The Upcoming Djibouti Spaceport Project

The strategic location of Djibouti provides additional advantages for rocket launches as the equatorial position of Obock minimises the fuel required for take-off.[1] This initiative is part of a cooperative agreement intended to develop a premier commercial spaceport in Africa.[2] The investing stakeholders will formalise and implement the development of energy infrastructure for powering the space facilities, including wind, hydroelectricity, and solar.

The Djiboutian orbital spaceport, valued at US $1 billion, encompasses the construction of a seaport facility, a power grid, and a highway to ensure the safe and secure transportation of aerospace materials.[3] It consists of seven satellite launch pads, three rocket testing stands, and a land use rights grant of a minimum of 10 sq. kilometres lasting at least 35 years.[4] The ambitious space programme aims to create and launch two nanosatellites, Djibouti-1A and Djibouti-1B, in addition to building a spaceport.[5]

The space venture aligns with China’s broader strategy of increasing its military influence and strengthening its economic and investment ventures in Africa. Being one of the largest exporters of space exploration and research applications, China is actively seeking to launch various facilities, both domestically and through foreign nodes, for space exploration.^[6]

This development, however, has sparked speculation regarding the potential involvement of China and its political and military objectives. The project’s implications go beyond scientific advancement and have potential political and military ramifications. Under the pretext of developing Africa’s space industry, China aims to secure the success of its Belt and Road Initiative.

HKATG justifies the establishment of a foreign orbital spaceport in Djibouti by highlighting the existence of ‘bottlenecks,’ such as talent shortages, capital limitations, inadequate infrastructure, a lack of testing data, and industrial ecology within China’s current spaceports.[7] However, Djibouti's technological advancements and essential infrastructural developments are limited, which makes Chinese efforts to assert and influence the region more noticeable.[8] This is evident in the escalating military surveillance by the People’s Liberation Army Navy in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), as exemplified by the deployment of an underwater surveillance network.[9]

These endeavours would enable China to gather intelligence pertaining to the operational patterns and tactical behaviours of not only the US and Indian navies but also other naval forces operating within the IOR.

This move raises concerns about potential coercive diplomacy with smaller nations in East Africa and speculations of a more assertive and militarised Chinese encroachment as perceived by the US and India.^[10] The concerns are rooted in the possibility of China leveraging its growing economic influence and military capabilities to exert pressure on or influence these nations to foster Chinese aims and objectives in political and military realms.

In light of the above-mentioned findings, India’s increased involvement with the islands of East Africa in the western Indian Ocean is crucial for its ambition to secure its military, diplomatic and regional engagements. In 2022, India conducted its first trilateral naval exercise with Mozambique and Tanzania as a strategic move to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean. This exercise was conducted as part of a broader initiative to strengthen defence ties with East African nations in the IOR.[11] In contrast to China, India views African nations as more than “extractive economies” and seeks sustainable partnerships that benefit both parties, emphasising inclusivity[12].

These strategic partnerships are essential for securing India’s energy networks and the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) and strengthening its geopolitical and geostrategic standing in the Indian Ocean.[13] India has signed logistical agreements with the US, France, and Japan, which maintain military bases in Djibouti. This aims to strengthen its influence and military presence in the region and secure its maritime trade routes.

In addition to their political and military connections, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is partnering with the Kenya Space Agency (KSA) to explore opportunities for collaboration in space exploration.[14] It is thrilling to consider the possibility of collaboration between Kenya and India in the space sector. This partnership could cover various areas, including satellite technology, remote sensing, space research, and exploration. The alliance between the two nations has the potential to propel space research and technology, enhance scientific knowledge, bolster defence capabilities, and drive economic growth.[15]

Conclusion

In conclusion, the US $1 billion spaceport project in Africa raises concerns about China’s growing influence and coercive diplomacy in the IOR. It highlights the ongoing power struggle among China, the US (and its allies), and Japan.

China’s engagement in the IOR, as evidenced by the deployment of research vessels equipped with tracking and surveillance devices, serves the purpose of closely monitoring its satellite launches. Such monitoring activities promote the argument that China intends to establish a foreign spaceport to bolster its strategic and defence capabilities. By establishing a spaceport in Africa, China aims to enhance its expertise in space science, which could have both civilian and military implications.

