South China Sea International Conference

Inaugural Session

Introduction to the Dialogue Dr. Pankaj Jha

Dr. Pankaj Jha, the coordinator of the South China Sea International Conference inaugurated the event and welcomed the speakers. At the outset he appreciated the Centre for Security Studies and the Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University for organising and laid the context of the conference. His introductory remark was that every country in the South China Sea (SCS) region is seeking for brinkmanship to pursue their respective national interests. He further highlighted China’s legitimate claim in the South China Sea which has led to disputes with the littoral states which has led the ASEAN regional architecture to carefully weave and workout a mechanism to maintain maritime order in the region. He pointed out and concluded that every country in the region is a growing economically and besides the economic paradigm, he questioned the potential course of action and the possible narratives of member countries within the regional sphere which could help confront and deter china’s expansionist policy at the global stage. 

 Welcome Remarks- Professor Sreeram Chaulia

On the back of his newly launched book, ‘Trumped: Emerging Powers in a Post-American World’ Sreeram Chaulia, the Dean of Jindal School of International Affairs, laid the strategic relevance of the Indo-Pacific region as the fulcrum of geo-strategy in the 21^st century, comparing it to the Great Game of the nineteenth century which was to influence and control land power in Central Asia. He stated that there exists an imbalance of power in the area, despite U.S military presence in the region and free and open sea lanes of communication in the region. He believes that U.S is no more an influential clout as it was in the past in the region. In contrast, China’s economic colossus coupled with demonstration of power in the region has enabled it to provide economic and infrastructure aide and support since the U.S has failed to provide the desired aides. The U.S has also failed to come to its allies’ aid on several occasions, namely the Scarborough Shoal incident, a territorial dispute between China and the Philippines, where China disregarded and simply overlooked Philippines’ claims of sovereignty over the island. The US simply took a back seat and did not intervene to aid its ally in a time of crisis, which raised suspicions in the minds of its other allies, causing concerns while undermining the ability of the U.S as a hegemon. The realisation has dawned upon the ASEAN member states that they cannot anymore blindly rely on the U.S alone to defend them against the Chinese aggression, since the U.S acts no more as a liberal hegemon but more as a mercenary, as it appears to be turning within to resolve its own internal issues. On the other hand, China has made inroads into the economically backward states through the BRI project, in an attempt to build trust and win the hearts and minds of those countries. He remarked that the US acts no longer as a liberal hegemony unlike the US of the Cold War era that confronted and challenged any threat posed by a foreign state towards its allies, in contrary it acts as a mercenary force, maintaining its interests first.

He maintained that the ASEAN architecture is presently seeking for military and economic aid and assistance which the U.S is unable to provide however, on the contrary China is meeting their interests through the BRI project, despite many countries having their territorial differences with China. In the midst of this ongoing territorial conflict between China and the ASEAN member states, he questioned the legitimate strength of the ASEAN block as he believes that it is currently unstable and incapable to counter China’s assertive policy in the region and therefore suggested that counter-balancing is the only way forward since this would bring a regional identity from within and also help create a united front from within the ASEAN organisation.

In continuation to the unification process, he pointed out at India’s ASEAN connectivity project which has reached a slow burner and questioned the role of India in the unification process of the ASEAN. He concluded by recommending that without Japan’s support the ASEAN mechanism will fail to counter-balance the Dragon and there is a need for a broader grouping for ensuring stability in the region.

Special Remarks- Professor Brahma Chellaney

Professor Brahma Chellaney, a well renowned Indian strategic thinker, was of the opinion that the Indo-Pacific region bears a critical importance because of growing international maritime challenges in the 21^st century. Whatever transpires in the South China Sea will impinge Asia and also global maritime affairs. He opined that China is chipping away India’s maritime interests in the Indian Ocean region (IOR), as well as in the Indo-Pacific realm. He further expressed that if China keeps surging ahead in its expansion it will soon gain control of the entire South China Sea and if it does that it will grow to spread its presence in the IOR, as well as in the South West Pacific, capturing half of the world’s ocean surface. He indicated that 2019 earmarks the sixth anniversary of China’s reclamation policy, a roadmap towards its territorial expansion that commenced in 2013. To support his argument on China’s reclamation act, he picked the example of the Johnson South Reef debacle in 1988 between China and Vietnam and elucidated China’s aggressive act of transforming a reef into an island within a few months which demonstrates China’s expansionist mind-set. In the last six years China has built 7 man-made islands and militarised them without firing a single bullet or having to incur any sort of loss. Nothing succeeds like aggression, for China. The Chinese have created a reclamation space in the SCS, the size of Washington D.C and have militarised it, it would require an immense quantity of ammunition and firepower to flatten the reclaimed island. This is where he commended Vietnam’s gumption by pointing out at the tough resistance, put against China despite being overpowered by the former and  while having meagre and inadequate support from the international community. Vietnam ensured that its Exclusive Economic Zone along with its maritime interests are protected at all costs from the Chinese.

