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Politics December 23, 2022 1624 Reads

Attack on Imran Khan – New turbulence in Pakistan’s polity

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By Ridipt Singh
Author • Centre for Security & Strategic Studies
Attack on Imran Khan – New turbulence in Pakistan’s polity
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS

An attempted "assassination" left former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan injured "when a shooter started firing at his rally in the Wazirabad region of Punjab province. According to a spokeswoman for his party, Imran Khan was immediately rushed to a hospital. The shooting at the gathering injured at least five people, including Imran Khan with the lone attacker being immediately apprehended.

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The 70-year-old Imran Khan was leading a protest march against the government when the shooter identified as Basheer opened fire on him striking him in the right leg. Later on, Basheer admitted that the reason he attacked Imran Khan was that he was trying to mislead the public. According to police sources, other individuals identified as Waqas and Sajid Butt sold Basheer a gun and ammunition for PKR 20,000, adding that the gun was unlicensed and unregistered. The police sources further added that they were taken into custody in Wazirabad, Punjab province. Witnesses said that Basheer fired from close range at the truck carrying Imran Khan that was mounted with a container. Imran Khan was transported by road to the Shaukat Khanum Medical Center in Lahore, where he underwent surgery and recovered successfully [1]. A week after being injured in the attack, Imran Khan encouraged his followers via video link on Thursday to continue an anti-government march. He also denied police’s claim that a lone shooter had attempted to murder him. In the same eastern city of Wazirabad where the attack took place, Imran Khan upon recovery also spoke to a small group of workers who were resuming the march [2].

Political ramifications:

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, along with other members of the administration denounced the assault, as did the Pakistani military via its press office. States all around the world and the United States did likewise. However, Imran Khan accused three people of participating in the attack—Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah, and the Major General in charge of the intelligence agency's counterintelligence wing—in a message that was later removed from the internet by a PTI leader [3]. Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah responded to Imran Khan's assertions saying that all of these claims were untrue. Sanaullah later appeared on the Geo News show "Naya Pakistan" during his first press conference following the incident and blasted Imran for simply "speaking lies." He added that the PTI leader has not shown "a single proof" to support his assertions. Imran Khan has sought the resignation of the three people he believes were responsible for the attempt on his life [4].

Imran Khan asserted that he didn't care about his personal safety and that he wouldn't succumb to "these thieves' servitude." He further stated that Pakistan "wasn't designed for slavery," adding that he would leave for Islamabad as soon as he recovers and "come out onto the streets." In his comments attacking the military establishment’s involvement in the assassination attempt, former General Qamar Javed Bajwa, COAS, was urged to hold his organization's "black sheep" accountable by Imran Khan [5].

Undertones of the assassination attempt:

Given that a new Army Chief was likely to be named by November 29th, the month was already building up to be significant for Pakistan. The Prime Minister selecting one candidate from a list provided by the Pakistani Army to fulfill the position is regarded as the most powerful in all of Pakistan. This election process offers Pakistan's civilian leader a unique chance to attempt to influence the country's future course in a nation where the military is generally regarded as the prime institution politically. It is a risky choice as there have been numerous instances of Prime Ministers being overthrown by the very Chiefs they chose. Imran Khan's protest, which started in Lahore after he was allegedly denied a role in the decision through backchannel negotiations, was presumably prompted in part by this. Imran Khan was removed from office in a no-confidence vote in April, which he claims without providing any proof was the result of a plot orchestrated by the coalition in power and backed by the United States. He asserts that the then-opposition forced him from the office out of concern that he would choose Lt. Gen. Faiz Hameed as the new Army Chief, which was their favored choice. This came after a commotion in October 2021, when Imran Khan momentarily attempted to block military transfer preparations and keep Lt. Gen, Faiz Hameed in charge of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Imran Khan’s activities as former PM:

Democratically dismissed from office in April following a no-confidence vote, Imran Khan has been holding rallies nonstop to show off his broad appeal and maintain the momentum of his support. Khan unquestionably has a following and support from all echelons of Pakistani society, as well as within state organizations. it can also be said that Imran Khan has been able to mobilize the citizens of Pakistan to vocally oppose the military establishment and its interference in political affairs. As of now, Imran Khan and his allies are successfully waging information warfare against their political adversaries with his stories being able to successfully connect with the general public. Imran Khan has received a lot of support for his anti-corruption campaign and for calling out the opposition leaders as corrupt. Citizens who are frustrated with dynasty politics and consider corruption as a major contributing factor to Pakistan's escalating economic crisis seem to be responding favorably to calls for the resignation of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.

