Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea: Non-state actor disrupting global trade

On the other hand, the Houthis claimed to have seized a ship in that vicinity but labeled it as Israeli. However, no references to Israel were made in a statement made by a representative of the group and only mentioned that "we are treating the ship's crew per Islamic principles and values,". The confirmation came later from a senior spokesperson of the Japanese government acknowledging the detention of the Nippon Yusen-operated ship Galaxy Leader further stating that Japan was appealing to the Houthis while also requesting assistance from Saudi, Omani, and Iranian officials to work toward prompt release of the vessel and its crew [1]. This marked the start of the conflict in the Red Sea that gradually escalated over the subsequent months.

The Attacks:

The US Navy reported on December 03 that three commercial vessels were attacked in international waters in the southern Red Sea. The Carney, an American destroyer, responded to distress calls and assisted with missile and drone launches from Houthi-controlled territory, according to US Central Command. However, a Houthi representative in a broadcast statement stated that “its navy” assaulted two Israeli ships, Unity Explorer, and Number 9, using an armed drone and a naval missile after they ignored warnings, further adding that the strikes were in response to Yemeni demands and Islamic nations' pleas to support the Palestinian people in the ongoing conflict in Gaza. The US military later stated that the Carney downed three drones while assisting commercial vessels but was unclear whether the vessel was a target adding that the attacks posed a threat to the trade flow in the region [2]. On December 9, the Houthis threatened that they would target all ships bound for Israel, regardless of nationality, and urged all foreign shipping corporations to avoid interacting with Israeli ports [3].

Since the November 2023 attacks, 29 additional ships have been assaulted in the vicinity, with 13 of them receiving direct hits from missiles or drones. The attacks have caused significant disruptions to world trade, almost 12% of which runs through the Red Sea. A cataloged data compiled by Reuters showcased the armaments used by the Houthis to target commercial ships and indicated that Houthi drone and missile activity has increased since the Gaza war began, despite Western military airstrikes on their bases in Yemen beginning on January 11 [4]. The Houthi arsenal includes Qasef-1 and Qasef-2 drones with an estimated range of 200km, as well as others with up to 1,800 km of flight range, ground-launched missiles capable of hitting ships up to 800 kilometers away. The Houthis have also attempted to attack ships using small boats, and on one occasion, used a helicopter to land an assault force on the deck of the Galaxy Leader cargo ship. Some of the weapons used in these attacks were stolen from Yemen's military since the beginning of the civil conflict. As per the United Nations (UN), components for Houthi weapons were supplied from East Asia via civilian supply lines. However, the increasingly sophisticated array of drones and missiles employed by Houthi forces has led to speculation that Iran is also supplying them with weapons. The US has reported the seizure of what it claims are missile and air defense system components on a fishing boat traveling from Iran to Yemen. Military analysts also believe that the MV Behshad - initially a cargo ship later outfitted with monitoring devices - is assisting the Houthis in targeting shipping in the region [5].

The Houthi Identity:

The Houthis are Zaydi Shiites or Zaydiyyah - a subset of Shiites with ideology and views that differ greatly from those that rule Iran, Iraq, and elsewhere. The Houthi Movement borrows its name from their leader Hussein al Houthi under whom they arose as a Zaydi resistance to Ali Abdullah Saleh, a Zaydi republican officer, and his corruption in the 1990s. They accused Saleh of huge corruption, stealing the wealth of the Arab world's poorest country for his own family, like other Arab rulers in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria, and denounced Saudi and US support for the regime [6]. Iran is generally accused of supporting the Houthis in fighting Yemen's Sunni-majority government since 2004. In September 2014, the Houthis took over Yemen's capital, Sanaa, and by 2016, they had gained control of much of northern Yemen. Yemeni government and Sunni states have regularly accused Iran and its proxy Hezbollah of providing arms, training, and financial support to the Houthis. Although the allegations have been dismissed by the Iranian government and Hezbollah, the US, alongside Saudi Arabia has provided evidence of Iranian arms deliveries to the organization [7].

When Houthi troops attacked the capital, Sanaa, and overthrew the internationally recognized and Saudi-backed government, it sparked a conflict that escalated into a larger war by 2015, when a Saudi-led coalition invaded to drive the Houthis back. Although the alliance has been unable to oust the Houthis, a ceasefire was negotiated in 2022 which only lasted six months. However, the warring parties have not reverted to full-scale combat. Since the ceasefire, the Houthis have established control over the majority of northern Yemen and sought an agreement with the Saudis that would end the war and solidify their position as the country's rulers [8].

