Hybrid Warfare and its Impact

For instance, in 1778 the French allied with the Americans against the British. On the other hand, at the operational level, a commander on the field has the option of using guerrilla forces behind enemy lines or preventing the enemy state from amassing forces. For instance, in 1780-1781, General Nathanael Greene used the same operational tactics in the Southern campaign in the American Revolution. Another instance is from the Battle of Cowpens in 1781 where both regular and irregular forces joined tactically [1].

During the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, General Krulak predicted future conflicts as distinct from the large-scale mechanized sweeps as happened in Operation Desert Storm. He used the case of “Stepchild in Chechnya” where the Chechens used swarming tactics to counter Russian domination. This model did not resonate with the traditional security community with evidence from other cases like Mogadishu, Beirut, and Sarajevo suggesting the same. Gradually, the thought processes in the security community shifted with more focus on the future characteristics of conflict [2]. The most prominent characteristic of such modern-day conflicts is that it blurs the lines between a military conflict and the use of non-military means.

Origins of Hybrid Warfare:

General Valery Gerasimov of the Russian Armed Forces in a not very famous speech referred to non-military means which can be employed to start an armed conflict in order to justify an intervention by external powers. In the speech, General Gerasimov did not specifically mention the term “hybrid” but its interpretation led to the Russian Hybrid Warfare doctrine otherwise known as the “Gerasimov doctrine”. General Gerasimov’s thoughts were actually a transition from the use of force in war to the use of other nonviolent or non-military means below the war threshold. Here, it must be noted that the interpretation of the doctrine was not correct but later came out to be politically helpful. The aggression against Ukraine and Georgia led to the understanding that Russia poses a major security challenge for the West. Further, after experiencing an exhausting war in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, hybrid means turned out to be politically convenient allowing a shift away from costly and exhausting wars. This shift in the strategic thought processes led to the start of what certain observers call a renewed Cold War [3].

Achieving Conceptual Clarity:

The conceptual undertaking of Hybrid Warfare is ambiguous. Conceptually, hybrid warfare could be defined as an attempt to create a political identity when there is a shift in the nature of conflicts [4]. Hybrid Warfare was conceptualized in Western scientific thought in 2005 with the term first being mentioned by Lieutenant General James Mattis in a speech. While analyzing the challenges regarding the globalization of military science along with Frank Hoffman, they reached the conclusion that wars in the future will be determined by hybrid methods and strategies. However, the crucial moment which led to the recognition of hybrid threats was after the release of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Through the report, the authors convinced the effectiveness of hybrid warfare at the conceptual level. This led to the military establishments in the West understanding the facts at the conceptual level but lacking the appropriate consensus among academics, political leaders, and military experts regarding the understanding of the phenomenon [5].

The concept of hybrid warfare revived attention after the Russian annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Later in September 2014 at the NATO Wales Summit, the concept of hybrid warfare was a matter of discussion alongside the Russian aggression. Hoffman’s original concept which already lacked appropriate analytical grounds became synonymous with Russian tactics and instead of non-state actors, Russia became the most immediate security threat to the West. The understanding of hybrid warfare at the conceptual level is still inadequate with multiple interpretations existing at the same time which further leads to a lack of precision at the academic or policy level [6].

Impact on thought processes:

The Russian aggression against Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea led to the realization among NATO members that they lacked appropriate responses to this rising threat. This led member states to rethink and adapt to tools for collective defense beyond Article 5 of the NATO treaty. NATO has addressed this threat at two levels. First, defining a strategy beyond national authorities and helping the countries being targeted at the national level. Next, the new counter-hybrid support teams would come into effect on which the member states agreed on July 2018 [7]. The most discussed source regarding hybrid attacks is Russia due to its active involvement in spreading disinformation, cyber-attacks, and interference in elections often acting through a third non-state entity like a terrorist, guerrilla, insurgent, or criminal group. This tactic allows the state deniability from attacking other states causing confusion and preventing an adequate response. Therefore, through hybrid warfare states are able to go beyond their jurisdiction with very less accountability. From the international community’s perspective, Russia’s indulgence in hybrid warfare marks a new challenge and therefore requires a shift in strategic thought processes in order to counter the hybrid attacks.

 Impact on Combat Operations:

In order to understand the future nature of conflicts, one must consider the use of cyber-related actions and information warfare. These tools have been increasing in both scope and importance on the battlefield. In this regard, hybrid tactics and information warfare form one of the most crucial factors for understanding conflicts of the future. For instance, during the combat operations in Debalcevo and Illovaysk in Ukraine, there was a significant increase in activities in the information space. Negative information regarding personnel from the Ukrainian military and government was circulated widely. This tactic called cyber aggression in addition to disinformation campaigns became a common feature of hybrid warfare.

In hybrid warfare, a common pattern has emerged which includes cyber aggression against important figures in the government to cultivate mistrust among the public regarding their government. This negative information is further amplified by false news on social media. Here, even if negative information does not change the beliefs of people, it impacts the interpretation of future information. Such circumstances can be used by any aggressor who wishes to influence the course of events into weakening the strength of the government. In some cases, such tactics evolve into kinetic operations which can compromise defensive operations before it even commences [8]. The tactic of cyber aggression has had a severe impact on how states respond to external aggression. The traditional ways of response are not of much help when the identities of actors and their motives are concealed through technological means.

