Evaluating Japan’s New Security Strategy

The National Security Strategy (NSS) serves as a framework for thinking about national security, while the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) define a course for the military to achieve that objective. The first and only NSS was released in 2013; the other two papers are released on a regular basis. This iteration will see some significant changes in Japanese strategy and policy, and the government is preparing the public for the most contentious of them. There are two issues in the document, those stand out: acquiring a counter-strike capability and determining how to support an expanded defence budget. While the first appears to be certain; the second appears less assured.

The new NSS is both transformational in terms of focusing on counter-strike capabilities and increasing the defence budget and is compatible with Japan's continued commitment to being a peace-loving nation. The NSS emphasises Japan's decades-long record of success in sustaining a fundamental policy of entirely national defence-oriented policy. This includes refraining from becoming a military force that threatens other countries. Notably, Japan continues to adhere to the three non-nuclear principles of not creating, possessing, or permitting nuclear weapons transit through Japan.

THE COUNTER-STRIKE CAPABILITY

The authorisation of what Japan calls counterstrike capability, which refers to the ability to hit missile-related installations within an attacking country, will undoubtedly be the most talked-about component of Japan's recent security papers. A combination of missile defences and dependence on US attack capabilities has aided Japan's long-standing resistance to such a capability. However, North Korea's rapid rise in missile launches and China's modernisation and diversity of its missile arsenal have made it simpler to justify Japan's own deterrence and defence. This is evident by public opinion, with more than 60% advocating counter-strike capacity, which appeared unthinkable merely a decade ago. Successive governments have interpreted Japan's constitution to allow the use of force only in response to an actual attack and to prohibit "armaments deemed to be offensive weapons designed solely for the mass destruction of another country" (such as intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range strategic bombers, or "attack aircraft carriers"). Counter-strike capability has been problematic in Japan since the weapons required may also be used offensively, and it can be challenging to determine when an enemy assault with a missile has formally commenced before the missile is airborne. To address these concerns, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's administration has proposed a framework to guarantee that counter-strikes are reactive rather than preemptive.

It is critical to recognise that, independent of counterstrike capacity, Japan's solely defence-oriented strategy already empowers the country to employ force in self-defence as soon as an assault is launched, the precise assessment of which is based on a variety of case-specific considerations. Such force, however, can be used only in the absence of alternative "acceptable measures" and to the "least required extent." This is not changed by the new counterstrike capability authorisation; instead, it broadens the means Japan can deploy to support its defence strategy, such as weapons capable of countering a strike on Japan from within enemy territory.

JAPAN’S APPROACH TO THE POTENTIAL CHALLENGES

First and foremost, the National Security Strategy assessed which nations are potential threats to the country and which are its allies or friends. Japan has identified three countries as potential challengers: China, North Korea, and Russia. North Korea was featured first in the previous National Security Strategy in 2013, followed by China.

Ten years ago, Japan was much more sensitive to the security challenges posed by China than much of the rest of the Western world, and its language was cautious, focusing on concerns about China's military activities and "lack of transparency in its military affairs and security policy," and caveated with assertions about the importance of stable and mutually beneficial relations based on common strategic interests "in all areas," including economics, people-to-people exchanges, and security.

The new NSS section on China is significantly more prolonged and blunter, including an estimation of China's posture as unparalleled and the most significant strategic challenge in ensuring Japan's peace and security, as well as the peace and stability of the international community, as well as in strengthening the international order based on the rule of law, to which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power and in collaboration with other like-minded countries.

The statement on Russia is also worth noting since it represents such a major shift since the last time. Japan used to recognize Russia as a potential asset for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific back in 2013 and urged for collaboration with Russia in many areas, including engagement in resolving disputed islands to Japan's north. Japan now sees Russia as a hazardous spoiler whose action towards Ukraine has easily violated the basic foundation of the rules that form the international peace and stability. Russia's operations near Japan and collaboration with China are of great security concern to Japan, in addition to being the most major and direct danger to security in the European region.

While the thrust remains the same, the language on North Korea's threat has been expanded, and there is a greater sense of urgency about how North Korea's military exercises pose an even more serious and immediate danger to Japan's national security than ever before due to Pyongyang's explosive growth of missile-related advanced technologies.

Despite China's criticisms that these steps imply militarisation and a shift away from pacifism for Japan, these texts emphasise deterrence and its relevance in sustaining peace and stability in an already armed region. Japanese leaders have been keen to emphasise Japan's continued commitment to its peaceful course. While China and North Korea responded angrily to Japan's papers, partners in the region and Europe are expected to applaud the efforts.

