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Military January 26, 2021 2063 Reads

Export of Brahmos- A New Component of India’s Defence Diplomacy

A
By Abhijeet Nehra
Author • Centre for Security & Strategic Studies
Export of Brahmos- A New Component of India’s Defence Diplomacy
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS

Brahmos is a supersonic cruise missile with a flight range of 290 km and has maximum pace of Mach 3(three times the speed of sound). The name originates from the Brahmaputra river in India and Moskva in Russia. In February 1998, the two countries signed an inter-governmental agreement which called to establish the Brahmos Aerospace for building the supersonic cruise missile. Brahmos Aerospace is a joint venture between the Defence Research and Development Organisation of India and NPO Mashinostroeyenia of Russia. It is also said to be the improvised version of Yakhont missile of Russian origin. 

The missile can be lodged onto ships, submarines, aircrafts as well as ground vehicles. It is the lone cruise missile which can be launched from all three surfaces. The cruise missile has been used by the Indian army, air force and the navy. There are three version of Brahmos missile with different utility. The Version I is land attack version while version II is steep dive mode with target discriminating capabilities. Version III high manoeuvres at multiple points and can hit targets camouflaged in a mountain range.

On 17th October 2020, the navy launched and successfully fired Brahmos from the stealth destroyer INS Chennai in the Arabian sea and the air force also successfully tested the missile out of Sukhoi jet in Bay of Bengal on 30th October. Not long ago, on 24th November, the Indian army tested the missile in Bay of Bengal at Car Nicobar islands.

A new version of the missile has been developed whose range is 400 km specifically for export. India which has long been a defence importer, may slowly turn towards becoming a defence exporter through the sale of Brahmos as well as other defence equipment. Once the domestic requirement is fulfilled, India along with Russia may look to export the missile to friendly nations around the world.

Features of Brahmos:

The land version of the missile is equipped with 4 to 6 independent launchers which have the capacity of 3 missiles on board, they can be launched concomitantly. In addition to the land-based version being autonomous, it is also accoutred with the inertial navigation system and the global positioning system, better known as GPS. The naval version has the power to hit sea-based targets above the radar horizon at the same time or 8 missiles with intervals of 2.5 seconds. These missiles could obliterate a group of frigates which are endowed with missile defence systems. It can even be launched from 50 meters below the surface in addition to surface launch capability. The missile would bolster the long-range capacity of the marine forces. The aerial version can hit target on land as well as at sea with deadly precision in all weather conditions, thereby enhancing the proficiency of the flying force.

In 2016, the union government ordered the Brahmos aerospace to raise production as it has been approached by countries from ASEAN, South America, and Eastern Europe. For instance, Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore from ASEAN, Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Venezuela from south America, Greece & Bulgaria from eastern Europe. Gulf countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. All the countries mentioned above are keen on obtaining the fastest anti-ship cruise missile.

Vietnam:

Hanoi has held extensive talks with New Delhi to procure Brahmos since 2016, but nothing has materialised yet. However, Russian deputy chief of the mission Roman Babushkin has communicated that the Brahmos aerospace is considering exporting the missile to friendly nations. New Delhi has long held the outlook of not selling weapons to ASEAN member states in fear of Beijing’s aggressive response. Getting Brahmos would be beneficial as the south east Asian country has been embroiled in the maritime dispute with China and has been on the receiving end of the dragon’s aggressive tactics.

Philippines:

Talks with Manila have been going on since 2019 and a deal was expected to be inked in 2020 but due to the pandemic, negotiations have been put on hold. Philippines has enquired about purchasing the land-based version of the missile. President Duterte is anticipated to sign a defence cooperation agreement including the purchase of Brahmos at the next summit. Provided the two countries sign a contract, it would permit Manila to fortify its defences, moreover it would give New Delhi the power to challenge Beijing in its backyard.

Thailand:

The ASEAN member state has conveyed its preference to obtain cruise missile Brahmos. Discussions for the acquisition of the missile picked up pace after the royal Thai navy chief Admiral Ruddit paid a visit in December 2018. The Indian navy is working with the Thailand navy to restore, overhaul its fleet of Dornier patrol aircraft and considering assistance in ship design and construction. Brahmos would not only increase the defence capacity of Thailand’s arms forces but also equip New Delhi to deepen defence ties.

