Agenda for the next Quad Meeting

India is now attempting to form a revised schedule that would be fitting for all Quad members, unlike the previous dates [1].

President Biden’s Visit Cancellation:

Eric Garcetti, the US Ambassador to India, had earlier made a public announcement that India had extended an invitation to the US President to be the primary guest for the 26 January Republic Day celebrations. While the statement by Ambassador Garcetti did not explicitly associate it with the Quad Summit, India's External Affairs Minister announced in November that India would host a leaders' meeting "early next year" [2]. On the other hand, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s commitments for Australian National Day on January 26, the earliest he could have arrived in India would have been January 27, and with the Japanese Parliament in session at the time Prime Minister Fumio Kishida would have had to take a leave to attend the Quad Summit. However, officials were waiting for a confirmation on President Biden’s availability [3][4].

President Biden’s cancellation is also attributed to the alleged assassination plot of Khalistani separatist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun by Indian intelligence operatives as claimed by the US Department of Justice upon the arrest of an Indian national named Nikhil Gupta in Czechoslovakia [5]. This insinuation is being speculated as a possible strained relationship between the two countries due to the preceding diplomatic tussle between India and Canada over the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, another Khalistani separatist on Canadian soil allegedly by Indian authorities. However, a possible explanation for the decision from the American side could be the unlikelihood of planning a visit three months after the prior visit to India for the G20 Summit amidst upcoming US Presidential elections in November where President Biden will be contesting as the Democratic Party’s Presidential candidate [6].

Maintaining the Momentum:

Developments so far borne out of previous meetings like the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) in addition to the Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, and the Quad Investors Network (QUIN) point to the fact that member states have been wary of the impending issues that need to be tackled and are able to produce cooperative policies accordingly. Moreover, member states have not let their divergent positions on certain issues to interfere or disrupt with the priorities and discussion points of Quad [7].

While there are security undertones to the non-military issues that Quad seeks to champion in the Indo-Pacific, calling Quad grouping purely a military alliance, as was done with the Asian NATO comment, would be undermining its potential as a platform that can deliver cross-sectoral strategic results. Hence, it is imperative for the member states to build up on the previous developments and maintain the momentum that Quad has achieved as a valuable forum. Hence, when addressing matters of critical technologies, free trade, maritime security, free trade, climate and human assistance, and disaster relief, it is imperative for Quad members to form regional partnerships with countries that share the same objectives.

ASEAN- A Crucial and Delicate Regional Partnership:

The resurgence of Quad after a decade of functional halt in 2017, raised questions about its implications for ASEAN’s centrality, however, there has been an aversion from contention and an ‘openness’ to cooperate on issues of mutual interest. Participation of some ASEAN member states in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) negotiations indicates that if ASEAN is able to secure its strategic autonomy, it is willing to cooperate on matters of advantage [8]. This understanding was publicly showcased by Indonesian President Joko Widodo in an interview that ASEAN should view the Quad (and Aukus) as partners, and not competitors [9].

Quad’s engagement with ASEAN needs to be a delicate balance between mutual objectives like balancing China’s influence, ensuring the free flow of public goods, and maintaining ASEAN Centrality. Even though some ASEAN member states maintain friendlier relations with China, a Free and Open Indo-Pacific is a matter that all ASEAN member states and Quad agree upon [10]. In this regard, Quad’s approach of ensuring the free flow of goods by sea and India’s active regional engagement through its Act East Policy could allow the cooperative efforts to consolidate in light of Chinese assertiveness [11]. Moreover, it should also be wary of not attempting to expand membership to ASEAN members as it might negatively affect the possibilities of Quad-ASEAN cooperation on much larger issues in the future [12] and must also defer from anti-China rhetoric in its cooperation with ASEAN [13]. Thus, more areas need to be explored where Quad can deliver benefits on issues that do not hinder the regional dynamics and instead complement the ASEAN governance.

The critical and emerging technologies is one particular area where Quad can establish a trust-based cooperative effort at a flexible capacity. Mark Bryan Manantan suggests that undersea cables are crucial to the region and therefore an ASEAN-Quad working group on undersea cables should be established that could support ASEAN in areas of cyber-maritime security, maritime sustainability, and Infrastructure, and Investments [14]. Further through the IPMDA, Quad can forge partnerships by providing real-time maritime awareness to ASEAN nations who struggle with monitoring their seas [15].

A Potentially Flexible Approach with South Korea

The expansion of Quad’s official membership to other states that share the concerns and vision of Quad in the Indo-Pacific has long been discussed. While no official plans are being mentioned by any of the members, South Korea’s prospects should be explored as its vision and capacity could be a crucial driver for the Quad going forward.

