Evaluating 25 years of India- France Strategic Cooperation

Evaluating 25 years of India- France Strategic Cooperation

The Indo-French Strategic Partnership has turned 25 years old in 2023. It was launched on January 26, 1998, on President Chirac's visit to India, and it represents both countries' desire to enhance their separate strategic independence via tangible bilateral collaboration to maintain peace and global security. This collaboration encompasses all facets of bilateral cooperation that have a strategic component. It is centred around strong collaboration in the defence, civil nuclear energy, space, and security (cyber security, counter-terrorism, and intelligence) sectors, and it now includes a major Indo-Pacific component. 

It necessitates high levels of confidence between the two State Parties and a common goal for an equitable partnership. France has emerged as India's most important commercial partner, with annual trade of $12.42 billion in 2021-22. The country is India's 11th largest foreign investor. The total investment of $10.31 billion from April 2000 to June 2022 which accounts for 1.70% of total foreign direct investment inflows.

France and India share ideals like their dedication to democracy, and a desire to promote and protect multilateralism and international law. These two nations have been working together to establish a multipolar world guided by the rule of law and respects sovereignty. This collaboration exemplifies France and India's long-standing trust and solidarity over the last 25 years, particularly through tough times. France was the first major Western country to establish a multipolar long-term strategic alliance with India. In 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared France one of India's most trusted defence partners. In his speech in Chantilly in 2019, the President of the French Republic highlighted the importance of the partnership with India in meeting modern problems and achieving accomplishments together.

 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

During the Cold War, the path to strategic alliances between India and France was forged. Notwithstanding the fact that the Soviet Union was India's primary security and diplomatic partner, France injected a new aspect by attempting to balance India's over-reliance on the Soviet Union. Apart from the appeal of India as an export market, France recognised and associated with India's strategic position in the greater South Asian area. During the 1971 Indo-Pakistan conflict, for example, France sided with India. This occurred even though the United States actively supported Pakistan during the conflict. France was trading on a rather independent path on numerous issues, including nuclear technology, space and defence cooperation with India.

The late 1990s was a watershed moment in the relationship. With the Soviet Union becoming defunct, French President Jacques Chirac was keen to fill the void, announcing a "strategic relationship" between the two countries. France emphasised the need to resolve India's exclusion from the global nuclear framework. This struck a chord with the Indian authorities. France not only refrained from condemning the "Pokhran-II" nuclear tests but also boosted its strategic involvement with India. Such a statement by France resounded strongly throughout and among the establishment in India at a time when India had become a nuclear pariah, and on an emotional level and it resonates to this day.

 

STRATEGIC COOPERATION BETWEEN INDIA & FRANCE

Defence, civil nuclear energy, space, and security are all examples of strategic concerns. These characteristics allow France and India to maintain strategic independence, especially by limiting their reliance on other nations in these areas. 

Since the 1960s, when the Sriharikota launch pad was built with French technical support, India and France have had a long history of space collaboration. Based on the historical links in the civilian space domain, India and France released a “Joint Vision for Space Cooperation” during the visit of President Macron to India in March 2018. In 2020, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and the French National Centre for Space Studies (CNES) formed a Joint Working Committee to further bilateral space collaboration. Later, soon, ISRO and CNES revealed plans to work on a combined Mars mission. India and France have also collaborated to solve the issue of space debris. ISRO and CNES announced intentions to work together on a collaborative Earth observation mission in 2021, which will include building a satellite to investigate the Earth's atmosphere and climate.

France has significantly developed as a very important defence partner for India, becoming the country's second-largest defence supplier between 2017 and 2021. With critical defence purchases and growing military-to-military contact, France has emerged as a vital strategic partner for India. A notable example is the induction of French Scorpene conventional submarines, produced in India under a 2005 technology transfer deal, and the Indian Air Force receiving 36 Rafale fighter fighters. In addition, the Tata company has partnered with Airbus to produce the C295 tactical transport aircraft in Vadodara, Gujarat. Under a joint venture with France, this line will be expanded into other commercial and military aircraft manufacturers. These ties are strengthened further through a comprehensive network of military conversations and joint exercises — Varuna (navy), Garuda (air force), and Shakti (army). The French Ambassador to India, Emmanuel Lenain, has stated that France is a willing partner for India as it builds its national industrial base for defence industries and vital strategic defence projects, emphasising the importance of defence collaboration.