Showing concern towards the expansionist attitude of China, Professor Chellaney questioned the validity of the appropriate international mechanisms in place to solve territorial and maritime issues that could help deter China’s expansionism, since dialogues with China are futile. China’s rejection and disdain towards international maritime tribunal rulings are stark contrast to that of India’s. Unlike China, India has always respected and complied with the international tribunal rulings and displayed professionalism; for instance, it gave away parts of the Bay of Bengal to Bangladesh in compliance with the international tribunal ruling. Compliance and defiance are defined by the state character and not by its geographical size and assets. 

In conclusion, he acknowledged the single biggest impediment for the U.S in the Indo-Pacific region is the South China Sea, since it connects the Indian Ocean to the Pacific and therefore, its primary objective is to ensure that the sea lanes of communication in the region are open and free. He pointed out that America needs to have a clear vision on how it wants to tackle China in the region and that it needs to be more assertive in terms of action against China’s illegal ventures and wrongdoings against its allies, so that it does not trigger any kind of speculation and doubts in the minds of its partners, questioning the capability and preparedness of the U.S to take on China. The U.S needs to desperately plug this gap in its strategy in regard to China in the SCS. Without American leadership and resolve, it would be challenging to prevent China’s expansionism in the region, besides it is also imperative for the International community to be more vocal and committed to the cause to ensure that the South China Sea doesn’t turn into a Beijing Lake.

Session One: Strategic Importance of China

Dr. Vijay Sakhuja, Increasing Maritime Relevance of South China Sea.

The speaker outlined that the narrative of South China is hardwired in the realist perspective. This narrative has been building since 1969. In the recent years, the SCS has witnessed reclamation, fortification, militarization, weaponization and aggression. There has been an aggressive response particularly from China, which claims domination of the public goods at sea.

Dr. Sakhuja said, India carries out anti-piracy activities without charging any commercial company or government. There are a lot of shipping activities in the region which has caused many incidents. According to the statistics presented by Dr Sakhuja, there have been 659 cases registered in the SCS region in the year 2019 alone, indicating the region as a hotbed of maritime engagement. It is an extremely busy maritime zone with high a density of shipping operations that include fishing activities which makes it an accident-prone region. Although, the air traffic above these waters is equally dense, it does not encounter as many incidents as on the seas. 

Dr. Sakhuja stated the Search and Rescue operation is an extremely complex and challenging endeavour since, the regional capacity to handle such huge volume of maritime activities is absent. Besides, submarine activities are on a high in the region, so in the event of a submarine incident, which is most unlikely, no country will be prepared to carry out a search and rescue operation due to the sensitivity of the matter. 

The heavy activity in the SCS is also compounded by the destruction caused by natural and manmade disasters. Dr. Sakhuja said typhoons are a common occurrence but showed more concern towards the ecological disasters caused due to the land reclamation by the Chinese. 

He added further by stating that there is suspicion and lack of trust among the nations claiming territorial sovereignty over the SCS. He said since there are no bilateral agreements and information sharing mechanisms in place among the regional member countries, they abstain from sharing information of any kind and nature with one another. The Chinese claim that they will deliver public goods service in the SCS without involving any other nation. This has created a huge conflict of interest between the regional countries. “We do not know yet how good is Chinese readiness for the region.” Highlighting the sensitivity of the region, Dr Sakhuja said all the states in the SCS region are bound in hard politics where sovereignty has become an irreconcilable challenge.

Oliver Gonsalves, Seabed Mineral Resources and Oil – How Feasible is this pursuit?

