LIVE DISPATCH
• Arctic Geopolitics: From Frozen Frontier to Global Contest • From Physical Borders to Intelligent Borders: The Evolution of India's Border Security Architecture • Bridging the Fifth-Generation Gap: India's Su-57E Dilemma, AMCA, and Strategic Autonomy • AI Driven Cyberwarfare and National Security • Regulation as Power? The EU, US and China in the Geopolitics of Artificial Intelligence • The Continuing U.S. Regime-Change Toolkit: Color Revolutions, Political Influence, and Vietnam • The New Defence Architecture: Deconstructing the India-Belgium Geostrategic Win • Digital Pathways to Extremism: An Investigative Study of ISIS and Al-Qaeda's Use of Digital Platforms in India • Beyond Oil: Saudi Arabia's Civil Nuclear Deal with the United States • Strategic Autonomy in the Age of Weaponised Interdependence: India’s Geopolitical Dilemma • The Myth of Mankind's Inheritance: China, the US, and the Battle for the Clarion-Clipperton Zone • China’s Grey-Zone Strategy in the Indian Ocean: Implications for India’s Maritime Security • China's Surveillance Architecture in the Bay of Bengal and Its Strategic Implications • Europe’s Digital Dependence: Can the EU Achieve Strategic Autonomy? • A Reformer for an Institution in Decline: What does the Next Secretary-General Inherits? • Cuba’s Economic Crisis and Strategic Relevance: A Peripheral State in Renewed Great Power Competition • Silent Depths, Loud Signals: Nuclear Deterrence Infrastructure and the Crisis-Stability Costs of India’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Partnerships • Loss and Damage Finance: From COP28 Pledges to Policy Architecture • Securing India's Digital Frontiers: Cybersecurity Challenges and Strategic Responses in the Age of Hybrid Warfare • Beyond Consultation: BIMSTEC's Emerging Role in Regional Intelligence and Security Cooperation • Prism of Dragon’s Maritime Assertiveness: Regional Implications and India’s Strategic Options • Between the Desert and the Savannah: Conflict and the Political Economy of Instability in the Sahel • The Architecture of Cooperation: Navigating East Asia's Geopolitical Landscape • The Politics of Ali Khamenei's Funeral • From Civil Nuclear Power to Nuclear Hedging: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Emerging Nuclear Security Dilemma in the Middle East • Operation Sindoor and the Changing Dynamics of India–Pakistan Security • The Invisible Front: China-Pakistan Grey-Zone Operations • Generative AI, Labour Sovereignty, and the Geoeconomics of India's Service Economy • India's Agentic AI Strategy Needs Authority Budgets before Autonomy Scales • India's AI Diplomacy and the Future of Strategic Technologies • Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Governance Deficit: Challenges to International Humanitarian Law and Accountability • Great Power Rivalry and the Crisis of the United Nations • Ten Years After Brexit: Regret, Reform, or Reversal? • Sports, Strategy and Statecraft of Mega Sporting Events as Geoeconomic Instruments: Qatar 2022 to Saudi Arabia 2034 • Hardening the Quad: From Strategic Dialogue to Operational Cooperation • The Maghreb of States: Identity, Sovereignty, and the Limits of Non-Interference • Beyond the Battlefield: Understanding Unconventional Security Challenges in Contemporary Geopolitics • Trapped in Deterrence: Nuclear Stability and the Persistence of Conflict in South Asia • Extended Deterrence Under Strain: Credibility, Assurance, and the Stability-Instability Paradox in the Indo-Pacific • Maritime India: Security, Trade, and Great Power Competition • Arctic Geopolitics: From Frozen Frontier to Global Contest • From Physical Borders to Intelligent Borders: The Evolution of India's Border Security Architecture • Bridging the Fifth-Generation Gap: India's Su-57E Dilemma, AMCA, and Strategic Autonomy • AI Driven Cyberwarfare and National Security • Regulation as Power? The EU, US and China in the Geopolitics of Artificial Intelligence • The Continuing U.S. Regime-Change Toolkit: Color Revolutions, Political Influence, and Vietnam • The New Defence Architecture: Deconstructing the India-Belgium Geostrategic Win • Digital Pathways to Extremism: An Investigative Study of ISIS and Al-Qaeda's Use of Digital Platforms in India • Beyond Oil: Saudi Arabia's Civil Nuclear Deal with the United States • Strategic Autonomy in the Age of Weaponised Interdependence: India’s Geopolitical Dilemma • The Myth of Mankind's Inheritance: China, the US, and the Battle for the Clarion-Clipperton Zone • China’s Grey-Zone Strategy in the Indian Ocean: Implications for India’s Maritime Security • China's Surveillance Architecture in the Bay of Bengal and Its Strategic Implications • Europe’s Digital Dependence: Can the EU Achieve Strategic Autonomy? • A Reformer for an Institution in Decline: What does the Next Secretary-General Inherits? • Cuba’s Economic Crisis and Strategic Relevance: A Peripheral State in Renewed Great Power Competition • Silent Depths, Loud Signals: Nuclear Deterrence Infrastructure and the Crisis-Stability Costs of India’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Partnerships • Loss and Damage Finance: From COP28 Pledges to Policy Architecture • Securing India's Digital Frontiers: Cybersecurity Challenges and Strategic Responses in the Age of Hybrid Warfare • Beyond Consultation: BIMSTEC's Emerging Role in Regional Intelligence and Security Cooperation • Prism of Dragon’s Maritime Assertiveness: Regional Implications and India’s Strategic Options • Between the Desert and the Savannah: Conflict and the Political Economy of Instability in the Sahel • The Architecture of Cooperation: Navigating East Asia's Geopolitical Landscape • The Politics of Ali Khamenei's Funeral • From Civil Nuclear Power to Nuclear Hedging: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Emerging Nuclear Security Dilemma in the Middle East • Operation Sindoor and the Changing Dynamics of India–Pakistan Security • The Invisible Front: China-Pakistan Grey-Zone Operations • Generative AI, Labour Sovereignty, and the Geoeconomics of India's Service Economy • India's Agentic AI Strategy Needs Authority Budgets before Autonomy Scales • India's AI Diplomacy and the Future of Strategic Technologies • Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Governance Deficit: Challenges to International Humanitarian Law and Accountability • Great Power Rivalry and the Crisis of the United Nations • Ten Years After Brexit: Regret, Reform, or Reversal? • Sports, Strategy and Statecraft of Mega Sporting Events as Geoeconomic Instruments: Qatar 2022 to Saudi Arabia 2034 • Hardening the Quad: From Strategic Dialogue to Operational Cooperation • The Maghreb of States: Identity, Sovereignty, and the Limits of Non-Interference • Beyond the Battlefield: Understanding Unconventional Security Challenges in Contemporary Geopolitics • Trapped in Deterrence: Nuclear Stability and the Persistence of Conflict in South Asia • Extended Deterrence Under Strain: Credibility, Assurance, and the Stability-Instability Paradox in the Indo-Pacific • Maritime India: Security, Trade, and Great Power Competition
Politics February 20, 2020 2099 Reads

