Analysis of Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan: A Case Study of TTP

TTP is a coalition of various militant groups that emerged in 2007 to unite against the Pakistani military. Its goals include removing the influence of the Pakistani government from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, implementing a strict interpretation of Sharia law throughout the country, and removing coalition forces from Afghanistan. The group's leaders have also expressed their desire to establish an Islamic caliphate in Pakistan, which would necessitate the overthrow of the Pakistani government.[1] The TTP is a faction of the Pakistani Taliban, encompassing the majority of its groups, although not all. About 50% of Pakistani Taliban factions are part of the TTP, while the rest are either weakly linked to it or have no connection at all. The TTP has strong ties with Al Qaeda and is also affiliated with the Afghan Taliban.[2]

Origin:

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is a militant group that emerged as a result of intra-jihadi politics in Pakistan after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. In 2002, the Pakistan Army's military operations in North and South Waziristan were responsible for triggering widespread militancy in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Many Pakistani jihadists who had previously fought for the government in Afghanistan and in Indian Kashmir turned against the Pakistani state for its support of the US's "global war on terror," among other grievances. These operations caused coordination among various armed groups based on tribes, territories, and commanders.[3]

The Taliban took advantage of the power vacuum created by the Pakistani military's actions against al-Qaeda affiliates, which involved deploying 70,000 to 80,000 soldiers to the region. As a result, the Pakistani Taliban, which was a decentralized network of various militant groups in FATA, emerged and began to establish their own leadership. They targeted local tribal elders, enforced their own interpretation of Islamic governance, and clashed with the existing local political structures.[4] The Pakistani government launched a commando operation against the Red Mosque in Islamabad on July 10, 2007, resulting in the death of over 100 militants. This action served as a catalyst for the Pakistani Taliban to initiate a war against the Pakistani state. As a result, the Pakistani Taliban started to conduct suicide bombings and ambushes against the country's security forces.[5] [6] The TTP was established in December 2007 as a loosely connected coalition, with Baitullah Mehsud, a militant leader from South Waziristan, as its leader. A consultative committee, or shura, consisting of forty prominent local Taliban leaders was formed to represent the tribal regions of FATA and districts of KP, many of whom had connections to criminal networks in the area. [7] The shura was composed not only of representatives from the seven tribal agencies of FATA, but also includes members from the settled districts of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) such as Swat, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan, Buner, and Malakand.[8]

Non-tribal and non-Pashtun fighters from non-tribal areas of Pakistan started joining TTP cadres and getting trained at the training camps organised by TTP and Al-Qaeda. A number of these militants were previously pro-Pakistan government and part of Kashmir-based jihadi groups. Jihadist cadres of these non-Pashtun militants later came to be known as ‘Punjabi Taliban’ and played a major role in conducting many sophisticated attacks and wreaking havoc in Islamabad, Punjab and Sindh.[9]

Although the TTP was initially financially supported by al-Qaeda for its role in keeping Pakistani security forces occupied, the group eventually adopted the enforcement of Sharia as its main objective, giving it legitimacy and permanence. The TTP has always maintained an anti-American stance and used this rhetoric to gain support and cash in on anti-American sentiment in the region.[10]

Within five years of its formation, the TTP became the largest militant organization in Pakistan, with strongholds in many districts and tribal regions in the North-West Frontier Province. Its primary strongholds were in South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Orakzai, Kurram, Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur, and Darra Adam Khel tribal regions, as well as in the settled districts of Swat, Upper Dir, Lower Dir, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank, Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Mardan, Charsadda, and Kohat. [11]

While Pashtuns make up the majority of the TTP's members, the group also has a robust presence of Arab, Uzbek, Afghan, Chechen, and Punjabi militants. Members of the TTP are believed to be from all seven of FATA's tribal agencies and districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including Swat, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan, Buner, and Malakand.[12]

Ideology:

The TTP is a Sunni militant group with a Deobandi-Wahabi sectarian orientation and Islamist, jihadist, and Salafi ideologies. They have been known to adopt a violent and extremist interpretation of Islam and have carried out numerous attacks on civilians, government officials, and security forces in Pakistan.[13] The group is known to be anti-Shia, and its ideology is rooted in an extremist interpretation of Islam that seeks to establish a pure Islamic state in Pakistan through violent means. [14] [15] The TTP also espouses a Wahhabi ideology, which is an ultra-conservative branch of Sunni Islam that originated in Saudi Arabia. This ideology is evident in the group's strict interpretation of Islamic law and their opposition to Sufi practices, which they view as un-Islamic.[16] The TTP, or Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, is known for its strict opposition to female education. This was evident in the 2012 assassination attempt on girls' rights activist Malala Yousafzai, who was shot by the group while she was returning from school in Pakistan's Swat Valley.[17]

The TTP views female education as un-Islamic and has implemented a number of measures to prevent girls from attending school, including destroying school buildings and threatening female students and teachers. The group's opposition to female education is part of its broader agenda of imposing a rigid interpretation of Islamic law, which includes strict gender roles and restrictions on women's rights and freedoms.[18]