Mr Gonsalves reiterated that the SCS is rich in seabed minerals which has increased stakes disproportionately among the regional countries. According to estimates, stated by Mr. Gonsalves, there is 25.9 billion barrels of oil in the region. Vietnam has 4.4 billion barrels, Malaysia has 3 billion barrels, Indonesia has 3.2 billion barrels while Brunei has 1.1 billion barrels of oil. The biggest consumer of oil in the region is China, which consumes 13,525 million barrels a day. China already has huge natural gas reserves of 6.1 billion cubic meters while Vietnam has 9.6 billion cubic meters of gas reserve. There was a clash in 2017 over the drilling exploration rights between China and Vietnam. Vietnam has two large oil fields in the region – they are dwindling so they have resolved to offshore drilling which has caused conflict with China. Philippines is also involved in oil drilling and production – causing conflict and tension specifically with China. Amongst all the shareholders, Brunei has the biggest share in terms of oil reserves, which has forced it to enter into the conflict as well. Seabed minerals have equally aroused tensions and has been a source of conflict among nations. 

Mr. Gonsalves noted that, currently there are almost 30 projects for mineral exploration which has caused conflict between the environmentalists and the mining companies. Despite such tensions, the exploration activities for seabed minerals is increasing, since there is no international watchdog organisation to overlook and intervene environmental hazards during seabed explorations. However, over 120, 000 square km has been given to mine exploration for 30 years to mining companies, which has to be returned to the international seabed authority upon expiry.

Dr. Faisal Ahmed, Economic Dimension of SCS – Trade, Fisheries and Insurance.

 Dr. Ahmed said whenever there is a discussion on SCS, it raises many questions for instance, why is the economic dimension getting so important in SCS, and how to overcome and get benefits? 

With this in mind, he suggested that there are five specific issues:

1. Cost of noneconomic cooperation. If countries do not cooperate, there will be an economic cost of 2.5 trillion dollars on all resources. The US claims to stop/prevent Chinese activities in the region. China is opposing it by saying that a non-ASEAN country has no right to intervene in the SCS.
2. Oil, Gas, natural resources. There is a value chain involved, while it is not about the presence but the benefit of these resources – global value of these resources. If these countries do not agree to the value chain, there will be a huge economic cost. Over 100 billion cubic meters of flammable ice is in the SCS. China has produced 300 million cubic meters of gas. There is also an exploration cost involved.
3. Artificial island building. Coral reefs are being damage due to the artificial island buildings, while overfishing have huge economic costs on natural livelihood, migration and climate change. 16% of coral reef has declined in the past 10 years. Island building mainly by China has resulted in the shrinkage of over 40,000 acres of coral reefs. The Chinese fishery sector hires 4 million people in China and also, 50% of the world’s fishing vessels are found in the SCS.
4. Sea lines of communication. If these are threatened, there will be a huge economic cost of 5 trillion-dollars’ worth of goods. The SCS is an important international trade route. If the current tensions intensify further, the economic costs will proportionally increase as well, causing enterprises to opt for other trade routes. If other sea routes are discovered, it will lead to an economic disaster in the region and SCS will lose its geostrategic significance and importance as well.
5. Blue economy. China is planning to develop three corridors. It is not clear whether these corridors have any economic advantages. Marine cost insurance has already increased by 13.9% since 2009. The risk of war has a direct bearing on the surge of marine insurance which will then lead to high trade costs passing through the SCS. Estimates indicate that tensions among states has hiked up the insurance costs of business cargoes to over 400 million dollars.

Dr. Nguyen Ba Cuong, Vietnam’s Perspective on Development in the SCS.

The speaker outlined China's recent provocative action particularly against Vietnam in the SCS. The Vietnamese have two oil and gas fields named Nam Con Son Basin [Wannan Basin] and and Tu Chinh Vung May Basin [or Blue Whale gas field]. Dr Nguyen expressed concern that China had also sent its own vessels and coast guards in a provocative manner to the area belonging to Vietnam thus arousing tension and even “spoiling for a war”. He claimed the Chinese coast guards had continuously harassed Vietnamese operations. In July 2019, Chinese coast guards had entered the Vietnamese operational waters. The Vietnamese Government sent coast guards to warn the Chinese vessels and signalled them to leave the Vietnamese waters. However, the Chinese coast guards tried to resist them by using high pressure water to push the Vietnamese vessels away. Dr Nguyen highlighted the Vietnamese stance which rejected Chinese claims and said that China does not have any right over its waters. China deliberately intimidated the Vietnamese coast guard to cause collision, which is illegal and a violation under the UN charter.