However, it is essential to recognise that this development is not isolated but a manifestation of a larger power struggle. The presence of military bases of the US, its allies, and Japan in Djibouti underscores the complex dynamics at play in the region. The spaceport project can be seen as part of a broader competition for influence and control over strategic locations, resources, and technological advancements, with each player seeking to strengthen its position in the global arena.

Notes

[1] The rotation of the Earth generates a centrifugal force. This force is at its greatest at the equator. Thus, it enables the launch of more extensive and heavier rockets at a lower cost, increasing fuel efficiency.

[2] Benjamin Silverstein. China’s Space Dream Is a Legal Nightmare. (Foreign Policy 2023) https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/21/china-space-law-treaty-djibouti-obock-launch-facility-ost/

[3] Africa will get a new $1 billion spaceport in Djibouti. (Quartz 2023) https://qz.com/africa-will-get-a-new-1-billion-spaceport-in-djibouti-1849994821

[4] A planned spaceport in Djibouti may give China a boost. (The Economist 2023) https://www.economist.com/china/2023/01/19/a-planned-spaceport-in-djibouti-may-give-china-a-boost

[5] Jevans Nyabiage. Djibouti in Horn of Africa on track for spaceport following deal with Hong Kong firm, six years after opening of Chinese naval base. (South China Morning Post 2023) https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3207626/tiny-djibouti-horn-africa-home-chinese-naval-base-track-spaceport-after-deal-hong-kong-firm

[6] Benjamin Silverstein. China’s Space Dream Is a Legal Nightmare. (Foreign Policy 2023) https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/21/china-space-law-treaty-djibouti-obock-launch-facility-ost/

[7] A planned spaceport in Djibouti may give China a boost. (The Economist 2023) https://www.economist.com/china/2023/01/19/a-planned-spaceport-in-djibouti-may-give-china-a-boost

[8] Dr. Indu Saxena. Robert Uri Dabaly. Arushi Singh. China’s Military and Economic Prowess in Djibouti: A Security Challenge for the Indo-Pacific. (Air University 2021) https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2847015/chinas-military-and-economic-prowess-in-djibouti-a-security-challenge-for-the-i/

[9] H I Sutton. China Builds Surveillance Network In South China Sea. (Forbes 2020) https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/08/05/china-builds-surveillance-network-in-international-waters-of-south-china-sea/?sh=4641fe2774f3

[10] China uses its more militarised coast guard like Navy. (Deccan Herald News 2023) https://www.deccanherald.com/international/world-news-politics/china-uses-its-more-militarised-coast-guard-like-navy-1227373.html

[11] India Holds First Trilateral Naval Exercise With Tanzania, Mozambique: Focus On Western Indian Ocean As China Invests In Dual Use Infra. (Swarajya 2022) https://swarajyamag.com/news-brief/india-holds-first-trilateral-naval-exercise-with-tanzania-mozambique-focus-on-western-indian-ocean-as-china-invests-in-dual-use-infra

[12] India is not ‘extractive economy’ and doesn't pursue ‘narrow economic activities’ in Africa, says EAM Jaishankar. (First Post 2022) https://www.firstpost.com/india/india-is-not-extractive-economy-and-doesnt-pursue-narrow-economic-activities-in-africa-says-eam-jaishankar-12839362.html

[13] Darshana M. Baruah. Maritime Competition in the Indian Ocean. (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2022) https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/05/12/maritime-competition-in-indian-ocean-pub-87093

[14] Keerthana Kantharaj. India's Cosmopolitan Constellation of Space Exploration Activities. (CEO Insights India 2023) https://www.ceoinsightsindia.com/business-inside/india-s-cosmopolitan-constellation-of-space-exploration-activities--nwid-14985.html

[15] Keerthana Kantharaj. India's Cosmopolitan Constellation of Space Exploration Activities. (CEO Insights India 2023) https://www.ceoinsightsindia.com/business-inside/india-s-cosmopolitan-constellation-of-space-exploration-activities--nwid-14985.html 

Pic Courtsey-Tyler Van Der Hoeven at unsplash.com

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)