While there was a reluctance from South Korea to openly embrace Quad when it was largely seen as an anti-China grouping, Quad’s shift to non-military issues has opened avenues for South Korea within Quad [16]. While President Yoon Suk Yeol administration's willingness to formally join the Quad faced hesitancy from the USA despite its enthusiastic support for Seoul's decision to join the Indo-Pacific Framework (IPEF), commentators are of the view that the unexpected response may have been motivated by a desire to avoid further alienating China, which could react strongly to South Korea's participation in the Quad, in addition to a potential Japanese resistance due to frayed bilateral ties with South Korea, which could detract from the overall goals of the four-way forum [17].

There is, nevertheless, room for South Korea to join the Quad, if not as a full-fledged member, then in some of the Quad's subsidiary initiatives. Given its expertise in coast guard-related activities and experience in Maritime Domain Awareness in the South China Sea, South Korea can play a pivotal role in the maritime component of Quad’s agenda. Furthermore, another prospective avenue for South Korean regional participation is the Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP), a new project aimed at cooperation in support of the Pacific Islands which was formed in response to the Solomon Islands' security pact with China [18]. Discussions around South Korea in the Quad are frequently derailed by an over-emphasis on formal membership without realizing that mutual benefits can be achieved through less formal involvement. The Quad is not a formal institution, as its members have frequently stated, and much of its benefits stem from its capacity to bring together like-minded countries for common aims and to accelerate action at the leaders' level. As a result, this type of adaptive engagement with partners is well suited to the current Quad structure where countries such as South Korea may choose the appropriate level and pathway of engagement based on their priorities [19].

UK’s Involvement:

There have also been certain developments that put the UK as a potential partner for Quad Plus. Admiral John C Aquilino, Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command hosted a meeting before the commencement of the Quad leaders’ meeting in Hiroshima in May 2023 which was attended by the top military commanders of Quad nations alongside a representative of the UK Chief of Defence Staff of the rank of Vice-Admiral. Given that an overt security arrangement already exists in the form of Aukus among the USA, Australia, and the UK, the presence of a UK Vice Admiral raised curiosity over the possible expansion of Quad in any manner [20].

For the UK, there is a strong imperative to get involved in the Indo-Pacific after its House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee released a report titled ‘Tilting Horizons: The Integrated Review and the Indo-Pacific’ which recognized the Chinese threat in the region for the UK suggesting that the UK would need to work alongside like-minded democratic partners to counter Chinese aggressive policies [21]. It is stated that Britain not only shares Quad's interests in a free economic order but has also built capacity across the region that allows it a strategic outreach. For instance, Britain's strategic links with regional states from the Persian Gulf to Oman and from Diego Garcia to Singapore imply that it already qualifies as an Indo-Pacific maritime power [22]. In this regard, similar to South Korea, the UK’s potential involvement with the Quad in any capacity should be explored in upcoming meetings.

Conclusion:

The Quad has seen some success in maintaining its relevance in the Indo-Pacific through multiple initiatives, but it is still at a nascent stage. While unilateral efforts from member states could bring some weight to the Quad’s existence, it would still require more partnerships and policy-oriented efforts from the Quad as a whole. In this context, the agenda upfront should be recognizing potential partners with whom cooperative efforts can be established in addition to bringing other like-minded countries, at least to the discussion table if not as official members, to take policy actions in relevant areas.

Endnotes:

1.       Joe Biden not coming to India for Republic Day, Quad meet postponed: Report, Business Today, 12 December 2023 https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/world/story/joe-biden-not-coming-to-india-for-republic-day-quad-meet-postponed-report-409154-2023-12-12

2.     Devirupa Mitra, Biden Won't Be the Republic Day Chief Guest, Scheduled Quad Summit in January Postponed, The Wire, 12 December 2023 https://thewire.in/diplomacy/biden-wont-be-the-republic-day-chief-guest-scheduled-quad-summit-in-january-postponed-officials

3.      Shubhajit Roy, US President Biden not coming for Republic Day, Quad set to be deferred, Indian Express, 13 December 2023 https://indianexpress.com/article/india/joe-biden-republic-day-celebrations-pm-narendra-modi-9065015/

4.     Suhasini Haidar, No U.S. President Joe Biden visit for Republic day, indicate officials, The Hindu, 12 December 2023 https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/quad-summit-in-delhi-not-to-be-held-in-january-2024/article67630303.ece

