LIVE DISPATCH
• A Reformer for an Institution in Decline: What does the Next Secretary-General Inherits? • Cuba’s Economic Crisis and Strategic Relevance: A Peripheral State in Renewed Great Power Competition • Silent Depths, Loud Signals: Nuclear Deterrence Infrastructure and the Crisis-Stability Costs of India’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Partnerships • Loss and Damage Finance: From COP28 Pledges to Policy Architecture • Securing India's Digital Frontiers: Cybersecurity Challenges and Strategic Responses in the Age of Hybrid Warfare • Beyond Consultation: BIMSTEC's Emerging Role in Regional Intelligence and Security Cooperation • Prism of Dragon’s Maritime Assertiveness: Regional Implications and India’s Strategic Options • Between the Desert and the Savannah: Conflict and the Political Economy of Instability in the Sahel • The Architecture of Cooperation: Navigating East Asia's Geopolitical Landscape • The Politics of Ali Khamenei's Funeral • From Civil Nuclear Power to Nuclear Hedging: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Emerging Nuclear Security Dilemma in the Middle East • Operation Sindoor and the Changing Dynamics of India–Pakistan Security • The Invisible Front: China-Pakistan Grey-Zone Operations • Generative AI, Labour Sovereignty, and the Geoeconomics of India's Service Economy • India's Agentic AI Strategy Needs Authority Budgets before Autonomy Scales • India's AI Diplomacy and the Future of Strategic Technologies • From Physical Borders to Intelligent Borders: The Evolution of India's Border Security Architecture • Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Governance Deficit: Challenges to International Humanitarian Law and Accountability • AI Driven Cyberwarfare and National Security • Great Power Rivalry and the Crisis of the United Nations • The Continuing U.S. Regime-Change Toolkit: Color Revolutions, Political Influence, and Vietnam • Ten Years After Brexit: Regret, Reform, or Reversal? • Digital Pathways to Extremism: An Investigative Study of ISIS and Al-Qaeda's Use of Digital Platforms in India • Sports, Strategy and Statecraft of Mega Sporting Events as Geoeconomic Instruments: Qatar 2022 to Saudi Arabia 2034 • Strategic Autonomy in the Age of Weaponised Interdependence: India’s Geopolitical Dilemma • Hardening the Quad: From Strategic Dialogue to Operational Cooperation • China’s Grey-Zone Strategy in the Indian Ocean: Implications for India’s Maritime Security • The Maghreb of States: Identity, Sovereignty, and the Limits of Non-Interference • Europe’s Digital Dependence: Can the EU Achieve Strategic Autonomy? • Beyond the Battlefield: Understanding Unconventional Security Challenges in Contemporary Geopolitics • Trapped in Deterrence: Nuclear Stability and the Persistence of Conflict in South Asia • Extended Deterrence Under Strain: Credibility, Assurance, and the Stability-Instability Paradox in the Indo-Pacific • Maritime India: Security, Trade, and Great Power Competition • Beyond Ukraine: Understanding Putin's Vision of Russian Power • Silicon Sovereignty: How Semiconductors Are Redrawing Global Power Hierarchies • The Negative Impact of US–Iran War on the Pacific Region • BRICS Expansion and the Multipolar Moment: Opportunity or Strategic Contradiction? • Foot-Dragging as Feminism: Iran, South Korea, and the Ungovernable Body • Beyond Proximity: Why the UAE Occupies a Growing Place in Iran’s Strategic Calculus • Why Fiji Matters: The New Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Islands • A Reformer for an Institution in Decline: What does the Next Secretary-General Inherits? • Cuba’s Economic Crisis and Strategic Relevance: A Peripheral State in Renewed Great Power Competition • Silent Depths, Loud Signals: Nuclear Deterrence Infrastructure and the Crisis-Stability Costs of India’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Partnerships • Loss and Damage Finance: From COP28 Pledges to Policy Architecture • Securing India's Digital Frontiers: Cybersecurity Challenges and Strategic Responses in the Age of Hybrid Warfare • Beyond Consultation: BIMSTEC's Emerging Role in Regional Intelligence and Security Cooperation • Prism of Dragon’s Maritime Assertiveness: Regional Implications and India’s Strategic Options • Between the Desert and the Savannah: Conflict and the Political Economy of Instability in the Sahel • The Architecture of Cooperation: Navigating East Asia's Geopolitical Landscape • The Politics of Ali Khamenei's Funeral • From Civil Nuclear Power to Nuclear Hedging: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Emerging Nuclear Security Dilemma in the Middle East • Operation Sindoor and the Changing Dynamics of India–Pakistan Security • The Invisible Front: China-Pakistan Grey-Zone Operations • Generative AI, Labour Sovereignty, and the Geoeconomics of India's Service Economy • India's Agentic AI Strategy Needs Authority Budgets before Autonomy Scales • India's AI Diplomacy and the Future of Strategic Technologies • From Physical Borders to Intelligent Borders: The Evolution of India's Border Security Architecture • Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Governance Deficit: Challenges to International Humanitarian Law and Accountability • AI Driven Cyberwarfare and National Security • Great Power Rivalry and the Crisis of the United Nations • The Continuing U.S. Regime-Change Toolkit: Color Revolutions, Political Influence, and Vietnam • Ten Years After Brexit: Regret, Reform, or Reversal? • Digital Pathways to Extremism: An Investigative Study of ISIS and Al-Qaeda's Use of Digital Platforms in India • Sports, Strategy and Statecraft of Mega Sporting Events as Geoeconomic Instruments: Qatar 2022 to Saudi Arabia 2034 • Strategic Autonomy in the Age of Weaponised Interdependence: India’s Geopolitical Dilemma • Hardening the Quad: From Strategic Dialogue to Operational Cooperation • China’s Grey-Zone Strategy in the Indian Ocean: Implications for India’s Maritime Security • The Maghreb of States: Identity, Sovereignty, and the Limits of Non-Interference • Europe’s Digital Dependence: Can the EU Achieve Strategic Autonomy? • Beyond the Battlefield: Understanding Unconventional Security Challenges in Contemporary Geopolitics • Trapped in Deterrence: Nuclear Stability and the Persistence of Conflict in South Asia • Extended Deterrence Under Strain: Credibility, Assurance, and the Stability-Instability Paradox in the Indo-Pacific • Maritime India: Security, Trade, and Great Power Competition • Beyond Ukraine: Understanding Putin's Vision of Russian Power • Silicon Sovereignty: How Semiconductors Are Redrawing Global Power Hierarchies • The Negative Impact of US–Iran War on the Pacific Region • BRICS Expansion and the Multipolar Moment: Opportunity or Strategic Contradiction? • Foot-Dragging as Feminism: Iran, South Korea, and the Ungovernable Body • Beyond Proximity: Why the UAE Occupies a Growing Place in Iran’s Strategic Calculus • Why Fiji Matters: The New Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Islands
Health January 22, 2022 13358 Reads