Strategy:

According to analysts, the TTP's ideology is closely linked to the US and NATO military operations in Afghanistan. They believe that the primary reason for the formation of TTP was to fight against Pakistan's cooperation with the US in the War on Terror, as well as the presence of American troops in Afghanistan. When the TTP was initially established in December 2007, their core objectives were to enforce sharia law, unite against coalition forces in Afghanistan, and carry out defensive jihad against the Pakistani Army.[19]

Tactics/Modus Operandi:

The TTP is a terrorist organization that frequently uses bombings, particularly suicide bombings, as their main form of attack. They tend to target Pakistani security forces and other symbols of the Pakistani government that they consider to be against Islam.[20] The group spreads its message through illegal radio channels, CDs, DVDs, newspapers, and websites, and heavily focuses on recruiting young people, including children. They glamorize the concept of child martyrdom and use this propaganda to indoctrinate teenage boys to become suicide bombers. New recruits are sent to training facilities in the FATA to learn guerilla warfare and bomb-making. Suicide bombers receive additional training in South Waziristan to prepare them for their missions.[21]

Aside from suicide bombings, the TTP also conducts hit-and-run attacks against low-level targets, such as remote check-posts, supply lines, and mobile patrols of Pakistani security forces. These attacks are intended to demoralize the soldiers and cause destruction with minimal resources. The TTP relies on these attacks to maintain a constant threat to their enemy, which requires the security forces to maintain a high level of vigilance.[22]

Leadership:

Baitullah Mehsud was known for his militant activities in the tribal areas of Pakistan. He formed a coalition of militant groups in 2007, which later became the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and he became its first leader.[23] Under his leadership, TTP was responsible for carrying out several terrorist attacks in Pakistan, including suicide bombings, assassinations, and other acts of violence against Pakistani military and civilian targets. He was also responsible for numerous deadly attacks in Pakistan, including the 2007 assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.[24] [25] [26] Under Baitullah Mehsud's leadership, the TTP was involved in several high-profile attacks, including the 2008 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, which killed more than 50 people.[27] In October 2009, TTP militants attacked the headquarters of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi, killing several people and causing significant damage.[28] The TTP also claimed responsibility for a series of bombings in Lahore in March 2009 that killed more than 50 people and injured over 100.[29] The group also carried out attacks on security forces and government targets in the tribal areas of Pakistan, which resulted in the displacement of thousands of civilians. Additionally, the TTP claimed responsibility for the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore in March 2009, which resulted in the deaths of atleast eight Pakistanis and injuries to several others.[30] The U.S. charged Baitullah Mehsud with involvement in the 2009 suicide bombing attack on a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency base in Afghanistan. Baitullah Mehsud was known for his close ties with al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.[31] He was also known for his strict interpretation of Islam and opposition to Western influence in Pakistan. Baitullah Mehsud's ideology was rooted in extremist interpretations of Islam and a militant form of Pashtun nationalism. In August 2009, he was killed in a U.S. drone strike.[32]

Hakimullah Mehsud was the second emir of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), taking over after the death of his predecessor Baitullah Mehsud. Under the leadership of Hakimullah Mehsud, the TTP continued its campaign of violence against the Pakistani state, carrying out numerous attacks on military and civilian targets.[33] In 2010, the TTP was responsible for bombings at a Sufi shrine in Lahore, which killed more than 40 people.[34] In 2011, they carried out the bombing of a paramilitary training center in northwestern Pakistan, killing at least 80 people.[35] The TTP claimed responsibility for the 2013 bombing at a church in Peshawar, which killed more than 80 people.[36] One of the deadliest attacks during his time as leader was the May 2011 attack on a naval base in Karachi, resulting in the deaths of at least 10 military personnel and damage to several aircraft and other equipment.[37] Additionally, the TTP was involved in the 2010 Times Square car bombing attempt.[38] [39]

He also had ties to Al Qaeda and other militant groups, and was believed to have received support from foreign sources.[40] Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in a U.S. drone strike in November 2013, and was succeeded as TTP emir by Mullah Fazlullah.[41]

Mullah Fazlullah was a prominent militant leader who rose to prominence as the emir of the TTP following the death of Hakimullah Mehsud in a US drone strike in 2013.[42] He was known for his radical and uncompromising views, particularly on the issue of female education, and was responsible for numerous deadly attacks on Pakistani security forces and civilians during his time as TTP leader.[43] Some of the most notable attacks carried out under his leadership included the 2014 Peshawar school massacre, which resulted in the deaths of more than 140 people,[44] and the 2012 assassination attempt on Malala Yousafzai.[45] Despite his infamy, Fazlullah was killed in a US drone strike in Afghanistan in June 2018, which dealt a significant blow to the TTP's leadership and operational capabilities.[46]

Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud is the current emir of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), taking over the leadership position in 2018 after the death of his predecessor, Mullah Fazlullah. Mehsud, who hails from the South Waziristan region of Pakistan, is known for his militant activities and involvement in the TTP since its inception. He is considered to be a hardliner within the TTP, advocating for continued attacks against the Pakistani government and military.

