country to mainland China. Achieving the vision of One China and a moderately prosperous society by 2020, Xi Jinping has been laying stress on integrating the autonomous regions with the mainland. Working towards the vision of National Rejuvenation, connecting the nation through rail, aviation and road networks. The Autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet have been struggling for freedom with China using every possible means of coercion, from stifling protest to re-education camps, and propaganda to strangulate their unique identity.
Giving modern economy and development as an option for these regions to forget their ethnic past and identity and become Communist Party approved Chinese. Which makes transport and telecommunication connectivity an essential job. According to Human Rights Watch report for China 2021, the government launched the promotion of “Nationality Unity Model Area”, these policies encourage economic migration from other parts of China and phasing out Tibetan-medium instruction in primary schools. Intensified surveillance and intimidation in neighbourhoods, workplaces, and homes has prevented public protest, a goal emphasized repeatedly by leading officials.[1]
Tibet has been on the agenda of Xi Jinping ever since he came to power in 2013. That year, he ordered officials to implement a new policy for Tibet, saying, “To govern the country well, we must first govern the borders well.” China has resolved its border issues with all other countries except India. India-China border conflict and the Belt and Road Initiative has brought urgency to the project. In July 2020 India and China clashed with each other in the Galwan valley incident, killing twenty Indian soldiers and three Chinese soldiers as reported by the media of respective countries. Also in 2018, both countries were at a standoff with each other at the Doklam plateau. This has put both the countries on alert of a possible conflict and has been working towards building their border infrastructure to increase the mobility of goods and soldiers.
Belt and Road Initiative launched in 2013, has been expanding at a quick pace with almost 47 billion dollars of investment. The infrastructure and transportation project in Tibet is the outcome of a plan to open a corridor to connect China with the region of South Asia. The third plenary session of the 10th Tibet People’s Congress announced the launch of the “Himalayan Economic Rim project” although the precise route is not yet known. According to Chinese media reports, the “Himalayan Economic Rim refers to [land] ports in Tibet including Zham, Kyirong, and Purang economically supported by Shigatse and Lhasa.”[2] Additionally, China and Nepal, BRI partners, have planned a trans-Himalayan new era connectivity network running through China’s Tibet and other countries. This connectivity network is a strategic link between the two countries which will contribute to deeper bilateral relations as both of them are working toward expanding border ports, railway, road, aviation and telecommunication networks.
In its 14 five year, plan China also announced to promote high-quality Belt and Road development. The development of inter-connectivity and building linkages with South-Asian nations to promote trade and exchange and assimilate the growth of the region makes it crucial for China to invest in the region. According to the Chinese 14 five-year old plan, the government is planning to spend about 30 billion dollars in the period from 2021 to 2025 for improving infrastructure in the Tibet region.[3]
For which there have been three new airports that are in construction with the expansion of the Lhasa Gonggar Airport, the others being located in Lhunze County, Tingri County and Burang County respectively. Gonggar Airport is the largest in the region with a capacity of 9 million passenger trips by 2025.
In addition to that, China is also integrating the region with the mainland through the construction of highways and railways. On June 25, China’s most advanced Fuxing bullet train started operation running along the Qinghai-Tibet plateau for the first time. The railway’s annual freight transport capacity is 10 million tons and also provides strong support for the flow of goods.[4] Preparing itself for any kind of border hostilities that might develop due to the ongoing conflict with India.
