The 7th Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Meeting in Myanmar

About the LMC Cooperation Mechanism:

The first Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Leader’s Meeting was held in Sanya of Hainan Province in China on 23 March 2016. The theme of the meeting was “Shared River, Shared Future” and brought together the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, Vice President of Myanmar Sai Mauk Kham, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, Lao Prime Minister Thongsing Thammavong, and Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh. The meeting was successful and released the Sanya Declaration of the First Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Leaders' Meeting --For a Community of Shared Future of Peace and Prosperity Among Lancang-Mekong Countries officially establishing the LMC mechanism. Since its inception in 2016, the LMC mechanism has contributed to the development of the Lancang-Mekong sub-region. The mechanism aims to boost socio-economic development, and well-being of the sub-region, support ASEAN Community building, promote the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and further advance South-South cooperation [1].

The 7^th LMC Meeting:  

4 July 2022 marked the 7^th foreign minister’s meeting of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC), held in Bagan, Myanmar. The meeting was co-chaired by China’s State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Myanmar’s Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin. The attendees included the foreign ministers Saleumxay Kommasith of Laos, Prak Sokhonn of Cambodia, Don Pramudwinai of Thailand, and Bui Thanh Sun of Vietnam. Wang Yi stated that the mechanism has set a golden example of regional cooperation as six nations have worked in solidarity to foster shared benefits for all member nations. Further, Wang Yi highlighted the need of upgrading the mechanism amidst global changes, continue with the correct path and innovate for regional cooperation. Wang Yi further mentioned that the LMC as a mechanism for cooperation at the sub-regional level has developed and the member countries will continue to promote the Lancang-Mekong culture. The success of the LMC mechanism was shared at the meeting through the release of the List of the Projects supported by the LMC Special Fund of 2022 and the Progress Report of 2021 on Implementing the Five-Year Plan of Action on LMC (2018-2022) [2].

The 7th LMC meeting is also the first meeting of regional importance held in Myanmar since the military took over. Major General Zaw Min Tun, spokesperson of the current military government stated that the meeting would result in the signing of several agreements and that the presence of the delegation showcases recognition of the government and Myanmar’s sovereignty. From China, there has been no condemnation of the military takeover of Myanmar and the response was limited to China’s policy of non-interference in the affairs of other countries. The National Unity Government of Myanmar who is in opposition to the current government protested the meeting stating that such partnerships with the military government violates the will of the citizens. Conducting the meeting in Myanmar is also said to be a direct opposition to a peace plan by the ASEAN countries [3].

Cooperation Consensus - Three Sixes:

The meeting resulted in the announcement of consensus on a series of new cooperation summed up by Wang Yi as the "three sixes". The first ‘six’ included directions for cooperation in six areas. These are strengthening strategic guidance, further deepening of economic integration, expanding cooperation in the agricultural sector, working towards green development, cooperation in building digital infrastructure, and maintaining closer cultural exchanges. The second ‘six’ includes the implementation of plans beneficial for the countries in the region. These plans are the Plan on Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Benefiting the People, the Cooperation Plan on Lancang-Mekong Digital Economy, the Lancang-Mekong Talent Plan, the?Lancang-Mekong Space Cooperation Plan, the?Lancang-Mekong Public Health Cooperation Plan, and the?Hundred, Thousand, Ten Thousand Action Plan on Lancang-Mekong Agricultural Cooperation. The third ‘six’ endorsed a Five-Year Plan of Action on the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (2023-2027) issuing six documents which included a joint press communique and statements regarding customs and trade security, facilitating customs clearance, cooperation in agriculture, a guarantee of food security, cooperation in disaster management, and cultural exchanges and mutual learning among civilizations [4].

Six areas for future cooperation – the first ‘six’:

Following the meeting, Wang Yi highlighted China’s economic growth and building a new development paradigm that will provide new opportunities for the Mekong countries. Increased regional cooperation and long-term strategies could take the LMC mechanism to a new level. In this regard, Wang Yi proposed to promote cooperation in six areas in the future to achieve the desired results.

The first area of cooperation includes joining the development plans of each member country to create a demonstration zone for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a pilot zone for the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and a pioneer zone for the Global Development Initiative (GDI) including a closer Lancang-Mekong community with shared future and a Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Economic Development Belt. The second point of cooperation includes releasing the beneficial effects of the China-Laos Railway, promoting the China-Laos-Thailand Railway, increasing cooperation on the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor, building a Lancang-Mekong market with joint participation for shared benefits, building a model of cooperation regarding intelligent customs governance, and to ensure security in regional production and supply chains, finance and energy. The third is regarding cooperation in agriculture which includes constructing demonstration bases of agricultural products, ensuring fertilizers and agricultural materials supply, green ecological grain storage cooperation, and creation of a value chain for quality products, to jointly enlarge the "rice bag", "vegetable basket" and "fruit bowl". The fourth area of cooperation is regarding green development which includes cooperating for water resources, meteorology, and environmental resources, medium as well as long-term cooperation mechanisms in forestry, and establishing a Lancang-Mekong disaster management cooperation mechanism. Further, it includes establishing a low-carbon and circular economic system that would ensure regional ecological security. The fifth point is about digital cooperation for constructing a digital and 5G infrastructure which also includes the establishment of a platform for natural resource information sharing, and a satellite remote-sensing application cooperation mechanism to decrease the "digital divide" further enabling high-quality development in the region. The final area of cooperation would include close people-to-people and cultural exchanges. This would include video dialogue sessions for women's organizations in the LMC member nations, forums for local government cooperation and world cultural heritage, establishment of the Mekong-Lancang Tourist Cities Cooperation Alliance, a television media cooperation alliance, and creating new highlights in maternal and child, youth, local, sports and media cooperation [5].