During his leadership, the TTP has continued its campaign of violence, targeting both military and civilian targets in Pakistan. Some of the most notable attacks under his leadership include the 2019 suicide bombing at a marketplace in the city of Quetta, which killed at least 20 people, and the 2020 attack on the Pakistan Stock Exchange building in Karachi, which resulted in the deaths of four security guards and a police officer.

Cadres:

The TTP is not a homogeneous organization but rather an amalgamation of more than 40 Islamist and Pashtun tribal factions from Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). It is also a diverse group, comprising of Arab, Uzbek, Afghan, Chechen, and Punjabi militants in addition to the majority Pashtun members. The Mehsud Group and the Punjabi Taliban are the most dominant factions in the TTP. The former is primarily focused on waging jihad against the Pakistani government and forms the core of the TTP. The latter consists of various sectarian groups with a focus on the Kashmiri jihad. Additionally, there are several smaller factions within the TTP that have distinct objectives from the overarching goals of the group. [47]

Between 2014 and 2018, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) faced a decline due to a combination of factors such as Pakistani military operation Zarb-e-Azb (2014), US drone attacks, and internal conflicts. However, the group has recently witnessed a significant resurgence since the US government and Afghan Taliban signed a peace agreement in February 2020.[48] In 2020, TTP oversaw the reunification of several splinter groups in Afghanistan, resulting in an increase in the group's strength and a surge in attacks in the region. This was further bolstered by the alliance of five entities with TTP in July and August of that year, including the Shehryar Mehsud group, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, Hizb-ul-Ahrar, the Amjad Farooqi group, and the Usman Saifullah group (formerly known as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi). The unification of various Pakistani militant groups into TTP that started in 2020 also continued in 2022, with as many as seven militant factions merging with TTP that year, including the Commander Zarrar group from Bannu, Ezzatullah Kheyali group from North Waziristan, Tipu Gul Marwat's faction from Lakki Marwat, and Aslam Baloch group from Noshki, Balochistan. Similarly, associates of militant commanders Jameel Madakhel, Saeedullah, and Ahmed joined TTP from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's North Waziristan, Lakki Marwat, and Kurram tribal districts, respectively.[49] The negotiations for the merger of the groups were reportedly facilitated by officials from either al-Qaeda or the Haqqani network. Among the merging groups, two were affiliated with al-Qaeda and were based in Pakistan, while the other two were powerful local factions from North Waziristan. The TTP has announced that a new militant group from Balochistan, led by separatist leader Mazar Baloch from the Makran district of southern Balochistan, has joined their ranks. The newly merged group is referred to as "the most influential" among the Baloch liberation and separatist groups.[50] According to a UN Security Council report, TTP announced its decision to approve the application of Majeed Brigade to join TTP on July 14, 2022. Another UN Security Council Report also suggest developments in the relationship between The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement/Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIM/TIP) and TTP, with the former providing TTP with intelligence and explosive devices and the latter pledging support to ETIM/TIP as it infiltrated Pakistan.^[51]

Finances:

There are various sources that enable Tehrik-e-Taliban to sustain, which include illegal activities such as kidnapping for ransom and robbery, as well as taxes, penalties, and extortion money. The group also receives funding from other terrorist organizations and exploits natural resources and archaeological sites.[52] As per certain high-ranking intelligence and law enforcement authorities, the TTP received their funding from various sources, including 20% from criminal activities like kidnappings and bank robberies, 50% from donations and extortion, and the remaining 30% from drug-related activities.[53]

The TTP also generates revenue from the trade of heroin, which is exported to foreign countries through Karachi. In August 2009, terrorists affiliated with Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and TTP were arrested in Karachi and confessed to exporting heroin to various countries, including the US, Europe, Malaysia, Singapore, China, and the United Arab Emirates. They revealed that the profits from the sale of heroin were being channeled to Taliban commanders in Balochistan and the families of arrested militants.[54]

Moreover, the TTP receives donations from both domestic and international sympathizers.[55] In September 2009, Pakistan's Criminal Investigation Department found evidence that Al Qaeda had provided $15 million to the TTP. The money was reportedly transferred to the TTP via the al-Hara-main Foundation, a charity organization based in Saudi Arabia.[56]

The TTP also collects taxes and extortion money from businesses and individuals in areas under its control. This includes imposing a "jizya" tax on non-Muslims and levying a "zakat" tax on local businessmen.[57] The TTP has resumed its extortion racket along the Pakistani side of the Durand Line, particularly in the Swat area, after being emboldened by the Afghan Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan.[58] Mardan chapter of TTP had demanded Rs 8 million in extortion from Senior Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Minister Atif Khan. [59] Since June 2012, the TTP factions in Karachi have become increasingly violent and bold, extorting money from truckers and workers in exchange for protection from kidnapping or harm to their families. [60] The TTP has been engaging in phone-based extortion of Pakistani traders and parliamentarians, using telephone numbers that bear Afghanistan's international dialing code. According to a tweet by former TTP spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan, the group received a payment of $36,350 (7.5 million rupees) in protection money from the former governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.[61]