Session 2: Current Challenges in the South China Sea

Dr. Sarabjeet Parmar, Executive Director, (NMF) - Enforcing UNCLOS and Compliance to International Obligations.

Emphasizing the realist nature of the international system, it was opined that nation-states would interpret the UNCLOS in their national interest but not with a global consensus. While providing the background for UNCLOS, Dr. Sarabjeet Parmar reiterated the fact that sovereignty reigns supreme when it comes to maritime disputes.

Chinese claims to the SCS are opined to be based on the baseline formation with reference to the archipelagos and islands listed in article 2 of the Law of the PRC on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone promulgated on 25 February 1992. With this, China has a strong legal defense even if, it violates the International legal system. China had also rejected the final verdict of the ICJ which went in favor of the Philippines on the pretext that the matter was not a maritime dispute but a case of sovereignty. While the latter argument was China’s posture, countries such as India, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines believe that signing of the UNCLOS shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereign rights under and arising from their constitution. 

Today, nationalism is gaining traction and concerning maritime depositions and UNCLOS interpretations, Lawfare is on the rise. Lawfare is the ability to influence the events to one’s advantage without firing a shot by interpreting the law in one’s favor. This is an American term that the Chinese have used effectively till now and are continuing to do so. An effective solution to resolve the SCS disputes would be through compromise, which could be achieved through the agreement of the Code of Conduct between the ASEAN architecture, under the condition that all countries are on the same page in regard to resolving the maritime disputes.

Dr. Sana Hashmi, former Consultant, East Asia, MEA - Chinese Assertive Posture and Intimidating Tactics.

Dr. Sana Hashmi gave her analysis and assessment about the Chinese rationale behind its iterative and evolving assertive posture. Peculiar incident to reiterate its aggressive posture was in 2014, when China deployed its oil rig where Vietnam claimed it to be its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). China's posture can be understood in four categories:

1. Use of official Statements

The Chinese government has not issued any dedicated white paper on the South China Sea, while it has got a mention in its defense white paper, 2016. It shows that SCS is important but is not at the core interest of China.

1. Historical Usage

The use of historical arguments is one of China’s legal fortes, to claim its sovereignty and authority over the South China Sea. China claims that it was the first country to discover and name the islands in the SCS and therefore it has the authority over them.

1. Countering the claims of other parties

China is seen downplaying the claims of other ASEAN member states by arresting fishermen from the ASEAN states who enter into its claimed territory in the SCS, while rejecting the ICJ ruling on the pretext that it had no jurisdiction over this issue.

1. Military posturing

The construction of artificial islands and land reclamation activities have become one of the most contentious issues when it comes to the SCS. The past 40 – 50 years have seen China claiming thousands of acres while other littoral states have claimed only a hundred. The reason for the assertive posture of China is the insecurity of its claim, and its perception of Asia rebalancing strategy of American president Obama as a containment policy, China believes that there shall be no threat to its near seas and that the SCS is one of theirs.

Countering China's posture has become difficult even for the US, since it is not the party to the SCS issue and on the other hand China keeps snubbing the ICJ and the UNCLOS as the international legal authorities. This makes the US a weak player for mediation in the SCS. This is forcing other littoral states to partner with the extraterritorial countries such as the US, Australia, Japan, and India to intervene and mediate.

Dr. Vo Vinh, Deputy Director-General, Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, Hanoi- ASEAN Role and the Draft COC-

Dr. Vo Vinh started with a historical account of the ASEAN dialogue on the SCS disputes dividing the timeline between the united stance of ASEAN and the separation. The ASEAN has unitedly argued on the 1992 ASEAN declaration, 1995 ASEAN foreign minister's statement, 29th ASEAN ministerial meeting in 1996, declaration of conduct of parties on SCS in 2002, and ASEAN ministerial meeting of 2014. The separation of ASEAN on the SCS dispute has begun overtly from the failure of issuance of ministerial meeting communique in 2012, retraction of joint statement of foreign ministers in 2016 and the change in the terminology from 'leaders and ministers' to 'some leaders and some ministers' whenever ASEAN mentions SCS dispute in its statements.

To understand the reason for the latter, it was opined that it would be ancillary to understand the meaning of ASEAN centrality. Another interesting position is that ASEAN does not set a trend but adopts to the established trend. Such ASEAN has become the theater for discussion which helps to create a balance of power and stability.

