India-China Perception Game: Ancient Wisdom in Modern Conflict
In the latest interview with US magazine Newsweek, Indian PM Narendra Modi emphasised how important stability in India-China relations is for the entire world. He said, “It is my belief that we need to urgently address the prolonged situation on our borders so that the abnormality in our bilateral interactions can be put behind us”. India’s border situation with China is the elephant in the room that wants to be addressed, but neither party knows how to tame it.
Back in 1947 post-independence, India’s 1st PM Jawaharlal Nehru, saw China as a potential friend, and coined the term, ‘Hindi-Chini bhai bhai’, but in return, China just saw him and India, as a ‘lackey’ of the British. India’s China policy too looked more like an unrequited affair. Subsequently, such miscalculations led India to go to war with China thrice: the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the border clashes in Nathu La and Cho La in 1967, and the 1987 Sumdorong Chu standoff. Recently, since 2020 multiple border stand-offs in Doklam and various points along the India-China border, China’s baseless claim over Arunachal Pradesh, and building multiple villages close to the Indian border, have been giving Delhi too many sleepless nights.
Now that India has stopped looking at China through rose-tinted glasses, there is another hurdle to overcome. How should India even deal with China? This question is important because, as a student of foreign policy and strategic culture, multiple factors are considered while ‘perceiving’ a said state, in this case, China. Both are civilizational powers but their world view differ vastly. China’s inflated ego is reflected in its self-perception, and perception of the world; ‘Tianxia’ (all under heaven), ‘Tianming’ (mandate of heaven), and ‘Tianzi’ (son of heaven - Chinese rulers). On the other hand, Bharat a.k.a India thrusts its belief in ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ (the world is one family) and ‘Dharma’ roughly translated to morality, righteousness, sustenance-based governance.
So as a civilizational power, how should India perceive and tackle China? In Mahabharata’s Shanti Parva, there’s an interesting story which helps us greatly in this case. An insightful conversation between a wise bird - Pujani and King Brahmadatta, on how enmity stems.
“Pujani says, Enmity originates from five causes. Learned people know it. Those five causes are woman, land, harsh words, natural disagreement, and injury.” - (MHB 12.139.42)
In International relations, enemy is a strong word to be used for any nation. But India-China relations have indeed soured due to:
- Land: Unlawful claims over Arunachal Pradesh, Doklam-border skirmish, Galwan Valley dispute.
- Harsh words: Chinese media outlets, regularly run propaganda news against India. Heavy anti-India rhetorics spun amongst the Chinese audience.
- Natural Disagreement: India’s disapproval of China’s unreasonable maritime claims in the South-China Sea region. China’s uneasiness at India’s growing Act East stance and intimacy with the QUAD.
- Injury: Three wars/conflict in 20th century, Influx of Chinese spies in India, malware attack on Mumbai’s power grid
Furthermore, Pujani even states,
“No friendship can again be formed between a person who has injured and him who has inflicted an injury in return. The hearts cannot forget what has taken place.”
- (MHB 12.139.36)
Delhi definitely cannot afford to forget the treatment meted out by Beijing. China’s Confucian strategic culture, drawing references from Sun Tzu’s cunning, deceptive strategies is something India cannot befriend. Pujani has a sound rebuttal to this.
“Those, who cannot be subdued by force and sharp weapons, can be conquered by insincere professions of love like (wild) elephants through a (tame) she-elephant.”
- (MHB 12.139.39)
If India has to deal with China problem, does India intend to bestow ‘insincere professions of love’ on the latter? Pujani ideally advises to ‘distance’ or ‘renounce’ a ‘bad friend’, since there can be no permanent friendship whose attachment itself is very uncertain. The bird opines, that there is disgrace in a bad friendship when there is no necessity for it. However, having said that China is India’s immediate neighbour (even according to Kautilya’s Mandala theory it would be an Ari - enemy) and cannot be ignored, nor underestimated.
Another conversation from Rajadharmanushasana Parva, between Brihaspati and Indra will usher Delhi’s South block to take a better stance towards Beijing. Indra seeks Brihaspati's guidance on how a Raja should deal with his enemies.
