Australia's Comprehensive Maritime Strategy in a Shifting Global Landscape

This essay aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of Australia's maritime environment and its various responsibilities. It also explores the country's future imperatives and historical context. The essay emphasizes the need to recalibrate the country's maritime strategy due to the changing global dynamics and resource limitations. The recent review conducted by the DSR Australia also acknowledges the increasing risks of a military confrontation and the country's lagging defence policy. It also noted that the Australian Defence Force is not at full readiness. Therefore, this underestimation of Australia's maritime domain importance has resulted in a RAN that is under-resourced and has not been able to address the country's security and prosperity effectively. Some believe that the AUKUS alliance shows capability is the key to developing a coherent force structure. The RAN's structure and capabilities should be based on a maritime strategy that is responsive to the 2023 DSR's strategic circumstances.

The RAN relies on a core of around 11 to 12 surface combatants to ensure Australia's maritime security. A major surface combatant is an aircraft carrier that is designed and armed for battle. Currently, the RAN's major surface-combatant force consists of eight ANZAC-class frigates and 3 Hobart-class destroyers. These vessels are capable of conducting various types of warfare, such as anti-submarine warfare and air warfare. The RAN's other surface fleet also includes a variety of smaller vessels such as patrol boats, mine countermeasure ships, and hydrographic and amphibious ships.

However, the current fleet of patrol boats will be replaced by larger offshore patrol vessels known as OPVs, which are scheduled to be commissioned in 2024. Although the OPVs are not expected to replace the RAN's existing surface combatants, they are designed to supplement the existing fleet. And despite numerous recommendations from fleet structure reviews, the RAN's current surface combatants have remained relatively unchanged for over 50 years. This is because the recommendations from these reviews were not always followed by the necessary changes. Fleet structure reviews were conducted during the 1970s and the 1980s when the concept of a "hot war" was real. Following the Cold War's end, policymakers believed that the era of state conflict was over. Nevertheless, the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific has significantly changed over the past two decades.

RAN's Structure:

The acquisition of eight new nuclear-powered submarines is expected to significantly increase the RAN's capabilities, but it does not represent a significant change in the overall structure or scope of the RAN's operations. The acquisition will also allow the RAN to sustain more submarines in key areas of operation. However, it does not represent a significant increase in the RAN's overall capability.

The bipartisan DSR's call for a structural change in Australia's strategic framework and the need for an expansion of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), both of these elements are needed, given the importance of maintaining a balanced fleet and the need for an updated RAN structure.

Despite the current competitive environment, the need for the RAN to expand its surface combatant fleet is still needed to meet the country's maritime strategy needs. To ensure that it can effectively address the threats that are emerging, the RAN should maintain a balanced fleet. One of the most important factors that the government should consider when it comes to maintaining a balanced fleet is the reduction in the number of Hunter-Class frigates. Although the DSR's report recommends the establishment of a larger surface combatant fleet, even with an increase of 16-20 major combatants, the RAN would still be a small-to-medium size maritime force. It does not have the necessary resources to develop custom platforms for specific tasks.

Experts that the current number of 11 to 12 surface combatants is not enough to address Australia's strategic and maritime security needs. This issue has become more prevalent due to the emergence of new strategic competitors and the size and capability of China's growing military.

While making decisions regarding expanding its surface combatants RAN should consider cost of the country's naval shipbuilding industry and the continuous shipbuilding program. Although, it is clear that there are various ways in which the government can support the RAN in increasing its surface combatants. Some of these include the possible addition of Hobart-Class destroyers, the reconfiguration of the Hunter-Class frigate, or aligning with the US' future destroyer programs.

The RAN's surface combatants cannot be viewed as standalone capabilities, as they have to be integrated with other maritime capabilities such as maritime transport, sealift, and mine warfare. These capabilities will require a coherent maritime strategy.

History at glance:

If a country has a comprehensive maritime strategy, it should be able to effectively utilize its national power to address the various maritime domain challenges. In 1972, the Australian Defence Review stated that Australia could not control the vast ocean areas that give the country access to its coasts. This highlighted the need for the country to develop a defence strategy that focuses on sea denial. Although it wasn't officially acknowledged as a strategy for Australia, the ADR noted that this concept could be the country's only feasible option to protect its interests.

In the 1987 DWP did not explicitly state the term maritime strategy, it provided a framework for the country's Defence in depth. Unfortunately, the strategy was never properly resourced for maritime purposes. Later, in the 2000 DWP, the first time a defence planning document explicitly mentioned a maritime strategy, it provided little detail on what it was.

Whereas, in 2004, a parliamentary committee was established to investigate Australia's Maritime Strategy. The committee's findings revealed that while Australia's economic dependence and geographical location highlight the importance of having a comprehensive maritime strategy, it also demonstrates the challenges that it faces in developing one.

In 2007, the DWP released a defence update that explicitly stated that Australia needed to be able to operate freely within its region and maintain sea control. This contradicted the ADR's position from over 40 years earlier.

