Vucic’s Serb World: Serbian militancy and the emerging threat to Balkan region
The purpose of this article is to analyse the rising Serbian militancy, along the borders of Serbia. The contextualization of this militancy is historically associated with the Serbian nationality. The ideology of Greater Serbia and Serb World, convey the political goals of Belgrade by uniting the distributed Serb ethnicity in the region. Separatist ideologies of the Serbian nation-state have continued to haunt contemporary international politics, considering the events of the Srebrenica Massacre in 1995 and with the renewed militancy along the borders, the security concerns are on a rise again. With the political history associated with Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 2006 separation of Montenegro from Serbia, any political contention can constitute a security threat in the region, and it can revisit the violent past of the Balkan region. But it begs the question that what is leading to this contemporary rise of militancy? Is the agenda of Greater Serbia of the 20th century being characterized into the 21st century? How big of a security threat can the Balkan region witness from Belgrade and what is the possible route of solution for this political and security concern? The analytic juncture of this article will present us with the historicism associated with the Serbian narrative in the Balkan region and the diplomatic avenues that can affect the political relations of Serbia with its neighbouring countries.
The history of Serbian nationality is a history associated with the irredentist ideology of a greater nationality. The idea of Greater Serbia completely resonates with the history of Serbian nationality to create and incorporate all the regions of the South Slavic ethnic group. Historical significance and glory of the former Serbian Empire, existing in the 14th century of Southeast Europe, acts as the canon for the Serbian agenda. After the Ottoman wars in Europe, between the former Ottoman Empire and the former Byzantine Empire, Bulgarian Empire, Serbian and Albanian region (also known as the Hole League) from 13th- 15th century respectively, the Ottoman Empire was able to expand into the Balkans, further culminating to the peak of the Turkish presence in Central Europe (Gallaghar, 2001). Leading from 1683, several conflicts and insurgencies mounted an attack against the Ottoman Empire, particularly from the Holy League, against the existing Ottoman strength. The Serbian insurrection of 1804 to 1817, Greek insurgency of 1821- 1831, Russo- Turkish wars of the 16th Century, the retreat of the Ottoman forces had begun (Gallaghar, 2001). After the First Balkan war of 1912- 1913 and following the signing of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, the retreat of the Ottoman empire from central Europe was completed (Bregu, 2013).
Taking inspiration from the Unification of Italy in the 18th century, which was also responsible for the establishment of the Fascist regime in Italy during the World Wars, the principality gave the Serb nationality the strength and unity to pave the war against the Ottoman Empire (Bregu, 2013). The desire for full unification was a desire to remove the external powers and re-establish the glory of the Serb empire. “Draft of the Principality of Serbia” created by Illija Garasanin, inspired by the ideas of Otto Von Bismarck, in 1844 laid the grounds for Greater Serbia (Tcherneva, 2021). The draft emphasized the importance of integrating the Serb population of Montenegro, Northern Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and creating a new Balkan Federation. The draft was not only a source of nationality, but it provided the Serb nationality with the purpose of secession during the first world war. The principality of Serbia is a significant legacy for the region. The idea is peculiar among the other ongoing conflicts as the proponents of Greater Serbia were conscious that it doesn’t align or become a political proxy during the world wars and avoided any possible Soviet or Russian integration. Serbian hegemony was meant to be an ethnic agenda rather than political. The disintegration of Yugoslavia halted the progress of this idea. In 1976, the Socialist Republic of Serbia was divided into two provinces, turning into a period where the members of the Serb ideology started accusing its members of betrayal or were being exiled due to rising tensions in the bloc (Gallaghar, 2001). Serbian population was itself divided and the momentum that Greater Serbia had during this period, faded away. The irredentism of Greater Serbia was silenced for the time being.
The rhetoric of Greater Serbia is being rejuvenated, with the terminology “Serb World” representing it in 21st-century international relations (Al Jazeera , 2021). Serbia’s interior minister referred to the historic principality by citing the need to unite the Serb World. This statement is a concern for the international community. Whether this is a reference for creating a new secession movement or starting a campaign of taking over neighbouring countries where the Serb nationality exists, the concern within the Balkan region is rising. But the pertinent question that this article will deal with is why it’s becoming a security concern? Isn’t the age of secessionism and territorial annexation over or is Serbia moving towards irredentist agenda in a new form? Is the rising Serbian militancy a part of that agenda? The purpose of this article is to investigate the recent Serbian development and analyse the rising security contention for the international community.
