Turkey’s Geopolitical Ambitions: The Role of Turkic Council

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Turkey was one the first nations to acknowledge the newly independent countries of Central Asia. Furthermore, Turkey shares a rich history with the countries around the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus. Owing to the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, modern Turkey remains favourable to the expand its economic and cultural horizons to include Central Asia. Nevertheless, it is only at the end of the first decade of the 21^st century that it was able to institutionalise its multi-lateral linkages with other Turkic countries. For Turkey, its close cultural ties alone were not able to bring out a concrete united body of the Turkic-speaking states, it was only later that more pragmatic policies including political and economic ones were introduced. Formed in 2009, the Turkic Council consists of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan which joined much later in 2018. The member states had entered into what is called the Nakhchivan Agreement. The region’s geopolitical significance and its strategic relevance have remained vital for great powers over the years. Turkey’s position as the linkage between Europe and Asia also serves as an incentive for the landlocked region of Central Asia. Geopolitics aided by Turkey’s ambition for political power garners a lot of interest to look at the developments of this body.

There are three possible reasons to understand why the Turkic Council is important for Turkey’s geopolitical ambitions, they are, economic, political, and ideological. From an economic point of view, Turkey has been a strong economic power in the Eurasian region. Its adoption of the neo-liberal market reforms has served as a model for the newly formed states once part of the erstwhile USSR. The large number of markets that have opened up provide a potential revenue creator for the Turkish economy. Due to the advantage of its location, Turkey also remains essential for the Central Asian economies to work with Europe and vice versa. China’s BRI serves as an added advantage for Turkey to cooperate with actors involved in the massive project that would include large infrastructure building and trade flexibility in the Central Asian region. On the other hand, it is also trying to be less dependent on Russia, a good example of which is the replacement of Azerbaijan as its main gas supplier. The BTC(Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) and the TANAP(Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline) are some of the valuable contributions which have been championed by Turkey. There are about 400 to 600 Turkish companies in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan but most of the Turkish companies are in the construction sector. However, it is to be noted that its trade volumes fall surprisingly short vis-à-vis these two states, a reminder that the Turkish economy is still smaller compared to other powerful actors like Russia and China. Also, its deteriorating ties with Europe is a major area of concern for economists who already have a negative opinion of Turkey’s economy.  

Secondly, Turkey’s political significance around the Caspian Sea and Central Asia remain vital to the heavily contested region. There is little disagreement that the area has historically remained a sphere of influence for both Turkey and Russia. As is evident in contemporary times, both these powers have been joined by China which may prove to be a possible adversary in the near future. China’s expansionary policies and economic aid to the region pose a serious threat to what is still considered as “Russia’s backyard.” Given the fact that Turkey is the largest member of NATO in Eurasia has both positive and negative sides. Positive because Turkey can prove to be a mediator for Central Asian states such as Kazakhstan to improve their hold on NATO which already has opened channels for better cooperation with the region. As NATO aims to reach out to the strategically important region, Turkey’s role will remain crucial. It also has its negative effects because these countries have remained suspicious of Western hegemony and have tried to secure themselves by aligning with Russia. Owing to Turkey’s allegiance, these states find it difficult to fully engage with the old friend of the Western bloc. Nevertheless, Turkey’s most recent ties with the US has been characterized by the US sanctions sending out a very different message. President Erdogan’s strong criticism of the West and his resistance towards bodies like the EU can be a major cause for Turkey to build a better political ecosystem in Central Asia. Hungary which has been an observer state of the Council has developed a strong mutual interest with Turkey in politically attacking the EU. Moreover, its[Turkey’s] involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh and a show of support for Azerbaijan has not gone unnoticed. Security concerns in Central Asia have remained a real thing as Russia has been actively involved in mobilizing the Russian communities living in these states. Furthermore, after the conflicts in Crimea and Georgia, it is less doubtful that Russia would not be carrying out its expansionist policies. A move towards a Turkic alliance only seems viable considering the uncertainties related to the future of the region. Although there is greater collaboration between Erdogan and Putin thanks to their revivalist ideas, the Turkish president has actively sorted for friends in Central Asia. A good example of this is Uzbekistan joining the Turkic Council after Shavkat Mirziyoyev became President in 2016. The Turkic Council seems to be a middle path for Turkey which has strained its relations with the US while also maintaining a distance from its long-standing adversary- Russia. Turkey’s relative military capabilities vis-à-vis Russia and the US are far from equal, therefore, the Turkic Council is understandably a good start for Turkey to increase both strategic and political engagement with fellow Turkic-speaking countries.