Geographical Background:

Lancang and Mekong are the same water body that runs across China and the Indo-China peninsula. In China, it is called the Lancang River, and the downstream flow of the river out of the Yunnan Province, which runs across Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, is referred to as the Mekong River. Multiple factors like fishing, hydropower generation, and transportation make the Mekong River crucial for economic development as the residents in the region are largely engaged in agriculture. Due to the geographical location of the Mekong states, the region is a site of major strategic importance. On one side, there is China, and on the other hand, there are external powers like India, Japan, Australia, and the USA which altogether form the Quad today. With intensifying geopolitical and great power competition in the Indo-Pacific, both China and the Quad nations want these states to be politically neutral and therefore the alignment of the Mekong states is crucial [6].

Governance initiatives for the region:

In 1957, the Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin or the Mekong Committee was established as the first initiative to set up a governance body for the region. Although this initiative was meant for economic development, the plan was more influenced by the Cold War and was therefore supported by the United States as it sought to prevent the general area of the Mekong Basin to come under communist influence. The members were the riparian countries along the lower course that were dependent on American aid. These were Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam (at the time referred to as South Vietnam or the Republic of Vietnam). The American interests in the plan became apparent when the USA, although not a member acted as the administrative head of the Committee. Due to the Vietnam War, Southeast Asia saw constant instability which hindered the functioning of the Mekong Committee, which was later reconstituted as the Mekong River Commission (MRC). In 1992, the Greater Mekong Subregion program (GMS) was established by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) including Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Burma, and China (in the form of Yunnan province). This program functions as a forum for the development of varying sectors like energy, tourism, and transport. ADB has financed the power transmission lines in the dam constructions in China and is therefore called to be a contributor in developing the regional power grid in Southeast Asia. Rather than being involved in regulations or projects, the GMS serves as a body for negotiations and agreements. In 1995, the Mekong Committee was replaced by the Mekong River Commission (MRC) as Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia signed the Agreement for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin. This initiative faced major problems like China refusing to become a member, Thailand’s reluctance in the initial stages of the discussion upon fear of restricting freedom of action, and the Cambodian Prime Minister’s condition that the headquarters should be in Phnom Penh for at least five years. The latest initiative to regulate activities along the river was in April 2000 in the form of the Agreement on Commercial Navigation in the Mekong-Lancang River between Thailand, Laos, China, and Burma to upgrade navigation in the river [7].

Importance for China:

China’s quest of protecting its strategic interests in the Mekong region was faced with pre-existing institutions in the region which were largely dominated by the West and its allies. The LMC has a comprehensive agenda that includes exclusive membership of all Mekong riparian states and large financial resources which can be used by China as a tool for China to gain greater strategic authority.

China aims to construct more hydropower projects in the upper part of the Lancang-Mekong region. In 1986, construction began for the Manwan Dam hydropower project. It was built unilaterally and got operationalized in 1995. Since then, multiple hydropower projects have been constructed altering the free flow of the river to an engineered type for hydropower. For China, these projects have been a way to deepen economic integration since the generated electricity is traded with other nations like Thailand and Laos. These projects also fulfill the objectives of environmentally friendly economic growth under China’s 13^th Five Year Plan (FYP).  China also seeks to enhance its navigation system in the region to improve trade. The Lancang-Upper Mekong River Commercial Navigation Agreement aims to broaden the use of the river to enhance tourism and trade of which China is a signatory. China has also undertaken infrastructure development projects in cooperation with the Lower Mekong riparian states. Other than that, the river provides power to the Southeast Asian region as well through the expansion of power from China to lower Mekong riparian nations [8].

Competing powers in the Lancang-Mekong region:

The Mekong region has been a site of great power competition where states, especially the USA and China have tried to establish their influence through several initiatives. Other than the LMC, initiatives like the Mekong River Commission (MRC), Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), and Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) have been operational in the region. Most of the Mekong countries are former colonies and therefore value and seek autonomy concerning other powers active in the region. Their pursuit of autonomy is fostered through their own initiatives in the region like the MRC. Regional powers like Japan and China in addition to the USA tend to exert influence through their own initiatives and also aim to counter the influence of the rival countries. For instance, China under the LMC has invested around RMB 10 billion (USD 1.58 billion) as concessional loans. This amount is mostly used for industrial and infrastructural development. This mechanism is also meant to counter the American influence in the region. On the other hand, the LMI mechanism under the USA seeks to diminish Chinese influence in the Mekong region. Due to the US-China rivalry, the regional states have been affected. Cambodia has been accused of falling for Chinese interests due to its support for the LMC and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This has affected Cambodia’s perception in the international community and regionally in ASEAN. More importantly, ASEAN’s economic growth requires investments in infrastructural development and the multiple initiatives which are in place due to the power competition can bring the required benefits to the Mekong countries by creating more funding and investment opportunities [9].