Reinvigorated Serb Nationalism:
On 11th October 2021, leaders, and organizations from Albanian- America, Bosnian- American and Montenegrin- American communities reached out to the delegates and leaders of the United States of America to have a stronger presence in the Western Balkan (Al Jazeera , 2021). These organizations believe, along with witnessing a greater deployment of Serbian forces along its borders, backed by the government. Serbia’s growing aggression toward Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro was acknowledged by the US secretary of State, Anthony Blinken and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan. A letter that was released by the organizations, stating the USA’s diplomatic stance on the issue along with these members, expressed that “This is a matter of utmost concern to the US because it directly imperils the peace and stability of the Western Balkans region and in Europe as a whole”. (Carpenter, 2021) The heart of the letter clearly outlines that Serbia is being seen as a rising threat in the region. The fragility of the Balkan region has never been strengthened, even since the end of the Cold War.
Srebrenica massacre has entrenched a wound in the region that requires a long road of consolation in the region and the Balkan region still operates on a highly volatile political foundation. In September 2021, a political crisis erupted between Montenegro and the Serbian orthodox church. Enthronement of the new Montenegrin Metropolitan of the Serbian Orthodox Church created new branches of tensions among the parties, for Serbia it's jeopardizing the autonomy of its orthodox church (Gjevori, 2021). The church and government in Podgorica, whose close ties with Belgrade are well known in the regions, has sparked further ethnic issues in the region (Emmott, 2021 ). For Serbian politics, ethnic issues are a situation of priority for their identity. Though their historical stance has been to avoid the politicization of the same, contentions with neighbouring countries destabilize the existing diplomatic and regional relationships.
The hostility of the Serb nationality in Bosnia, especially from the Serb members of Bosnia’s presidency, continues to grow in the status quo. Serbian sentiments in Bosnia, with Milorad Dodik, a Serb member of Bosnia’s presidency, continue to use the threat or propagate the narrative of a possible Serbian secession from the country (Mujanovic, 2021). This is particularly more alarming because Dodik’s reference is to the “Republic of Srpska[1]” in Bosnia, which was responsible for the orchestration of the Srebrenica genocide and responsible for the death of more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslims, under the disguise of Greater Serbia (Heler, 2018). The systematic violence associated in the past with the Greater Serbia always brings back the horrific memories of 1995. Especially, with the talks of formal political and institutional unification of all ethnic Serb states in Western Balkans, the atrocities are recalled upon international attention. Though the contemporary agenda might be called as “Serb World” and political rationalizations might be given of encapsulating a peaceful existence of the Serbian ethnicity, heightened militancy on the Serbian borders justify the alarming of the Balkan region and international community. The concern for Balkan states and the European Union (EU) remains that Belgrade’s indication of increasing force for the same reasons increases the danger of further deterioration of relations between Belgrade and Bosnia (Morina, 2021). The jeopardy of the Dayton Peace Accord of 1995[2] is at stake with these renewed talks. Peace and security of the Balkan region, particularly Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia, come under jeopardy with a possible inclination towards military action by Serbian forces. And this threat can also be considered on the grounds of diplomatic propaganda by inciting the nationalistic elements in other regions. Serbian broadcast channels, like Pink TV in Bosnia, have been delivering and distributing messages, calling upon all the Serb nationals to unite (Popovic, 2021). The political reach of Belgrade expands through these mechanisms, further validating the concern of Belgrade.
Security and Political Challenge in Balkans:
The issue of Serbian militancy under the disguise of Serbian nationality makes the region fragile. Serbian relations with Bosnia and Montenegro are at an all-time low since Montenegro’s independence in 2006 and the Srebrenica massacre of 1996 by the Bosnian Serbs. Historically, the Serbian foreign policy has always been confrontational and soft diplomacy is the path least ventured by Serbia. Post cold war period, the Russian support towards the Serbian presidency and its activities have provided them with a diplomatic boost in the region (Al Jazeera , 2021). Even the October 2021 diplomatic talks between Serbia and Montenegro efforts of repairing the relations were not successful (Al Jazeeera, 2021). The dispute over the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the status of the Serb minority in Montenegro continues to be the throne for Serbian diplomacy and Montenegro. Ethnic identity in Montenegro continues to deliberate over the question of whether Montenegrins are a distinct ethnic identity of their own or not. This dispute has wider consequences when considering the Serbian identity in question. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the secession of Montenegro from Serbia in 2006, the Balkan region continues to ponder if Montenegrins is a sub- group of the Serb ethnicity or not. If Montenegrins, as an independent ethnic group is not recognized, then Serbs won’t be considered a minority in Montenegro and will continue to be a majority populous in the nation, which diplomatically serves into the hand of the Serbian delegation (Dordevic, 2021). Though near 42% of the Montenegrins believe that their native language remains to be Serbian, the identity they believe that they represent historically and in contemporary times constitutes “ethnic Montenegrins”, which garners the support of 44.98 % of the population, as per the 2011 Montenegrin census (Dordevic, 2021). Tussled with ethnic and political divides, For Montenegro, keeping peaceful relations with Belgrade is important. Serbian politics has increased its interference in the country because of the heightened question of ethnic rights in the land. Accusing the country of supporting and forwarding anti- Serb politics, the previous government of Montenegro reciprocated with ideas of Serbian intervention in controlling the domestic affairs of the country (Popovic, 2021). A breach of territorial sovereignty, as an accusation in the 21st century, is an indicator, no less than a policy of annexation or intervention in the region. Further, in June 2021, Montenegro passed a resolution that recognized the Srebrenica Massacre by Bosnian forces and officially termed it as an “act of genocide” (Al Jazeera , 2021). For Aleksandr Vucic, President of Serbia, the stigma of the Serb nationality associated with genocide, is a sign of ostracism towards the ethnicity. The question then becomes that how Montenegro and Serbia will continue to forge their diplomatic relations with each other. If any mutual bilateral relation needs to be established, then the question of ethnic relations needs to be revisited by both parties, but it should not become a political bone of contention. Both the countries have agreed since 2006 about the mutual economic benefit they receive from each other. But as history indicates, in the fire of ethnic or cultural wars or conflict, the utility of economic relations can be diluted quickly and it can lead to the perpetual stage of conflict and hostility between the parties concerned.