The third and final reason may be Turkey’s strong affiliation with Political Islam. After becoming the President, Erdogan is seen to have encouraged Islamic revivalism along with an attempt to create a Turkish model of Political Islam. Like its counter-parts Iran and Saudi Arabia, Turkey under Erdogan has appealed for a transnational Muslim identity that would appeal for political actions and international solidarity. But unlike Iran and Saudi, Turkey’s approach remains moderate which is why most of the Turkic-speaking countries do not seem to be threatened by these ideas. Due to its relatively modern and democratic approach to Islam, Turkey has not been welcoming of militancy and neither has it spread to Central Asia after Cold War. Its affiliation to Islamic cultural identity has been adopted using institutional mechanisms like the Turkic Council which has been active in developing multi-lateral organisations to carry out a rather unique and inclusive form of Political Islam. Turkey has also encouraged the use of Latin script instead of Cyrillic for greater flexibility in the exchange of culture and ideas. It is, however concerning since Erdogan has posited himself as a “neo-ottoman” and his party the AKP remains fundamentally an Islamic party.  His decision to turn Hagia Sophia into a mosque is one of the many symbolic moves that reflect on his standpoint. Therefore, it can hardly be ruled out that Turkey eyes towards its Turkic-speaking neighbours who are overwhelmingly Muslim as it goes on to establish its version of Political Islam by establishing Turkey as its hub.

In conclusion, there might be various contributing factors to Turkey’s ambitions, but what is essential is its inclination to empower a body like the Turkic Council. A powerful actor like Turkey can move against a Great Power even if it has limited means to do so, but from an international relations perspective, it has to look for allies and potential actors that would help build its economy as well as security. For now, it seems Turkey’s safest option is to form an alliance independent of any Great Power. A coalition of states that have demographic, cultural and linguistic similarities seems like an apt move on Turkey’s part. All that said, religion can also prove to be a major force to bring these countries together. Erdogan’s populist policies and strong consolidation of power only prove that Turkey might be trying to move away from its natural label of being a modern-liberal and democratic state. But the road towards achieving such goals is not easy as Russia and China plan to counter the US dominance. The Turkic-speaking states of Central Asia play a vital part in this imagination. For now, it seems Turkey still needs a formidable ally to secure its interest in the process of avoiding a sandwich like situation in the Great Power rivalry.   

Notes   

1. Balci, Bayram, and Thomas Liles. 2018. “Turkey’s Comeback to Central Asia.” Insight Turkey 20 (4): 11-26. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26542170.
2. Fida, Zeeshan. 2018. “Central Asia's Place in Turkey's Foreign Policy.” Policy Perspectives 133-125.
3. Hashimova, Umida. 2021. “Turkic Council Sets Sights on Upgrade Rooted in Economic Connectivity Projects.” The Diplomat, 12 April. https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/turkic-council-sets-sights-on-upgrade-rooted-in-economic-connectivity-projects/.
4. Laws, Lawrence Cenk. n.d. Turkey: The Key To NATO's Expansion And Ensuring Eurasian Security. https://www.turkheritage.org/en/publications/analysis-by-tho-contributors-and-liaisons/turkey-the-key-to-natos-expansion-and-ensuring-eurasian-security--9617.
5. Lynch, Ian J. 2019. 16 October. https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-central-asia/turkic-council-presents-new-opportunities-turkey.
6. Resul, Ali. 2015. “: Changing World Politics, Peace And Order in Central Asia and the Caucasus, And The Role Of Turkic Council.” http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep05095.15.
7. Tashijan, Yeghia. 2021. “Turkey’s Pivot in Central Asia: A Calculated Risk?” The Armenian Weekly, 17 February. https://armenianweekly.com/2021/02/17/turkeys-pivot-in-central-asia-a-calculated-risk/.

Pic Courtesy- Adli Wahid at unspalsh.com

(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent view of CESCUBE.)