Another source of funding for the TTP is funds from other terrorist organizations. The group has been known to have close ties with al-Qaeda and has received financial support from the organization in the past.[62] The TTP also receives financial support and gifts from smaller groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Harakat-ul-Mujahideen in exchange for training and shelter. According to reports, the Afghan Taliban has also provided funding to both the TTP and the Pakistani Taliban in the past. In March 2006, Mullah Omar allegedly gave $70,000 to Baitullah Mehsud, leader of the Pakistani Taliban, in exchange for their cooperation in targeting diplomats from countries involved in the publication of cartoons deemed offensive to the Prophet Mohammad. However, it is uncertain if the Afghan Taliban has continued to provide support to the TTP since its formation.^[63]

Finally, the exploitation of natural resources and archaeological sites has also been a source of income for the TTP. In areas under its control, the group has been known to extract and sell precious stones, minerals, and timber. The group has also been involved in the illegal excavation and smuggling of antiquities. [64] The TTP has generated more than $100 million by selling timber from the Swat Valley.[65] Additionally, they have gained financial benefits by engaging in the illegal drug trade of heroin, taking control of mines and quarries in Pakistan, and stealing valuable artifacts from archaeological sites located in Swat. [66]

Social Media Presence:

Umar Media is the media wing of the TTP, responsible for disseminating the group's message through various forms of media such as videos, audio recordings, and written statements. The group uses Umar Media to release propaganda material and claim responsibility for attacks, as well as to recruit new members and intimidate opponents. Umar Media has been known to release videos of suicide bombers and conduct interviews with TTP leaders. The group has also used Umar Media to promote their ideology and spread their message across Pakistan and beyond.[67]

The TTP has used social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube to disseminate propaganda, recruit new members, and claim responsibility for attacks. The group's social media presence has allowed them to reach a wider audience and communicate their message more effectively. However, their accounts have been repeatedly suspended or blocked by social media companies for violating their terms of service, particularly for promoting violence and terrorism. Despite this, the TTP has continued to find ways to use social media to spread their message, including creating new accounts and using encrypted messaging apps such as Telegram.[68]

Evolution:

Initially, the TTP's structure was highly decentralized, allowing local commanders to make decisions based on local politics and tribal concerns. This led to internal dissent, with some local militants, such as Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Mullah Nazir, forming their own groups that were distinct from the TTP and opposed its aggressive stance towards the Pakistani state.[69] In 2008, Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur formed the Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban (Local Taliban Movement), which was separate from the TTP led by Baitullah Mehsud. The group opposed attacks on the Pakistani state and had disagreements with the TTP over the issue of protecting foreign fighters.[70] These groups had ties to al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and the Haqqani Network[71], and in late 2008 and early 2009, their leaders, along with TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud, met with Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar.[72] To help the Afghan Taliban fend off the upcoming escalation of U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, the leaders of Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban urged them to put aside their differences and scale back their operations in Pakistan. Later, to focus on foreign forces in Afghanistan, Baitullah, Nazir, and Bahadur founded the Council of Unified Mujahideen (Shura Ittihad al-Mujahedeen), which subsequently collapsed owing to internal strife.[73] Following that, Bahadur and Nazir resumed their operations as separate factions within the Pakistani Taliban. Several Taliban factions in Pakistan came together and formed alliances with militants from Punjab and other countries as a result of the ongoing military operations in the tribal areas.[74]

After the death of Baitullah Mehsud in a missile strike in 2009, Hakimullah Mehsud became the new leader of the TTP. Under his leadership, the TTP intensified its cooperation with al-Qaeda and other foreign fighters.[75] This increased cooperation led to the TTP becoming more involved in sectarian attacks against Shiites, with greater collaboration with groups such as Sipahe Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.[76] [77] Through its links with other militant groups, the TTP received both material and reputational benefits. Al-Qaeda provided financing and technical assistance in exchange for safe havens and training camps in FATA.[78] Punjabi militants provided access to their infrastructure, which enabled the TTP to carry out attacks in urban areas. In reaction to increased American targeting of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban officials in 2008 and 2009, the TTP, which had previously concentrated on strikes within Pakistan, broadened the scope of its activities. In retaliation for Baitullah Mehsud's passing, the organisation carried out a suicide bomber strike on a US base in Afghanistan in late December 2009.[79] Following US drone attacks on TTP officials, the TTP declared in a video published in April 2010 that it would begin attacking American cities. In May 2010, a bombing attempt on Times Square occurred as a result of this threat.[80]