International COVAX Programme: How Nations are responding

M
By Mahima Ghildiyal
Author • Centre for Security & Strategic Studies
International COVAX Programme: How Nations are responding
Share Analysis:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS

COVAX is an international alliance for manufacturing, researching and distribution of covid-19 vaccines to those parts of the world which are unable to procure or manufacture them due to poor economies. The COVAX programme is a vaccine initiative led by GAVI, the World Health Organization and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) in partnership with UNICEF, vaccine manufacturers and the World Bank, among others. The objective of the vaccine programme is to ensure equitable distribution of covid-19 vaccines for all people in all countries. It is an extraordinary initiative with several parties involved working towards ensuring a collated battle to end the pandemic.

GAVI is the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization. It is a public-private partnership across nations to increase the access of vaccines to poor countries. It has been leading the challenge by providing vaccines for the under-developing countries. Serum Institute of India (SII), the largest manufacturer of vaccines forms the backbone of this initiative. Here is where the problem begins, the private, as well as government manufacturers, and vaccine development are mostly based in the developed countries which have been accused of hoarding vaccines, giving expired products or products with very little shelf life remaining. For example, when India was hit by the second wave of covid-19 during March 2020 with less than half of the population vaccinated, the government and the SII received a lot of criticism on fulfilling the domestic needs first and hence SII was restrained from exporting vaccines.[1] There were even life threats over Adar Ponnawalla, the CEO of SII, who shifted to London amid concerns. [2]

Another challenge is the need for booster shots amid the new variants coming at the front like the newly Omicorn variant which has again pushed states toward lockdown. Again as booster shots will be required first which will be served will be the developed countries and poor countries will lag in vaccinating their people, which will again lead to different and stronger variants and thus the cycle will continue. Hence, vaccinating all the people till 2022 should be the prime aim of the countries instead of closing their borders and saving their population only which will help nobody.

Giving 70 percent of the world’s 8 billion people two shots will require 11 billion shots. Adding a third shot or booster pushes that target to at least 16 billion shots. Moreover, not all shots provide a strong response, particularly against omicron.[3] Also, nearly half of the vaccines delivered so far come from Chinese manufactures, these shots are much less effective than the US-made Pfizer-BioTech and Moderna’s mRNA vaccines which are much stronger against the new variants.

The next problem that is arising is the supply chains infrastructure in the under-developed countries. The vaccines need ultra-cold conditions to safely secure distribution and storage. Pfizer vaccines, one of the most efficient vaccines, need ultra-cold temperatures to store which African nations are unable to provide. On the other hand, Sinopharm, Moderna and Jhonson and Jhonson have no such conditions.

Only 8.9% of low-income countries have received vaccines as compared to high-income countries 78.4 % of the population have received the vaccine data as available in Our World in Data.[4] This unevenness in vaccine distribution shows that the covax programme which was to ensure that the vaccine is available everywhere has failed miserably.