Terror Organization Designation:

On January 17, 2024, after the attacks had escalated, the US Department of State designated the Houthis, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group, effective 30 days after the announcement. The statement from the State Department read that the Houthis should be held accountable and any negative repercussions on the Yemeni people should be avoided. It further added that during the 30-day implementation delay, the US government will map out stakeholders, aid providers, and partners vital to facilitating humanitarian assistance and commercial imports of critical commodities into Yemen. Furthermore, the Department of the Treasury is also issuing licenses authorizing certain activities including the distribution of food, medicine, and gasoline, as well as personal remittances, telecommunications and mail, and port and airport operations that the Yemeni people rely upon [9].

Implications for Global Trade

Around 12% of global trade passes through the Red Sea accounting for billions of dollars in goods and 30% of global container transportation. Access to the Red Sea requires passing through the Bab al Mandab, a small strait about 20 miles wide that connects Djibouti to the west and Yemen to the east. Due to the pertaining security challenge seven of the top ten maritime corporations, including Maersk and BP, have decided to cease shipments via this route while some firms plan to take a new route south via the Indian Ocean, past the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa, and then up Africa's western coastline. This alternative route might take up to two weeks of shipping and cost more than $1 million in transportation charges. This additional time and expenses would ultimately reflect in increased fuel prices and product availability [10].

The disruption will be reflected significantly in the energy sector as the Suez Canal transports 12% of seaborne oil and 8% of liquefied natural gas (LNG). 40 percent of Asia-Europe traffic typically passes across the water and the ships that avoid the Red Sea will have to travel around the Horn of Africa, which can cost up to $1 million in additional fuel expenditures every round trip. Nonetheless, over 150 commercial ships have taken the lengthier route since November. Consequently, insurance costs for ships using the Red Sea have increased nearly tenfold since the attacks began and some shipping corporations are already operating on these increased costs. CMA CGM, France's second-largest shipper by market share, recently revealed plans to triple the shipping charges from Asia to Europe. However, as of early January 2024, these are yet to result in significant price hikes for consumers. The price of Brent crude, a US standard, remains lower than the October average, despite a spike following big strikes. Here, CFR Fellow Zongyuan Zoe Liu is of the view that Europe will experience economic difficulty sooner than the US will [11]. Overall, it is believed that the Houthi actions have redirected around $200 billion in commerce, disrupting global supply networks, and putting great economic stress on Israel, blocking traffic into the Red Sea port of Eilat [12].

Potential Impact on Internet Cables:

The escalations have also led to growing concerns regarding threats posed by the Houthi militia to international internet traffic and financial data transmission. The group has made warnings to Yemeni telecom providers and has indicated plans to disrupt internet cables in the Red Sea. On February 04, Yemen's General Telecommunications Company, affiliated with the UN-recognized government, issued a statement criticizing the Houthis' "threats to target international marine cables". Later, on December 24, a Houthi-linked Telegram channel uploaded a map illustrating the convergence of communications cables in the Red Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf, accompanied by an ominous message concerning Yemen's "strategic location". Approximately 17% of the world's internet traffic is routed through Red Sea fiber pipelines which adds to the security challenge in the region alongside the disruptions to trade [13].

Yemen's General Telecommunications Corporation in its statement added that up to 16 of these submerged cables, which are frequently barely thicker than a hosepipe and are prone to damage from ship anchors and earthquakes, flow through the Red Sea to Egypt. One of the most crucial is the 15,500-mile (25,000-kilometer) Asia-Africa-Europe AE-1, which connects Southeast Asia to Europe via the Red Sea. Gulf Security Forum asserted in a report that the "cables have been kept safe more due to the Houthis' relative technological underdevelopment than for a lack of motivation" but also made a cautionary remark that cables in some spots run at a depth of 100 meters, reducing the requirement for high-tech submarines. In one particular instance, in 2013, three divers were detained in Egypt for attempting to destroy an undersea cable near the Alexandria port, which provides much of the internet capacity between Europe and Egypt [14]. It is indicated that over time, the Houthis may be able to modify some of their maritime tactics to attack critical lines as they have received combat diver training and have a stockpile of naval mines to disrupt the lines. Furthermore, the ongoing escalation demonstrates its willingness to mark a larger role and a network of these cables could be the ideal soft target for their next strike, which should concern all governments that rely on this critical infrastructure, both close and far [15].