5.     Abhinav Singh, US President Joe Biden to not attend Republic Day celebrations in India; Quad meet postponed, WION, 12 December 2023 https://www.wionews.com/india-news/us-president-joe-biden-will-not-attend-republic-day-celebrations-in-india-668889

6.     Quad leaders’ India summit planned for January 2024 postponed indefinitely, Biden reportedly declines Republic Day invitation as chief guest, India Sentinels, 12 December 2023 https://www.indiasentinels.com/diplomacy/quad-leaders-india-summit-planned-for-january-2024-postponed-indefinitely-biden-reportedly-declines-republic-day-invitation-as-chief-guest-6061

7.     Titli Basu, The Quad needs to raise the game in the Indian Ocean, Raisina Debates, Observer Research Foundation. 01 June 2023 https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-quad-needs-to-raise-the-game-in-the-indian-ocean

8.     Gurjit Singh, QUAD and ASEAN, Raisina Debates, Observer Research Foundation, 15 June 2023 https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/quad-and-asean

9.     [Exclusive] Jokowi: Aim is to make Asean region stable [NSTTV], New Strait Times, 08 May 2023 https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2023/05/906846/exclusive-jokowi-aim-make-asean-region-stable-nsttv

10.  Manjari Chatterjee Miller, Cooperation Between ASEAN and the Quad is Critical for Indo-Pacific Stability, Council on Foreign Relations, 22 August 2023 https://www.cfr.org/blog/cooperation-between-asean-and-quad-critical-indo-pacific-stability

11.    Commodore Lalit Kapur (Retd.), Whither the Quad?, DPG Policy Brief, Delhi Policy Group, 14 June 2023 https://www.delhipolicygroup.org/publication/policy-briefs/whither-the-quad.html#_ftn28

12.   Premesha Saha, The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: Why ASEAN remains cautious, Issue Briefs, Observer Research Foundation, 20 August 2023 https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-quad-in-the-indo-pacific-why-asean-remains-cautious

13.   Gurjit Singh, QUAD and ASEAN, Raisina Debates, Observer Research Foundation, 15 June 2023 https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/quad-and-asean

14.  Mark Bryan Manantan, The ASEAN-Quad partnership in undersea cables: building inclusion, sustainability, and regional connectivity, National Security College, Australian National University, October 2023 https://nsc.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/nsc_crawford_anu_edu_au/2023-10/qtn_telecom_mark_bryan_manantan_the_asean-quad_partnership_in_undersea_cables_nsc.pdf

15.   Teesta Prakash and Gatra Priyandita, How the Quad can become more than an anti-China grouping, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 23 May 2023 https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-the-quad-can-become-more-than-an-anti-china-grouping/

16.  Garima Mohan, Bonnie S. Glaser and Kristi Govella, Expanding Engagement among South Korea and the Quad Countries in the Indo-Pacific, German Marshall Fund, 06 June 2022 https://www.gmfus.org/news/expanding-engagement-among-south-korea-and-quad-countries-indo-pacific

17.   Kang Seung-woo, Why doesn't US want to add South Korea to Quad?, The Korea Times, 26 May 2022 https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/01/113_329904.html

18.  Thomas Cynkin, Don’t call it a Quint, but South Korea does have a future with the Quad, Atlantic Council, 20 May 2023 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/dont-call-it-a-quint-but-south-korea-does-have-a-future-with-the-quad/

19.  Garima Mohan, Bonnie S. Glaser and Kristi Govella, Expanding Engagement among South Korea and the Quad Countries in the Indo-Pacific, German Marshall Fund, 06 June 2022 https://www.gmfus.org/news/expanding-engagement-among-south-korea-and-quad-countries-indo-pacific

20. Premesha Saha and Vivek Mishra, QUAD 3.0: A security-oriented reincarnation?, Raisina Debates, Observer Research Foundation, 08 June 2023 http://20.244.136.131/expert-speak/quad-3-0-a-security-oriented-reincarnation

21.   Ritu Sharma, UK Should Join QUAD, Expand AUKUS To Include South Korea & Japan To Counter China: British Report, The Eurasian Times, 02 September 2023 https://www.eurasiantimes.com/uk-should-join-quad-expand-aukus-to-include-south-korea-japan/

22. Prakash Nanda, Three Musketeers! UK, France & S.Korea To Expand The QUAD Alliance Amid Rising Chinese Threats?, The Eurasian Times, 27 May 2023 https://www.eurasiantimes.com/uk-france-s-korea-could-expand-the-quad-alliance/

Pic Courtsey-Pankaj Jha

(The views expressed are thsoe fo the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)