Germany’s first ever National Security Strategy
On 27 February 2022 in the German Bundestag, Chancellor Olaf Scholz in his speech called Russia's attack on Ukraine a turning point (Zeitenwende) for Europe and announced a radical change in German policy. The announcements included Germany's decision to increase its defense spending to more than 2 percent of GDP as well as its unprecedented decision to supply arms to Ukraine.
Echoing the sentiment of the speech, Germany released its First National Security Strategy (NSS) on 14 June 2023. The decision outlined bold steps to address serious threats and security challenges. This strategy sets new priorities for ministries, armed forces and intelligence services, and envisions a stronger international role to ensure peace and security in Europe.
In the document quoted from Anadolu Agency, the German Government stated; “We maintain our basic freedom and modification regime against attempts at unauthorized influence from abroad. Together with our partners, we support a free international order based on international law and the United Nations Charter.”
Since its rise as a Federal Republic over the ashes of World War II, Germany has been shaken from its bold stance. After reunification in 1990, caution was replaced by complacency. Prosperity seemed assured under a trinity of blessings: American security, cheap Russian energy, and a thriving Chinese market. Even before Russia crushed Ukraine last year, it was clear that the good times would not last.
When the current coalition was elected in 2021, its promise to put out a national security strategy was meant to be a signal that it understood the growing precariousness of Germany's situation. However, the greatest danger felt then was to drag America into Trumpian isolation. But while Trumpian isolation isn't a wasted force, it doesn't deserve a mention in the review.
The national security strategy slogan "Strong, Tough, Sustainable" is also a reflection of coalition politics. Defensively short, in short, the document hits a necessary note on budget probity for the liberal Mr Lindner's Free Democrats, as well as commitment to climate change goals for the Greens. But more important than the wording of the document is the fact that it was written.
National Security Strategy Defining Germany's Interests
The German government emphasizes that; “The main task of Germany's security policy is to ensure that we can continue to live in our country in peace, freedom and security. Germany's security is inseparable from the security of our European partners and allies. Our commitment to NATO and the EU is unwavering. We stand firm on the promise of mutual defense under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. We are strengthening the Bundeswehr as a cornerstone of defense in Europe. National and collective defense is a core task of the Bundeswehr, and this task includes our contribution to NATO's deterrence capabilities. We will allocate 2 percent of our GDP, as an average over a multi-year period, to achieve NATO capability goals, initially partly through a newly created special fund for the Bundeswehr. At the same time, we will support investments in the protection of critical infrastructure."
The German National Security Strategy underscores the need for the country to strengthen its counter-espionage activities and further develop its cyber security capabilities. The government also promised to reduce dependence on imported raw materials and diversify sources of energy supply. The constant availability of many raw materials and commodities on the global market is no longer a given. Therefore, the aim is to reduce existing unilateral dependencies, prevent the emergence of new dependencies, provide targeted support for raw material projects in collaboration with businesses and provide a backup strategy.
Such expressions of interest could go a long way in reassuring Germany's international partners and friends where Germany stands on its current security policy. The German National Security Strategy determines Germany's political position in Europe. And, because it defines its values and determines its priorities, the National Security Strategy will reduce the continuing and growing doubts and distrust of Germany's leadership in Europe that does not dominate European policy.
Thus, the new National Security Strategy offers the opportunity in Germany's current Zeitenwende to strengthen Europe's defense by accepting responsibility for international security, as President Gauck and Ministers Steinmeier and von der Leyen promised at the 2014 Munich Security Conference. Thucydides noted that courage is the secret to freedom, and courage to overcome national security strategies is necessary.
Limitations of the German National Security Strategy Document
Although the National Security Strategy aims to be forward-looking in scope, it mostly refers to existing issues such as climate change and conflicts such as Ukraine, Syria and Iraq, Libya, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region, but does not address potential issues such as Taiwan. In addition, the relevance of the Indo Pacific for Germany and Europe was mentioned once but not emphasized in the strategy. Lastly, while the document makes reference to promoting diversification by forging new partnerships in Asia and Africa, it does not mention key countries like India or any other country from the Global South despite its increasing engagement with the region.
In addition, the document also avoids controversial strategic debates about priorities, especially for future financing. Strategic policy priorities need clarification. The volatile geopolitical environment requires strategies to end Russia's war in Ukraine, manage strategic competition with China, balance transatlantic relations with the EU, and forge the emerging international order. An integrated approach is an important guiding principle for the German government and a unique opportunity to use broad and comprehensive strategic conceptions that can generate new thinking.
At the same time, the strategy requires processes to address the priorities in the document, including calls for protection of critical infrastructure, cyber capabilities, effective diplomacy, disaster prevention and resilient assistance, stabilizing Germany's partners.
Overall, the document was predictable and contained no major surprises in laying out Germany's broad approach. However, there are some glaring omissions. For starters, aligned with Germany's Indo-Pacific strategy released in 2020, the document links Germany's security to the security and stability of other regions of the world. But it makes only one reference to the Indo-Pacific, and no reference at all to its allies in the region including India, South Korea and Japan. Interestingly, it also makes no reference to Taiwan, which is a serious security flashpoint. This exclusion has the potential to send confusing signals to German partners around the world.
The strategy also makes no mention of the goal of 'strategic European autonomy', French President Macron's pet project, which Berlin lacks interest in. But while supporting the US role in Europe, it does not address Europe's uncertain security future amid concerns over America's future political trajectory with elections coming up next year.
With respect to spending 2 percent of its GDP on NATO (which is estimated at 75 billion euros by 2022), the document adds a faint warning to do so "as an average over a multi-year period". Questions about how these commitments will be funded remain unanswered, particularly with Lindner's statement that the strategy will be implemented "at no additional cost to the entire federal budget".
In addition, it may be difficult to translate strategy into actionable policy without an agency or structure such as the National Security Council in place to coordinate effectively between the various agencies.
In terms of partnerships, the strategy eliminates associated countries such as the United Kingdom (UK) and Poland which are at the forefront of Europe's struggle against Russia. In contrast, the United Kingdom Unified Review Refresh released in March this year, focused heavily on the bilateral partnership, and made several references to Germany as an "ally". Instead, the strategy focuses more on institutions such as the European Union and NATO and multilateral forums such as the G7 and G20. Moreover, opposition leaders such as Alexander Dobrindt have questioned the sensitivity of strategy in setting priorities, mentioning only 'China' six times and 'climate' 71 times.
Conclusion
While the outcome of the strategy document was disappointing, perhaps what matters most to many German observers is not the content of the strategy, but the fact that such a strategy was released in the first place. Indeed, given the country's traditional pacifism, this is a historic moment for developing a stronger German strategic culture, demonstrating that security is now at the forefront of German policy-making and thinking. In addition to negotiations between various ministries under the tripartite coalition, even the wider community such as scientists and civil society actors are also involved in the drafting process.
The strategy has activated a long overdue intellectual shift and is a political accomplishment in providing much needed direction. This now needs to be accompanied by material and structural shifts. As Scholz emphasized, "Strategy is not an end point, but a starting point".
As Berlin continued its process of introspection, "Zeitenwende" really did it. Hopefully, the upcoming China strategy will provide further answers and clarify some of the ambiguities surrounding China's policy in Berlin.
Pic Courtsey-Aron Merinelli at unsplash.com
(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)