Chinese aggressive behavior has affected the discussion forum. Only four states being the claimants of sovereignty in the SCS zones, the dependence of South East Asian states' economic prosperity on China, and the low profiles of other states within the ASEAN are other factors for the separation of united stance on SCS issues. Even if the trade is considered, intra trade of ASEAN is much lesser than the external trade, making the collective power of ASEAN weak (ASEAN Statistical Year book, 2018). China stands as the single largest exporter to the region making it economically strong and influential. Its increase in FDI was rapid from 1.5 % in 2008 to 8.4% in 2017, while the United States' was 7.5% of total FDI in the region in 2008 to 3.2% in 2017. This proves the growing influx of Chinese influence into the region reducing the collective power of ASEAN.

In conclusion, Dr. Vo Vinh expressed his concern over ASEAN and China are likely not to conclude COC by 2021, marking the expiry of the agreement. Even if they do, it would be useless as its non-binding nature is more dangerous and China would take advantage of the latter. He urged external powers that have stakes in the region to intervene and maintain the balance of power. 

Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh, Senior Research Associate, IDSA- Major Powers and International Apathy towards SCS-

Recollecting the incidents like the entry of the Chinese survey ship, Haiyang Dizhi 8 along with military escort in July 2019, Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig standoff of 2014, Dr. Udai bhanu Singh pointed out the intrusion of China into EEZ blocks 0.51and 0.61 which is under Vietnam's sovereignty. Along with this, ASEAN centrality has also become weak because of the belt and road initiative. The masterplan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 which is a part of the belt and road initiative requires an annual investment of $110 billion which explains the importance of the Asian Investment Bank (ADB). This makes the economic and financial position of China stronger in South East Asia. With the economic hegemonic desire, China wants non- intervention of external powers into the negotiations of COC but at the same time, ASEAN treats both the US and China as external powers and wants to balance both. It realizes its strength lies in collective bargaining power and multilateral diplomacy is opined to be the way forward.

ASEAN’s outlook in 2018 which emphasized on strengthening the existing mechanism to face challenges in the SCS and other important solutions for multilateral diplomacy were taking a legal recourse. The United Nations and other international forums can enter into the SCS conflict resolution through the international tribunal for the law of seas and the international court of justice.

In conclusion, it was opined that ASEAN would be able to counter China’s aggressive posture in the SCS, only if it showed resolve both militarily and diplomatically. Military posture was advocated since important islands such as Hanoi are in the missile range of China, making it a helpless frog.

Open Discussion:

The open discussion provided that UNCLOS and sovereignty go hand in glove. It can be applied to the maritime disputes only when the landmass under contention has sovereignty. The claimants also base their cases only after accepting the baselines and if not, the UNCLOS would become meaningless. If there should be any change in the UNCLOS, it would be on articles which have fewer contentions. If there are contentious articles to the disputing parties, the best way is to get the issue solved by bilateral negotiations.

In solving the SCS issue, ASEAN plays as a platform to bring in major powers into the discussion. Be it EAS, ADMM+, they do not have standalone power to oppose China. On the contrary, Dr. Udai Bhanu Singh opined that forums like EAS would prove effective, if regional power comes together as a single united front. His view on India was that, even though it has some stakes, it is not a direct party to the SCS dispute. It likes to look at the issue from a distance. China's interest to keep the dispute alive is because it gains legitimacy domestically. It cannot afford to lose it which would question its legitimacy or strength.

Session III- Future Perspectives

Gen. Shashi Asthana, Chief Instructor USI - Can Quad be a useful Instrument in South China Sea?

Gen. Asthana voiced that the South China Sea is a global issue, so India certainly has its stake in the region. The SCS dispute is inevitable because the UNCLOS declares the EEZ of every coastal state as 200nm from its shore, subsequently resulting in the overlapping of EEZs’ of several ASEAN member countries including China owing to the geographical proximity, amounting to territorial disputes among one another. Given the Chinese economic power and dominance in the region, the one option to counter China’s aggression is to make the issue global, so that International pressure could be exerted on them.

QUAD is definitely is an option:

The General suggested that the Quad is an option to counter China since all four countries are democratic. Unfortunately, from 2007 to 2017 only three meetings at the Joint Secretary level have taken place. He added that China follows the incremental encroachment strategy: i.e. They encroach and stop at just short of a war and resume their encroachment activity at a time of their choosing, eventually taking control of the entire land and space. Now the only way to stop further encroachment is by globalizing the issue and taking it to the UNSC. He explained as to why India is not as vocal as the other Quad countries against China’s belligerence in the SCS because India has had and is yet having a longstanding direct border dispute with China in the northeast and north-west frontier, hence it cannot respond in an unmeasured manner. Although, the Quad was formed, it has failed to address the key issue in the SCS in regard to countering China’s aggression, as most Quad discussions involve issues on cyber security, humanitarian help and denuclearization of North Korea.

