Deciphering Australia’s Defense Strategic Review, 2023
Australia published its Defense Strategic Review on April 24, the day before ANZAC Day- a memorial day honouring those who have served in the war and died fighting for it.The Defense Strategic Review succeeds in its challenging goal of offering an all-encompassing analysis of Australia's defense force organization and standing. The Review's main theme is deterrence, and more specifically, a denial approach using deterrents at a distance. It describes the defense strategy's objective as "to secure peace and prosperity" and Australia's investment in more robust defence capabilities as a means of "helping deter coercion and lowering the risk of conflict."
The paper, according to Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Richard Marles, "marks the most significant change in Australia's defence dynamics in decades." In light of the growing strategic and defense connections between Australia and the United States, the DSR does certainly call for fresh initiatives to refocus the armed services on the considerable military challenge posed by China. The Review's conclusion that the Australian Defense Force (ADF) is now not fit for purpose and that a quicker plan for force creation, including acquisition, is required is encouraging. It highlights that the military system needs “to abandon its pursuit of the perfect solution or process and focus on delivering timely and relevant capability,” echoing contemporary discussions in European NATO member countries.
KEY CHANGES TO AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE STRATEGY
The Review suggests making the following significant adjustments to Australia's defense and military strategy. The Australian Defense Force's (ADF) 'Defense of Australia' has largely served as the foundation for Australian policy for many years. Through a national/whole-of-government effort to increase overall resilience across all domains (including sea, air, land, cyber, and space), this will be converted to a concentration on National Defense.Australia will adopt a deterrence-via-denial strategy that focuses on long-range attack and submarine capabilities as well as anti-access/area denial capabilities. Australia's security and strategy will continue to be centred on its relationship with the US, which will only grow in significance over the next decades. It seems, it is also crucial for Australia to invest in other Indo-Pacific alliances, such as the one with India. The ADF needed to have the ability to respond to a variety of threats, including low-level threats connected to continental defense, regional operations, and international assistance for the US, in order for the ADF to be changed from a Balanced Force to a Focused Force. The ADF force will instead be organized on important capabilities in the future, deprioritizing capabilities deemed non-essential (such as armoured capabilities) in order to accomplish this. In order to become an integrated force across all domains, the ADF will now transition from its current form as a joint force. In case of a joint force, all forces operate under joint command and the three services retain primary responsibility for raising, training, and supporting their forces. Joint enablers like integrated logistics and communications will be part of this. Australia will also create its own long-range missile production. In the future, the ADF should only be used as a last resort for domestic disaster assistance. Other Federal and State authorities will take up the responsibility for disaster aid. The Review points out that Australia's strategic stance no longer bases defence planning on a 10-year warning period. Instead, the Review defined three-time frames: 2023–25 for urgent concerns, 2026–2030 for general matters, and then 2031 and beyond.
CHANGES FOR THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY
The Australian Army will undergo some of the most glaring changes as a result of this Defense Strategic Review, giving up its long-standing balancing force structure in favour of being optimized for coastal movement operations. It is in some respects, similar to the marines. A large number of units will move to Australia's northern shore. The Australian Army's armoured capabilities will be significantly diminished. This will need a substantial cut in investment in new tanks and infantry combat vehicles—by more than two-thirds. No purchasing more self-propelled howitzers that are regarded as too weak in range or lethality. The funding will be redistributed to landing craft and small vessels for littoral manoeuvres. Through HIMARS systems, among other means, the Army will acquire a new long-range land-based marine strike mission. The Review supports previously stated plans to purchase a fleet of nuclear-powered and conventionally armed submarines from the US and UK for up to AUD 368 billion. Along with rotational deployments of American and British nuclear submarines, these will be mostly stationed at Fremantle on Australia's west coast. The Review also suggests building a new nuclear-powered submarine station on Australia's east coast. To safeguard and disperse assets, the Australian Air Force will be given urgent instructions to stregthen its network of airfields throughout northern Australia including the territory of Cocos Islands in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, at this time, Australia will not purchase B-21 bombers built in the US. However, the Review supports stepping up domestic manufacture of 'faithful wingman' drones that can be destroyed and fly alongside crewed aircraft.
