Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula- Status update

In 2019, UAE and Security Belt forces launched an anti-terror military campaign which was focused to remove all the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQAP militant’s hideout in Mahfad, Yemen[1]. The security forces were successful in seizing arms and ammunition and were successful in eradicating most of the operating AQAP militant forces in the region. Even though AQAP later retreated into the regions of Abyan and Shabwa, UAE-backed Yemen security forces were able to pressurize and chunk out most active operating AQAP forces in the region, proving to be a humanitarian threat for the people[2]. Despite the fact AQAP has gained a turbulent foot in the region of Shabwa, the success of the militant campaign has assisted in decreasing the influence of the Islamic militant group. The case of a middle eastern country, if evaluated from a political, sociological, and cultural point of view, provides a case of a deeply divided society on the lines of polarized political ideologies. These divergences can be seen in the form of ongoing secession conflicts which have uprooted and destabilized the established governance and legislative system of the government. But when we evaluate the case of the middle east considering the problem of Islamic militancy, there is a growing consensus between the states to take up collective action towards the issue of rising terrorism[3]. UAE—Security Bloc forces is one of the prominent examples when we see the plight of Islamic terrorism in the region. On the scale of international developments, when Joe Biden became the 46^th President of the United States of America, one of the prominent focuses of his administration was to take up a new approach towards the problem in the Middle East. As the Biden administration has a resemblance to the ministers appointed during the Obama administration, suspicions was raised whether his administration will be able to provide any substantial change in the plight of the Middle East[4]. He focused and re-established his framework by insisting that Islamic terrorism should be countered in the most effective way possible to solve the issue on the grounds of humanitarian developments.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is formally a Yemen-based militant group. The conception of AQAP is a merger of multiple radical networks of Saudi Arabi and Yemen, which are essentially targeting the provinces and societies of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the United States of America, and the West intervention in the Middle East. AQAP has been responsible for one of the deadliest attacks which involves series of bombing cases from 2000-2004 and is considered by the State Department of the United States of America as one of the deadliest branches of Al- Qaeda[5]. AQAP has received quite a social media uproar. When suspected ties with radical imam Anwar-al Awlaki were released a huge social media uproar against AQAP was initiated. AQAP subsequently clarified on the target of annexing the land of Yemen and spreading the cause of Sharia in the land. For a country like Yemen and considering its plight in the status-quo, the problem of AQAP possesses substantially higher security threats. The group was officially formed in 2009 when Saudi Arabia pushed a certain branch of Al-Qaeda from land to Yemen’s border. The move towards the border of Yemen’s border has initiated a movement that has seen the branches of various Al- Qaeda groups and forming a single franchise. Even though the official name of AQAP was recognized in 2009, the operation and history of the organization is traced back to1990’s after the conclusion of the Soviet-Afghan war and mujahideen fighters travelling to Yemen[6]. At that time, the Saleh regime gave settlement to these people along with stateless foreigners and even though most mujahedeen fighters were integrated into Yemen’s society, certain people continued that violent jihadist faction in society, the violent element was never eroded during the Saleh regime. These fighters were distributed along different lines of violent activities, some protesting the government or supporting the militant cause of the Marxist government against the Saleh regime. When funding was being received from Al-Qaeda and resources were being smuggled into the mainland of Yemen via Afghanistan, the initial organization, Islamic Jihad in Yemen (IYJ) was formalized in 1990, and despite its lack of organizational structure, a face to an upcoming organization was given[7]. IJY was later transformed to Army of Aden Abyan (AAA) and once AAA was dissolved, the Al Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) was considered as an established coherent organization working on the lines of Islamic militancy in the nation-state[8]. The 2000 attack on the USS Cole, which was organized as AQY’s first large-scale attack, recognizes them as a legitimate terror threat not only in the nation but in the international community as well[9]. Since 2000 there has been a gradual increase in activities of bombing and shooting by AQY. 2003 saw joint Yemen and US-based counter-terrorism operations taking place to destabilize the working and operations of AQY and by 2006 the reaming members of AQY retreated to back away for eradication. In 2009 AQY officially merged with the AQ Saudi Arabia branch and started carrying out its operations as AQAP.  And with their franchise theme which includes the Yemen Soldiers Brigade, “We Start from Here and We Meet as al-Aqsa” outlined their goals and ideology for their organization[10].  