ASEAN is also divided into two groups: One group which is affected by the overlapping of the exclusive economic zone and the other which is not. China wants to deal with each ASEAN state separately through a bilateral dialogue. Although ASEAN countries like Vietnam expect India to take an aggressive stand against Chinese assertiveness but the General strongly believed that a state has to first confront on its own and only then expect others to help.

He suggested a list of actions that the QUAD can do to deter China’s aggression:

1.    Military exercise can ensure freedom of navigation.

1. We can take China to the UNSC which we haven’t done so far.
2. We need not worry about Chinese response, let us do what we can do and let them do what they can do.
3. If China can take India to the UNSC under the garb of Human rights violation. Why can’t QUAD take China to UNSC?
4. Create a situation wherein, the U.N maintains its force to observe the activities in the region.
5. QUAD can be one of the instruments but not the only instrument.

He concluded by saying the ASEAN architecture needs to rethink its strategy regarding the BRI. They need to understand and prioritize their national interests first, whether it is to resolve the South China Sea dispute or make most of China’s and U.S’ aid, since acquiring all at once is not feasible.

Rudraneel Ghosh, Assistant editor, Times of India - Activating Media and Sustaining International Interest in the South China Sea

Rudraneel remarked that ASEAN and the entire South China Sea region is the next global growth hub. Media definitely has a crucial role to play because much of what is claimed in the South China Sea is a narrative. Unfortunately, the media has not a given sufficient attention and coverage to the South China Sea dispute and the events that have transpired regularly. Although only a few issues in the region have made the news, namely China’s reclamation activities, creation of artificial islands, threat to freedom of navigation and a couple of skirmishes between the Chinese Navy and couple of ASEAN member countries’ navies and coast guards, no real comprehensive coverage has been undertaken in the region, to reveal China’s aggression and expansionist posture.

He was of the view that although every stakeholder in the region has their own historical justification, and each state provides their own historical testimony to claim their ownership on the disputed waters, China’s claim is the most expansive and it has taken militarization to another level. Today the basic aim is to bring China into a fair, consultative, legal binding framework for operations in the South China Sea.

Possible solutions:

He suggested a few possible solutions to expose China globally. He opined that internationalizing the SCS issue and providing the rationale of the importance of the region will galvanize international pressure on China to stop their assertiveness in the region. However, the Indian media views the SCS

1.    A China-ASEAN issue.

1. Perceiving it as a US-China issue but failed to portray it as a relevant to the Indian context.
2. Indian media must stop making South China Sea a dispute as remote.
3. Stop making episodic research.
4. In-fact China is happy with Indian media approach.
5. We need to start Think East.
6. ASEAN region is covered insufficiently.
7. More focus on South Asia, Europe and US.
8. To send more reporters and correspondents to the area.

He pointed out that Indian print media for instance Times of India website on any random given day displays less news on ASEAN compared to other regions of the world. Changing the media narrative: to stop showing the South China Sea dispute as a technical issue and to show it as an emotional issue, because it is the emotions which drives people to raise their voice against injustice and oppression. He wound up by emphasizing on the need to spin an Indian narrative for the South China Sea region while considering it as India’s backyard as well. During the Chola empire, Indian culture and spirituality spread far South East and had strongly influenced their culture which is vibrant even today, courtesy to Hinduism. Hence, he suggested that India should utilize its history to claim its association with the SCS region, in order to deter China’s control over the entire region.

Sripathi Narayanan, Assistant Professor, JGU - Chinese Maritime Silk Road and Indo-Pacific Architecture: Contestations

Sripathi questioned China’s legitimate objective of the BRI. He suggested that China is attempting to capture the mind space of the developing states. Any discourse today in the International Relations, it is either hyphenated China or china hyphenated it. This is the biggest achievement of BRI.

The Indo-pacific narrative is missing in the South East China because now it’s all China. He further stressed that as an international community we always limit it to South China Sea and fail to look at it, as Beijing centric strategy. He provided a hypothetical situation and probed beyond the context of China and questioned, if we remove China from the SCS equation would it ensure peace between the ASEAN countries? What about the overlapping boundaries of the EEZ among the ASEAN states?