In 2013, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) underwent a change in leadership when Mullah Fazlullah from the Swat District replaced the Mehsud clan as the leader of the group. The Mehsud tribe constituted a majority of the population in South Waziristan, and the tribal loyalties played a crucial role in the region. The Mehsud leadership had earlier contributed to cementing loyalty to the TTP in South Waziristan.[81] The TTP member groups engaged in a protracted succession battle as a result of the leadership shift, which split the group and altered its operational capabilities.[82] Fazlullah was unable to keep the original militant alliance, which joined in 2007, together since he did not come from the prominent Mehsud tribe. As a result, the TTP suffered severe division in 2014, with groups clashing over crucial strategic choices like negotiations with the Pakistani government and the use of civilian targets..[83] One of the most prominent factions that broke away was the Mehsud division. Fazlullah's leadership not only weakened the TTP's cohesion but also triggered more extreme attacks, including the Army Public School attack in 2014 and the Bacha Khan University attack in 2016.[84]

As a response to the TTP's increasing number of strikes on military and civilian targets, the Pakistani government began Operation Zarb-e-Azb in June 2014, focusing on militant organisations in North Waziristan.[85] Many TTP militants, including important leaders, were forced to leave the FATA as a result of this operation, U.S. drone strikes, and internal financial issues. In the FATA, Pakistani security forces destroyed around 70% of the TTP's infrastructure and cleaned away the majority of its hubs, which led to a decrease in suicide bombings there by 2015.[86] Due to a lack of coordination between the Pakistani and Afghan governments, the TTP was still able to carry out significant strikes in Pakistan, allowing terrorists to locate safe havens in Afghanistan.[87] To eliminate the remaining threat of terrorism from Pakistan, the Pakistani Army started Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad in February 2017. Attacks against TTP leaders and linked organisations have impeded their capacity to organise and carry out strikes.[88] In addition, some elements have left the TTP and sworn allegiance to IS as a result of the growth of the Islamic State. The government of Pakistan's struggle against the TTP's radical ideology also caused a rise in leadership defections. Fazlullah passed away in Kunar, Afghanistan, in 2018, and was succeeded by Mufti Noor Wali, a Mehsud tribesman who played a significant role in the TTP's operations in Karachi.[89]

Current Situation:

The data shows a significant increase in the number of attacks conducted by the TTP in Pakistan between 2020 and 2023 compared to the previous four years. The TTP carried out 504 attacks during this period, resulting in 1058 casualties. ^[90] In contrast, between 2016 and 2019, the TTP claimed responsibility for 185 attacks.^[91] This represents a clear trend of increased activity by the TTP in recent years. The data suggests that despite sustained efforts by the Pakistani government to eliminate the threat of terrorism, the TTP remains a potent force capable of conducting deadly attacks. The Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), based in Islamabad, has reported a 42% surge in terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2021 compared to the previous year. The report highlighted that the TTP was accountable for 87 assaults, which resulted in the deaths of 158 individuals, representing an 84% rise in attacks compared to 2020.[92]

Following the TTP's heavy losses during Operation Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fassad, their relocation to Afghanistan, and the death of Fazlullah, many believed that the TTP was near complete dissolution. However, two significant developments have laid the foundation for its resurgence. Firstly, the TTP leadership returned to the Mehsud tribe, and secondly, a a 13-page, Urdu-language document released by TTP in September 2018, titled “The Code of Conduct: For the Mujahideen of Tehrik-i-Taliban.” was released.[93] This code aimed to unite differing factions under the group's central leadership and to instill more structure and discipline by setting clear lines of authority and responsibilities, introducing a process for identifying legitimate targets, and providing guidelines for martyrdom operations. Under Noor Wali's leadership, the TTP renewed its attacks against state politicians in addition to targeting security personnel. The guidelines prohibited attacks on civilians and called for members to concentrate on Pakistani security forces. The TTP fighters seemed to be following these guidelines as around 90% of their attacks in 2020 targeted Pakistani security forces with civilian casualties being a small percentage.^[94] The TTP's deliberate avoidance of targeting civilians appears to be a conscious effort on their part to improve their image, considering that past indiscriminate violence led to the organization's splintering post-2014 and a public outcry in Pakistan.

In 2019 and 2020, the TTP re-established ties with several factions previously affiliated with other organizations, indicating potential for a resurgence. On August 17, 2020, two militant groups that broke away from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) and Hizb-ul-Ahrar (HuA), announced their reunion with the TTP.[95] The JuA was founded in Pakistan's Mohmand tribal district in 2014 by Abdul Wali, also known as Omar Khalid Khorasani, after developing differences with Fazlullah. In 2017, the JuA also split when its commander, Mukarram Khan, formed his own group, HuA. The Punjabi Taliban, led by Asmatullah Muawiya, have also reunited with the TTP. This expansion coincided with an increase in attacks directed towards Pakistani security personnel since the group's leadership change in 2018. In response to the rise in fatal attacks and the TTP's growing influence, the Pakistani government engaged in negotiations for a ceasefire in November 2021. The negotiations were facilitated by the Afghan Taliban and resulted in a month-long ceasefire, but the TTP accused the government of violating their agreement to release TTP prisoners, leading to the ceasefire's end. Since then, the TTP has claimed responsibility for multiple attacks in northwest Pakistan. From the recent attacks, it seems that the TTP, as an organisation, is now more cohesive, especially, after the recent mergers.

