Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia: New strategic permutation

During Xi's visit, Saudi Arabia and China issued a roughly 4,000-word joint statement describing their agreement on various political topics and pledging closer collaboration on dozens more. Riyadh and Beijing were eager to demonstrate their agreement on most critical topics, ranging from space research, digital economy, and infrastructure to Iran's nuclear programme, the Yemen conflict, and Russia's assault on Ukraine.

Xi's visit has been widely viewed through the prism of Saudi-US ties, particularly given the remaining friction between Washington and Riyadh over OPEC+'s decision to increase oil prices through production cuts. The US considers this to be essentially assisting Russia's war effort in Ukraine by boosting the flow of funding to Moscow's military machine. As a consequence, foreign media concluded that Xi's visit seeks to exploit Riyadh-Washington tensions, arrives amid fraying ties with the US, steps on Washington's toes, and is the outcome of a made in the US policy. Others argue that this is part of a larger Chinese goal to develop an alternative to the Western-led security order and a new scramble for the Gulf.

DEVELOPING TIES BETWEEN CHINA AND SAUDI ARABIA

This is the fifth visit by a Chinese president to the Kingdom. The bilateral connection has grown deeper and broader with each tour, beginning with Jiang Zemin in 1999. The two nations have diverse interests in dealing with one another, which is more important than a perceived slight to Washington. If it were merely a matter of the Saudis expressing their discontent with the US, Washington could ultimately restore the relationship, and Riyadh would dump Beijing. That will never happen.

China typically obtains about 18% of its oil from the Kingdom. Trade between the two was valued at more than $80 billion in 2021, and Chinese businesses profited more than $36 billion in Saudi Arabia contracting since 2005. Moreover, given the Chinese government's many issues with its Muslim minority groups, Saudi Arabia's prominence in Islam makes it a vital partner for China. China is Saudi Arabia's top economic partner, a key technology provider, a long-term energy consumer, and a comprehensive strategic partner with a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. The two countries' connection has grown stronger throughout the previous century, and this visit builds on that. It is more than just a reaction to perceived US errors. Chinese and Saudi corporations inked 34 agreements encompassing green energy, information technology, infrastructure, and other areas, after earlier predictions that the two nations would sign twenty deals totalling $29 billion. It is obvious that energy lies at the heart of Sino-Saudi ties. Xi's visit comes as China strives to safeguard its energy security in the face of ongoing global oil and gas market restructuring caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the Group of Seven price ceiling on Russian seaborne oil supplies. Saudi Arabia is currently China's largest oil supplier. Maintaining this position not only increases Saudi Arabia's relevance to China but also gives China significant negotiating leverage to keep the prices of its Russian oil imports low. It is also not unexpected that the two sides inked a memorandum of understanding on hydrogen this week, among other agreements, as Beijing strives to establish itself as a superpower in the Middle East's clean and sustainable energy technologies.

The notion of "non-interference in mutual affairs," which has been one of the republic's basic objectives since the 1950s, is one of China's most precious concepts. Today, Saudi Arabia is eager to incorporate the notion into its political discourse as it balances its traditional Western allies, the Eastern bloc, and Russia. Interfering in each other's internal affairs likely means refraining from commenting on domestic policies or criticising human rights records. The frequent criticism over internal and international policy was one of the major stumbling blocks in Saudi Arabia's relationship with the US and other Western nations. This was most visible in the case of the murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the Yemen conflict, and the Kingdom's oil strategy, in which US lawmakers accused Riyadh of weaponising to collaborate with Russia in its war on Ukraine. Similar resentments toward the West have arisen in China due to international concerns about Taiwan, a democratically governed island of 24 million people that Beijing claims as its territory, as well as human rights violations against Uyghurs and other ethnic groups in China's western Xinjiang region.

This collaboration between Saudi Arabia and China also has geostrategic benefits for China. The Saudi crown prince defied the Biden administration's urge to raise petroleum output was music to China's ears. Chinese leaders would want to see more of this. The more influence China has over the energy sector of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the more leverage it will have to counter US hegemony in the Middle East. The fact that China places a high value on "harmonising" the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Saudi Vision 2030, as seen by an agreement reached, calls into question the assumption that the BRI is less essential in Beijing's eyes. This is not to say that the Sino-Saudi partnership is without problems. The lack of China-GCC trade from conversations, for example, was striking. It demonstrates that, despite their mutual high trade volume, pageantry, and considerable public relations, the GCC nations remain cautious about some elements of their engagement with China.

UNITED STATES IN THIS NEXUS

The United States, which has valued its strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia for more than eight decades, now finds its old partner looking for new allies, notably China, which the US fears are expanding its sphere of influence worldwide. While Saudi Arabia was eager to dismiss concepts of polarisation or "picking sides," it also demonstrated that it could create strong ties with China without the criticism or "intervention" it has long despised from its Western counterparts.