There is also new language on Taiwan as well, referring to it as an extraordinarily important partner and cherished friend with whom Japan shares essential ideals, including democracy, and has deep economic and personal ties, while emphasising that Japan's fundamental approach toward Taiwan remains unchanged. Other essential aspects of the NSS aligned with Indo-Pacific geopolitics focus on technological innovation, economic development, and engaging with like-minded countries throughout the region to create a rules-based order that is not necessarily based on democracy or human rights but rather on a shared understanding of how the region should develop. This common understanding is founded on clear, rule-based agreements and understandings throughout the area on the marine routes of communication that span the Indian Ocean via the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and the East China Sea. For Japan, they are still vital since they carry practically all of its commerce and energy resources.

WHAT NSS MEANS FOR INDIA?

Aside from the United States, both the National Security Strategy and the National Defence Strategy listed friends. Australia is first followed by India, and then the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and South Korea. South Korea's status used to be higher. According to the papers, Japan is now prioritising Australia and India. In the case of India, joint fighter aircraft drills are being planned. There is also a chance that India would import Japan's UNICORN for its navy ships. Both nations' defence ministries have already begun a collaborative armaments development effort for unmanned vehicles. This is critical since India and Japan have lately taken opposing positions in the recent past.

India, Japan, and Australia have lately sought improved strike capabilities. Australia declared its intention to have long-range attack capabilities in July 2020. In addition, India has placed supersonic cruise missiles along the India-China border. India is also conducting missile testing with hypersonic missile warheads. Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and South Korea are all beefing up their strike capabilities. The long-range attack capacity is effective when these nations face China's territorial expansion. For example, if both India and Japan have long-range attack capabilities, China must defend on numerous fronts. Even if China engages in border adventurism, it will still need to devote a portion of its budget and military assets to protect itself from Japan. Long-range strike capacity is crucial for securing China's chosen path to expand its territory. If the straits or other choke points are within striking distance of India, Japan, the United States, and Australia, China may be reluctant to exploit them. As a result, this counter-strike capacity benefits India, Japan, the United States, Australia, and other friends and partners.

The NSS states unequivocally that Japan will expand Official Development Assistance (ODA) for strategic reasons. Apart from ODA for developing countries' economic and social development and other reasons, the paper states to increase security cooperation with like-minded countries. This agreement stated unambiguously that Japan would give security to countries confronted by China's territorial expansion. This will be a very significant proponent for the India-Japan arms trade and cooperation. Currently, India requires infrastructural projects along its border with China. However, if a new cooperation framework is established, Japan may be able to send heavy machinery to develop roads in this region, even if they are for military purposes.

CONCLUSION

Japan has historically kept its defence spending around 1% of GDP, despite consecutive record defence budgets in recent years. Kishida revealed last month's intentions to increase defence expenditure and raise the defence budget to 2% of GDP by 2027, in accordance with NATO norms. Again, demonstrating a substantial shift in popular mood, there is overwhelming support for higher defence spending, given Japan's heightened vulnerability to China, North Korea, and Russia.

The new security plan is a notable shift from the Yoshida Doctrine, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida's post-World War II policy that outsourced Japan's military to the United States in order for Japan to focus on economic growth. The NSS, also known as the Abe doctrine by some, guarantees that Japan maintains strategic autonomy while remaining close to its American and like-minded friends. It also assures that it vigorously opposes Chinese hegemony in the region while looking for opportunities to cooperate with revisionist regimes in areas such as environmental and energy cooperation or the next pandemic.

The new policies necessitate a fundamental transformation in national defence thinking. It is significantly easier to legislate and implement this evolution away from the public eye, limiting the possibility of disturbance or resistance. However, it is precise because these reforms are so critical and necessary that public support is required. The Japanese government has been quietly laying the groundwork for this transformation. It is a solid start, but much more is needed. The release of the three security papers will usher in a new era in this debate. Obtaining public support is critical. The stakes are at an all-time high for Japan.

REFERENCES-

1.        “Japan Charts a New Course on National Security.” The Japan Times. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2022/12/02/editorials/japan-national-security-strategy/

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6.        “National Security Strategy (NSS).” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html

7.        Oue, Sadamasa. 2022. “New National Security Strategy Needs to Respond to Realities on Three Fronts.” The Japan Times. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2022/12/15/commentary/japan-commentary/security-strategy-threats/

8.        “Pragmatic Realism and Japan’s New Security Strategy | The Japan Times.” https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2022/12/25/commentary/japan-commentary/japan-defense/

9.        “View: How Japan’s New National Security Strategy Impacts Cooperation with India - The Economic Times.” https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/view-how-japans-new-national-security-strategy-impacts-cooperation-with-india/articleshow/96516738.cms

10.    “What You Need to Know About Japan’s New National Security Strategy.” United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/12/what-you-need-know-about-japans-new-national-security-strategy

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(the views expressed are those of the author and do nto represent views of CESCUBE.)