In 2021, the TTP conducted a bomb blast on the Serena Hotel in Quetta, Balochistan using a SVBIED (Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device).[96] The attack on the Serena Hotel in Quetta by the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) demonstrates the group's growing operational strength and indicates its ability to assemble suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) and target heavily guarded landmarks. This attack was also significant because it took place in Balochistan, a province outside of the TTP's traditional stronghold that has gained greater strategic importance due to its vast resources. The attack was the TTP's first in a major urban center since its reunification, and it shows that the group is expanding its reach and capabilities.[97] The attack resulted in the deaths of five people and injured a dozen others, highlighting the ongoing security challenges faced by Pakistan. There are unconfirmed reports suggesting that the target of the attack on the Serena Hotel in Quetta may have been the Chinese ambassador, who was reportedly staying at the hotel during the time of the incident.[98] According to a local researcher from the South Waziristan tribal area who was allowed to visit TTP training camps, the militant group has formed an alliance with Baluch separatist groups. The researcher, who wishes to remain anonymous due to potential repercussions, reveals that the TTP offers military training to Baloch fighters, while the Baluch separatists provide logistical support to the TTP in Balochistan. This partnership has led to an increase in attacks against Pakistani security forces in Balochistan over the past few months.[99]

Assessments tell that TTP's fighting strength ranged between 2,500 and 6,000, with the group responsible for over 100 cross-border attacks between July and October 2020.[100] The group also constitutes the largest component of foreign terrorist fighters in Afghanistan, with assessments ranging between 3,000 and 4,000. By 2022, TTP had between 7,000 to 10,000 fighters in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area, according to Pakistan's Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah.[101]

Conclusion:

The findings of this research paper indicate that the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remains a significant threat to Pakistan's stability and security. The TTP has demonstrated an ability to conduct sophisticated terror attacks and has expanded its geographical reach, as evidenced by recent mergers with other terrorist groups. Moreover, the TTP's ideological motivations, funding sources, recruitment tactics, and operational tactics make it a highly resilient organization that can adapt to changing circumstances.

Looking ahead, it is highly likely that the TTP will continue to carry out attacks in Pakistan, especially in the wake of the US troop withdrawal from neighboring Afghanistan. The TTP has historically used the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region as a safe haven and training ground, and the withdrawal of US forces could create a permissive environment for the group to expand its activities. Additionally, the TTP may seek to capitalize on the ongoing political and security challenges facing Pakistan, including sectarian tensions, regional power dynamics, and economic pressures.

To counter the TTP's threat, policymakers and practitioners must adopt a multifaceted approach that includes both security and non-security measures. On the security front, the government should enhance its intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities, strengthen border security, and increase the capacity of law enforcement agencies to respond to terrorist incidents. Non-security measures could include initiatives to promote social cohesion, address economic inequality and corruption, and counter the TTP's propaganda and recruitment efforts.

Overall, this research paper underscores the need for sustained and coordinated efforts to disrupt the TTP's activities and enhance Pakistan's resilience to terrorism. The insights and recommendations provided in this paper could serve as a useful resource for policymakers, practitioners, and researchers interested in countering terrorism in Pakistan and beyond.

References

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[8] Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i- Taliban Pakistan,” CTC Sentinal 1, no. 2 (January 2008), https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol1Iss2-Art1.pdf.

[9] Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, “The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban,” CTC Sentinal 14, no. 04 (May 2021): 28–38. https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/CTC-SENTINEL-042021.pdf

[10] Nizam Elahi, Terrorism in Pakistan: The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Challenge to Security (London New York: I.B. Tauris, 2019).

[11] Rahimullah Yusufzai, “A Who’s Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province: Part Two – FATA Excluding North and South Waziristan,” Jamestown, accessed April 3, 2023, https://jamestown.org/program/a-whos-who-of-the-insurgency-in-pakistans-north-west-frontier-province-part-two-fata-excluding-north-and-south-waziristan/.

[12] Quandeel Siddique, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for Its Growth in Pakistan’s North-West, DIIS Report, 2010:12 (Kopenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2010), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125545/RP2010-12-Tehrik-e-Taliban_web.pdf.

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[14] C. Christine Fair, “Who’s Killing Pakistan’s Shia and Why?,” War on the Rocks, May 20, 2014, https://warontherocks.com/2014/05/whos-killing-pakistans-shia-and-why/.

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[28] “Historic Timeline | National Counterterrorism Center,” accessed April 7, 2023, https://www.dni.gov/nctc/timeline.html.

[29]Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, April 15, 2009, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/defining-the-punjabi-taliban-network/.