The construction of strategic highways is also underway. On May 20, 2021, it completed the construction of a significant highway along the Brahmaputra River, providing access to remote areas along the disputed border with Arunachal Pradesh in India. This highway that took seven years to complete passes through the Grand Canyon of the Yarlung Zangbo River (As the Brahmaputra is called in Tibet), the world’s deepest canyon. The highway will reduce the distance between Nyingchi city and Medog from 346 km to 180 km and will cut the travel time by eight hours.[5]
Not just that, according to Arunachal Times, it has also been building new civilian settlements along with the border areas in line with the recently announced plan to build ‘628 first and second line moderately well off villages along China’s border with India, Bhutan and Nepal. As investigated by Robert Barnett, China has also taken over certain pockets of Beyul, a village situated in the western borders of Bhutan. China aimed to obtain certain pockets of territory on Bhutan’s western borders that would give China a military advantage over India, and it had told Bhutan from as early as 1990 that it would renounce the claim to the Beyul if Bhutan would give China those western areas.[6] Bhutan which is under treaty obligations with India cannot accept such offers. India needs to react strongly against such kind of coercion. One can also view these build-ups as China strategy of ‘subduing the enemy without fighting’. India with China’s ever-growing military power might prefer a compromise rather than an all-out war. Up till now more than twenty rounds of negotiation comprising the third tier of diplomacy have occurred between the two countries without any scope of reaching an agreement. But for India losing the 1962 conflict to China might mean that it is ready for redemption. Also, as many Indian political analysts have pointed out India is better at high altitude military warfare. Advantages and disadvantages are there on both sides as is the military preparedness.
What are the major developments taking place in the region?
01 Border cities and towns
China will improve the functions of border towns and focus on supporting the border towns of Manzhouli, Kuandian, Hunchun, Suifenhe, Dongxing, Tengchong, Milin, Tayu, and Kokdala to increase their carrying capacity.
02 Border villages
China will improve infrastructure and public service facilities in border villages, build about 200 new villages, and achieve universal coverage of road access, electricity, communications,postal services, and radio and television in natural villages along borders.
03 Highways along and across borders
China will build highways along and across borders from Ji'an to Huanren, Hunchun to Quanhe,Lushui to Tengchong, Medog to the Yunnan-Tibet boundary via Chayu, Qinghe to Altay via Fuyun, Bulungkol to Khunjerab Pass, Barkol to Laoye Temple, and Erenhot to Saihan Tara.
04 Border airports
China will build airports in Tashkurgan, Longzi, Suifenhe, and other airports, relocate Yanji Airport, and build about 20 general border airports.
05 Border ports
China will construct ports at Lizi, Heihe, Tongjiang, and Heixiazi Island and transform and upgrade the ports at Jizha, Zhangmu, Mohan, Khorgas, Alashankou, Manzhouli, Erlianhot,Ruili, Youyiguan, Hongqilap, Ganqimaodu, Ceke, Turgat, and Irkeshtam.
Figure 1 Proposed developments along the border[7]
Conclusion
From establishing settlements on the Tibet border to increasing connectivity through the construction of highways, railways and airports, China is not keeping any stone unturned in securing its borders. China only military adversary in South-East Asia is India, with whom it still has lagging border territory issues. Although the peace and tranquillity agreement of 1993 ensured that relations can be run smoothly but China’s continuous transgression on the border area leading to the Galwan incident has thrown everything into the water. And relations are nowhere towards becoming better. Militaries are on high alert both sides of the border and relations are, as S. Jaishankar, India’s external affairs minister put it is going through a “rough patch”.
Notes
[1] Human Rights Watch (2021) China: Events of 2020, China. URL:https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/china-and-tibet
[2] Bhutia, Tshering C (2016), “Tibet and China’s ‘Belt and Road’”, The Diplomat, 30 August 2016. URL: https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/tibet-and-chinas-belt-and-road/
[3]Pao, Panging M (2021), “Chinese border infrastructure”, The Arunachal Times, 31 October 2021, Arunachal Pradesh. URL: https://arunachaltimes.in/index.php/2021/10/31/chinese-border-infrastructure/
[4] GT Staff Reporters (2021), “China’s infrastructure plan in Tibet to benefit regional economy beyond border”, 5 July 2021, Beijing. URL: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202107/1227853.shtml
[5] Krishnan, Ananth (2021), “China completes strategic Tibet highway near Arunachal border”, The Hindu, 21 May 2021, Chennai. URL: https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/china-completes-strategic-tibet-highway-near-arunachal-border/article34607474.ece
[6] Barnett, Robert (2021), “China Is Using Tibetans as Agents of Empire in the Himalayas”, Foreign Policy, 28 July 2021, Washington DC. URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/28/china-tibet-bhutan-empire-borders-villages/
[7]Center for Security and Emerging Technology, “Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035”, Georgetown University. URL: https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-14th-five-year-plan/
Pic Courtesy-Evgeny Nelmin at unsplash.com
(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)