Impact on Society:

While conducting an assessment during the reconstruction of post-conflict regions, a pattern emerged that suggested that certain attacks were not targeted at military units or civilians but were meant to traumatize communities and prevent them from recovery. An attacker can exploit the vulnerabilities of a community by targeting its key supplies. Further tactics could include targeting agricultural lands, installing landmines, or destroying health or environmental infrastructure. Such practices were witnessed in civil wars and were associated with ethnic cleansing. Similar tactics occur in hybrid warfare. Generally, if the resilience of society breaks, it becomes vulnerable to emerging hazards. For instance, while Ukrainian society struggles through intense hybrid warfare tactics like disinformation campaigns, delegitimized financial systems, and a crumbling economy, it also loses the ability to function through other policies meant for citizens [9].

Impact on International Security:

Hybrid warfare involves all dimensions of state power to influence the decision-making process of another state. Here the attacking state exploits the most vulnerable points of the society. Therefore, under such a conflict, society and citizens themselves become the first line of defense. From an international perspective, the hybrid tactics by Russia are a major challenge where the consequences of such attacks cannot be anticipated. To counter this, states need to form a coherent strategy to develop a system of indicators capable of warning against such attacks with active responses including prevention and risk mitigation. To achieve this, the European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats was established in Finland which operates under the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This level of synergy and cooperation is necessary to counter hybrid attacks. Due to the non-state component attached to hybrid warfare, states need to respond in a coherent global action. While the Western world, primarily North America and Europe is concerned about the Russian tactics, other states that share democratic values like South Korea, Australia and Japan should also come up with solutions to such issues. As hybrid attacks are transnational in nature, it requires a global approach to be dealt with.

From the Western liberal order’s perspective, NATO’s ability to mount a full-scale conventional war has diminished in the absence of any major war. However, NATO has asserted that Russian tactics require new and multidimensional approaches to counter. These responses should be within international law both at the strategic and operational levels. Further, it would also require a conceptual understanding of hybrid warfare to come up with approaches to ensure security [10].

Conclusion:

While the Western liberal order was equipped to counter Russia at the operational level, Russia’s shift in the strategic thought process led to a multidimensional approach to warfare. The concept of hybrid warfare which although is not new still lacks conceptual understanding. This inadequacy leads to a lack of appropriate measures and responses at the policy level to counter such attacks. These tactics have not only impacted and changed the course of warfare in combat operations but also in terms of society. In a hybrid warfare scenario, unconventional means are involved to meet objectives and therefore the distinction between civilian and military operations gets blurred. This in turn will totally change the nature of conflicts in the future with additional means of warfare being developed and adopted on a wider scale.

Endnotes:

1.       Peter R. Mansoor, Hybrid Warfare in History, Cambridge University Press, https://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/26087/excerpt/9781107026087_excerpt.pdf

2.     Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21 st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007 https://potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf

3.      Ilmari Käihkö, The Evolution of Hybrid Warfare: Implications for Strategy and the

Military Profession, The US Army War College Quarterly, 25 August 2021 https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/11/

4.     Filippa Lindberg, Hybrid War: A Conceptual History Study The meaning of hybrid war in the scholarly debate between 2008 -2021, Swedish Defence University, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1589230/FULLTEXT01.pdf

5.     Iryna Zhyhlei, Segiy Legenchyk and Olena Syvak, Hybrid war as a form of modern international conflicts and its influence on accounting development, ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/346406091_Hybrid_war_as_a_form_of_modern_international_conflicts_and_its_influence_on_accounting_development

6.     Ilmari Käihkö, The Evolution of Hybrid Warfare: Implications for Strategy and the

Military Profession, The US Army War College Quarterly, 25 August 2021 https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss3/11/

7.     New Perspectives on Shared Security: NATO’s Next 70 Years, Carnegie Europe,  https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/wars-of-ideas-hybrid-warfare-political-interference-and-disinformation-pub-80419

8.     Yuriy Danyk, Tamara Maliarchuk, and Chad Briggs, Hybrid War: High-tech, Information and Cyber Conflicts, Connections The Quarterly Journal, http://connections-qj.org/article/hybrid-war-high-tech-information-and-cyber-conflicts

9.     Chad M. Briggs, "Climate Change and Hybrid Warfare Strategies.", Journal of Strategic Security 13, no. 4 (2020): 45-57. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.4.1864 Available at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1864&context=jss

10. Artem Bratko, Denys Zaharchuk and Valentyn Zolka, “Hybrid warfare – a threat to the national security of the state”, Revista de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional, Vol. 7, No. 1, (2021), pp. 147-160. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18847/1.13.10, Available at: https://seguridadinternacional.es/resi/html/hybrid-warfare-a-threat-to-the-national-security-of-the-state/

Pic Courtsey-Federico Beccari at unsplash.com

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)