Australia-India-Indonesia: The Need to Upgrade Track II Dialogue
India over the years has become involved with many countries in trilateral dialogues, but the trilateral involving Australia-India-Indonesia is the least talked about. With the world going through significant geopolitical changes, especially with the increased focus on the Indo Pacific, it is more likely that such trilaterals grouping are going to shape the politics and probably counter the rise of China in the region. With relations between China and Indonesia as well as China and Australia at an all time low shows the possibility of upgrading the trilateral. India is also facing assertive China at the borders.
Australia-India-Indonesia (AII) held a trilateral dialogue in November 2017 in Indonesia, and it involved former Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister Dino Patti Djalal, former Australian Foreign Affairs Secretary Peter Varghese, and former Indian Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon. Like many policies of India, the emergence of this trilateral is also a lot to do with China’s rise in the international politics. The increasing involvement of China in the Indo-Pacific has led to the need to have a counter to China. It has become vital not only because everyone fears and is weary of China, but also access and control of Indo-Pacific is important for the countries for trade and security.
Australia-India-Indonesia (AII), all have had their trysts with China and all of them view China in different regards. For Australia and Indonesia, China is a trading partner with multiple strategic interests which might not be in tandem with their interests. For India, China is an aggressive state which is threatening the rise of India, and creating impediments in international geopolitics due to complicated history that both the countries share. However, while Australia-India-Indonesia might have different reasons to counter Chinese advancements, they share certain issues - maritime security, trade and cyber security and importantly, democratic values and open economy. All of this has been threatened by China, and with the ongoing pandemic, a new dimension of fighting the virus also comes into the picture.
Another dimension which has led to the creation of the trilateral is the geopolitical location of the three countries in the Indo-Pacific and the vision they share for maritime Asia. It is no secret that all the countries in the Indo-Pacific are trying to promote their own visions for the same. The trilateral is not behind in this race. Indonesia under Jokowi has manifested the Indo-Pacific policy through the Global Maritime Fulcrum, Australia through its Pacific Set-up and India through its SAGAR initiative. All the three countries are not only non-claimants in the South China Sea Disputes but are also the stakeholders to the conflict. Both India and Australia are threatened by the territorial disputes in the South China Sea as they have critical resources, trade, energy and security interests in the region. This, coupled with the strong vision of maritime democracies of Asia taking leadership roles, where rule of law and freedom of navigation can be upheld - are pivotal for the emergence of AII. The emphasis on the maritime security and the development of the infrastructure for better connectivity, therefore makes sense.
Given the decreasing predominance of USA in the Indo-Pacific, it has created a need to fill the lacuna for a countering power. It has given countries like Indonesia along with India and Australia to innovate and cooperate and engage in order to create opportunities for themselves to promote their interests. Hence, the Indian Ocean trilateral has not only become the need of the hour but also a strategy to create a multilateral alliance.
The foundations of this trilateral were laid in 2013 via Trilateral Dialogue on Indian Ocean came up from an unexploited institution - the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). While the trilateral dialogue back then made some advancement in terms of establishing closer relationship between the two countries, it was not enough. The trilateral was again conceived formally in 2017 and has gradually made a steady progress. AII has held senior level meetings in Canberra in 2018 and New Delhi in 2019. While the meetings have been happening steadily at high levels, one cannot see the progress being translated into work by the trilateral. This has increased the concern among the scholars where they hope that the trilateral should meet at a dead end. Hence, the emphasis on the need of have track II dialogue. Having a second track dialogue would not only make the trilateral running but it would also lead to some join policy decisions being formulated and practically implemented.
The geopolitical order is now going under a dramatic shift. The second level and middle tier countries which were initially subdued, either by the big powers or for the lack of resources or ambitions, are now looking to not only play a greater role in regional and international politics but also to gain benefits and work according to their interests. This has resulted in the emergence of many coalitions across the world. AII has many opportunities which it can work upon. Indonesia has control over a substantial geographical jurisdiction of maritime chokepoints Malacca Strait, Sunda Strait and the Six Degree Channel. Malacca connects the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean and falls under the sovereignty of Indonesia along with Malaysia and Singapore. Sunda Strait is an alternate sea route to Malacca and it located close by Indonesia. Australia, being located near both, can benefit greatly from through the waterways. The Six Degree Channel has been hinted to become an important cooperation location for AII. Therefore, utmost priority to securing sea lines of communication and maintaining navigation freedom has always been a national interest for all the three countries and has also become a pivotal goal of the trilateral. It can only be strengthened when other countries, either with the same goal or similar interests join the trilateral. The Quad can be a part of this cooperation to strengthen its activities and increase the strategic value of the development projects which the three countries are either jointly or individually taking.
Bilateral cooperation has been central to the development of relations between the three countries and foster deeper cooperation. The bilateral visits of top-level officials have increased amongst the three and so have the military exercises. Jokowi visited Australia just before the pandemic struck where they pledged to work towards building the multilateral trading system to upholding the rule of law in the South China Sea and also working on strategic projects and alliances. While both Australia and Indonesia enjoy good relations with India, the increase of bilateral ties between Australia and Indonesia makes the trilaterals stronger.
Politically, AII finds a good space to gain political legitimacy in the current Covid-19 induced political climate given the apprehensions of all the countries towards China. Even in ambit of their individual foreign policies - India’s Act East policy, Australia’s Pacific Step-up, and Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum - these policies have a common value economic, security, and diplomatic outreach with states in the Indo-Pacific—particularly those in Southeast Asia—and can, therefore, find synergy with each other. Additionally a new point of development has emerged where the AII trilateral can collaborate with the upcoming ventures of constructing environment. There has been noise that the AII should collaborate with Japan’s Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure. Working closely with Japan would not only create a new bloc type coalition between the four middle powers, especially in a time with the USA's power waning. It could also benefit all the countries engaged, especially Indonesia, which would have a new supply chain and in return become a Japanese market.
It is interesting to observe that the rise of Chinese influence in international politics and reducing dominance of USA has led to the emergence of coalitions of middle powers. The rise of the AII trilateral has nothing but opportunities from which all the three countries can benefit. There is a need to invest in capacity building which can be strengthened by increased bilateral cooperation and taking advantages of the developmental propaganda which most of the Southeast Asian countries are investing in. AII also stands to emerge as a strong bloc for China if it follows the textbook rules of implementing their policies. But for these policies to take shape, Track II of the dialogue needs to be given attention and preference in this year before all is lost.
(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)