International Responses

As a response to the escalations in the Red Sea, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin announced Operation Prosperity Guardian to ensure freedom of navigation in the region. A statement from the US Department of Defense read that the challenge requires collective action and nations must work together to address the threat posed by the group. The Operation Prosperity Guardian thus brought together the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the Seychelles, and Spain [16]. However, some important US partners, such as Australia, Japan, and most Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, are not partaking in this security initiative. In light of the conflict in Gaza, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Egypt, and Morocco criticized Israel's actions in response to the Hamas strikes on October 7 citing violations of the international law and participating in a security initiative that is vehemently opposed to the Houthis could expose these governments to criticism for their previous stance. Saudi Arabia is unlikely to invest further in the conflict with the Houthis given that despite assisting anti-Houthis forces they have managed to hold on to power. A DW report states that Bahrain’s participation as the only Middle Eastern nation could be primarily driven by the fact that it is home to the US Navy's 5th Fleet. There is a general reluctance among other US partners too. For instance, Italy’s deployment of the Virginio Fasan to the Red Sea is intended to protect national interests but is separate from Operation Prosperity Guardian while Australia stressed upon the need to focus on national strategic concerns in their region and instead of deploying in the Red Sea tripled their contribution in the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) [17].

It was initially believed that this initiative would be successful akin to the international anti-piracy efforts in Somalia, but, unlike the Somalian challenge, there is no international mandate supported by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and no coalition has emerged in the aftermath of the current crisis primarily due to the political nature of the situation influenced by the Palestinian sympathies. Despite these setbacks, Operation Prosperity Guardian has managed to assemble a force that, together with related efforts from other countries, may be sufficient to discourage Houthi strikes and restrict their impact on international shipping. On December 24, Danish shipping giant Maersk Line indicated its desire to resume some shipping across the Red Sea, citing the US-led task force, while other corporations, such as France's CMA CGM, began a cautious return. Here, analysts are of the view that Prosperity Guardian can prove to be effective only if it can ensure the safety of vessels and restore commercial confidence in the route but the lack of public support should continue to be a point of concern for US officials [18]

Alongside Operation Prosperity Guardian, the USA and the United Kingdom have undertaken bombing operations naming it Operation Poseidon Archer. Since January 11, the United States has attacked Houthi targets in Yemen eight times, the majority of which were launched independently by the US military. According to an official, Operation Poseidon Archer began with the first wave of bombings, in which the United States and the United Kingdom struck approximately 30 facilities in Houthi-controlled Yemen [19]. This bilateral effort has targeted one-way attack drones, anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and other targets in an effort to impede the Houthis' capacity to fire on international maritime channels. Here, officials have stressed the fact that Operation Poseidon Archer is distinct from Operation Prosperity Guardian, which seeks to be a defensive alliance of nations that have committed naval assets and men to mitigate security challenges in the Red Sea [20].

Conclusion:

The ongoing crisis is further exacerbated by the fact that the Red Sea happens to be a strategically crucial site and its security is of global interest but due to the political sentiments attached to it, it is unlikely that a common view or a coalition will occur to mitigate the risks entirely. Unlike the anti-piracy efforts in Somalia, the current crisis can be seen as a latent effect of the Israel-Gaza conflict and the Houthis being used as a proxy by Iran. This further complicates the situation making it a geopolitical issue rather than a security challenge that can be collectively addressed.

In this regard, the issues at hand are three-fold. First, the capacity of the Houthis to undertake these attacks needs to be dismantled and external support in the form of funding, equipment, and training needs to be cut off. Secondly, an international mandate and public support need to be garnered. Finally, the confidence of shipping companies in the route will have to be restored.

 The first can only be achieved by adopting an offensive posture against the militia despite the lack of an international mandate or support from allies. Furthermore, the attacks have been said to be an extension of the conflict in Gaza and hence it is imperative to contain the expansion of the conflict. Here, relevant stakeholders will have to address the issue highlighting the global repercussions to establish political support internationally. Finally, Operation Prosperity Guardian will have to establish itself as a security guarantor of the trade and internet data traffic flow in the Red Sea.