Hoarding of vaccines

Vaccine production has ramped up quickly and now more than 8 vaccines have been approved by WHO for emergency usage then why have only 8.9 % of the low-income countries have been vaccinated? The production remains in the hands of developed countries and their power in losing the ropes to distribution. The wealthier nations have a huge surplus of vaccines which they are hoarding in the need of booster shots. The G7 and the EU combined would have 1.39 billion surplus vaccines by the end of the first quarter of 2022, even if 80% of all adults had vaccines and boosters, according to Airfinity’s analysis. If donations continue at their current pace, just 500 million of these would be given away, according to the organization’s analysis, leaving 890 million to spare.[5] Vaccine distribution will be speeded up if wealthier countries would cooperate not only in words but through action too. Only the US and Switzerland have committed to providing vaccines to countries in dire need.

The delay in vaccine procurement for low-income countries is never going to stop the pandemic, as suggested by vaccine manufacturers, stronger and vaccine-resistant variants will arise and no amount of booster shots will be effective in controlling the rise in cases. Only if more than half of the population is vaccinated by the year-end do we stand a chance to beat this pandemic.

The slogan for COVAX is “no one is safe until everyone is safe” but states have not been that philanthropic, in conjugation with the pharmaceutical companies and have been denying access to vaccines to low income countries, the prime aim of the project. Covax was not the priority, and it showed: the scheme had promised to provide 2 billion doses by the end of this year, but by July it had delivered only 95 million.[6]

What covax lacks is leadership and command in the panic situations which the states are in. WHO advisors suggest any G7 leader might be able to provide a solution to this deadlock situation we are facing. Someone with contacts who can negotiate with the superpowers to fight for the vaccination programme for the low-income countries. On the other hand, states have now started to directly contact the companies even those who are due vaccines through the Covax programme, like Rwanda which made agreements with Pfizer to directly import vaccine.[7]

It is not just the problem of vaccine re-distribution but what is required is also required by covax is fiscal resources for proper distribution of vaccines in the population for example in Benin only 267 shots were given each day, a pace so slow that 110,000 of the program’s AstraZeneca does expire.[8]Also, there is the problem of freezers which have been mentioned above Pfizer needs very low temperatures hence covax also need to install more freezers and backup generators, these countries also have electricity problems like Chad. Hence, covax to become a success need a lot of motivated coordinated and determined effort. Which, states who are in chaos due to rising omicron cases are trying only to save their ships first.

Conclusion

This behaviour of states is nothing new but a perfect example of classic realism. When a crisis occurs everyone wants to save themselves without consideration of others. In Thucydides words, “the strong do what they have to do and the weak accept what they have to accept”. In realistic terms, powerful countries will secure themselves before saving everyone else whether it is climate change or pandemic wreaking havoc around the world. Financial contribution in stressful times becomes very difficult for states, if there is a hegemon at the stop pushing things it might be possible but right now the international political situation is chaotic which is further worsening the pandemic affecting the low-income states adversely.

Notes

[1] Kapur, Manavi (2021), “Why Africa feels let down by India’s largest Covid-19 vaccine maker”, Quartz India, 10 December 2021. URL:https://qz.com/india/2100997/africa-cdc-says-it-was-let-down-by-poonawallas-serum-institute/

[2]Kapur, Manavi (2021), “Why Africa feels let down by India’s largest Covid-19 vaccine maker”, Quartz India, 10 December 2021. URL: https://qz.com/india/2100997/africa-cdc-says-it-was-let-down-by-poonawallas-serum-institute/

[3] Rowland, Christopher (2022), “Vaccine makers were just beginning to catch up to demand. Then omicron hit.”, The Washington Post, 7 January 2022. URL:https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/01/07/vaccine-global-supply-boosters/

[4] Our World in Data, “ Share of people who received at least one dose of Covid-19 vaccine” https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-people-vaccinated-covid’country=High+income~Upper+middle+income~Lower+middle+income~Low+income

[5] Goldhill, Olivia (2021), “We have enough Covid vaccines for most of the world. But rich countries are stockpiling more than they need for boosters”, Stat News, 3 December 2021 URL:https://www.statnews.com/2021/12/13/we-have-enough-covid-vaccines-for-most-of-world-but-rich-countries-stockpiling-more-than-they-need/

[6] Nature, “Omicron: the global response is making it worse”, 7 December 2021.

URL: https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-03616-x

[7] Robbins, Rebecca and Benjamin Muellar, “Where a vast global vaccination program went wrong”, The New York Times, 7 October 2021. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/02/world/europe/covax-covid-vaccine-problems-africa.html

[8] Robbins, Rebecca and Benjamin Muellar, “Where a vast global vaccination program went wrong”, The New York Times, 7 October 2021. URL:https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/02/world/europe/covax-covid-vaccine-problems-africa.html

Pic Courtesy-Vietnam News Agency

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)

Mahima Ghildiyal
About Mahima Ghildiyal →

Mahima has studied politics with specialization in international politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University. Research interests include security studies, Chinese history and politics and international political economy.

Related Strategic Analysis