Future scenarios:

What happens in the future will be greatly influenced by Khan's intentions, including whether or not he chooses to remain to be part of the system seeking reelection or continue to protest against it, and how long the military establishment will put up with his blunt public criticism. Imran Khan has so far made an effort to combine threats and demands for protests with requests for the Army Chief's support but it appears that the military is losing patience, which could further increase political pressure on the PTI at a politically sensitive time.

This attack also reveals a crucial weakness for the PTI, which is the absence of a suitable replacement for Imran Khan. Imran Khan has been able to contest the elections based solely on his charismatic and populist appeal among the public given his legacy as a highly accomplished cricketer. Without him, the party would struggle to remain cohesive and would also fail to provide a leadership face to the Pakistani public as his replacement and keep public support after the initially anticipated outburst of public resentment towards the government. It can be said that Imran Khan’s name stands synonymous with the PTI. Further, Imran Khan's complete lack of dynastic ties, which distinguishes him from other Pakistani leaders and contributes to his appeal further restricts the PTI's ability to remain resilient through a clear succession plan.

In light of the numerous risks Pakistan is currently facing, navigating the current political crisis will be the most difficult one. Due to a potentially unmanageable load of financial debt, severe inflation, and growing energy and import costs, creditors have downgraded its rating to invaluable junk status while its international allies are reluctant to assist. As a result, Pakistan’s economy is in terrible condition. Among the political crisis, the government also faces a number of challenges as a third of Pakistan drowned in floods in September affecting 33 million people while certain parts of Pakistan still remain underwater. Additionally, the resurgent Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TP) which the government has attempted and failed to contain through negotiations also threatens to expand its influence further into Pakistan creating another internal security concern for Pakistan.

Conclusion:

It is important to note that Imran Khan doesn't appear to be giving up. His appeal has grown as a result of the general public connecting with his story. He has been able to portray himself as the victim of cunning information warfare against him by his political adversaries. It will be interesting to see how the army responds if Imran Khan doesn't back down and the conflict continues. The transition of the Army Chief from former General Qamar Javed Bajwa to General Asim Munir has exacerbated the crisis in Pakistan. In order to give Imran Khan an opportunity to replace Sharif as the next army chief if he were to win the next election, he had urged delaying the transition of the Army Chief until after that election. Additionally, a new army chief's appointment brings with it a new set of difficulties, particularly in light of the financial crisis and the global warming calamity. Imran Khan till now has kept up his criticism of the current administration by planning rallies and organizing the populace demanding new elections. The likelihood of new elections, however, appears to be extremely low.

Endnotes:

1. “Attack on Imran Khan: Pakistan police arrest two more suspects”, The Hindu, 04 November 2022 https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/attack-on-imran-khan-pakistan-police-arrest-two-more-suspects/article66096065.ece

2. Asif Shahzad, “Pakistan's Imran Khan relaunches political march after surviving gun attack”, Reuters, November 10 https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-imran-khan-relaunches-political-march-after-surviving-gun-attack-2022-11-10/

3. Elizabeth Threlkeld, “What the Imran Khan Attack Means for Pakistan”, South Asia, Stimson Center, 04 November 2022 https://www.stimson.org/2022/what-the-imran-khan-attack-means-for-pakistan/

4. “Attack on Imran Khan LIVE Updates: PTI leaders to hold nationwide protest today”, Live Mint, 04 November 2022 https://www.livemint.com/news/former-pakistan-pm-imran-khan-assassination-attempt-gunman-firing-attack-rally-wazirabad-live-updates-11667478971925.html

5. “Attack on Imran Khan LIVE Updates: PTI leaders to hold nationwide protest today”, Live Mint, 04 November 2022 https://www.livemint.com/news/former-pakistan-pm-imran-khan-assassination-attempt-gunman-firing-attack-rally-wazirabad-live-updates-11667478971925.html

Pic Courtsey-Ali Muhammad at unsplash.com

(the views expressed are those of teh author and do not

R
About Ridipt Singh →

Ridipt Singh is currently pursuing MA. International Studies from Symbiosis School of International Studies, Symbiosis International University, Pune, Maharashtra (2021-23)

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