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Environment November 11, 2022 1909 Reads

China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) to Cope with Climate Change

S
By Silvanah Silva
Author • Centre for Security & Strategic Studies
China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025)  to Cope with Climate Change
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS

China's rapid economic growth has incurred huge environmental costs and pushed China into the limelight when it comes to climate change. China's most highlighted environmental problem is air pollution which contributes in accelerating climate change. China's climate change is expected to show how much committed the Chinese government is in viewing the issue of climate change and carrying out its mitigation efforts.

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Until now, China seems to continue to play a role in environmental issues and overcome domestic environmental problems, although on the other hand, its implementation is considered less serious if one looks at the many environmental problems in the country. Currently, China still ranks first as one of the largest carbon emitting countries in the world. The resulting carbon emissions are dominated by excessive use of coal. China's success in becoming the second largest economy in the world is mainly driven by the use of cheap coal, but it is China's biggest source of pollution. This then makes China feel it has significance in addressing this issue through its environmental policies.

China's policy on environmental issues has only become serious after its commitment to signing the Paris Agreement in 2016. China's focus on environmental regimes, including the Paris Agreement, has begun to show a significant and clear shift. This is also driven by a shift in China's policy direction and economic orientation which is increasingly towards renewable energy and the environment.

To comply with the agreement, China has also included its environmental policies in China's Five-Year Plan (FYP). The FYP is a comprehensive policy blueprint released by China every five years to guide overall economic and social development. Now China has entered the period of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan which has a target achievement starting from 2021 to 2025.

Over the years, China's FYPs have expanded beyond their original economic roadmap function. Official documents now cover all important issues, from national security to carbon emissions. Xi called the plan an "important way for our party to govern the country".

What are the Climate Targets in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan ?

Experts interviewed by Carbon Brief said that more detailed targets on climate action, such as total CO2 emission control targets (“CO2 emission limits”), are likely to be disclosed in the 14th FYP on greenhouse gas emission control and prevention.

In addition, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) has launched the formulation of an “action plan for peak emissions by 2030” which requires provincial governments to formulate a “provincial peak emission action plan” by April 2021. It is therefore important for China to set consumption limits. energy in the country.

Min Hu, executive director of the Innovative Green Development Program (IGDP), stated that an "energy consumption limit" was in place in previous energy plans for the energy revolution 2030, which set a total control target for total energy consumption of "no more than 6 billion tonnes of standard coal." in 2030.

Furthermore, coal consumption will need to decline slightly over the 14th FYP period, if the upcoming energy development plan includes suggestions such as from the China State Network Energy Research Center to continue to reduce the share of coal consumption in primary energy down from 57% in 2020 to around 50% by 2025. However, this still represents 100-200 gigawatts (GW) of new coal-fired power generation capacity.

Although the most confusing part of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan was not setting a carbon limit. However, some Chinese experts believe that the Chinese government will introduce a carbon limit policy in the next FYP. For now, the target is still difficult to enforce due to two problems.

First, a top-down approach will not address the realities faced by local officials. Second, China currently does not have sufficient detailed research on how to achieve “carbon neutrality” to support the government in generating overall carbon cover.

In the past, the central government has used mandatory top-down instructions to solve problems around energy consumption and energy intensity. But there have been substantial downsides and setbacks, such as cutting power supplies to meet targets. So in this case, the Chinese government has learned from this experience related to carbon cover regulation.

But so far, the efforts that have been made by the Chinese government in dealing with climate change contained in various frameworks in the 14th FYP are struggling to achieve the target in 2025. It can be said that China's journey in implementing environmental targets in the 14th FYP is seen as progressing. well.

The Ministry of Ecology and Environment said the average concentrations of all major pollutants including ground-level ozone, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and carbon monoxide had decreased in the 339 cities monitored last year.

By 2021, air pollution in 339 Chinese cities had increased, with the average concentration of a tiny, harmful particulate in the air known as PM2.5 dropping 9.1% from the previous year to 30 micrograms per cubic meter. China's official "interim" air quality standard is 35 micrograms, although the World Health Organization recommends a level of just five micrograms.

Due to the hard efforts made by China over the decades, it is hoped that China will continue to make concerted efforts to reduce coal consumption in order to combat climate change while encouraging industry to increase efficiency and use cleaner or more sustainable technologies.

In addition, China can also demonstrate its successful compliance with the Paris Agreement regime. With evidence that China has succeeded in reducing its carbon emissions in the years after ratification.

On the other hand, the inclusion of China in environmental issues as well as a large role as a Climate Leader will be very beneficial for China itself. As a super power country with ambitions to reach the position of Great Power, China needs a very good reputation to be able to outperform the United States in every aspect.

Pic Courtsey-Pankaj Jha

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)

Silvanah Silva
About Silvanah Silva →

Silvanah Silva is a student of International Relations at the Islamic University of Indonesia and a researcher at the Center for Indonesia-China Studies (CICS)

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