The biggest emerging security threat in form of any possible violent conflict is associated with Bosnia. Bosnia’s Serb Police, at the beginning of November 2021, were found to be conducting anti-terrorist drills. The movement was detected out of the capital of Sarajevo, which the Balkan leaders believe to be a form of Serbian separatist provocation (Al Jazeera, 2021). With the drill involving armoured vehicles, helicopters, rapid police force deployment, EU forces in the area were monitoring the exercise, making the Bosnian Serb Leader, Dragan Lukac, agitated over the interference of the EU and denouncing any claims of provocation in the area. Bosniak and Bosnian Croats refuse to believe that these exercises and movements are not a form of separatist provocation and believe that these activities can be the start of a deep political crisis in the region. For Dodik, the purpose of the Republic of Srpska is to attain autonomy from the region. With Bosnia having a three-member rotating presidency between Bosniak, Serbs and Croats, which leads to joint institutions of the army, economic, financial, and judicial, Srpska joining neighbouring Serbia will be a victory (Emmott, 2021 ). Though tacit support from Russia makes the issue ever active, the approval for the same from the West and US, being involved in the Dayton Peace Agreement, will be rejected and unlikely. Diplomatic rejections and hindrances are a problem for the rising Serb Nationality in the region. The leaders of the European- Union-led peacekeeping force EUFOR, further believe that these elements are “tantamount to secession without proclaiming it” (Morina, 2021).
Conclusion:
The sensitivity of Serb nationality is quite visible with the recent events. The concept of identity and ethnic relations for that matter is a sensitive topic to behold. But the Serbian agenda of continuing with the reminiscent Greater Serbia in the status quo highlights the priority for Serbian foreign policy. What highlights the issue is the confrontational strategy of Serbian foreign policy, which has become the core of this security concern. The outward rejection of the EU and West intervention in the Balkan region makes the situation more complicated. With Russian support, the cause of uniting and unifying all Serbs in the Balkans will continue to persist in international politics. Since the beginning of World War I, the identity of Serbia has been defined by not backing down to any rising diplomatic pressure and moral virtue. A crucial multilateral diplomatic intervention from the West is necessary for the stability of the region. The focus of the diplomatic intervention should not be narrowed down to Vucic, the question of stability requires an equal recognition of issues emerging in Bosnia and Montenegro, which constitutes solving the issues of ethnic representation. For Montenegro, it's crucial to resume and strengthen its economic interdependency with Serbia, to avoid any violent conflict.
The attempt to intervene in Bosnia further requires consideration of all the three ethnicities working collectively to run a nation. The rising forces of nationalism and ideologies of secession need to be addressed equally. Currently, the Serbian tactics resonate with a psychological attempt to stake its claim in the region. Any argument for sanctions or removal of forces cannot be brought up into the question. Neither the West can recklessly enter the region and attempt to suppress the issue. The rising paranoia of Serb militancy needs an effective and efficient dialogue on the scales of ethnic and political lines. For Serbia, in the pursuit of its ethnic superiority, the incidence of past conflict or tensions mean nothing to them, except the idea that their right has been stolen away from them. With the Russian backing in Vucic’s administration, the challenge will be that if the West and US do indeed recognize the need to intervene in the issue and it should not become a stage for proxy diplomacy or war. The core of the issue is a humanitarian consideration of ethnicity and peaceful relations. The history of the Balkan conflict can only be forgotten if power diplomacy is kept aside in the region and effective multilateral dialogue can be established. The challenge for liberal institutionalism is not to let situations like rising Serbian militancy bring back the period of cold war hostility and conflict.
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Notes
[1] Republic of Srpska/Republika Srpska in one of the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the other being the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and is located in the North and East of the country.
[2] Ibid
Pic Courtesy-Ivan Aleksic at unsplash.com
(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)