THE GEOPOLITICAL IMPACT
The DSR fundamentally supports Australia's return to supporting a US-led regional balance of power while simultaneously bolstering Australia's autonomous capacity to defend itself and its regional interests. Australia is making significant investments based on the underlying premise that the US will not become isolationist and will keep funding regional security efforts in the Indo-Pacific. Due to Australia's support for the US-led balance of power, US troops may be dispersed forward such that they are not within striking distance of most Chinese systems but are still close enough to be useful in a matter of days. Additionally, it reinforces the protective barrier in the waters surrounding China. The northern areas of Australia still lack the necessary infrastructure, but it is being planned to be built over time.
China's wolf-warrior diplomacy, on the other hand, is seemed to have backfired. Australia had successfully resisted China's economic pressure, much as India did in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh when China used military force against the country. China is already in talks with Australia to gradually remove the tariffs it had put on Australian barley exports, and this process will be extended to other goods as well. Greater equilibrium in the rivalry between big powers is being achieved in maritime Southeast Asia. The nine Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites that are being built would provide US forces more redundancy and the capacity to be used in both Taiwan and South China Sea emergencies, signaling a clear tilt back towards the US on the part of the Philippines. The foreign and defence ministries confirmed their intention to raise the current agreement to one that is binding in international law, implying Indonesia's renewed willingness to work with Australia. China's ambitions to encroach on the seas of the Indian Ocean and the Southern Pacific are effectively resisted by a stronger Australia that will arise after the DSR recommendations are put into practice. One may anticipate an increase in trilateral security cooperation between Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, as well as between Japan, Indonesia, and Australia.
INDIA AND AUSTRALIA
According to the Strategic Review, Australia's immediate region, encompassing the north-eastern Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia into the Pacific, including our northern approaches, should be the primary area of military interest for Australia's National Defense. The Australian government has approved this suggestion. The suggestion to promptly upgrade the northern network of bases, ports, and barracks, probably including the Australian station at Cocos (Keeling) Island, has also been agreed in principle. India is primarily interested in monitoring the crossings via the Indonesian straits that connect the Pacific to the northern Indian Ocean in this region. Australia, Indonesia, and India all share a shared interest in keeping an eye on all marine activities in this area. The moment is right for these three comprehensive strategic partners to strengthen their collaboration in order to keep an eye on maritime activities, particularly the movements of China's surface and subsurface troops, fishing fleets, drones, and other devices used in the grey zone. Cooperation may only be restricted to domain awareness and joint marine drills for the time being, but it is enough to demonstrate a desire to stand together.
The strategic community in India will agree with many of the DSR's recommendations. India must also take a national and a national-level perspective on its increasingly complex strategic environment. The basic goal of the Indian armed forces must be to prevent conflict. Instead of relying on a general idea of a balanced force, which suggests either an incapacity or unwillingness to define what constitutes a strategic risk, they should be organized to cope with explicitly defined strategic risks. Much more must be done to increase India's capacity in the cyber and space sectors. India also has to improve its capacity to keep trained workers in the military and the defence sector. In order to achieve a balance between process and timely acquisition of necessary capacity, India's procurement system has to be drastically restructured. Finally, India has to prioritize the prompt delivery of a thorough national security policy that would be reevaluated on a regular basis.
CONCLUSION
The Defence Strategic Review promotes a new strategy for a new strategic environment that integrates defence into a larger national strategy that uses all sources of national power. Australia is obviously putting forth effort to prepare for the resumption of major power conflict in the Indo-Pacific. It will be fascinating to observe how the area responds to Australia's National Defence strategy for defending its strategic interests. Southeast Asia has been looking towards potential future areas of cooperation after coming to grips with the DSR's consequences and Australia's intention to improve the regional strategic balance. Australia must rely on its US alliance and highly established Strategic Partnerships with Japan, the UK, and other nations to play its role in a unified front to survive strategic competition since it lacks the resources and capabilities to alter the regional balance of power independently. The DSR offers a detailed roadmap for how Australia plans to accomplish its goals in collaboration with its reliable friends and partners.
References
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Pic Courtsey-Joey Csunyo at unsplash.com
(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)