He claimed that there is an absence of an objective for the Indo-pacific architecture and indicated that objectives are important in International politics; he cited a couple of examples, the Monroe Doctrine, the Marshall plan and even the Cold war, all had well formulated objectives. He expanded further by saying that the Indo-pacific architecture is quite satisfied by addressing the elephant in the room, the SCS, but it has misjudged the elephant since the real elephant is not the South China Sea but beyond it, the Indo-Pacific.

The Indo-pacific architecture faces some fundamental issues, such as divergence in mapping of the Indo-Pacific region between India and the U.S which naturally affects the objectives and strategies and common strategic areas of cooperation between the two states. Besides, the U.S is stymied by the involvement of different bureaucratic and military structures that affect operations in this region, for instance the numerous operational naval commands that exist in one zone which reduces the overall operational effectiveness due to the co-existence of several independent military structures under one zone.

So, what is the solution to face Chinese aggression? He suggested play the waiting game. Wait for the Chinese music (BRI) to stop, as the BRI project is not as fascinating for the far East African and East European region as it is for China’s immediate neighborhood like the CPEC. The BRI is a beautiful marketing gimmick but fails to cater a concrete objective. He reckoned the individual components of the BRI are not equally fascinating either, thus how far will China expand?

Dr. Pankaj Jha, Associate Professor, JSIA - Evaluating Possible Strategy-Perspective from India.

Coming to the last speaker of the Conference, the most important question was still being asked, how to draw the global attention towards the South China Sea? Dr. Jha stated that a very unique aspect is emerging across Asia. We have very strong and promising leadership (Modi, Shinzo Abe & Xi-Jinping) and these leaders when they falter on promises they made, certain situations reflect how strong they are, and South China Sea is also one of those elements. He questioned whether the BRI, maritime and all those things will sustain on the long run? Or whether China will also suffer the financial deficit, like the US by engaging in unnecessary war. Can China sustain the unwanted trade war? Interestingly, he pointed out at the US withdrawal from the SCS, while even the US citizens are thinking about America’s benefit and involvement in unwanted tussles with China in the islands of South China Sea.

He said that India for far too long has been mute and hesitant to really take note of what exactly is transpiring in the region and it is time that it changes its posture. India is not in the base mentality (because of its past experience in creating base in Central Asia). He reckoned that India can play a mediatory role in the South China Sea dispute. He believes that if India wants to rise from a regional power to a global power then India has to take sides, and if the sides favor our interest then India should consider and take it. There has been group sail in the SCS and we were not a part of it, since we always play safe. In terms of bilateral & trilateral military exercises we have decreased our frequency of military exercises, unlike in the past when we used to do more frequently with Vietnam, Singapore in those contested waters.

He concluded by evaluating a set of important observations, if addressed and worked upon further, could provide a blueprint for India’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific region

1. Why can’t we (India) have Safe communication network with ASEAN states?
2. Indo-pacific architecture lacks security aspect which requires further work.
3. In RCEP India played safe and its reluctance to join the group has abated India’s chances of getting involved in the South China Sea.
4. India created the Indo-pacific division in the MEA, however it has not provided adequate technocrats and security experts in the division. This reflects the lack of a security perspective and mindset for the region. 
5. Why has ASEAN not come up with a newspaper on South China Sea issues and developments, which should clearly articulate the status of each of these islands with the aim to publicize and promote the developments in the region at the International level. Every narrative has two sides to it; hence it is important to put across an alternative narrative to defend China’s false narrative and to provide an unprejudiced angle to the discourse, and also serve an understanding of the events that culminate in the SCS for the public domain.
6. The SVIM (Singapore, Vietnam, India and Myanmar) has bigger role to play in the future strategy of India.
7. Surveillance, intelligence and military communication is critical, so working towards an integrated system could help countries operate more efficiently in critical times.
8. India has traditionally been a reactionary state, it needs to transform itself into ta pro-active state; the MEA must be more vocal and straight whenever Chinese aggressiveness threatens any ASEAN countries.

Post his presentation there was a small debrief by the rapporteurs on the takeaway from the Conference post which the curtains came down officially on the Conference.

Report prepared by Saber, Arun, Prasanna and Arjun (JSIA Phd Students).