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Security March 13, 2021 1559 Reads

Biden’s approach towards South China Sea, and the Indo-Pacific

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By Apoorva Jain
Author • Centre for Security & Strategic Studies
Biden’s approach towards South China Sea, and the Indo-Pacific
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS

In his first-ever speech on foreign policy called ‘America’s Place in the World’, President Joseph R. Biden gave a snapshot of the future of US-China relations in world politics. His address cautioned the oldest democracy of the world against “the growing ambitions of China to rival the United States.” Calling it the “most serious competitor”, Biden’s remarks towards China can help debunk the policy of the United States towards the South China Sea (SCS) that remains one of the most pressing issues of 21st century geopolitics. 

In the aftermath of the 2016 ruling where the Permanent Court of Arbitration rejected Chinese claims over all of the South China Sea, the Chinese Navy continues to flex its muscles and pose a threat to neighbouring littorals. In the year of pandemic as well, Chinese vessels sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat, entered Malaysian EEZ and claimed to have expelled a US guided-missile destroyer, USS Barry. The Trump administration took a hard-line approach, often openly criticising the Chinese actions and setting the stage for a Cold War 2.0 or a possible military conflict in the region. Before the situation could worsen, Biden came along with a hope of carrying a reset button.

Placing Biden’s perspective within Indo-Pacific

The issues concerning Washington with respect to Beijing include a trade war, and the latter’s provocative approach towards Taiwan and South China Sea, its high handedness in Hong Kong and possible human rights violations in Xinjiang and cultural repression of Tibet. All of the bilateral issues can be clubbed under the jargon of ‘Indo-Pacific’ that has been one of the central themes of the US foreign policy since Obama’s time. The then Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ announcement marked the entry of the US into the Asia-Pacific. It collided with a rising China that did not want the presence of an external power to undermine its influence in the region. The shift from ‘Asia to Indo’ further proved to be an irritant in US-China ties as it replaced China with India as the centre point in Asia. Biden appointed the man behind the ‘Pivot’ approach, diplomat Kurt Campbell as the coordinator of Indo-Pacific affairs under the National Security Council. Appointment of Campbell sends down a signal among international relations academia that Biden is likely to continue with the hard-line approach. Calling Trump’s arbitrary and often spontaneous policy on China as “US ambivalence”, he clearly identifies China’s way of pursuing its goals, for instance island-building as a challenge that threatens the stability of regional order.

Since Biden has been declared the President-elect, three important developments help us debrief the US position on China with respect to the SCS dispute. First, the declassified national security document on the 2018 Indo-Pacific strategic framework that underlines Trump administration’s strategy in dealing with the emerging Indo-Pacific. There is no direct mention of the South China Sea except a repeated call for “free and open Indo-pacific” that inadvertently points towards Chinese activities in the disputed waters. Second, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken reiterated the need to work together against China’s aggressive approach in the QUAD foreign ministers’ virtual meeting held in February 2021. He had previously given a subtle thumbs up to Trump’s tough approach towards China but called for engagement with its rival “from a position of strength.” The US press release of the phone call stated the commitment of QUAD countries “to strengthen cooperation on advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific region, including support for freedom of navigation and territorial integrity.” Third, the first call between Biden and his Chinese counterpart Xi saw a firm President calling out the “assertive actions in the region, including toward Taiwan”.

The rapprochement between the two on core issues can be assessed from economic and security point of view. Despite a trade war and decoupling efforts of the US, China emerged to be the largest trading partner last year. Meanwhile, the South China Sea remains a crucial maritime trade route between the US and the region itself. Within the security and strategic framework, the US is redefining its relationships with its allies that includes Japan, South Korea and Australia in the region. Since its fallout with China, Australia has been vocal about security and freedom of navigation of the seas and the same was reflected during the interaction between Australian defence minister and his US counterpart Lloyd J. Austin. It was explicitly stated that the US and Australia would continue to work with alliance partners to maintain security, and enforce inclusive and rules-based order in the South China Sea. The declassified document mentions Philippines, Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries to play an important role in the regional order. One of the first aims is to “promote and reinforce Southeast Asia and ASEAN’s central role in the region’s security architecture, and encourage it to speak with one voice on key issues.”

The Taiwan Question

Taiwan is another important player between US-China relations with respect to the South China Sea. China’s aggressiveness towards the island nation has been on the rise ever since President Tsai Ing-wen assumed office in 2016, who has a clear stance on sovereignty. Rejecting the Chinese narrative of ‘one country, two systems’ A guided-missile destroyer USS McCain has been patrolling the waters of Taiwan strait and around the disputed Paracel islands.

The declassified document clearly makes Taiwan one of the priority areas, calling for “protection of Taiwan and other first island-chain” that falls in the South China Sea. One of the objectives under the US Indo-Pacific Framework is to “enable Taiwan to develop an effective asymmetric defence strategy” to ensure its freedom, security, resilience to deal with China on its own terms. China on the other hand has communicated multiple times that Taiwan remains a sensitive issue between the two states, asking Biden to stop “crossing lines and playing with fire”. China’s warnings show a clear sign of urging the fairly new US government to change its Taiwan policy. The Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi when asked about the SCS dispute in a recent news briefing said “[They] The US and its allies have only one purpose: to sabotage peace and disturb regional stability.”

There are some points of continuity in the Biden administration’s approach with its predecessor. It is a confrontationist one. Within the first month of taking office, two US carriers, USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS Nimitz were deployed to conduct military exercises in the South China Sea as part of its Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP). The President also recently announced the formation of a 15-member task force to have a military strategy on China. Apart from clear outlining of issues between the two great powers, Biden’s apparent tough tone has strands of subtleness. Unlike Trump, Biden has repeatedly called for engagement with China “when it’s in America’s interest to do so.” Campbell in an article notes how “it is neither practical nor profitable to exclude Beijing from Asia's vibrant future”, calling for a place for Beijing in the regional order. It can be anticipated that while the US will maintain a tough stance on China and its activities in the South China Sea region, Biden will look to maneuver around by maintaining if not upgrading bilateral ties with the rival.

On the issue of South China Sea the deployment of USS Ohio a guided missile submarine and the sailing of US destroyers through Taiwan straits shows that Biden is not going to relent on pressure from China and is going to adopt a similar position as like his predecessor.

Pic Courtesy- Vietnam News Agency

References:

[1]https://theprint.in/world/bidens-secretary-of-state-antony-blinken-says-trump-was-right-to-take-tough-stand-on-china/601753/

[2]https://www.lawfareblog.com/growing-risk-inadvertent-escalation-between-washington-and-beijing

[3]https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-12/how-america-can-shore-asian-order

[4] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-south-china-sea-idUSKBN29X0C1

[5]https://theconversation.com/joe-bidens-first-foreign-policy-speech-an-expert-explains-what-it-means-for-the-world-154757

[6]https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/signaling-policy-continuity-us-declassifies-files-on-indo-pacific/

[7]https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/biden-announces-new-pentagon-task-force-on-china/articleshow/80839960.cms

[8] https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/IPS-Final-Declass.pdf

Apoorva Jain
About Apoorva Jain →

Apoorva Jain is a graduate in political science from Delhi University. Her interest in politics, governance and international relations led her to pursue a master's degree in Politics and International Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University. Her research interests include Diplomacy, Indian Foreign Policy and Indo-Pacific Affairs. She is presently research intern with CESCUBE.

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