Submarines, frigates, and other naval vessels, as well as air support and maritime strike capabilities, are required to establish sea control and project force in Australia's maritime environment. These capabilities are also used to protect the country's shipping lanes and maintain freedom of navigation.

In 2013, the DWP released a statement that stated that Australia needed a comprehensive maritime strategy to deter and defeat attacks. It also said that this strategy would contribute to the country's security and contribute to the region's stability. The objectives of this strategy include preventing or defeating attacks, maintaining sea and air control, and protecting key communication lines. The DWP also stated that Australia should be able to project power in the Indo-Pacific region. This can be done through the establishment of joint task forces and supporting operations.

Although the DWPs released in 2009 and 2013 provided some progress in the development of Australia's Maritime Strategy, they didn't go into detail about how the country would utilize its sea power. The 2013 DWP still stands as an important guide as it provides an overview of the RAN's various tasks.

In 2016, a major recapitalization of the Australian Navy was released by DWPs, which it referred to as the largest such project since the Second World War. It was a return to the DWP's 2009 commitment to acquire 12 new submarines and a replacement for the country's existing surface combatants fleet.

The DWP released another statement in 2016 that did not explicitly state that Australia needed a comprehensive maritime policy. This lack of a comprehensive strategy contradicted the statements made by the US, the UK, and India. These countries all have their own distinct maritime strategies.

Australia's Maritime Defence Imperative:

Due to Australia's vast maritime domain and its dependence on seaborne supplies, as well as the maintenance of international maritime rules, it requires a comprehensive maritime strategy that is geared toward defending the country's maritime interests. This strategy should be based on the multiple aspects of sea control, power projection, and geographical and time limitations. For instance, in response to an attack, Australia was able to successfully carry out a littoral sea denial. This type of defence was used to prevent the country's enemies from interfering with vital undersea cables. An effective and flexible sea control strategy can be used to protect Australia's maritime interests. It should be able to maintain control of the sea for a specific period of time.

Australia has a vast maritime domain, and its northern territories are located near the Western Pacific and the Coral Sea. These areas of concern are not currently under the country's attention. However, they are expected to become more prominent due to the country's growing maritime activities. In addition to the Western Pacific and the Coral Sea, Australia also has a power projection into the Southeast Asian and the Pacific islands. It could possibly expand its operations in these regions by establishing a permanent forward presence of RAN assets in the South China Sea.

Supporting allied maritime strategy involves Australia's participation in sea-control missions and allied power projection operations in the Western Pacific, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. A comprehensive maritime strategy would allow Australia to develop a more effective and resilient defence against potential threats. It would also provide the necessary framework for protecting its trade and amphibious capabilities. Unfortunately, the country's military can't effectively carry out such a strategy due to various limitations. For instance, it may be challenging for Australia to maintain sea control's elements due to the varying strategies of its partners and allies. Understanding the different tactics of our allies and partners will be vital in order to effectively carry out our operations. Hence, a comprehensive maritime strategy requires a strong support base, which includes a strategic merchant shipping fleet and a maritime sustainment program. An integrated Air Force (ADF) is also needed to support this strategy. This includes the development of effective all-weather intelligence and targeting elements.

It was recommended that the DWP and other government departments should develop a comprehensive maritime strategy as part of the country's national defence strategy in 2024. A comprehensive strategy should be released in a stand-alone document that provides a clear and consistent message about Australia's maritime capabilities. The strategy should also be accompanied by a strategy of deterrence to ensure that Australia's interests are protected.

Conclusion:

During the past decades, the commitment of Australia's maritime forces changed. There was also a lack of continuous focus on maritime security. However, the historical trajectory of the country shows that it still has a long way to go before it fully recognizes the significance of maritime defence. The importance of having a comprehensive strategy is acknowledged by Australia due to its various maritime activities and the country’s growing reliance on seaborne resources.

The current strategic environment requires a comprehensive approach to maritime security that incorporates the multiple aspects of power projection, sea control, and geographical and temporal limitations. Recent developments such as the AUKUS' acquisition of submarines and the Defence Strategic Update of 2023 highlight the need for enhanced capabilities. However, this does not necessarily mean that the Royal Australian Navy will undergo a fundamental change in its operational scope or structure. And the challenge of aligning Australia's naval capabilities with the regional security environment is still evident, especially in the Coral Sea, the Western Pacific, and the Pacific Islands.

The various strategies and tactics utilized by allied partners present a significant challenge, requiring a deeper understanding of their different approaches. The recommendation to develop a comprehensive strategy for maritime defence in 2024 is an important step toward ensuring that Australia's interests are protected. This essay aims to provide a framework for developing a strategic plan that will safeguard the country's maritime interests. By developing a comprehensive strategy, Australia can reclaim its position as a capable maritime power that can contribute to regional stability and address emerging threats.

Pic Courstey-Pankaj Jha

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)