Most Gulf nations know that their peace and security are based on their relationship with the US, and they are well aware that China is either unable or unwilling to assume the US's position in the near future. At the same time, they are concerned about the White House's inadequate reaction to a series of terror assaults on major energy infrastructure and civilian and financial institutions carried out by Iran's proxies. Tehran is now closer to attaining nuclear weapons than ever before, yet the Biden administration is preoccupied with issues like political freedom and human rights. Furthermore, although many Gulf nations are engrossed in their different ideas for a post-fossil-fuel future, such as Saudi Vision 2030, Washington is attempting to limit their options with China and force them to choose a side in a war that is not theirs. Nonetheless, Xi's visit this week highlighted that Saudi Arabia and the other nations in the region are not without alternatives. They will continue to utilise their enhanced strategic relevance for global stakeholders to have the best of both worlds. "We do not believe in polarisation or choosing between one partner and another," Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal declared last week. The economy of the Kingdom is quickly expanding, and we require all partners." Even in terms of security, while there is no absolute substitute for the United States' comprehensive deterrent, China is now proposing competitive options in modern military systems. Going forward, the US must pay more attention to the interests of the region's countries and avoid becoming complacent in the face of China's efforts to undermine regional alliances with Chinese answers and Chinese expertise.

The US-Saudi partnership is not ready to break down. Riyadh's principal partner in security and intelligence collaboration is likely to remain Washington, and the external danger from Iran is likely to ensure that at least one facet of the unique relationship survives if wounded. China cannot match the sophistication and efficacy of American armaments, nor can it guarantee freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf—in fact, the US Navy defends and helps secure Chinese oil supplies in the region. Still, the Biden administration should keep a careful eye on what enhancements to Chinese missiles currently in Saudi hands Beijing may be selling and any potential nuclear collaboration.

CHINA'S PRESENCE IN MIDDLE-EAST

While GCC nations are wary of China, it would be incorrect to equate this apprehension with any long-term direction in the China-GCC relationship. Many in Washington believe that the relationship is mostly transactional rather than strategic. This explanation tends to understate the significance of China-GCC collaboration in economic, scientific, and diplomatic fields—as well as how both sides will see that cooperation in fifty years. Because geostrategic stability and security are levers of Beijing's economic interests, China is concerned with them. As a result, the Middle East is one of the few locations in the globe where China's and the United States' interests and inclinations coincide. There is only one insurance policy for China's interests: the present US-led regional security framework. China is more interested in investing in the existing quo than disrupting it. As a result, China is eager to take advantage of this system for as long as feasible. However, this might also be a significant risk source for China. GCC oil supplies to China represent the pinnacle of this strange tie. China, for example, controls the oil exports it receives from the GCC. However, it cannot ensure that goods would reach Chinese ports safely during times of conflict since Beijing has no control over the Gulf and Indian Ocean shipping lanes, which are dominated by the US military.

Given Russia's de facto disengagement from the area and the US's lost momentum, Beijing is persuaded that present circumstances favour its goal to enhance its influence in the Middle East. Of course, there is no proof that China sees the Middle East as a competitive battleground with the US, but the opposite is true though it is crucial to note that Washington does not resist the expansion of Gulf-China ties as long as they remain commercial in character. In response, Beijing is not attempting to replace the United States as the Gulf's primary security partner. In truth, aside from the Taiwan standoff, China does not perceive itself in such a fight with the US. As a result, Iran is the only concern in the Gulf area with a security component. Beijing hopes to function as a bridge between Saudi Arabia and Iran, helping to reduce tensions and bringing the Yemen crisis to a conclusion. Tehran may oppose these measures, but Beijing has significant power over them as a result of their strategic agreement. Furthermore, Beijing buys massive amounts of Iranian oil, providing Tehran with a lifeline that has enabled it to avoid economic collapse as a result of severe US-led sanctions. Arab governments can use their ties with China to exert pressure on Tehran. This would be a significant move, given that Iran has previously attempted to form an alliance with Russia and China. Because of the shift in Arab-China ties, the character of this troika's Iranian and Russian components has fundamentally changed.

CONCLUSION

More than just using the "China card" against the US, Sino-Saudi interaction is motivated by a solid economic base and a determination on both sides to diversify and globalise their economies. This is part of a bigger effort to strengthen domestic stability and government support, which is heavily reliant on continuing economic development. While Mohammed bin Salman may be attempting to lure the United States to increase its assistance, he is also engaging China to further his domestic political and economic aims. The reciprocal strategic trust that Mr Xi mentioned in Riyadh is a constructive vision that should not frighten Washington as long as US-Gulf strategic relations are serious, consistent, and coherent. Maintaining this confidence will be critical for the different groups to maintain the significant progress made in recent weeks.

In this light, the shadow of developing Sino-Saudi connections, like the phantom of a growing China-Iran relationship, appears to be more a result of US efforts to restrict, postpone, and impede China's growing economic involvement with the rest of the globe, particularly in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Despite strengthening these connections, the Saudis remain loyal allies of the US, and the prospect of Beijing replacing Washington as Saudi Arabia's most important partner remains remote.

REFERENCES

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Pic Courtsey-Akil Imran at unsplash.com

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)