The Conundrum of Definitions in the War on Terror
States have been the most essential unit since the Treaty of Westphalia. The world has seen the entry of many new actors, but the state remains the most fundamental unit in international relations. The 9/11 attacks represent a major shift in the way people think of military, combat, international relations and foreign policy. Even though 9/11 has announced the strength of Violent Non-state actors to the entire world, violent non-state actors haven’t been new to the world. Although the reasons of motivation for the individual organisations have changed, the tactics and techniques remain similar.
“The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism” defines a wave as a cycle that takes place over a 40-year time period. Each cycle is dynamic in that it expands and contracts. Groups within a wave adapt to the exigencies of their time, are aware of the actions of other contemporary terrorist groups in other countries and are driven by a relentless energy that propels them into violent action. They share a common technological facility, including communications, weaponry, and logistics. Most important, they share a vision that perceives in the ills and abuses of the world the seeds of a revolutionary future.[1]
As David Rapport shows that each wave from the Anarchist wave to the Religious wave have used tactics similar to their contemporary terrorist groups. Terrorism isn’t itself a new phenomenon and has morphed multiple times since it was first popularised during the French Revolution. The tactics post World-War II changed spectacularly and have drawn more attention than ever before, although 9/11 is a watershed moment in the realm of international relations, Non-state violent actors themselves aren’t new. They just became more pronounced and were taken more seriously after the most spectacular attack the world has even seen.
Post 9/11, the question of unlawful combatants was the most complex question and remains so. Even though it has been more than 18 years since 9/11, the problem hasn’t yet been solved. The incidents of Abu Ghraib brought forth this question into public light. There have been no major legislative changes in International Law. The Taliban fighters though a part of an illegitimate government were granted Prisoner of War status according to the Geneva Convention. The question of legal rights or imprisonment of stateless terrorists wasn’t yet resolved.
Terrorist acts can be subdivided into two groups: those sponsored by states and those sponsored by private groups. Private citizens, including terrorists, have no claim to the benefits of protection guaranteed soldiers under Geneva Convention II. Under Geneva Convention III, attacks must avoid civilians and non-military targets by all means possible. Terrorist acts violate that principle. Article 4 requires that to qualify for protection as lawful combatants, irregular troops must: (a) be commanded by a responsible person; (b) wear a fixed emblem; (c) carry arms openly; and d) comply with the laws of war. Terrorists do not fulfil items (b), (c), and (d), because they rely on their civilian cover to conceal their intent to use force, and because they use force against civilians in a way proscribed under the customary laws of war, especially those codified under Geneva Convention IV.[2]
The degree of importance of Non-Violent state Actors once more morphed and had taken a very unexpected turn on 29 June, 2014 in the form of Islamic State.[3] The world is still perplexed about the question in means of handling violent non-state actors never expected such a drastic change in international relations. Although 9/11 announced new actors on the world stage which were no longer to be avoided as mere anomalies which occurred rarely to be seriously considered as a major actor on the world state, there was no consensus with the basic questions and legalities of what “terrorism” is. Major countries in the “War on Terror” didn’t yet have a comprehensive strategy to deal with individual terrorists, radicalisation, detaining, imprisonment and many such nuances.
Fall of ISIS
The continuous push of US-led allied forces started making strides beginning with the ousting of IS forces from its site of declaration of the Caliphate by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. As the push from the US-led forces started continued. On March 23, 2019, Islamic State lost its final stronghold in Baghouz, Syria bringing an end to the so-called Caliphate. As the Islamic State began falling, there were multiple stories people escaping from ISIS held territories due to continuous US bombing. This later was culminated by the killing of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi last year[4] and leading to de-centralization of the ISIS and the return of foreign ISIS recruits back to their home countries. The accounts of such people fleeing revealed the structure of how the Islamic State worked.
The population was divided into civilians and combatants. The fighters formed the leadership of the Islamic State whereas the civilians were similar to the citizens of modern states. It revealed that civilians who fled from their home countries into Islamic State believed that they would be able to practice their religion and have better lives than the ones they led back home. A new category of brainwashed civilian women began showing up in the refugee camps called “ISIS brides”.
ISIS Brides
Shamima Begum, one of the most well-known ISIS Bride is set to return to the United Kingdom and to fight her citizenship case in the Court and has also been legal aid. She joined ISIS at the age of 15 and later had a child in ISIS territory. This brings in new questions such as the status of her revoked citizenship. [5]
Women of the “Caliphate” are widely expected to be wives, mothers and homemakers under the Islamic State. Some took more powerful roles and in 2014, the all-female “al-khansaa” brigade was formed.[6] This unit acted as moral police to keep other women in check. They tortured women who spoke ill of ISIS and imprisoned them.[7] Al-Khansaa brigade enforcers were almost entirely foreign, British in particular.[8] This fact must be taken seriously as the these were the women who left their native countries so that they could marry an IS fighter, begin a family and practice Islam in its most lethal version. Although some women have publicly spoken against ISIS post their supposed liberation, the rational question remains that can they be trusted. Many have wanted to abandon the Islamic State not due to their fundamental differences with the philosophy of Islamic State but rather because of fear of personal safety for them and their children.