India’s counter to China:

Since Beijing has time and again utilized Islamabad to encircle New Delhi, coupled with heightened tensions at the Line of Actual Control, its time India give a befitting response. As the dragon is operating the “string of pearls” strategy in India’s neighbourhood, the elephant can respond in the same manner by foraying into the ASEAN defence market through sale of Brahmos to Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand. Marketing indigenous built weapons would empower New Delhi to not only counter China’s aggressive conduct but also facilitate strategic partnerships and defence ties.

Brazil:

The two nations have had discussions with regards to the purchase of Brahmos. But the pandemic hampered the global economy and as a result, talks have been suspended for the time being. President Jair Bolsonaro’s government is riveted in procuring the Brahmos-NG variant, which is a miniature version of the original model, as it is lighter and shorter but with the same range. Aircraft Embraer, Gripen Jets as well as its nuclear-powered submarines could be equipped with the supersonic cruise missile. Acquiring the aerial and naval variant would stiffen Brasilia’s defence capacity as the cruise missile could deter adversaries.

Chile:

The south American country has evinced interest in purchasing Brahmos. Brahmos aerospace is already registered with the armed forces of the south American country, which is a requirement to export defence material to them. Santiago is riveted to buy the coastal, naval as well as the aerial version of the Brahmos-NG variant which will enhance its deterrence capability. Marketing the cruise missile would empower New Delhi to ameliorate its standing as a defence exporter.

Saudi Arabia & UAE:

The two-gulf nations have indicated their interest in the Indo-Russian cruise missile. However, nothing has materialized yet as far as the sale of Brahmos is concerned. The army chief general MM Naravane visited both the gulf countries to deepen defence and strategic ties in December 2020. The two oil giants are eager to diversify their economies, and UAE has invested $75 billion in India, also having signed a defence cooperation agreement with the key accord being supply of ammunition to the Emirati military. Saudi Arabia invested $100 billion in India and signed an accord for joint defence production. The two countries are also working together towards a comprehensive security dialogue to discuss maritime security and international trade.

Final View:

India is the world’s second largest arms importer considering the 2015-19 period, but the situation is changing rapidly as many countries have contacted New Delhi to get their hands on the fastest cruise missile. But India’s Achilles heel is that none of the agreements have come to fruition yet. The elephant in the room needs to do more to not only counter the dragon’s influence, but to improve its standing as a net defence exporter. No one can argue with the noteworthiness of Brahmos as it is the lone cruise missile which can be launched from all three terrain that is air, sea, and land. However, the might of the Indo-Russian cruise missile would not suffice if the two countries are not able to sell it abroad. The paper has succinctly exemplified the reason why so many countries have approached the Brahmos aerospace to acquire the cruise missile, but both the countries need to ensure that the deal goes through.

End Notes

1)https://www.army-technology.com/projects/brahmossupersoniccru/

2)https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/brahmos-to-be-exported-to-third-countries-starting-with-philippines-russian-dcm-169705

3)https://www.navhindtimes.in/2016/06/10/nationalnews/india-set-to-export-supersonic-brahmos-missile-to-vietnam/

4)http://www.indiandefensenews.in/2020/08/india-to-export-brahmos-missiles-to.html

5)https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/brahmos-to-be-exported-to-third-countries-starting-with-philippines-russian-dcm

6) https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/brahmos-missile-and-significance-of-ongoing-series-of-tests-by-armed-forces-7070213/

7)https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/india-vietnam-virtual-summit-strengthens-partnership

8)https://www.army-technology.com/news/india-and-philippines-in-talks-over-brahmos-missile-purchase-deal/

9)http://www.brahmos.com/content.php’id=16

10)https://www.defenseworld.net/news/25233/Thailand_Likely_To_Buy

11)https://guardingindia.com/diplomacy/indian-brahmos-missile-will-be-heading-to-brazil-as-an-export-success/

12)https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/uae-saudi-arabia-interested-in-brahmos-missile-army-chiefs-visit-to-focus-on-deepening-military-ties

13)https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/brahmos-in-demand-chile-eyes-indo-russian-missile-big-interest-for-ship-and-shore-based-platforms

14)https://eurasiantimes.com/worlds-biggest-defence-exporters-india-placed-very-low-as-make-in-india-dream-derails/

Pic Courtesy- By One half 3544 - Own work, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php’curid=2325920e

(The views expressed are personal.)

Abhijeet Nehra
About Abhijeet Nehra →

Abhijeet Nehra is a M.A. International Relations from University of Sheffield and has done his graduation in Global Affairs from Jindal School of International Affairs, O P Jindal Global University . He was research associate with CESCUBE.

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