 

COOPERATION ON NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS

In the recent times, non-traditional dangers are far more terrifying than conventional threats because they need not only an outward reaction to handling their exterior dimension and fostering international collaboration but also an inside response with an open mind to carry out socioeconomic and political reforms. India and France are dealing with various non-traditional security concerns and have joined together to oppose and plan against them. India and France have continuously denounced terrorism and committed to collaborating with the UN to ratify the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT).

Regarding climate change and energy security, the two parties have agreed to declare 2021-2022 the Indo-French Year of the Environment, with five major themes: environmental protection, climate change, biodiversity conservation, sustainable urban development, and the development of renewable energies and energy efficiency. Their leadership in the International Solar Alliance (ISA) demonstrates their commitment to climate change. The alliance's principal goal is to promote the effective use of solar energy to minimise reliance on fossil fuels. We have been seeing a change in the dynamic of bilateral cooperation, which is now tiltung towards the human security aspect.

 

MARITIME COOPERATION

In the recent years, there has been significant progress in India-France maritime security cooperation, with a focus on the Indian Ocean Region. With its rising economic, marine military capabilities and geopolitical objectives in the Indo-Pacific region, India is eager to develop ties with nations those have stakes in that region. Seeing geopolitical developments, France has sought to emphasise its identity as an Indo-Pacific nation and desire to build relationships with the region's main actors.

Both countries have significant interests in the Indian Ocean Region. India, with its 7500-kilometre-long coastline, more than 1380 islands, and 2 million square kilometres of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), is a key participant in the region. This region facilitates much of India's commerce with its key commercial partners, which include ASEAN nations, Japan, the Republic of Korea, China, and the Americas. Across the Indian Ocean, about 80% of the country's crude oil consumption, predicted to rise in the future, is imported. France, on the other hand, is a state of the Indian Ocean Area due to its overseas possessions of the Mayotte and La Réunion Islands, as well as a substantial EEZ. There are 4,100 French forces stationed in the Indian Ocean, including deployments in both overseas territories, Djibouti and Abu Dhabi. As a result of their considerable interests, India and France have a vested interest in ensuring peace and stability in the IOR.

Both nations have a history of fruitful collaboration and engagement between their fleets. The first naval exercise between India and France took place in 1983, and it was named "Varuna" in 2001. The 19th iteration of the "Varuna" bilateral exercises occurred in the Arabian Sea in April 2019. It was a massive drill involving both fleets' frontline battleships, submarines, aircraft carriers, and other combat equipment.

The two governments agreed on a Joint Strategic Vision of the India-France Partnership in the Indian Ocean Area in March 2018. The vision document stated that the two democracies "shared concerns about emerging challenges in the IOR, including the security of maritime traffic in the face of terrorism and piracy, particularly in the Horn of Africa; respect of international law by all states, an organised crime such as trafficking and illegal fishing; climate change, environmental and natural resource protection." Both parties reaffirmed their commitment to further cooperation in the IOR and indicated a willingness to collaborate with additional like-minded nations through trilateral conversations.

 

CHINA’S AGGRESSION IN INDO-PACIFIC

In recent years, France has been particularly concerned about China's provocation of European nations, forcing them to embrace a "One-China" policy with no exceptions, as well as China's assault on Hong Kong's independence and China's assertion of wolf warrior diplomacy across its foreign policy. According to the European Commission's study "EU-China: A Strategic Perspective", EU member states now see China as a "systemic opponent pushing alternative governance models". This impression is heavily influenced not just by China's scary nationalist narrative and its rising support for European populist parties but also by Europe's unhappiness with its inability to access Chinese markets.

China's aggressive efforts in the Indian and Pacific Seas influence France's strategic interests. China's interactions include four main dimensions: dual-use infrastructure development, political-diplomatic relations, connectivity initiatives, and essential military-motivated operations. In addition to establishing an offshore facility in Djibouti in 2017, China has dramatically increased its naval presence in the critical sub-region. Furthermore, China's forceful manoeuvres and exclusionary tactics in the Pacific come at the price of France's freedom of navigation and the rules-based system. As a result, France's opinion of China's aggressiveness continues to deteriorate. Nevertheless, according to a 2020 Pew Research study, France's negative attitudes toward China climbed to 70% in 2020, up from 42% almost two decades before. 