There is always a chance of making an error by not treating such women individually but as a general category. There are several factors to be considered before a verdict. Age, society, motives of performing hijra (moving to Islamic State). It must be noted that women have played vital roles in Islamic terrorism before and having children is not deterrent for violent action. This is not a scientifically grounded fact. For example, in the case of 25 August 2003 Mumbai bombings which were preceded by multiple low intensity blasts orchestrated by the so-called Gujarat Revenge Force, one of the chief co-conspirators, Fahmida Syed was mother of two daughters. She wasn’t coerced in any manner by her spouse but indeed encouraged him to go violent in order to avenge the Gujarat killings.[9]
About Fahmida, Judge Puranik noted, ‘… participation of accused no.3 [Fahmida] in causing the bomb blast was not the result of her helplessness on account of her husband but it was here well-designed action with free will. Since the accused persons are bloodthirsty, therefore there is no scope for their reformation and rehabilitation. They shall be hanged by the neck till they are dead.’[10]
In contrast there is the case of Lina, a German born brought up in Lebanon and married to a abusive husband when she was fourteen years. Lina moved to Germany with her husband and his parents and led a life of abuse and servitude until she ran away from them. She eventually moved to the Islamic State with a new husband and wishing that she can practice her religion without any ostracisation which was so prevalent in Germany. She later on tried moving away from ISIS held territory in fear of her safety and a son she bore with an ISIS fighter. [11]
The probability of someone going towards violent means is not easily known until they do go violent. This is a paradox which has plagued counter terrorist practitioners since 9/11. Though Lina and Fahmida may have found solace in Islam, they are two very different people. It is much better to see the individual cases under a comprehensive terrorism law and then prosecute individuals void of factors of gender and age.
Non-combatants in ISIS held territory
It is better to see women who were not in the fighting force as non-combatants. This raises the question of whether they have provided logistical, financial and material support to the Islamic State. If so, must they be tried under laws which cover these offences. It must be noted that Islamic State had comprehensive taxation system which minted upto $360 million. This number is a significant one especially for a terrorist organization.
Some of these taxes are like normal state taxes; others are religious taxes (involving fines and penalties for not following IS extremist social and political codes) or extortion. Reportedly, IS imposed a 10% income tax, 10-15% tax on business revenues, 2% Value Additional Tax (VAT) as well as road and customs tolls for vehicles crossing IS-held territory and taxes for smuggling drugs and weapons. IS also levies ?departure taxes of up to US$1,000 from those able to pay to leave ISIS territory.[12]
There is also the question of citizenship for the children born in ISIS territory. The question whether they be granted citizenship by the place of birth or mother’s native country can only be resolved through a multilateral dialogue among the respective nations.
Conclusion
The 9/11 attacks caused a major shift in the importance of Non-State actors. The lack of a comprehensive legal framework internationally or multilaterally is one of the major reasons for such ambiguities such as role of non-combatants, material support, intent to radicalise individuals to commit violence. Now, more than ever is the need to define terrorism in order to establish a legal framework which can used as a model to combat transnational terrorism. The world has to be proactive in terms of combating terrorism and needs to address this definitional question at least now.
The laws and regulations enacted to provide security forces with an instrument for combating terrorism. A definition of terrorism is necessary when legislating laws designed to ban terrorism and assistance to terrorism, as well as when setting minimum sentences for terrorists or confiscating their financial resources and supplies. Barring an accepted definition, this legislation has no value. Legislation and punishment must distinguish terrorism from ordinary crime, even when they might actually be identical in practice. The need for a separate legislation and punishment for terrorism stems from the enormous danger that terrorism, due to its political dimension, as opposed to crime, poses to society and its values, to the government in power, and to the public at large.[13]
Picture Courtesy-Levi Clancy at unsplash.com
(Hussainpur Sai Charan is post graduate student of JSIA, O P Jindal University. He is Research intern with CESCUbE. The views expressed are personal.)
[1] Jeffrey Kaplan, “Four Waves of Terrorism”, Oxford Research Encyclopaedias, November 2016. https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-24
[2] Manooher Mofidi, Amy E. Eckert, “Unlawful Combatants or Prisoners of War: The Law and Politics of Labels”, Cornell International Law Journal, Volume 36 Issue 1 (Spring 2003), 74.
[3] ISIS Spokesman Declares Caliphate, Rebrands Group as “Islamic State”, SITE Intelligence Group, June 29,2014. https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/isis-spokesman-declares-caliphate-rebrands-group-as-islamic-state.html
[4] Maegan Vazquez, Zachary Cohen and Kevin Liptak. “President Trump: ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is dead”. CNN. October 27, 2019
[5] Doimnic Casciani, “Shamima Begum: IS bride set to be granted legal aid”. BBC News. 15 April, 2019
[6] Iman, “IS wives: Why I joined the 'caliphate' in Raqqa”. BBC News. 26 July, 2017.
[7] Khadiya al-Omary, “IS wives: Why I joined the 'caliphate' in Raqqa”. BBC News. 26 July, 2017.
[8] Abu Ibrahim a-Raqawi,” How the Islamic State uses women to control women,”interview by Ghardinia Ashour, Syria Direct, March 25, 2015.
[9] S.Hussain Zaidi and Brijesh Singh, Dangerous Minds(Gurgaon: Penguin Random House India,2017),96.
[10] Judgement in special court constituted for Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) in the Gateway blasts: State of Maharastra vs Sayyed Mohd. Hanif Abdul Rahim, POTA special case no.1 of 2004, 27/07/2009 and 06/08/2009.
[11] Azadeh Moaveni, Guest House for Young Widows, Among the women of ISIS (New York: Random House, 2019)
[12] Patrick Blannin , “Islamic State’s Financing: Sources, Methods and Utilisation”, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses , Vol. 9, No. 5 (May 2017), pp. 13-22
[13] Boaz Ganor, “Defining Terrorism - Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?”, International Institute of Counter-Terrorism, https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1123/Defining-Terrorism-Is-One-Mans-Terrorist-Another-Mans-Freedom-Fighter#gsc.tab=0 (January 1, 2010)