China Communist Party Schools - Role in Political Apparatus

M
By Mohit Vashisth and CeSCube Team
Author • Centre for Security & Strategic Studies
China Communist Party Schools - Role in Political Apparatus
Share Analysis:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS

In China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) schools have spread across in many provinces. There are a large number of military schools as well as party colleges in China. Xi Jinping, the President of China once said, “Around the world, the scholars acknowledge the role of the party schools”. In fact, many scholars attribute the structural changes and transformation in party objectives and internal discourse to the party schools. In the Chinese political system, the party schools are a well-organized machinery which indoctrinates the minds, and influences the behaviour of the party workers and as well as local administrative officials. Many state and central officials swear that attending courses in party schools is the only way to achieve promotions and gain the leadership role in administrative hierarchy. 

There are seven aspects of the party schools functioning. This includes official training in strategic aspects and party fundamentals. Secondly, integrate the party principles in training manuals and cadre course curriculum. Thirdly, training in philosophy and party concepts. Fourthly, training of officials associated with the working of party. Fifthly, periodic training programmes to meet party requirements. Sixthly, institutional building for official refresher courses and imbibement during it. Lastly, continuously update the party history and also secretarial training to lower rank officials.

The main role of institutional building and imbibing values and fundamentals among the party workers and officials is a regular work in progress. One important cardinal principle of the CCP schools is to regulate and define the work of the party schools which are of five major objectives. The party school training of officials, support base for provincial CCP, major rendezvous platform for all levels of officials, building theories and thoughts of party and act as important research organization.

Many different party schools have been established in China. The Yunnan CPC was inaugurated in 1950 while the governance institution was founded by central party committee in 1990. The party school also have an international division based in Beijing which circulates papers and other documents to the international audience. There are in total 25 different party schools out of which 15 are official training institutes while 10 are for teaching and research.

The primary work of the party schools are to research on philosophy, party history, party building, conducting coordination between research centres etc. Also party schools have been supported through a network of public administration institutes, ethnic and cultural research centres. In different party schools the strength of the faculty is 350-450 teachers and many party schools are spread over 20-45 hectares with student hostels. In provincial party schools the accommodation is provided to 600-1000 students at any point of time. Each provincial party school also runs 3-4 journals to disseminate information related to party and in any province the party schools train 2000-3000 officials annually. There is also a party app which is known as Chesi Suang Ao used within party schools.

The first party school in China originally started in 1921 and the purpose of the party schools was to complement party and training activities for the cadres. There is a central party school and China Governance Institution for Central Politburo members. There is official trainings school in Ziang He while there is a senior official training school in Dalian. There are more than 34 party schools spread across China while there are 50 sub-party schools. In total there are 300 party schools at central and provincial level while 2500 party schools for primary classes among children.

The indefinite presidency for President Xi Jinping was also discussed in party schools but given the fact that Chinese party general secretary and the chairman of the central military commission are the same person therefore centralization of power is witnessed. The problem that might get reflected in future would be the power struggle when Xi Jinping relinquishes the post either due to ill health or internal resistance. Since the time of Chairman Mao, Xi Jinping is the only general secretary of the CPC who has so much power vested in him. As like all political parties across the globe, CPC also suffers from obsequiousness and coterie formation along the power centre. In that context the role of the party schools gets important that the lobbying and the factionalism within party should be noted and reported. In fact party schools also at times vet official for promotion or elevation in the party hierarchy. The budget of the party schools have been heavily guarded issue and as per one estimate a party school receives a sum of 5-10 million dollars year for capital procurement, teacher salaries and promotional events.

(Dr. Pankaj K Jha is the Executive Director of the Centre for Security and Strategy Studies at www.cescube.com)

Mohit Vashisth and CeSCube Team
About Mohit Vashisth and CeSCube Team →

Senior Research Fellow at Centre for Security & Strategic Studies.

Related Strategic Analysis