To address these issues, France became one of the first European governments to define an Indo-Pacific policy, intending to proactively strengthen Paris' diplomatic networks and strategic alliances. Nevertheless, despite the strategic shift, France's Indo-Pacific strategy lacks visibility. India's rising diplomatic and material capabilities as an Indo-Pacific state and traditional security provider in the Indian Ocean Area continue to strengthen its geopolitical position. As a result, strengthening strategic ties with India may create new diplomatic avenues for France to reinforce its position in the Indo-Pacific, such as prospective trilateral frameworks between India and France with nations such as the UAE, Australia, Indonesia, and Japan.

 

CHALLENGES

Despite their friendly connections, the bilateral cooperation between the two countries faces some challenges. France and India do not yet have a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Furthermore, there has been no development on the India-EU Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA). These lead to lack of free flow of trade and commerce between the nations. Despite a robust defence alliance, the two nations have differing defence and security cooperation agendas and approaches. The concentration of India on its neighbourhood and its "non-aligned" strategy can often collide with France's global goals. Despite being strong trading partners, India and France have a trade imbalance, with France exporting more to India than the other way around. This imbalance has been a cause of worry for India, and both nations are seeking solutions. France has accused India of failing to appropriately protect intellectual property rights, harming French enterprises working in India. And most importantly, as discussed above, both India and France are concerned about China's growing influence in the Indian Ocean region, which has the potential to disturb the regional balance of power and endanger regional peace and security.

 

WAY FORWARD

A strengthened India-France alliance will offer enormous value to a region blighted by a binary polarisation of power caused by escalating US-China competition, which comes at the price of regional countries seeking to safeguard their interests, security, and prosperity. Given their significant material capacity and shared interests and concerns in the region, both states will need to consistently evolve and operationalise the potentials of their strategic relationship in order to address the ongoing shifts in the Indo-security Pacific's and geopolitical architecture.

France might be an important IOR partner for India. The access to French military stations in the Indian Ocean region allows India more leeway. France, with an active presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, might be a dependable partner for India in the broader Indo-Pacific context. Long-range and maritime capabilities, surveillance, aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, drones, and cyber warfare have been deployed across the Indo-Pacific in pursuit of force projection, making this area unpredictable, hazardous, and prone to great power confrontation. In such a setting, strategic partnerships between India and France in the IOR can assist in ensuring peace, stability, and security in the larger IPR by cooperating and incorporating other regional players.

 

REFERENCES-

1.         Embassy of India, France & Principality of Monaco: Bilateral Brief. (n.d.), from https://www.eoiparis.gov.in/page/bilateral-brief/

2.       étrangères, M. de l’Europe et des A. (n.d.). The Indo-French Strategic Partnership in 4 questions. France Diplomacy - Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs., from https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/india/the-indo-french-strategic-partnership-in-4-questions/article/the-indo-french-strategic-partnership-in-4-questions

3.        GatewayHouse. (n.d.). India and France hold Strategic Dialogue. Gateway House, from https://www.gatewayhouse.in/events/india-and-france-hold-strategic-dialogue/

4.       Haldar, S. (n.d.). India and France in the Indian Ocean: The making of a new strategic partnership. ORF, from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-and-france-in-the-indian-ocean/

5.       “India is an all-weather, strategic partner for France.” (n.d.), from https://www.thedollarbusiness.com/magazine/india-is-an-allweather-strategic-partner-for-france/46198

6.       India-France Maritime Cooperation in the Indian Ocean: Enhancing the Strategic Partnership—Indian Council of World Affairs (Government of India). (n.d.), from https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=4782&lid=2496

7.       India-France Partnership Provides a Model for East-West Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. (n.d.), from https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/india-france-partnership-provides-a-model-for-east-west-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific/

8.       India-France Strategic Cooperation in the Indian Ocean: Towards a Broader Indo-Pacific Convergence. (n.d.), from https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/india-france-strategic-cooperation-in-the-indian-ocean-towards-a-broader-indo-pacific-convergence/

9.       ONLINE, O. (n.d.). India-France. ORF, from https://www.orfonline.org/tags/india-france/

10.    Racine, J.-L. (2016). India’s Foreign Policy toward France: A Strategic Partnership First. In S. Ganguly (Ed.), Engaging the World: Indian Foreign Policy since 1947 (p. 0). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199458325.003.0010


Pic Courtsey-Nuno Marques at unsplash.com

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)