AQAP’s operational area has been focused on the borders of Yemen. August 2009 saw an AQAP suicide bomber attempt but fail to assassinate the Saudi Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef, and has been alleged to be seen training with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab who attempted to blow up a Detroit – bound plane in 2009[11]. October 2010 also saw AQAP attempting to send parcel bombs on cargo to the United States of America, it is believed that the cargo was directed towards senate house. Since 2010 United States of America officially put AQAP on the top of its security threat list. These events also gained them the notoriety of the most dangerous central and operating branch of the Al-Qaeda currently operating in the Middle East[12]. These attacks also raised certain suspicion among the Yemenis whether the AQAP is having international backing to conduct regular strikes over its borders. AQAP influence in Yemen was not only limited to conflict but spread of terrorism was also a main objective. They had an active media influence by their magazine tailored to the Yemeni audience known as the Sada al Malahimm (The Echo of Battles), the magazine was full of anti-western propaganda and the idea of Islamic rule as the means to purify the world and get rid of the ills of the west[13]. The expansion of AQAP in 2011 was done by the establishment of an offshoot organization known as Ansar as- Shariah Yemen (ASY) in southern Yemen[14]. AQAP had the function of attracting more of the Yemeni crowd audience into the organization. Focus on the youth-based organization was a priority by the AQAP, and ASY could rain and further conduct bigger attacks on its target with its upcoming military establishment Yemen 2011[15]. ASY also took major territorial occupation in and started controlling the basic essential service of water, electricity supply and enforced upon the Sharia Law with a strict military-based check upon every section of the society. Yemeni forces were able to tackle the rising working and operation of AQY, countering the AQAP became much more of a difficult task for the Yemen forces. US Homeland Security Advisor in 2011 described the AQAP as one of the most active operational franchise, and  the organization claimed the 2015 attack on Paris headquarters[16] showing its reach and capability. The civil war in 2015 also provided substantial grounds for AQAP to expand its bases in the territory and wreak havoc on a much larger scale. Controlling the south and southeast, AQAP has faced altercations with both the Yemen forces and Houthi rebel and 2015 saw it seizing of Gulf of Aden which became an international concern to eradicate the terrorism as propagated by the AQAP[17]. The Saudi led coalition entered the Yemen civil war which consisted of UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, and Qatar in 2015. When the coalition targeted more on the Houthi rebels, AQAP were able to seize more territory and arms and ammunition and the power vacuum that has been established in Yemen civil war along with the deplorable conditions of humanitarianism has led to AQAP benefiting from the altercation and sustain its base as active Islamic militancy group in the region.

The period from 2016-2020 saw some crucial developments in terms of counter-terrorist forces operating against the AQAP. In 2020, The Trump administration was able to declare that after a major counterterrorism operation in Yemen, the US forces were able to kill Qassim al Rimi, the founder and leader of AQAP[18]. This development gave a lot of success to the Trump administration for its agenda against the counter-terrorist operations to be conducted in the Middle East. Since 2016, US drone strikes began to substantially increase in the Peninsula. The USA conducted 23 airstrikes in 2015[19]. Sticks substantially increased to 44 and 131 in 2016 and 2017, respectively[20]. Despite the fact, 2017 drone attacks led to the loss of lives for many US forces AQAP fighters were being seriously hampered by the increased intervention of counter-terrorist forces. AQAP deployed in the south and south-east territories, the success of the increased bombing of 2016 and 2107 led AQAP losing half of its territories in 2018, and a record membership of 20,000 fighters was reduced to 4,000 by the end of 2018[21]. The increased military pressure on AQAP has led to the weakening of the internal cohesion of the organization. The drone strikes of 2018 were able to decimate the AQAP and cutting its majority of communication lines and rendered them with weak leadership and organization which also led to the fall of its youth recruitment activities in the territory. Salafist militants, merged during the formation of AQAP, fragmented with AQAP in 2019 and aligned with the Hadi government or Southern Transitional Council and led to the decline of ASY operational ideologies curbing its offshore organization as well[22]. In 2019, AQAP also fell into a certain cold war with ISY which was extended till 2020, during which the Trump administration took into consideration. During the ongoing cold war, more than 50% of AQAP militants were targeted and the drone strokes and counter-terrorism operations in Abyan, Marib, and Shawah governorates increased the casualty and vulnerability of AQAP[23]. Despite the fact major operational mechanisms have taken place, no major confrontation between AQAP and ISY has been reported since November 2020.