Endnotes:

1.     Houthis seize ship in Red Sea with link to Israeli company, Reuters, 20 November 2023 https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-says-houthis-seize-ship-red-sea-no-israelis-among-owners-or-crew-2023-11-19/

2.     Aziz El Yaakoubi and Idrees Ali, Multiple commercial vessels attacked in Red Sea, Reuters, 04 December 2023 https://www.reuters.com/world/britains-maritime-agency-reports-potential-explosion-red-sea-2023-12-03/

3.     Houthi attacks on shipping in Red Sea persist, U.S. and allies strike back, Reuters, 12 January 2024 https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthi-attacks-shipping-red-sea-persist-us-allies-strike-back-2024-01-12/

4.     Simon Scarr, Adolfo Arranz, Jonathan Saul, Han Huang and Jitesh Chowdhury, Red Sea attacks, Reuters, 02 February 2024 https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ISRAEL-PALESTINIANS/SHIPPING-ARMS/lgvdnngeyvo/

5.     Joshua Cheetham, Tom Spencer and Shruti Menon, Tracking Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, BBC, 20 January 2024 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68031732

6.     Bruce Riedel, Who are the Houthis, and why are we at war with them?, Brookings Institution, 18 December 2017 https://www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/

7.     Who are Yemen's Houthis?, Wilson Center, 07 July 2022 https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-houthis

8.     Christian Edwards, Who are the Houthis and why are they attacking ships in the Red Sea?, CNN Business, 04 February 2024 https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/19/middleeast/red-sea-crisis-explainer-houthi-yemen-israel-intl/index.html

9.     Terrorist Designation of the Houthis, Press Statement, US Department of State, 17 January 2024 https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designation-of-the-houthis/

10. Susan Stigant, Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea Disrupt Global Supply Chains, United States Institute of Peace, 22 December 2023 https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/12/houthi-attacks-red-sea-disrupt-global-supply-chains

11. Noah Berman, How Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea Threaten Global Shipping, Council on Foreign Relations, 12 January 2024 https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-houthi-attacks-red-sea-threaten-global-shipping

12. Scott Ritter, Consequences of the Houthi Attack, Energy Intelligence, 18 January 2024 https://www.energyintel.com/0000018d-1c3a-db4a-a9cf-fe7b997d0000

13. Alex Blair, Could the Houthis sabotage international internet cables in the Red Sea?, Airforce Technology, 05 February 2024 https://www.airforce-technology.com/features/could-the-houthis-sabotage-international-internet-cables-in-the-red-sea/?cf-view

14. Houthis may sabotage western internet cables in Red Sea, Yemen telecoms firms warn, The Irish Times, 05 February 2024 https://www.irishtimes.com/world/middle-east/2024/02/05/houthis-may-sabotage-western-internet-cables-in-red-sea-yemen-telecoms-firms-warn/

 15. Emily Milliken, The Next Casualty of the Red Sea Attacks: Undersea Cables, Gulf International Forum, 29 January 2024 https://gulfif.org/the-next-casualty-of-the-red-sea-attacks-undersea-cables/

16. Statement from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on Ensuring Freedom of Navigation in the Red Sea, US Department of Defense, 18 December 2023 https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/

17. Rishika Singh, Red Sea attacks: Why many US allies have not joined its Op Prosperity Guardian, Indian Express, 01 January 2024 https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/red-sea-attacks-arab-us-op-prosperity-guardian-9089791/

18. Tom Freebairn, Operation Prosperity Guardian Faces Early Hurdles, Defense and Security Monitor, 02 January 2024 https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/2024/01/02/operation-prosperity-guardian-faces-early-hurdles/

19. US and UK Strikes Against Houthi Targets in Yemen: Operation Poseidon Archer, Archyde, 23 January 2024 https://www.archyde.com/us-and-uk-strikes-against-houthi-targets-in-yemen-operation-poseidon-archer/

20. Oren Liebermann and Natasha Bertrand, US names campaign to target Houthis in Yemen "Operation Poseidon Archer", CNN World, 22 January 2024 https://edition.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-01-22-24/h_bcea34adfb7d01899d1d59278a3a9bfe

Pic Courtesy-Natalya Letunova at unsplash.com

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)