“ If the enemy is strong, the adoption of a policy of conciliation is not good. On the other hand, punishment by secret means should be inflicted. Such enemies should not be treated mildly, repeated attacks, destruction of crops, poisoning of wells and tanks, and suspicion regarding the seven branches of administration, should be made.”
- (MHB 12.103.40)
The verse explicitly advocates against conciliation and favours punishing by covert means. China cannot be dealt with lightly, and strategies which mimic ‘death by a thousand cuts’ should be appropriated. In the modern-day context, cyber-attacks, strengthening India’s export-to-import ratio, etc. India is also presenting itself as a lucrative manufacturing destination, compelling tech giants, to shift their bases from China. A huge domestic market, friendlier investment regulations, a skilled labour force, and growing infrastructure are a huge plus for India to counter China on an economic front (Kosha).
“The king should, on such occasions, adopt various kinds of deception, various expedients for setting his foes against one another, and various kinds of hypocrisy. He should also, through trusted agents, learn the doings of his enemies in their cities and provinces.”
- (MHB 12.103.41)
While deception in its foreign policy doesn’t come to India naturally, the possibility of the same cannot be rooted out completely (e.g. Pokhran Nuclear Test) when national interests are at stake. So can we expect the South block to deceive China? Gradually as India is becoming stronger in the maritime domain, it can move away from its balanced posture to donning a more proactive stance in the South China Sea, this serves two purposes:
- Guided by its Act East policy in tandem with its broader Indo-Pacific vision, India’s commercial, and diplomatic interests in the region will be served. India should strategically succour Taiwan, Hong Kong, Philippines in the Indo-Pacific, and place itself in the strategic calculations of these South-China Sea island nations.
- India can geopolitically challenge on multiple fronts: Negotiating chip to China’s claims in the Northern and Eastern Himalayas; and securitise the Eastern Indian Ocean.
Another front is Janapada, (citizenry). China though, has safeguarded its’ citizens against outside media using the great firewall. The difficulty for intelligence-warfare advocates in India is to get seen on the TV and phone screens of Chinese citizens living in an information bubble. The next best thing India can do is, target the Chinese diaspora, tourists, students, etc with Indian content focussed on development, cinema, and lifestyle. The firewall applies to all provinces of China except Hong Kong and Macau's Special Autonomous Regions (SARs). These SARs provide an opportunity to capitalise on access to the mainland.
Bhishma answers how India should react to China’s belligerent, ‘tianzi’ attitude in a story about oceans and rivers. The mighty ocean asks river Ganga, and he observes why she brings with her only big trees, with huge trunks, roots and branches, but no cane is brought by her to the ocean. To which Ganga replies,
“Trees stand in the same place and are never displaced from where they stand. For this by their nature resisting our currents, they are obliged to leave the place of their growth. Canes, however, act otherwise.
- (MHB 12.113.8)
Here, the quality of trees refers to stubbornness, narrow-minded, and resistant tendencies. Meanwhile,
“The cane, seeing the advancing current, bends to it. The others do not act in this way. After the current has passed away, the cane resumes its pristine posture.”
- (MHB 12.113.9)
The quality of the cane represents, moving with the sentiment of the situation. Bending does not mean giving in to the enemy’s wishes and orders.
“The cane is acquainted with the virtues of time and opportunity. It is docile and obedient. It is yielding, but not stiff. Therefore, it stands where it grows, without being compelled to follow our current.”
- (MHB 12.113.10)
The cane exemplifies the quality of standing its’ ground, rooted in its values, not giving into popular opinions or beliefs. Considerate, yet firm. India has of late been displaying this quality of ‘strategic autonomy’ where it doesn’t get compelled to follow the current but doesn’t appear stubborn or narrow-minded either.
This is a classic high-stakes great-power rivalry that India cannot afford to put on a back-burner. As India navigates a modern landscape shaped by historical grievances and contemporary geopolitical imperatives, the wisdom of Shanti Parva offers invaluable insights into the nuances of statecraft, strategic culture and strategic manoeuvring. India's journey from expectations of friendship from China to a more pragmatic assessment of power dynamics with China reflects a maturity in its foreign policy outlook.
Pic Courtsey- Michal Czyz at unsplash.com
(The views are those of author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)