The cooperation initiatives from the Chinese side focus primarily on issues like trade, investment, and infrastructure while the American perspective deals with issues like sustainable development and good governance. The pragmatic issues of China are more appealing to the regional countries rather than the value and ideals-oriented issues of the USA. As a result, the Chinese approach achieved closer political and economic ties with the Mekong countries prioritizing development in the region [10].

In the context of BRI:

The Lower Mekong region, including Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, and Vietnam are fast-growing economies but lack modern infrastructure and therefore require investments for development. This dynamic has made the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) more appealing to the regional states. Additionally, due to the geographical proximity to China, these states would increase connectivity between Southeast Asia with the Southern provinces of China.  Despite officially endorsing the BRI, all five Lower Mekong countries have a varying stance on the same. Such a situation has occurred due to conflicting considerations on socio-economic and political issues, perceptions of Chinese initiatives both at home and internationally, and US-China competition in the region. This puts the regional states in a dilemma as they require the investments that BRI would bring but also need to consider the security implications. Cambodia and Laos are affirmed with the BRI projects. While Thailand and Myanmar have operationalized some projects, their implementation has faced setbacks. Meanwhile, Vietnam has been skeptical and wary of the BRI [11].

The rate at which China would be able to successfully implement BRI projects in the Lower Mekong region would be dependent on states’ considerations of the investment requirements and security. Further, the great power competition in the region puts these nations in a much dire situation where they would need to pick sides compromising their strategic autonomy.  

Conclusion:

As the 7^th LMC meeting concluded, Wang Yi highlighted the need for cooperation to have a greater impact and that China would always engage in neighborhood diplomacy with sincerity, inclusiveness, and mutual benefits. He further stated that China would share the benefits that the LMC would bring by adding momentum to the development process to create a better future for the citizens of the Mekong countries.

The LMC mechanism will bring the much-required investments in the region to boost infrastructure development but the regional states also need to be cautious of not losing their strategic autonomy. The importance of the Lancang-Mekong region goes beyond trade, transport, and tourism. The states can be at the heart of any conflict that may arise due to the great power competition in the region. The regional states are in a dilemma where they require economic assistance but also need to be neutral due to the geopolitical dynamics. Hence, the best way forward for the Mekong states could be to use the LMC mechanism to balance their requirement with caution by codifying laws and regulations to ensure the development, neutrality, and autonomy of the region.

Endnotes:

1.       “A Brief Introduction of Lancang-Mekong Cooperation”, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, 13 December 2017 http://www.lmcchina.org/eng/2017-12/13/content_41449851.html

2.     “The Seventh LMC Foreign Ministers' Meeting is held in Myanmar”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 5 July 2022 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/kjgzbdfyyq/202207/t20220705_10715629.html

3.      Myanmar hosts 1st regional meeting since army takeover, Times of India, 4 July 2022 https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/myanmar-hosts-1st-regional-meeting-since-army-takeover/articleshow/92655285.cms

4.     “Wang Yi: Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Sets a Golden Example for Regional Cooperation”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 5 July 2022 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202207/t20220705_10715541.html

5.     “Wang Yi Talks about Six Key Future Directions of Lancang-Mekong Cooperation”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 5 July 2022 https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202207/t20220705_10715479.html

6.     Greg Raymond, “Jagged sphere-China’s quest for infrastructure and influence in mainland Southeast Asia”, Lowy Institute, 30 June 2021 https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/jagged-sphere

7.     Milton Osborne, “River at Risk: THE MEKONG AND THE WATER POLITICS OF CHINA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA”, Lowy Institute, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/58734/2004-08-24.pdf

8.     Vilt? Brilingait?, “China’s Transboundary River Governance: The Case of the Lancang-Mekong River”, Centre For East and South-East Asian Studies, Lund University, 2017 http://www.cawater-info.net/bk/water_law/pdf/brilingaite.pdf

9.     Thearith Leng, “Mekong Countries in the Context of the Connectivity Competition”, Research Division Asia, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), November 2019 https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/projekt_papiere/BCAS_2019_Leng_Mekong_Countries.pdf

10.  Arrizal Anugerah Jaknaniha, “Minilateralism and Great Power Competition during the Covid-19 Pandemic: A Case Study of Mekong Region”, Journal of Integrative International Relations, 2020 https://zenodo.org/record/6621336#.Yt2hI4RBw2w

11.   Le Hong Hiep, “The BRI’s Footprint in the Lower Mekong Region”, Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, 15 December 2020 https://www.rosalux.de/en/news/id/43413/the-bris-footprint-in-the-lower-mekong-region

Pic Courtesy-Vietnam News Agency

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)