[30] Ibid.

[31] “Pakistani Taliban Leader Charged in Terrorism Conspiracy Resulting in Murder of Seven Americans in Afghanistan,” September 1, 2010, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pakistani-taliban-leader-charged-terrorism-conspiracy-resulting-murder-seven-americans.

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[34] Ajit Singh and Tushar Mohanty, “PAKISTAN: Sectarian Torments,” South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR), Vol. No. 9.9 (South Asia Terrorism Portal, September 6, 2010), https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/sair9/9_9.htm.

[35] “Pakistani Taliban Say Suicide Bombings Avenge Death Of Bin Laden,” accessed April 7, 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/suicide_bombing_kills_scores_in_pakistan/24099965.html.

[36] “Suicide Bombers Kill 78 Christians Outside Pakistani Church,” Reuters, September 23, 2013, sec. Top News, https://www.reuters.com/article/pakistan-peshawar-suicide-bomb-attack-idINDEE98L03020130923.

[37] “Pakistani Taliban Pick New Deputy after Drone Strike: Sources,” Reuters, May 30, 2013, sec. Emerging Markets, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-taliban-idUSBRE94T0BZ20130530.

[38] “U.S. Says Pakistani Taliban behind Bomb Attempt,” Reuters, May 9, 2010, sec. Editor’s Picks, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-timessquare-holder-idUSTRE6480ZZ20100509.

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[40] “FACTBOX: Pakistan Taliban Leader Hakimullah Mehsud,” Reuters, January 14, 2010, sec. Editor’s Picks, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-hakimullah-factbox-idUSTRE60D1HM20100114.

[41] “Profile: Hakimullah Mehsud,” accessed April 7, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/11/2/profile-hakimullah-mehsud.

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[44] “Taliban Chief Behind Pakistan School Massacre Promises More Attacks,” NBC News, January 6, 2015, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/pakistan-school-massacre/taliban-chief-behind-pakistan-school-massacre-promises-more-attacks-n280786.

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[53] Nizam Elahi, Terrorism in Pakistan: The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Challenge to Security (London New York: I.B. Tauris, 2019).

[54] Quandeel Siddique, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for Its Growth in Pakistan’s North-West, DIIS Report, 2010:12 (Kopenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2010). https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/104682/RP2010_12_Tehrik_e_Taliban_web.pdf

[55] United Nations Security Council. (2020). Twenty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities. S/2020/801. Retrieved from https://undocs.org/S/2020/801

[56] Quandeel Siddique, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for Its Growth in Pakistan’s North-West, DIIS Report, 2010:12 (Kopenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2010). https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/104682/RP2010_12_Tehrik_e_Taliban_web.pdf.

[57] Ibid.

[58] “TTP Extortion Rackets Return to Swat Valley after a Decade,” Express Pakistan News at Hapka.info - your window to Pakistan news, latest news, analysis and features from Pakistan, South Asia and the world, accessed April 4, 2023, https://hapka.info/archive/20221126/295181/ttp-extortion-rackets-return-to-swat-valley-after-a-decade/.

[59] “TTP Demands Rs8 Million in ‘extortion’ from KP Minister Atif Khan,” accessed April 4, 2023, https://www.geo.tv/latest/447199-senior-kp-minister-atif-khan-receives-rs8-million-extortion-letter-from-ttp.

[60] Combating Terrorism Center, “The Pakistani Taliban’s Karachi Network,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 23, 2013, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-pakistani-talibans-karachi-network/.

[61] Zia-Ur Rahman, “One Year Later, Pakistan’s Taliban Rule Hopes Put in Check,” August 10, 2022, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2022/08/mil-220810-voa02.htm.

[62] Quandeel Siddique, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for Its Growth in Pakistan’s North-West, DIIS Report, 2010:12 (Kopenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2010).

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid.

[67] “Search - Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),” accessed April 4, 2023, https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/index.php?option=com_customproperties&view=search&task=tag&tagId=347#operations.

[68] “Pakistan Militants Using Social Media for Propaganda,” The Economic Times, February 16, 2014, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/pakistan-militants-using-social-media-for-propaganda/articleshow/30521045.cms?from=mdr.

[69] Daud Khattak, “The Complicated Relationship between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban,” CTC Sentinel 5, no. 2 (2012), https://ctc.usma.edu/the-complicated-relationship-between-the-afghan-and-pakistani-taliban.

[70] “The Survivalist of North Waziristan: Hafiz Gul Bahadur Biography and Analysis,” Critical Threats, accessed April 7, 2023, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-survivalist-of-north-waziristan-hafiz-gul-bahadur-biography-and-analysis.

[71] “Mapping Militant Organisations,” Nazir Group (Stanford University, n.d.), https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/449?highlight=taliban.

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[74] Chris Harnisch, “Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad,” Critical Threats, accessed April 7, 2023, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/question-mark-of-south-waziristan-biography-and-analysis-of-maulvi-nazir-ahmad.

