Renewed Relevance: Five Power Defence Agreement
Formed in 1971 after the withdrawal of British forces east of the Suez, the five Power defense Arrangements (FPDA), has a primary aim to protect former colonies Malaysia and Singapore in a region marred in conflict. The two South East Asian countries grouped with Australia, UK and New Zealand that obliged them to consult one another in the event of an armed attack. The arrangement survives the wrath of cold war and disturbance of the post-cold war Unipolar period of USA pre-eminence, achieved the feet of being the oldest military pact, second to NATO, that turns 50 in October. Now the different situation is spewing different challenges, China has grown to the position where it can topple the status quo.
The establishment if FDPA was followed the ongoing war in Malaya and Vietnam War in 1971, termination of Anglo-Malaya defense Arrangement, and the British Decision to withdraw troops from east. The original aim of the arrangement of provide the ‘temporary security fix until Malaysia and Singapore had developed their military capabilities’, however, it continued through the Cold War and the volatile situation in Southeast Asia. As risks have developed over time, members' perceptions of threats have diverged. For the time being, the FPDA is still appreciated in all five capitals. The FPDA defence ministers recently released an extraordinary joint statement confirming this. In addition to expressing their sustained political commitment, the statement stated that "a fundamental concentration on conventional warfare... has enabled FPDA to preserve its relevance in an increasingly complicated contemporary security environment." That may appear to be purposefully agnostic about the sources of potential threat, but it was an attempt to highlight the FPDA's importance in the context of rising major-power competition in the region.
With its minimalist approach to institutionalisation, confined to the FPDA Consultative Council and the Integrated Area Defense System, the FPDA has remained a 'quiet achiever' for the past 50 years, particularly in the post–Cold War era. Even if Malaysia or Singapore are attacked, this does not indicate that its members are committed to military participation. Given the escalating tensions in the South China Sea, is it time for the FPDA to take a more prominent role? It's tempting to think so since, unlike the Quad, the FPDA offers a secure platform to its members while avoiding negative attention. Given China's unprecedented rise with an ever-growing territorial ambition, the US–China rivalry, and Britain's return to the region, the FPDA appears to be a credible security platform capable of assisting in the stabilisation of Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific.
Although the UK's duties in Europe remain paramount, Southeast Asia is of critical economic importance to the country, which may be maintained through continuous involvement in the arrangement. Britain now must play catch-up with its former European allies in the region because of Brexit. Canberra's security concerns compel its sustained support of the FPDA in the face of China's trade war and militarization of South China Sea islands near international trade routes. China's continuing tariffs on Australian goods are impacting Australia's economy, which has been increasingly reliant on China since the global financial crisis, and it's a relationship that has so far limited Australia's ability to respond. A resurrected FPDA could provide Australia with another platform to improve its security without jeopardising its economic interests. While Malaysia's and Singapore's military capabilities have increased recently, they are still no match for larger powers in the region who decide to be more assertive in their territorial claims. New Zealand is concerned about the same issues, but has been hesitant to join the Quad.
Members' diverse motivations are affected to a considerable extent by their relationships with the United States and China. They have solid connections with the United States, but the China equation is a challenge. Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore, unlike Australia and the United Kingdom, have positive relations with China. That could change in the future. Malaysia and China still have territorial disputes, which have so far been resolved quietly through back-channel diplomacy, with mixed results. Malaysia's and Singapore's reluctance to any anti-China platform is well known, and they haven't even given the Indo-Pacific framework any official recognition, unlike Indonesia.
With the FPDA's 50th anniversary approaching only weeks after the signing of the Aukus deal, which includes two of its members, some have wondered how the decades-old agreement will be affected. Members of the FPDA, according to defence analysts, could benefit. Aukus has been described as escalatory in several cases. The FPDA is asked about the possibility of expansion on a regular basis. The two Southeast Asian members have no desire for this, fearing that it will weaken the core pledge to safeguard Malaysia and Singapore. The desire to cross-brace the FPDA with other countries and structures in the region competes with this conservatism. The three 'Anglo' FPDA members may be held back by conservatism, as they do not want to weaken their relative value as security providers in Southeast Asia. The problem is to provide more interface with non-members such as Indonesia, Japan, and India without upsetting Malaysia and Singapore's delicate equilibrium. Given that it has less penetration into ADMM-plus defence networks than Australia or New Zealand, the UK may be less risk-averse in this regard.
References
1. As the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) turns 50, what lies ahead for the defence pact? | South China Morning Post: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3154233/five-power-defence-arrangements-fpda-turns-50-what-lies-ahead
2. The Five Power Defence Arrangements at 50: what next?: https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/12/five-power-defence-arrangements
3. The Five Power Defence Arrangements on JSTOR: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26458852’seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
4. The Five Power Defence Arrangements: time for the ‘quiet achiever’ to emerge | The Strategist: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-five-power-defence-arrangements-time-for-the-quiet-achiever-to-emerge/
5. Five Power Defence Arrangements: https://www.mod.gov.my/ms/maklumat/five-power-defence-arrangements
6. The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) were established in 1971.: https://navymuseum.co.nz/explore/by-collections/artefact-unpacked/five-power-defence-arrangements/
7. Five Power Defence Arrangements needs to stay nimble amid new threats: PM Lee, Singapore News & Top Stories - The Straits Times: https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/fpda-needs-to-stay-nimble-amid-new-threats-pm-lee
8. (PDF) The Five Power Defence Arrangements: The Quiet Achiever: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265154467_The_Five_Power_Defence_Arrangements_The_Quiet_Achiever
9. The Future of the Five Power Defense Arrangements – The Diplomat: https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/the-future-of-the-five-power-defense-arrangements/
Pic Courtesy-Joshua Ang at unsplash.com
(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)
Gaurav Sen is a graduate from Delhi University. He is currently doing his Masters in International relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His research area includes IR theories, Great Power competition in Indo-Pacific, Maritime Security, Emerging Warfare Concepts, and Military Strategies.