Since the February 2020 success of assassinating the leader of the AQAP, the activity of the AQAP has drastically slumped. The airstrike against the emir Qasim Al Raymi led to substantial organizational hampering of the AQAP. Houthi offence in the Qayfa tribal areas this year has hampered the activities of AQAP and ISY by the Houthi forces[24]. As per the end of 2020, 50% of AQAP interactions in 2020 have been focused on Houthi forces only[25]. AQAP media department, which was also quite essential in increasing its influence was also killed in the January 2020 drone strikes and the area of social media influence has also been substantially curbed. The Houthi offensive against the AQAP elements has severely impacted the working of organizing capabilities of the AQAP. In the northwestern region of Al Bayda, September 2020 altercation between Houthi forces and AQAP has led to substantial loss on the lines of soldiers and logistical[26]. This change in narrative now has compelled the AQAP to shift from fighting the jihadi cold war to spread anti-Houthi propaganda on the ground as well. June 2020, Houthi forces decimated the present AQAP forces and took over the Awadh territory and the advantage over the tribal grievances has been lost. After the killing of the last leader, Batarfi’s appointment came at a moment when AQAP was suffering from fragmentation and low morale which has affected the operational and mobilization capabilities as well[27]. Currently, the AQAP stands in a transformative stage. Suffering through fragmentation by the drone strikes and increased counter-terror initiative and the fight against the Houthi rebels has made the operation quite difficult in the status quo. AQAP believes that with its new leader, Batarfi, will be able to resurrect the group’s fortunes and as the former operational head of the organization, his declaration is against the rising Western propaganda in the region[28]. What AQAP will now focus on is to revert its ideological structures and working in terms of regaining its credibility and recruitment policies. AQAP, as a militant organization, has got itself isolated in Yemen’s territory. ACLED has reported that AQAP has been working and planning in terms of deploying new lethal weapons in the area to counter the rising wars of arms and ammunition in the nation[29]. In terms of international security and the future of Yemen, the same constant pressurized mechanism should be employed in terms of successfully countering the rising threat of Islamic Extremism. AQAP’s rise will also depend on how the Saudi-led coalition, Yemeni forces, and foreign intervention, especially the Biden Administration’s policies, will react for the upcoming period. Yemen civil war has led to a stage where any extremist or terrorist organization is either an active participant of the civil war and is being funded or regulating themselves with organized crime due to the derogatory situation of civil war that has destroyed the law and order. We can establish the argument that the cause of terrorism has been successfully dealt with in the region but on a meta-narrative scale the whole arena should be eradicated with the ongoing civil war to successfully counter the threat of terrorism of AQAP.

Notes

[1] J. Kocan. (2^nd November 2020). “Yemen File: Iran may be increasingly seeking to promote al Houthi relations to threaten regional rivals”. Critical Threats, Issue Briefs.

[2] Ibid.

[3] S. Ahmed (30th August, 2019). “AQAP in South Yemen: Past and Present”. Fikra Forum, Brief Analysis

[4] Dr. S. Shay (22nd February 2021). “The Leadership crisis of Al- Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)”. International Institute for Counter- Terrorism

[5] S. Phillips (March 2010). “What Comes Next in Yemen?: Al- Qaeda, the Tribes and State- Building”. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Program.

[6] Ibid

[7] Katherine Zimmerman, “Competing Jihad: The Islamic State and al Qaeda,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, September 1, 2014.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] K. Zimmerman (September 2015). “AQAP: A Resurgent Threat”. Combating Terrorism Center, Al- Qaida in The Arabian Peninsula.

[11] Ibid.

[12] M.L. Clausen (2017). “Islamic State in Yemen- A Rival to al- Qaeda?”. Partnership fro Peace Consortium of Defense Academic and Security Studies Institutions, Vol. 16, No.1, pp- 50-62.

[13] Ibid.

[14] S. Ahmed (30th August, 2019), ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] M.L. Clausen (2017), ibid.

[17] Ali al Mujahed and Hugh Naylor, “In Parts of Yemen, Rebels Have Lost Control. No One Else Has It Yet,” Washington Post, August 17, 2015.

[18] C. Weiss (30th January 2021). “AQAP congratulates JNIM for attacks on French soldiers”. FDD’s Long War Journal

[19] Gregory D. Johnsen, Khalid Batarfi and the Future of AQAP, Lawfare Blog, March 22, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/khalid-batarfi-and-future-aqap

[20] Ibid.

[21] A. Macias (4th February 2021). “‘This war has to end’- Biden halts U.S. support for offensive military operations in Yemen”. CNBC, Politics.

[22] (11th January 2021). “387 Days of Power: How al- Qaeda Seized, Held and Ultimately Lost a Yemeni City”. Homeland Security Today.

[23] Dr. S. Shay (22nd February 2021), ibid.

[24] J. Kocan. (2nd November 2020), ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] S. Ahmed (30th August, 2019), ibid.

[27] AFP (5th February 2021). Al- Qaeda’s leader in Yemen Khalid Batarfi under arrest: UN Report”. WION.

[28] B. Johnson (23rd February 2021). “Al- Qaeda and ISIS Use ‘Great’ Capitol Attack to inspire Operative, Incite Violence”. Homeland Security Today.

[29] A. Carboni & M. Sulz (14th December 2020). “ The Wartime Transformation of AQAP in Yemen”. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)

Pic Courtesy-Times of Israel

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views of CESCUBE or its officials.)