[75] “FACTBOX: Pakistan Taliban Leader Hakimullah Mehsud,” Reuters, January 14, 2010, sec. Editor’s Picks, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-hakimullah-factbox-idUSTRE60D1HM20100114

[76] “Factbox: Pakistani Taliban and al Qaeda | Reuters,” accessed April 7, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-taliban-factbox-idUSTRE6431I220100504.

[77] Sheikh, Mona Kanwal, Guardians of God: Inside the Religious Mind of the Pakistani Taliban (Delhi, 2016; online edn, Oxford Academic, 17 Nov. 2016), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199468249.001.0001

[78] Ibid.

[79] “Pakistani Taliban Leader Charged in Terrorism Conspiracy Resulting in Murder of Seven Americans in Afghanistan,” September 1, 2010, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pakistani-taliban-leader-charged-terrorism-conspiracy-resulting-murder-seven-americans.

[80] “U.S. Says Pakistani Taliban behind Bomb Attempt,” Reuters, May 9, 2010, sec. Editor’s Picks, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-timessquare-holder-idUSTRE6480ZZ20100509

[81] Amira Jadoon, “9DASHLINE — The Pakistani Taliban Is Reinventing Itself,” 9DASHLINE, October 28, 2021, https://www.9dashline.com/article/the-pakistani-taliban-is-reinventing-itself.

[82] Kristina Hummel, “Fixing the Cracks in the Pakistani Taliban’s Foundation: TTP’s Leadership Returns to the Mehsud Tribe,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, December 14, 2018, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fixing-cracks-pakistani-talibans-foundation-ttps-leadership-returns-mehsud-tribe/.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Sheikh, Mona Kanwal, Guardians of God: Inside the Religious Mind of the Pakistani Taliban (Delhi, 2016; online edn, Oxford Academic, 17 Nov. 2016), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199468249.001.0001

[85] Zahir Shah Sherazi, “Zarb-e-Azb Operation: 120 Suspected Militants Killed in N Waziristan,” DAWN.COM, 19:09:10+05:00, http://www.dawn.com/news/1112909.

[86] Amira Jadoon, “The Evolution and Potential Resurgence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” n.d., https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/sr_494-the_evolution_and_potential_resurgence_of_the_tehrik_i_taliban_pakistan.pdf.

[87] Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, “The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban,” CTC Sentinal 14, no. 04 (May 2021): 28–38. https://ctc.usma.edu/the-revival-of-the-pakistani-taliban/

[88] “Govt Cites Anti-Terror Operation as Model for Future Actions - Pakistan - DAWN.COM,” accessed April 7, 2023, https://www.dawn.com/news/1535945/govt-cites-anti-terror-operation-as-model-for-future-actions.

[89] “Noor Wali Mehsud,” Arab News, accessed April 7, 2023, https://www.arabnews.com/tags/noor-wali-mehsud.

[90] ACLED Database

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[92] “One Year Later, Pakistan’s Taliban Rule Hopes Put in Check,” accessed April 5, 2023, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2022/08/mil-220810-voa02.htm.

[93] Kristina Hummel, “Fixing the Cracks in the Pakistani Taliban’s Foundation: TTP’s Leadership Returns to the Mehsud Tribe,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, December 14, 2018, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/fixing-cracks-pakistani-talibans-foundation-ttps-leadership-returns-mehsud-tribe/

[94] “The Revival of the Pakistani Taliban – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,” accessed April 1, 2023, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-revival-of-the-pakistani-taliban/.

[95] “Tehrik Taliban-i Pakistan (TTiP) Pakistan Taliban,” accessed April 5, 2023, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ttp.htm.

[96] “Pakistan Hotel Bomb: Deadly Blast Hits Luxury Venue in Quetta,” BBC News, April 21, 2021, sec. Asia, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56834937.

[97] Frud Bezhan and Daud Khattak, “The Rise Of The New Pakistani Taliban,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 16:04:01Z, sec. Pakistan, https://www.rferl.org/a/the-rise-of-the-new-pakistani-taliban/31261608.html.

[98] Umair Jamal, “What Is the Significance of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s Latest Attack in Quetta?,” April 22, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/what-is-the-significance-of-tehreek-e-taliban-pakistans-latest-attack-in-quetta/.

[99] Frud Bezhan and Daud Khattak, “The Rise Of The New Pakistani Taliban,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 16:04:01Z, sec. Pakistan, https://www.rferl.org/a/the-rise-of-the-new-pakistani-taliban/31261608.html.

[100] United Nations Security Council. (2020). Twenty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities. S/2020/801. Retrieved from https://undocs.org/S/2020/801

[101] PTI, “Number of TTP Militants in Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region Range between 7,000 and 10,000: Pakistan Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah,” The Hindu, December 29, 2022, sec. World, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/number-of-ttp-militants-in-pakistan-afghanistan-border-region-range-between-7000-and-10000-pakistan-interior-minister-rana-sanaullah/article66316673.ece.

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(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)